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On 23 April 1964, five months after assuming the office of President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson launched the "More Flags" program as United States policy. While the publicly stated purpose of.the "More Flags" program was to obtain as much non-military free world aid for the Republic of Vietnam as possible, the program's principle goal centered around Lyndon Johnson's desire to obtain an international consensus for America's policies toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The "More Flags" program continued to serve both goals for the remainder of Johnson's presidency. Although started with high expectations of success, the "More Flags" program never succeeded in achieving the levels of international cooperation Lyndon Johnson desired. In fact, the program's significant lack of success necessitated a number of changes, during the program's first year, in both its stated goals and in the methods used to prosecute it's implementation. The most important of these changes would be Washington's use of the program's beneficent objectives to mask it's use as the means through which the United States would purchase mercenary troops to fight in South Vietnam. "Mercenaries in Service to America: The 'More Flags' Foreign Policy of the United States," presents the available history of the "More Flags" program during the years of the Johnson Presidency, with an emphasis on the documentation of the program's use as a disguise for America's obtaining mercenary forces from the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. The non-mercenary troop contributions from Australia and New Zealand are likewise examined. The majority of documentary evidence comes from the original sources documents in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald Mrozek / Both Presidents Johnson and Nixon used the ideology of military containment of Communism to justify U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. Until 1968, opponents of this intervention attacked the ideology of containment or its application to Vietnam. In 1968, opponents of the war switched tactics and began to focus instead on the President’s credibility. These arguments quickly became the dominant critique of the war through its end and were ultimately successful in ending it. The Gulf of Tonkin incident and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution were central to the change of opposition strategy in 1968. For Johnson, the Gulf of Tonkin incident had provided the political impetus to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which the administration used as an insurance policy against Congressional dissent. For Congressional dissenters in 1968, inconsistencies in Johnson’s version of the Gulf of Tonkin incident allowed them to undermine the Resolution as a weapon against Congress. For the American people, revelations about the administration’s dishonesty during the incident simply added to grave doubts that Americans already had about Johnson’s credibility; the American people lost confidence in Johnson, ending his Presidency. The dramatic success of this new strategy—attacking the administration’s credibility—encouraged other opponents to follow suit, permanently altering the framework of debate over the war. This change in opposition strategy in 1968 had a number of important consequences. First, this change in rhetoric ultimately ended the war. To sustain his credibility against relentless attack, President Nixon repeatedly withdrew troops to prove to the American people he was ending the war. Nixon ran out of troops to withdraw and had to accept an unfavorable peace. Second, after the war, this framework for debate of military interventions established—between advocates using the ideology of containment and opponents attacking the administration’s credibility—would reemerge nearly every time an administration contemplated military intervention through the end of the Cold War. Finally, because opponents of military intervention stopped challenging containment in 1968, the American public continued to accept the precepts of containment and the Cold War consensus survived until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The struggle between the President and the Congress over the power to control the use of military force is an enduring dimension of U.S. foreign policy. In the 20th century Arthur Schlesinger labeled the growth of Presidential war power the “Imperial Presidency.” While some scholars have attempted to explain the expansion of Presidential power based on the Cold War or nuclear weapons, there has been little work studying the link between America’s ascending role in international legal frameworks and this domestic legal transformation. In this dissertation, I argue that America’s participation in international legal frameworks, such as the United Nations and NATO, has been a central factor in enabling the growth of Presidential war power. These international frameworks allow the President to circumvent Congress and to assert that the use of military force was something other than a ‘war’ that would need Congressional authorization. In case studies of pre-WWII aid to Great Britain, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, I demonstrate how the rise of executive war power relied on America’s growing participation in international legal frameworks. The dissertation contributes to the nexus of International Relations and Constitutional scholarship. It offers a unique interpretation of Presidential war power while also offering new insights on the nature of the United States’ relationship with international legal frameworks. I argue that participation in international legal frameworks has been ‘democracy-undermining’ as the President utilizes those frameworks to circumvent the Constitution’s restrictions on Presidential war power.

