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Dreams play an important role in consciousness studies, because of their ubiquitous presence but ambiguous nature. Dreams can be divided into two categories: non-lucid dreams and lucid dreams (i.e., dreams in which the dreamer knows he is dreaming). Lucid dreams are experiences with features of both waking and dreaming consciousness. In this essay, I review the differences in neural correlates between non-lucid dreams and lucid dreams. While both types of dreams share similar neural substrates, lucid dreams are especially accompanied by more activation in prefrontal areas. These areas are known to be involved in functions of secondary consciousness such as metacognition and volition. These findings are also echoed by verbal reports from lucid dreams. While the relationship metacognition and volition and lucid dreams is not yet fully clear, it seems that increased activation of metacognition and volition cause the dreamer to realize he is dreaming. Based on previous literature, I offer a conceptualization of dreams, in which a continuous variable, lucidity, can measure the degree to which metacognition and volition vary across dream types. I suggest that the transition between non-lucid and lucid dreams is a two-step process. The implications of this are discussed.

Syftet med studien var att bidra med ny kunskap inom forskningsfältet teknik i förskolan genom att studera förskollärares och barns volition i bygg- och konstruktionslek för att för att se hur tekniskt kunnande delas mellan barn. Tre frågeställningar har väglett undersökningen: (1)Vad kännetecknar förskollärares och barns volition att bygga och konstru-era? (2) Hur utforskar barn teknik i och genom konstruktionerna? (3) Hur uttrycks och delas teknikkunskap mellan barn? Studien utgår dels från ett teknikfilosofiskt perspektiv, utvecklat av Mitcham och dels uti-från variationsteorins antagande om urskiljning, simultanitet och variat-ion för att utveckla lärandet. I studien har barns volition (viljeakt) stu-derats när de identifierar, bygger och förbättrar tekniska konstruktioner och hur förskollärarna stödjer deras tekniklärande. Data består av vi-deoobservationer och fältanteckningar från fyra olika konstruktionsak-tiviteter. En slutsats som kan dras utifrån studiens resultat är att det finns en koppling mellan teknisk kunskap och volition. Med ökade tek-nikkunskaper ökade barnens volition att delta i aktiviteterna och ut-veckla konstruktionerna. Studiens resultat visar att det är centralt att barn och förskollärare riktar sin uppmärksamhet mot ett gemensamt lä-randeobjekt i byggaktiviteten för att tekniklärande ska ske. Förskollä-rarnas aktiva deltagande är betydelsefullt för barns tekniklärande för att kunna urskilja nya aspekter av lärandeobjektet. De redovisade resultaten visar på ett flertal teknikaspekter som ges tillfälle att utforska i bygg- och konstruktionslek. Centrala tekniska begrepp bearbetas och barnen får erfarenheter av hur material och redskap kan användas för att skapa olika konstruktioner. Det ger också tillfälle till samarbete och att dela kunskap med varandra.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(医学) / 甲第20805号 / 医博第4305号 / 新制||医||1025(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院医学研究科医学専攻 / (主査)教授 高橋 淳, 教授 古川 壽亮, 教授 小杉 眞司 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Medical Science / Kyoto University / DFAM

While dreaming, one lacks the understanding that what is experienced is self-generated hallucinatory contents of consciousness. However, during dreaming there is a rare state called lucid dreaming. The minimal requirement for a dream to be considered lucid is that one is self-aware that one is currently sleeping. If self-awareness is the minimal criterion for lucid dreaming, that would entail the activation of those brain areas and networks typically related to self-referential processing. Further, lucid dreaming often entails the ability to exert volition over dream content. This thesis is a systematic review of the neural correlates of lucid dreaming and investigates the potential overlap of the neural correlates of lucid dreaming and volition. Only peer-reviewed original empirical articles that used healthy adults as participants were included. Thus, five studies were found. Two of the studies used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), two used electroencephalography (EEG), and one used both EEG and fMRI. This thesis found that the precuneus and left parietal lobe, which are brain areas related to self-referential processing, have increased activity during lucid dreaming compared to non-lucid dreaming. Also, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has increased functional connectivity in people who are more likely to experience lucid dreaming. DLPFC has been associated with metacognitive functions, which includes volition.There also seems to be an overlap in brain regions activated in volition compared to lucid dreaming; these areas include the parietal cortex, supplementary motor area, and anteriorprefrontal cortex.

