This thesis deals with changes in the scope of autonomy of the devisor's will in the period from 1 January 1812 until the present days. Using the descriptive and analytical method and comparative method, the aim of this thesis is to explicate development of individual institutes of the law of succession, by means of which the devisor could or in particular can manifest his/her autonomy. This thesis is divided into five main parts, which are further divided into chapters and subchapters. The first part of the thesis represents an introductory excursus to the issue of the law of succession and the stress is put on basic principles of the law of succession and historical development thereof. The second part deals with manifestations of autonomy of the devisor's will under effectiveness of ABGB. Attention is paid to individual institutes of the law of succession and development thereof, special part deals with a testament as the most important manifestation of the freedom of disposition. Interpretation of individual institutes is presented in particular in the light of the comments and judicature of the period of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The third part deals with manifestations of autonomy of the devisor's will under effectiveness of the Civil Code of 1950. The third part endeavors to describe...

This diploma thesis deals with Friedrich Nietzsche philosophy, especially his two works - The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first work, The Birth of Tragedy, was chosen, because it is author's first work and it built the basis for writing of his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The second work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, was chosen, because it is the most important work from the philosophical point of view. The goal of the thesis is to examine both of these works and focus on Nietzsche's most important thoughts. The first work, The Birth of Tragedy, connects four important influences - the first is cultural interest that manifests itself on the artistic level through encounter of two elements - Apollonian and Dionysian, the second influence is the attempt to grasp the Greek antiquity in a new way in contrast to classicist insisting on the Greek harmony, the third is Shopenhauer philosophy and the last one is almost divine respectability to Richard Wagner, who was Nietzsche's loyal friend. The second work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, shows in itself in the form of aphorisms, legends and myths the basis thoughts of Nietzsche's philosophy - death of God, nihilism, the will to power, the creation of "Übermensch", eternal return and the critique of mass culture. The work is not a collection of...

Three separate fMRI studies were conducted to study the neural dynamics of free decision formation. In Study 1, we first searched across the brain for spatiotemporal patterns that could predict the specific outcome and timing of free motor decisions to make a left or right button press (Soon et al., 2008). In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 using ultra-high field fMRI for improved temporal and spatial resolution to more accurately characterize the evolution of decision-predictive information in prefrontal cortex (Bode et al., 2011). In Study 3, to unequivocally dissociate high-level intentions from motor preparation and execution, we investigated the neural precursors of abstract intentions as participants spontaneously decided to perform either of two mental arithmetic tasks: addition or subtraction (Soon et al., 2013). Across the three studies, we consistently found that upcoming decisions could be predicted with ~60% accuracy from fine-grained spatial activation patterns occurring a few seconds before the decisions reached awareness, with very similar profiles for both motor and abstract intentions. The content and timing of the decisions appeared to be encoded in two functionally dissociable sets of regions: frontopolar and posterior cingulate/ precuneus cortex encoded the content but not the timing of the decisions, while the pre-supplementary motor area encoded the timing but not the content of the decisions. The choice-predictive regions in both motor and abstract decision tasks overlapped partially with the default mode network. High-resolution imaging in Study 2 further revealed that as the time-point of conscious decision approached, activity patterns in frontopolar cortex became increasingly stable with respect to the final choice.