Le mémoire historiographique qui suit a comme sujet principal l’étude de l’évolution des perceptions françaises sur l’implication américaine au Vietnam. Nous nous sommes basés sur l’historiographie de deux périodes distinctes, soit celles des années 1960-1970 et 1990-2000. L’objectif était de voir s’il y a eu une transformation du regard que portent les auteurs sur l’implication américaine et, si oui, quelles en sont les causes. Le travail est construit de façon thématique et se divise en trois chapitres. Le premier aborde le choix et l’ampleur des armes utilisées, le second se penche sur la notion du communisme et de la démocratie, et le dernier traite de la conception de l’impérialisme et du colonialisme. Pour tous les thèmes examinés, nous résumons la perception qui ressort de chacun des auteurs afin de comparer les tendances idéologiques propres aux deux périodes étudiées. Nous conclurons qu’il s’est effectivement produit une importante transformation des perceptions. Cette transformation se traduit par une approche de moins en moins critique envers l’implication américaine au Vietnam. Dans chaque chapitre, nous avons pu soulever des causes de changement propres au sujet abordé. Toutefois, une tendance générale et sous-jacente se dégage et s’avère des plus révélatrices, soit le glissement en France des valeurs politiques et morales de la gauche vers la droite, doublé d’un rapprochement idéologique avec les États-Unis. / The main topic of this historiographical thesis is the evolution of French perceptions on American involvement in Vietnam. We based our study on the historiography of two distinctive periods, those spanning from 1960-1970 and 1990-2000. The aim was to see whether there has been a real transformation in writers’ views on American involvement and, if so, what were the causes. The work is constructed thematically and is divided into three chapters. The first addresses the choices and the magnitude of the weapons used, the second examines the concept of communism and democracy, and the third deals with the notion of imperialism and colonialism. For all themes analyzed, we summarized the perception that emerges from each of the authors in order to compare the ideological tendencies of the two specific periods. We have concluded that there has indeed been a significant transformation of perceptions. This transformation has resulted in a less critical attitude towards American involvement in Vietnam. In each chapter, we have been able to observe specific causes of change. However, an underlying tendency emerges and is more revealing, namely the drift of France’s political and moral values from left to right, coupled with an ideological reconciliation with the United States.

This study examines how the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP) assisted American war resisters who came to Canada in response to the Vietnam War. It illustrates how the TADP responded to political decisions in Canada and in the United States and adapted its strategies to meet the changing needs of war resisters who fled to Canada. The main sources of material used for this research were the TADP’s archival records, newspaper accounts and secondary literature. This study traces the organization’s origins in the Canadian New Left before looking at how TADP released the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada; a document that advised war resisters on how to successfully prepare for immigration. It will also explore how TADP provided immigration counselling, employment, housing services and emotional support to American war resisters. Some of the organization’s principal actors and its relationship with other Canadian aid organizations are also examined. As the number of draft resisters coming to Canada decreased during the war, the number of military resisters entering the country increased. This shift led to a change in the type of counselling the TADP provided, a reorientation that is also discussed here. As well, the unexpected numbers of African-Americans and women resisters who crossed the border presented a unique set of challenges to the TADP. Finally, this thesis examines the TADP’s attempts to aid American war resisters in Sweden, spread the word about the Canadian government’s liberalized immigration regulations in 1973, and address the issue of amnesty for resisters in America.