Happiness, anger, surprise, irritation… if we note down the emotions that we go through on a given day, the list will most probably be quite long. A surge of studies on the bidirectional interaction between emotion and cognition suggests that we need emotional appraisals in order to lead a successful life and maintain our personal, social and economic integrity (Bechara, 2005; Damasio, 1994; Fox, 2008; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Walter, 2005). And yet, we seldom ‘just’ experience emotions, but often try to influence them to best fit our current goals. Based on the assumption that emotional reactions entail changes on various levels, and that these changes happen in- or outside of our awareness, affective science has adopted emotion regulation as one of its major research topics (Beauregard, Levesque, & Paquette, 2004; Gross, 1999; Ochsner, 2007). In fact, neural (e.g. amygdala activation) and behavioral (e.g. feeling of negativity) correlates of emotional reactions are effectively reduced by top-down processes of explicit and implicit control (Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 2009; Levesque, et al., 2003; Ochsner, Ray, et al., 2004). Furthermore, evidence from studies investigating voluntary thought control suggests that control strategies may have lasting and paradoxical consequences (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Wegner, 2009). In a very recent investigation, lasting effects of regulation were also shown after the cognitive control of emotions: the activation timecourse of the amygdala was significantly increased immediately following regulation, and this difference was also related to the activation of the amygdala to the same stimuli a few minutes later (Walter, et al., 2009). Aside from these contextual or qualitative influences, emotional processing also differs between individuals: genetic variation within the serotonergic system for instance is known to affect emotional reactivity both on the behavioral and on the neural level (Hariri, et al., 2005; Hariri, et al., 2002; Lesch, et al., 1996). In the present work, the temporal dynamics of volitional emotion regulation were investigated in three studies. It was hypothesized that both the subjective experience of negativity and the amygdala activation can be attenuated by the detachment from negative emotions, which in turn leads to an immediate neural aftereffect after the offset of regulation. Furthermore, volitional emotion regulation was expected to be capable of reducing or even obliterating genetically mediated amygdala hyperreactivity to negative emotional cues. Similar to previous investigations (Walter, et al., 2009), pictures of aversive or neutral emotional content were presented while participants were instructed to react naturally to half of the pictures, and to regulate their emotional response upon the other half of the stimuli. The first two studies of the present work were designed to further characterize the immediate aftereffect of volitional regulation in the amygdala: Study 1 included behavioral ratings of negativity at picture offset and at fixation offset in order to provide behavioral measures of experiential changes, while in Study 2, participants continued to experience or regulate their emotions during a “maintain” phase after picture offset. The primary goal of Study 3 was to evaluate whether volitional emotion regulation can reduce genetically mediated amygdala hyperreactivity to aversive emotional material in individuals with the short variant of the serotonin transporter genotype (Hariri, et al., 2005; Hariri, et al., 2002), and whether the immediate aftereffect is also influenced by the serotonin transporter genotype. In all three studies, the amygdala was significantly activated by aversive versus neutral stimuli, while cognitive emotion regulation attenuated the activation in the amygdala and increased the activation in a frontal-parietal network of regulatory brain regions. This neural effect was complemented by the behavioral ratings which show that the subjective experience of negativity was also reduced by detachment (Study 1). Also in all three studies, an immediate aftereffect was observed in the amygdala following the end of regulation. Moreover, the preoccupation with the previously seen pictures after the scanning session varied across the experimental conditions (Studies 2 and 3). Volitional regulation proved effective in reducing amygdala activation to negative stimuli even in 5-HTTLPR short allele carriers that show an increased reactivity to this type of cue. At the same time, functional coupling of the ventrolateral and medial orbital prefrontal cortex, the subgenual and the rostral anterior cingulate with the amygdala was higher in the s-group. However, in Study 3 the immediate aftereffect was found only in l/l-homozygote individuals following the regulation of fear. Taken together, the results of the three studies clearly show that volitional regulation is effective in reducing behavioral and neural correlates of the experience of negative emotions (Levesque, et al., 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner, Ray, et al., 2004), even in the case of a genetically mediated hyperreactivity to such materials. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that conscious will can effectively counteract genetic determinants of emotional behavior. Moreover, the present results suggest that the temporal dynamics of volitional emotion regulation are characterized by a paradoxical rebound in amygdala activation after regulation, and that the immediate aftereffect is a marker of the efficiency of the initial and the sustained effects of emotion regulation (Walter, et al., 2009). In summary, the successful replication of the immediate aftereffect of emotion regulation in all three studies of this dissertation opens up exciting new research perspectives: a comparison of the short- and long-term effects of different regulatory strategies, and the investigation of these effects also in positive emotions would complement the present results, since the neural mechanisms involved in these processes show some characteristic differences (Ochsner, 2007; Staudinger, Erk, Abler, & Walter, 2009). A comprehensive characterization of this neural marker and its implications for emotional experience might also be useful with respect to clinical applications. The detailed examination of the various time scales of emotional regulation might for instance inform the diagnostic and therapeutic interventions in affective disorders that are associated with emotional dysfunctions (Brewin, Andrews, & Rose, 2000; Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007). Ultimately, we might thus come to understand the neural underpinnings of what the feelings we have today have to do with the feelings we had yesterday – and with the feelings with might have tomorrow.