Cette étude a en vue de cerner les rapports complexes que Nietzsche entretient avec la notion de connaissance en général et avec celle de science en particulier, tout en conservant à l'esprit la dimension artistique que Nietzsche relève jusque dans la connaissance. Ainsi, les implications de la critique de la logique, critique qui n'est jamais uniforme chez Nietzsche, seront d'abord envisagées, avant d'examiner les relations que le philosophe entretient avec certaines grandes figures de l'histoire de la philosophie : Aristote, Bacon, Comte, mais aussi Pascal, Spinoza ou encore les Grecs de l'époque tragique. La façon de philosopher, et par conséquent la notion de méthode, seront au premier plan de ces analyses. Il s'agira alors de sonder les différents aspects du principe d'économie au sein de la pensée de la volonté de puissance afin d'en déterminer le rôle exact. Ce faisant, la dimension instrumentale de l'éternel retour sera spécifiée. De ce fait, un certain schéma inhérent à la réflexion nietzschéenne devrait se faire jour. En effet, la démarche de Nietzsche est bien souvent double : repérage et évaluation des sources productrices d'une interprétation d'une part, et conséquences de cette interprétation d'autre part. Cette démarche, à la dimension éminemment pratique, sera ici appliquée au problème même de la connaissance à travers l'étude du principe d'économie : généalogie de la science donc, mais aussi implications de celle-ci en lien avec la réflexion sur la civilisation. Ce projet, qui fut celui de Nietzsche depuis son entrée sur la scène philosophique et qui se poursuit jusque dans ses derniers écrits, devrait avoir des répercussions sur son style lui-même, la forme du texte de Nietzsche faisant corps avec sa philosophie. / This study intends to investigate Nietzsche's complex relationships with the notion of knowledge in general and with the notion of science in particular, while keeping in mind the artistic dimension which Nietzsche find even in knowledge. So, the implications of the criticism of logic, criticism which is never uniform in Nietzsche, will be considered at first, before examining Nietzsche's relationships with certain great figures of history of philosophy : Aristotle, Bacon, Comte, but also Pascal, Spinoza or even the Greeks of the tragic age. The way of philosophizing, and consequently, the notion of method, will be in the foreground of these analyses. This will be therefore to study the various aspects of the economy principle within the thought of the will to power to determine its exact role. In doing so, the instrumental dimension of eternal recurrence will be specified. Thereby, a certain scheme, inherent in the nietzschean thought, should appear. Indeed, the approach of Nietzsche is frequently double : identification and evaluation of the producing sources of an interpretation on one hand, and consequences of this interpretation on the other hand. This approach, which has a highly practical dimension, will be applied here to the knowledge problem through the study of the economy principle : genealogy of science thus, but also implications of the latter in relation to the thought about civilization. This project, which was the one of Nietzsche since his entry into the philosophical scene and which continues to his last writings, should have repercussions on his very style, given that the form of the text of Nietzsche is at one with his philosophy.

Le XXIe siècle s’est traduit pour les opérateurs économiques par un fort mouvement d’internationalisation qui les a aspirés dans une compétition sans frontières et les a conduit à s’implanter sur le globe au gré de leurs intérêts. Dans ce cadre, quelle attitude le droit adopte-t-il face à la problématique de la localisation des sociétés ? La localisation des sociétés est traditionnellement appréhendée comme une question de droit. En somme, le droit fixe les règles permettant d’inscrire les sociétés dans l’espace. Or, le droit parait abandonner une large place à la volonté, à telle enseigne que l’on puisse considérer que la localisation des sociétés s’affirme ainsi comme un élément disponible soumis à l’influence de la volonté. Face à cela, le droit s’intéresse aux décisions sociales qui affecteront la localisation des sociétés. Les règles qui gouvernent l’adoption des décisions affectant la localisation traduisent fidèlement les enjeux de pouvoir au sein des sociétés. La localisation des sociétés est aujourd’hui, pour le droit, la source d’un défi majeur en ce sens qu’elle est le terrain d’objectifs poursuivis par l’ordre juridique. Il n’hésite donc pas à remettre en cause des localisations choisies ou encore à paralyser certains effets attendus d'une localisation par ailleurs maintenue. Le droit s’autorise ainsi non seulement à tracer une frontière entre le licite et l’illicite mais encore à sanctionner les choix qui, bien que licites, auraient des conséquences inacceptables pour l’ordre juridique. La quête d’un équilibre entre la place de la volonté et le respect de l’impérativité irrigue alors l’action du droit sur la localisation des sociétés / The 21st century has seen economic actors taken into a great movement of internationalization drawing them into a border-free competition that led firms to relocate all over the world according to their own interest. Nowadays, every company, and not only multinational corporations, has to consider the opportunity of spreading abroad. Against this background, how does the law cover the issue of companies’ location?The location of companies has traditionally been considered as an issue of law, with a view to mark out the uncertain. The law lays down the rules to situate companies within space, but gives in to free will when it comes to the actual decisions. One could therefore state that private actors enjoy freedom in locating companies, so much so that the strategy of location could be considered as a mere possibility left to free will. Nevertheless, the law still has a say in the social decisions that affect the location of companies.The location of companies has become a major concern within the law today, as it is a ground for legal practitioners to actively achieve changes. Thus, the law does not hesitate to question a location or to paralyse some of its effects. Even though the law remains quite liberal concerning the location of companies, it does exert a form of control over such decisions. This control is twofold: not only does it draw the line between lawful and unlawful; it also frames possible legal actions against unlawful decisions. What is ultimately at stake is the search for balance between free will and necessary regulation.

