Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:48:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Piva.pdf: 408423 bytes, checksum: 724b19f54fd1334527b0ab955cef1604 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-23 / In this work the author begins with a short historic introduction about Saint Augustine, John Calvin and Free Will in order to deal specifically with their similarities and differences concerning this subject. His goal is to contribute to a larger understanding about the human will and its limitations from the perspective of Science of Religion, thus enlarging the field of knowledge of the humanities. / Neste trabalho o autor faz uma pequena introdução histórica sobre Santo Agostinho, João Calvino e o tema Livre-Arbítrio para tratar especificamente das convergências e divergências entre estes dois teólogos sobre o referido tema. Seu objetivo é contribuir para o maior entendimento sobre a questão da vontade humana e suas limitações sob o ponto de vista das Ciências da Religião, ampliando assim o campo do conhecimento das humanidades.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-05-19T18:28:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 lademirrenatopetrich.pdf TESE.pdf: 753889 bytes, checksum: 53aab563f1e0f89e474c1d19f93544e6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-01T19:25:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 lademirrenatopetrich.pdf TESE.pdf: 753889 bytes, checksum: 53aab563f1e0f89e474c1d19f93544e6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-01T19:25:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lademirrenatopetrich.pdf TESE.pdf: 753889 bytes, checksum: 53aab563f1e0f89e474c1d19f93544e6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-28 / A filosofia pós-kantiana viu-se no desafio de solucionar as dualidades oriundas da Crítica da Razão Pura e dar ao projeto crítico um aspecto positivo. Arthur Schopenhauer está inserido neste contexto, considerando a si mesmo o genuíno herdeiro de Kant e o único capaz de dar continuidade ao projeto crítico. Apoiando-se na primeira edição da Crítica, Schopenhauer se utiliza da distinção kantiana entre fenômeno e coisa-em-si para decifrar o “enigma do mundo”. A conclusão a que chega é a de que o mundo somente é compreendido a partir de duas verdades complementares: do ponto de vista gnosiológico, o mundo é representação; do ponto de vista metafísico, o mundo é Vontade. A Vontade se espelha no mundo objetivandose em inúmeros graus na natureza, dos quais o ser humano é sua cópia mais perfeita. É também no ser humano que a Vontade toma consciência de si e se descobre como fonte infindável de desejos, sendo a raiz de todo conflito e de todo sofrimento (é o pessimismo metafísico). É preciso haver uma redenção! A libertação é possível naqueles que têm o “conhecimento melhor”, de forma parcial na contemplação estética e definitivamente na negação da Vontade. No processo de descrição de seu sistema filosófico, Schopenhauer define o que pensa sobre as religiões e suas doutrinas. As religiões somente existem porque a maioria esmagadora da humanidade não tem capacidade filosófica. A estas pessoas é preciso uma linguagem mitológica e alegórica, típica das religiões. Neste sentido, as religiões se justificam em seu aspecto prático-consolatório, ficando em aberto a pergunta se seus benefícios compensam seus malefícios. Algo inusitado, no entanto, acontece quando Schopenhauer descreve o estado da negação da Vontade. Ao se chegar ao “nada”, Schopenhauer diz que é melhor remeter à linguagem dos santos e místicos do que elaborar um discurso filosófico com palavras fracas e débeis. Por que novamente recorrer à linguagem mitológica e alegórica? A explicação mais recorrente afirma que a metafísica de Schopenhauer, por se tratar de uma metafísica imanente (metafísica hermenêutica ou hermenêutica da existência), fica sem qualquer ponto de referência para elaborar um discurso no estado da negação da Vontade, pois para além do ser é impossível qualquer descrição da coisa-em-si. Apesar desta explicação ser bastante consistente, esta tese defende a hipótese de que a ausência de linguagem na negação da Vontade não é decorrente do ponto de chegada, o “nada”, mas sim do ponto de partida, que é o acesso metafísico. Schopenhauer chega ao conceito metafísico da Vontade através da autoconsciência do sujeito volitivo que se percebe como “querer”, sendo o desejo toda a sua essência. Porém, para as religiões o querer, tal qual descrito por Schopenhauer, é apenas a expressão do “ego” e não do “eu”. O “eu” em sua plenitude absorve todas as dualidades: querer/não querer; bem/mal; egoísmo/compaixão; etc. Desta forma, a porta de acesso à coisa-em-si está fragmentada em Schopenhauer, de maneira que a redenção precisou entrar “voando” em seu sistema filosófico e o tradicional problema do mal se transformou no “problema do bem”. / The post-Kantian philosophy found itself at the challenge of solving the dualities arising from the Critique of Pure Reason and give the project a critical positive. Arthur