Vietnams krig från 1945 till 1975 är en historia om hur kommunisterna och Nordvietnam med stödav Kina och Sovjetunionen besegrar kolonialmakten Frankrike och stormakten USA och etablerarkommunistisk regim. Under krigen var det två händelser som allvarligt skadade Nordvietnamsmotståndare; Dien Bien Phu 1954 och Tet-offensiven 1968.Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka vilka asymmetriska metoder som revolutionär krigföringinnehåller och hur dessa metoder, mer eller mindre omedvetet, har använts av Nordvietnam 1954och 1968. Som teoretisk utgångspunkt används Beaufres teori om indirekt strategi, dels för attfinna förklaringar till det asymmetriska karaktären och dels för att pröva Beaufres teori somförklaringsmodell. Arbetsmetoden har varit kvalitativ innehållsanalys och uppsatsen är ihuvudsak disponerad enligt kronologisk respektive tematisk ordning.Undersökningen visar att Frankrike och USA/Sydvietnam kontra de vietnamesiska kommunisternahade en diametralt motsatt syn på tid, operativt djup och mänskliga offer och därför praktiseradekontrahenterna vitt skilda operationskonster vilket utgjorde grunden för ett asymmetrisktförhållande. / The Vietnam wars from 1945 to 1975 tell the story of how the communists and North Vietnam,with the support of China and the Soviet union, defeat the colonial power France and the superpower US and establish a communist regime. There were two episodes that seriously damagedNorth Vietnam´s enemies; Dien Bien Phu 1954 and the Tet offensive 1968.The object of the thesis is to investigate the asymmetric methods used in revolutionary warfareand how these methods, more or less consciously, were used by North Vietnam in 1954 and 1968.Beaufre´s theory about indirect strategy is used a theoretical starting point, partly to findexplanations to the asymmetric nature and partly to evaluate the value of Beaufre’s theory as anexplanatory model. The method used has been a qualitative analysis of content and the thesis ismainly disposed in a chronological and thematic order.The thesis shows that France and the US/South Vietnam versus the Vietnamese communists haddiametrical opposing perceptions of time, operative depth and human sacrifices, which led thecontracting parties to use widely different conduct of military operations that formed the basis foran asymmetric relationship. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-uppsHylla: Upps. ChP 02-04

This study examines how the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme (TADP) assisted American war resisters who came to Canada in response to the Vietnam War. It illustrates how the TADP responded to political decisions in Canada and in the United States and adapted its strategies to meet the changing needs of war resisters who fled to Canada. The main sources of material used for this research were the TADP’s archival records, newspaper accounts and secondary literature. This study traces the organization’s origins in the Canadian New Left before looking at how TADP released the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada; a document that advised war resisters on how to successfully prepare for immigration. It will also explore how TADP provided immigration counselling, employment, housing services and emotional support to American war resisters. Some of the organization’s principal actors and its relationship with other Canadian aid organizations are also examined. As the number of draft resisters coming to Canada decreased during the war, the number of military resisters entering the country increased. This shift led to a change in the type of counselling the TADP provided, a reorientation that is also discussed here. As well, the unexpected numbers of African-Americans and women resisters who crossed the border presented a unique set of challenges to the TADP. Finally, this thesis examines the TADP’s attempts to aid American war resisters in Sweden, spread the word about the Canadian government’s liberalized immigration regulations in 1973, and address the issue of amnesty for resisters in America.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2009. / Adviser: Terri Fine. Includes bibliographical references (p. 120-123).

Combat veterans often return from war with psychological as well as physical injuries. Armed service members who are bodily injured routinely go to hospitals for treatment, first at military hospitals and later in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) system. But those with psychological injuries like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) often go years, if not a lifetime, without treatment, in large part because the VA denies their claims with dubious justification. Veterans’ service organizations like the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), the American Legion, and others, as well as state and county governments, have knowledgeable service officers whose job is to help guide veterans through the VA system and through the many appeals that are often needed to get treatment and an adequate disability rating that could result in monetary payments. This report tells the story of one VFW post in Burnet, Texas, its veterans, their families, and how their success in getting treatment for PTSD has positively affected their lives. It has also enabled them, as they recover, to help other veterans seek treatment and win compensatory disability ratings too. The report focuses on one Vietnam veteran, who four decades after his discharge from the Army came to be treated for PTSD. / text