Happiness, anger, surprise, irritation… if we note down the emotions that we go through on a given day, the list will most probably be quite long. A surge of studies on the bidirectional interaction between emotion and cognition suggests that we need emotional appraisals in order to lead a successful life and maintain our personal, social and economic integrity (Bechara, 2005; Damasio, 1994; Fox, 2008; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Walter, 2005). And yet, we seldom ‘just’ experience emotions, but often try to influence them to best fit our current goals. Based on the assumption that emotional reactions entail changes on various levels, and that these changes happen in- or outside of our awareness, affective science has adopted emotion regulation as one of its major research topics (Beauregard, Levesque, & Paquette, 2004; Gross, 1999; Ochsner, 2007). In fact, neural (e.g. amygdala activation) and behavioral (e.g. feeling of negativity) correlates of emotional reactions are effectively reduced by top-down processes of explicit and implicit control (Drabant, McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 2009; Levesque, et al., 2003; Ochsner, Ray, et al., 2004). Furthermore, evidence from studies investigating voluntary thought control suggests that control strategies may have lasting and paradoxical consequences (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Wegner, 2009). In a very recent investigation, lasting effects of regulation were also shown after the cognitive control of emotions: the activation timecourse of the amygdala was significantly increased immediately following regulation, and this difference was also related to the activation of the amygdala to the same stimuli a few minutes later (Walter, et al., 2009). Aside from these contextual or qualitative influences, emotional processing also differs between individuals: genetic variation within the serotonergic system for instance is known to affect emotional reactivity both on the behavioral and on the neural level (Hariri, et al., 2005; Hariri, et al., 2002; Lesch, et al., 1996). In the present work, the temporal dynamics of volitional emotion regulation were investigated in three studies. It was hypothesized that both the subjective experience of negativity and the amygdala activation can be attenuated by the detachment from negative emotions, which in turn leads to an immediate neural aftereffect after the offset of regulation. Furthermore, volitional emotion regulation was expected to be capable of reducing or even obliterating genetically mediated amygdala hyperreactivity to negative emotional cues. Similar to previous investigations (Walter, et al., 2009), pictures of aversive or neutral emotional content were presented while participants were instructed to react naturally to half of the pictures, and to regulate their emotional response upon the other half of the stimuli. The first two studies of the present work were designed to further characterize the immediate aftereffect of volitional regulation in the amygdala: Study 1 included behavioral ratings of negativity at picture offset and at fixation offset in order to provide behavioral measures of experiential changes, while in Study 2, participants continued to experience or regulate their emotions during a “maintain” phase after picture offset. The primary goal of Study 3 was to evaluate whether volitional emotion regulation can reduce genetically mediated amygdala hyperreactivity to aversive emotional material in individuals with the short variant of the serotonin transporter genotype (Hariri, et al., 2005; Hariri, et al., 2002), and whether the immediate aftereffect is also influenced by the serotonin transporter genotype. In all three studies, the amygdala was significantly activated by aversive versus neutral stimuli, while cognitive emotion regulation attenuated the activation in the amygdala and increased the activation in a frontal-parietal network of regulatory brain regions. This neural effect was complemented by the behavioral ratings which show that the subjective experience of negativity was also reduced by detachment (Study 1). Also in all three studies, an immediate aftereffect was observed in the amygdala following the end of regulation. Moreover, the preoccupation with the previously seen pictures after the scanning session varied across the experimental conditions (Studies 2 and 3). Volitional regulation proved effective in reducing amygdala activation to negative stimuli even in 5-HTTLPR short allele carriers that show an increased reactivity to this type of cue. At the same time, functional coupling of the ventrolateral and medial orbital prefrontal cortex, the subgenual and the rostral anterior cingulate with the amygdala was higher in the s-group. However, in Study 3 the immediate aftereffect was found only in l/l-homozygote individuals following the regulation of fear. Taken together, the results of the three studies clearly show that volitional regulation is effective in reducing behavioral and neural correlates of the experience of negative emotions (Levesque, et al., 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner, Ray, et al., 2004), even in the case of a genetically mediated hyperreactivity to such materials. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that conscious will can effectively counteract genetic determinants of emotional behavior. Moreover, the present results suggest that the temporal dynamics of volitional emotion regulation are characterized by a paradoxical rebound in amygdala activation after regulation, and that the immediate aftereffect is a marker of the efficiency of the initial and the sustained effects of emotion regulation (Walter, et al., 2009). In summary, the successful replication of the immediate aftereffect of emotion regulation in all three studies of this dissertation opens up exciting new research perspectives: a comparison of the short- and long-term effects of different regulatory strategies, and the investigation of these effects also in positive emotions would complement the present results, since the neural mechanisms involved in these processes show some characteristic differences (Ochsner, 2007; Staudinger, Erk, Abler, & Walter, 2009). A comprehensive characterization of this neural marker and its implications for emotional experience might also be useful with respect to clinical applications. The detailed examination of the various time scales of emotional regulation might for instance inform the diagnostic and therapeutic interventions in affective disorders that are associated with emotional dysfunctions (Brewin, Andrews, & Rose, 2000; Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007). Ultimately, we might thus come to understand the neural underpinnings of what the feelings we have today have to do with the feelings we had yesterday – and with the feelings with might have tomorrow.