Schopenhauer is inserted in this context, considering himself the true heir of Kant and the only one capable of continuing the critical project. Building on the first edition of the Critique, Schopenhauer uses the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself to crack the "enigma of the world." The conclusion reached is that the world is understood only from two complementary truths: the epistemological point of view, the world is representation, from the metaphysical point of view, the world is Will. Will you look to the objective world into numerous degrees in nature, of which the human being is more perfect your copy. It is also the human being that Will becomes conscious of itself and unfolds as a source of endless desires, being the root of all conflict and all suffering (it is the metaphysical pessimism). There must be a redemption! The release is possible in those who have the "know better", partially in aesthetic contemplation and definitely in denial of the Will. In the process of describing his philosophical system, Schopenhauer defines what you think about religions and their doctrines. Religions exist only because the overwhelming majority of humanity has no philosophical capacity. These people need a mythological and allegorical language, typical of religions. In this sense, religion justified in its practical aspect, consolatory, leaving open the question whether their benefits outweigh their harms. Something unusual, however, happens when Schopenhauer describes the state of denial of the will. When you get to "nothing," Schopenhauer says it is better to refer to the language of the saints and mystics that elaborating a philosophical discourse with words weak and feeble. Why again resort to mythological and allegorical language? The applicant contends that explanation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics, because it was an immanent metaphysics (hermeneutics metaphysics or hermeneutics of existence) is no point of reference for preparing a speech on the state of denial of the will, because beyond being is impossible for any description of the thing in itself. Although this explanation is quite consistent, this thesis is the hypothesis that the absence of language in the denial of the will is not due to the arrival point, "nothing", but the starting point, that access is metaphysical. Schopenhauer comes to the metaphysical concept of the Will through the subject's volitional self that is perceived as "wanting", and desire all its essence. However, for religions to will, as described by Schopenhauer, is just the expression of "self" and not "I". The "I" in its fullness absorbs all dualities: wanting/not wanting, good/evil, egoism/compassion, etc.. Thus, the access door to the thing in itself is fragmented in Schopenhauer, so that redemption had come "flying" in his philosophical system and the traditional problem of evil has become the "good problem".

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-03-16T15:23:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 joseafonsodepaularetto.pdf: 1257970 bytes, checksum: f6749314bc963eba3bb216f59b122ab9 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-03-16T15:44:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 joseafonsodepaularetto.pdf: 1257970 bytes, checksum: f6749314bc963eba3bb216f59b122ab9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-16T15:44:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 joseafonsodepaularetto.pdf: 1257970 bytes, checksum: f6749314bc963eba3bb216f59b122ab9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-07-15 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta dissertação aborda o tema da vontade, investigando como esse conceito é tratado na psicologia cognitiva. A partir disso, procuramos determinar se a psicologia cognitiva privilegia algum tipo de explicação para a vontade. Para tanto, inicialmente expusemos uma breve contextualização histórica do problema como abordado pela filosofia para situar, desta maneira, a forma como a psicologia cognitiva herdou a questão. Mostramos como o debate em torno do conceito da vontade se relaciona com o problema do livre arbítrio, a liberdade de ação e a responsabilidade moral assim como possui implicações referentes ao determinismo nomológico. Apresentamos os argumentos a favor e contra a possibilidade de uma vontade livre em um mundo determinista, de acordo com a visão compatibilista, que aceita que essas duas hipóteses sejam possíveis; a incompatibilista, que nega que uma vontade livre seja possível em um mundo determinista; e uma visão pessimista, que nega a possibilidade de uma vontade livre tanto num mundo determinista quanto indeterminista. Em seguida, investigamos os fundamentos da psicologia cognitiva, tais como o funcionalismo, o construtivismo, e a teoria do processamento de informação, a fim de rastrear possíveis filiações filosóficas ligadas ao problema da vontade. Procuramos também oferecer um resumo de como outras disciplinas pertencentes ao projeto de ciência da cognição