O escopo dessa dissertação é explicitar, na medida do possível, as críticas formuladas por Espinosa em relação a Descartes, notadamente em sua doutrina do livre-arbítrio. Compreendendo a noção de livre-arbítrio cartesiano, tentaremos precisar a ruptura existente entre os dois filósofos. Analisaremos na Ética e no Tratado da emenda do intelecto a concepção da natureza da ideia e a sua distinção entre ideias adequadas e inadequadas, o que nos levará à sua crítica da faculdade da vontade livre. Essa análise se deterá especialmente na identificação que Espinosa realiza entre ideia e volição, sendo a ideia concebida como um ato de afirmação ou negação, de modo que a volição é constitutiva da ideia. É em virtude dessa identidade que Espinosa afirmará que o verdadeiro e o falso não se referem a um juízo exterior às ideias, mas a um juízo que opera internamente, nas próprias ideias. Com essa análise, tentaremos evidenciar que a identidade entre ideia e volição não elimina o caráter voluntário da ação cognitiva do homem na filosofia espinosana. A crítica de Espinosa em relação ao conceito de vontade, entendida como uma faculdade abstrata, isto é um universal abstrato, visa a romper com a ideia de que a vontade é absolutamente livre. A vontade deixa de ser a faculdade que afirma a liberdade entre contrários e torna-se a afirmação da livre necessidade. É essa concepção de uma faculdade universal e abstrata que acarretará ilusão do livre-arbítrio. / Le but de cette dissertation est dexpliciter, autant que possible, les critiques formulées par Spinoza par rapport à Descartes, en particulier sa doctrine du libre arbitre. En comprenant la notion cartésienne de volonté libre, nous essayons de préciser la rupture existante entre les deux philosophes. Nous analyserons dans lÉtique et dans le Traité de la Reforme de lEntendiment la conception de la nature de lidée et sa distinction entre des idées adéquates et inadéquates, qui nos conduira à sa critique de la faculté de la volonté libre. Cette analyse se detient en particulier sur lidentification que Spinoza fait entre lidée et volition, étant lidée conçue comme un acte daffirmation ou de négation, de sorte que la volition est constitutive de lidée. Cest en vertu de cette identité que Spinoza affirmera que le vrai et le faux ne se réfèrent pas à un jugement extérieure aux idées, mais à un jugement qui opère internement, dans les idées elles-mêmes. Avec cette analyse, nous essaieront de montrer que lidentité entre lidée et volition nélimine pas le caractère volontaire de laction cognitive de lhomme dans la philosophie spinoziste. La critique de Spinoza à la notion de volonté, comprise comme une faculté abstraite, cest à dire, un universel abstrait, vise à rompre avec lidée que la volonté est absolument libre. La volonté cessera dêtre la faculté qui affirme à partir de lindétermination entre contraires et deviendra laffirmation de la libre necessité. Par contre, cest la conception dune faculté universelle et abstraite qui donnera lieu à lilusion du libre arbitre.

The Psychology of Working Theory (PWT; Duffy, Blustein, Diemer, & Autin, 2016) was recently proposed as an empirically testable approach to understanding the work processes of those for whom work decisions are influenced by contextual factors and who engage in work for reasons other than satisfaction. In the present study of 285 adults, I investigated the relationships between marginalization, economic resources, work volition, career adaptability, and decent work. I found that work volition, career adaptability, and economic resources all uniquely predicted decent work. I also found that greater economic resources and lower marginalization predicted greater work volition. Economic resources and marginalization have a significant negative correlation, and work volition significantly predicted career adaptability. I failed to support the hypotheses that greater marginalization would predict lower decent work experiences when accounting for other variables and that greater economic resources and lower marginalization would predict greater career adaptability. I identified two alternative models for the data. A model with only work volition and career adaptability predicting decent work provided an adequate fit. A model with only work volition predicting career adaptability provided mixed results. This study provides empirical support for the initial propositions of the PWT, provides further evidence for the importance of contextual variables in work experiences, and identifies several key factors that lead individuals to attain a decent work experience.