influenciaram uma possível visão da psicologia cognitiva quanto a esta questão, principalmente a ciência da computação, com Alan Turing, e a neurociência, com os experimentos de Benjamin Libet. Por fim, apresentamos algumas considerações de influentes psicólogos quanto ao tema e vimos como o conceito de vontade está implicado nas investigações sobre a motivação, visto nesta se tratar dos motivos ou causas do comportamento, assim como no conceito de função executiva, relacionado aos atos voluntários, controle cognitivo global, planejamento e execução do comportamento. Concluímos que ainda parece precária uma tomada de posição definitiva quanto ao problema da vontade, como alguns pesquisadores parecem proclamar, mesmo à luz dos recentes avanços científicos. / This dissertation approaches the issue of will, investigating how this concept is treated in cognitive psychology. From this, we sought to determine whether cognitive psychology favors some kind of explanation for the will. Therefore, initially we exposed a brief historical contextualization of the problem as discussed by philosophy to find how cognitive psychology inherited the issue. We show how the debate around the concept of the will relates to the problem of free will, freedom of action and moral responsibility as well as have implications for the nomological determinism. We present the arguments for and against the possibility of free will in a deterministic world, according to compatibilist view, accepting these two hypotheses are possible; the incompatibilist, which denies that a free will is possible in a deterministic world; and a pessimistic view, which denies the possibility of free will in either a determinist or indeterministic world. Then we investigated the foundations of cognitive psychology, such as functionalism, constructivism, and the theory of information processing in order to track possible philosophical affiliations linked to the problem of will. We also seek to provide an overview of how other disciplines pertaining to the cognition science project influenced a possible vision of cognitive psychology in this matter, especially computer science, with Alan Turing, and neuroscience, with the experiments of Benjamin Libet. Finally, we present some considerations of influential psychologists on the subject and we have seen how the concept of will is involved in research on motivation, since this is address the reasons or causes of behavior, as well as the concept of executive function, related to voluntary acts, global cognitive control, planning and execution of behavior. We conclude that it still seems precarious for a definitive position on the issue of the will, as some researchers seem to proclaim, even in light of recent scientific advances.

[pt] Pela decifração do enigma do mundo, Schopenhauer elabora uma metafísica da vontade, na qual rejeita o livre-arbítrio, mera ilusão fenomenal, e concebe o fundamento da verdadeira moralidade como compaixão, que surge misteriosamente, como uma graça. Diante da impossibilidade de liberdade para a vontade humana, a verdadeira liberdade repousa na negação da vontade, que se evidencia empiricamente no fenômeno da santidade. Todavia, paralelamente à sua investigação metafísica, mantendo-se no ponto de vista empírico, Schopenhauer elabora uma eudemonologia, uma orientação para se conduzir a vida da forma mais feliz possível, sua proposta de uma sabedoria de vida. A presente pesquisa visa investigar a Ética na obra de Arthur Schopenhauer, particularmente no sentido de compreender que liberdade nos resta para a prática de vida. / [en] In his way of decifering the world's enigma Shopenhauer works out a metaphysics of the will, in which he rejects free will as a mere phenomenal illusion and conceives of compassion as the true foundation of morality. Such compassion emerges mysteriously, as a Grace. Facing the impossibility of freedom for human will, he makes true freedom to lie on the negation of will, which is made empirically evident in the phenomenon of holiness. However, on a paralell with his metaphysical investigation, but keeping his empirical point of view, Shopenhauer elaborates an eudaemonism, that is an orientation for one to conduct oneself in life, in the most happy way possible, which is his proposal of a wisdom of life. The present research aims at investigating Ethics in the work of Arthur Shopenhauer, specially in the sense of understanding what is this freedom that is left over to us for our practice of life.

The paper examines the philosophical themes of Free Will as opposed to Determinism/Predestination and how they are portrayed in the seven books about Harry Potter. It is discussed whether the character of Harry Potter, but also the world itself in which he acts, seem to be governed primarily by forces of Free Will and/or Determinism. The author concludes that though Harry is indeed strongly tempted to believe in Determinism, influential figures around him direct him towards a different choice - making himself believe in Free Will instead.

Notre travail offre une analyse critique des principales théories explicatives de l’addiction articulée autour d’une distinction entre les théories médicales de l’addiction et les explications qui relèvent d’une approche morale (notamment l’explication acratique). Les secondes s’opposant aux premières essentiellement par l’idée que l’individu conserve dans l’addiction sa liberté d’agir autrement. Ces deux types de théories partagent cependant un présupposé commun : une condition pathologique serait incompatible avec une conduite volontaire et intentionnelle. Or certains éléments mis en avant par l’approche clinique de l’addiction, comme le sentiment d’ambivalence, l’initiation ou le phénomène du rétablissement spontané, obligent à remettre en cause un tel présupposé et à tenter d’échapper aux explications unilatérales de ce que nous proposons de qualifier philosophiquement de phénomène d’impuissance de la volonté. Il est en effet selon nous possible d’appréhender l’addiction à la fois selon une certaine forme de perspective morale et selon une certaine forme de perspective pathologique. En premier lieu (cf. Partie 1) parce que l’opposition entre approche acratique et approche pathologique compulsive cérébrale ne repose que sur une certaine idée de la compulsion qui peut et doit être remise en cause. En second lieu (cf Partie 2) parce que le concept de maladie qui sous-tend également cette opposition est lui aussi critiquable et qu’il convient de penser l’addiction à la lumière d’une notion de pathologie plus souple, permettant d’intégrer certaines marques de l’agentivité et de l’action volontaire. En troisième lieu, enfin (cf. Partie 3), parce que ce que l’on a appelé « les maladies de la volonté » offrent un modèle heuristique qui permet de redéfinir d’une manière plus appropriée le phénomène général l’impuissance de la volonté, grâce tout à la fois à l’idée de division interne à la volonté-même et à l’octroi d’un rôle central à l’obsession. Nous proposons donc à partir de notre enquête critique de repenser l’addiction comme une conduite obéissant à quelque chose que nous voulons et ne voulons pas de façon simultanée, au sens où nous avons des raisons simultanées de la poursuivre et de ne pas la poursuivre. Et de considérer que sa dimension pathologique vient de ce qu’une force interne s’y trouve bien introduite, mais dont la nature diffère de celle que désigne la notion dominante de compulsion. Car l’irrésistibilité à laquelle elle renvoie ne réside pas dans les actes, mais dans les pensées des agents. / This dissertation presents a critical analysis of the main explanatory theories on addiction structured around the distinction between the medical theories of addiction and explanations pertaining to a moral approach (namely, the acratic explanation). The latter set against the former primarily due to the idea that when addicted the individual retains the freedom to act differently. However, these two kinds of theories share a common assumption: a pathological condition would be incompatible with voluntary and intentional behavior. Yet, some components highlighted by a clinical approach – such as ambivalence, initiation or the “maturing-out” phenomenon – compel us to reconsider this assumption and to try and escape from unilateral explanations of what I propose to philosophically call “a phenomenon of powerlessness of the will”. Indeed, this dissertation argues that addiction can be understood both trough moral and pathological perspectives. Firstly (cf. part 1) because the opposition between the acratic approach and the pathological compulsive cerebral approach only rests upon a specific definition of compulsion, which can and must be called into question. Secondly (cf. part 2) because the concept of disease which is inherent to this opposition is open to criticism and addiction could be reconsidered in light of a more flexible disease theory, allowing for the integration of certain signs of agency and voluntary action. And finally, in a third part (cf. part 3), because the previously defined concept of the “diseases of the will” presents a heuristic model through which to redefine the general phenomenon of powerlessness of will. This is due both to the idea of internal division of the will and to the main part granted to obsession. Through a critical analysis, this dissertation thus strives to rethink addiction as a behavior subjected simultaneously to what we want and what we don’t want, insofar as we have simultaneous reasons to act and not act on this will. To conclude, the pathological dimension of addiction comes from the introduction of an internal force, whose nature is, however, not referred to in the classical concept of compulsion. The irresistibility to which it pertains does not lie in people’s behaviors but in their thoughts.

For centuries, criminal and deviant behaviors have always been considered as a mystery because they do not represent the social norm. Why do some people hurt others or themselves? What guides the decision to perform good or bad actions? What is the role played by individual differences in such choices? Criminal behavior is not an unitary phenomenon and many approaches can be proposed to understand it. In the present thesis, I focused on the subjective experience that accompanies our actions commonly known as the sense of agency. The sense of agency can be defined as the experience of being the author of an action and its consequences. Therefore, understanding how the subjective experience of being responsible for an outcome influences our actions is a key issue for the notion of criminal responsibility. Throughout each chapter of the present thesis, I aimed at systematically explore how disturbances in the intention-action-outcome chain impact the sense of agency, by using behavioral and electrophysiological methods. I hope the methods and findings presented in this thesis will provide new routes to explore the human mind and particularly the sense of agency in the context of moral responsibility. / Doctorat en Sciences psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The self-training movement of a teacher creating education workshop strategies (CORREA, 2000 & 2006) potentiated a research development with an interest of map the acquired knowledge during the immersion on deaf science education, on Escola Estadual de Educação Especial Doutor Reinaldo Fernando Coser, in Santa Maria/RS. The focus of this study is to report through diary and notes the reflection movements of a teacher in front of the question how should a science concept be shown if there is no signal in LIBRAS? The notes were produced during a science teacher training and on workshop realized through the extension project at school during the Chemistry Graduation. These writings shows an estrangement on teachers formation that is comprehend with the subjectivity machine of a teacher body (CORREA & PREVE, 2011) which the effect is exhaustion of teacher capacity to create different strategies of study to answer tests . In this cartography (ROLNIK, 2007) (GUATARRI & ROLNIK, 2011) the science education with deaf is comprehend such as a study territory (FREIRE, 1988) in know process with will (STIRNER, 2001). And giving a language (ROLNIK, 2007) to these sensations present on the diary notes grow such as a necessity of speak what still has not been said to Natural Science teachers. Giving space to visualization of these notes allowing find the acquired knowledge from bifurcation realized by the teacher in front of his questions which compose his self-training process. / O movimento de autoformação de um educador na elaboração de estratégias de educação em oficinas (CORREA, 2000 & 2006) potencializou o desenvolvimento de uma pesquisa interessada em mapear os saberes adquiridos durante a sua imersão na educação em Ciências com surdos, na Escola Estadual de Educação Especial Doutor Reinaldo Fernando Coser, em Santa Maria/RS. O foco desse estudo é relatar através de diários e anotações os movimentos de reflexão do educador a partir da questão como apresentar um conceito em Ciências se não há sinais em LIBRAS? . As anotações foram produzidas durante os estágios em Ciências e na produção de oficinas realizadas através de projetos de extensão na escola durante a graduação em Licenciatura em Química. Tais escritos apontam para o estranhamento da formação de educadores a qual é compreendida com uma maquinaria de subjetivação do corpo do educador (CORREA & PREVE, 2011) cujo efeito é esgotamento da capacidade do educador em criar estratégias diferenciadas de ensinar a fim de responder avaliações . Nessa cartografia (ROLNIK, 2007) (GUATARRI & ROLNIK, 2011) a educação em Ciências com surdos é compreendida como um território de estudo (FREIRE, 1988) em processos de conhecer com vontade (STIRNER, 2001). E dar linguagem (ROLNIK, 2007) a essas sensações presentes nas anotações dos diários emerge como uma necessidade de se falar o que ainda não foi dito aos educadores em Ciências Naturais. Dar espaço para a visualização dessas anotações permite encontrar os saberes adquiridos a partir das bifurcações realizadas pelo educador diante das suas questões as quais compõe o seu processo de autoformação.

Living will is a multidisciplinary, ethical-law problem. When applied a legally competent patient as a lay person orders the medical staff as professionals how to treat him or her in case of him/her not being able, temporarily or permanently, to give an informed permission with a treatment or alternatively refuse such treatment. A patient has a right to express his/her wishes concerning a future health care for him/her-self in a time when he/she is no longer capable to decide on his/her own. The living will is a particular kind of an informed consent or decline targeted towards a future event which is to an extent uncertain. The presented thesis consists of two parts which are additionally divided into three chapters. The major aim of the first part is to give a comprehensive explanation of the Living will's position in the legal system of the Czech Republic. This part also analyses the relation of the modification embedded in the the Act on Health Services and Conditions of Their Provision and the Civil Code. The second part consists of two chapters: "The Living will's reflection in the intensive and palliative care" and " Care limitations, the Living will and a the legal responsibility of a medical doctor". It deals with the use of the Living will in intensive medicine and palliative care. These...

This work examines the compatibility of prohibition of discrimination in private law and the principle of autonomy of will which is the leading principle of private law. For this purpose, the work analyses both principles and their limits, examines their conflict and possible coexistence. First of all, this work deals with the prohibition of discrimination in private relationships and the extend of its effect. This extend is limited by the scope of the Antidiscrimination Act as well as by certain exceptions from equal treatment. Considering the fact that antidiscrimination law does not have a long tradition in the Czech Republic, this work uses international law and EU law, as well as relevant case law, to interpret the norms of antidiscrimination law. Further, this work focuses on the principle of autonomy of will which is the fundamental prerequisite for realization of the will of individuals in private law. Besides the content of the principle of autonomy of will, this work analyses its limitations given by private law acts, especially Civil Code and Labour Code. The conflict of prohibition of discrimination and the autonomy of will is can be perceived from different perspectives. Some of them are mentioned in this work. In essence, this conflict is a conflict of two fundamental rights, equality...