With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) so-called ‘immoralism’. When he calls himself an ‘immoralist’ and even ‘the first immoralist’ (EH Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ which he insists ought to be possible (BGE 202). I shall interpret Nietzsche’s explicit claim of ‘immoralism’ and his ‘campaign against morality’ as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality ‘that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself’ (EH Destiny 4). His ‘immoralism’ does not reject the idea of an ethical life. Nietzsche favours a ‘supra-moral’ version of life (GM II 2&BGE 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a ‘negative’ (‘destructive’) and a ‘positive’ (‘productive’) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the ‘negative’ side, which involves Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality. In his Genealogy, Nietzsche criticizes the man of ressentiment, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world’, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (GM III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his ‘positive’ ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the Übermensch, and the paradox of the Übermenschas ‘the annihilator of morality’ (EH Books 1) and as ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). By proclaiming a process of ‘self-overcoming of morality’ (BGE 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (BGE 216), and ‘mere symptomatology’ (TI ‘Improvers’ of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (A 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (GS 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the Übermensch. His idea of the Übermensch implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment. There are affinities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsche’s process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsche’s philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Philosophy / unrestricted

Background: Both Freud (1921) and Skinner (1971) were regarded as 'hard determinists' who saw human thought and action as determined by prior events, and the idea of free will as simply an illusion. While this belief system clearly impacted on the models of therapy they developed, whether such beliefs also had an impact on their ability to develop qualities of effective therapy, such as empathic and genuine therapeutic relationships, is not known. Furthermore, whether there is something about holding this belief system that could affect therapists' abilities to attain and nurture such qualities, remains unclear. Research Question: The research study reported here sought to gain some insight into the above question, and into what it is like to deliver therapy from a hard determinist philosophical frame, by asking how clinical psychologists who hold a hard determinist philosophy, experience delivering therapy. Method: The study made use of a qualitative design methodology. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven hard determinist clinical psychologists, and interview transcripts were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Results: Four super-ordinate themes emerged from the analysis: 'From Hell to Utopia: How it feels to be a hard determinist therapist', 'Hating the sin, loving the sinner: Enhancing the therapeutic relationship', 'Free will: A felt vs reflective understanding', and 'Therapist as thinker'. Implications: The themes to emerge from the data gave rise to a number of implications and recommendations for practice and further research. In particular, it was recommended that the link between hard determinist beliefs and a perceived enhancement of the therapeutic relationship warrants further research. Furthermore, since the philosophy was linked to ideas about power, self-control, therapeutic models, science, and research, discussions of the philosophy may add valuable contributions to clinical psychology's understanding of these issues. In addition, a replication or development of this study with a broader range of therapists is recommended, to establish whether the findings reported here can be generalised to therapists from fields outside clinical psychology.

The object of this thesis is to examine the two opposite poles of human freedom, that is, determinism and total freedom, as found in the plays of Cocteau and Sartre that have been influenced by Greek drama. These contemporary playwrights however have set aside the religious aspect of ancient tragedy to concentrate on the analysis of the human condition. Cocteau, similar to Sophocles, is conscious of fate controlling human destiny. Since Cocteau is unable to alter its course, he accepts it; his plays, Antigone (1922), Oedipe-Roi (1925), Orphée (1926) and La Machine Infernale (1934), all embody such an attitude, thereby denoting freedom as an illusion. In the first chapter, Antigone, Orpheus and Oedipus are analysed as pawns of the cruel gods; as mere mortals, at the mercy of the Heavens, they cannot control their destiny. In the second chapter, emphasis is placed on man himself; we have endeavoured to show to what extent he is physically and psychologically determined and how he contains the seed of his own perdition. Cocteau's originality lies in the presentation of determinism through imagery. In La Machine Infernale, his most important play, destiny becomes a machine geared to destroy man caught in a network from which he cannot extricate himself. Such a person is Oedipus, controlled by both outer and inner forces. The outer forces or the gods plot a fate of parricide and incest which he is unable to avoid or escape. In the second instance, Cocteau studies the complexity of the human machine; in so doing, he reflects the twentieth century's interest, notably that of Freud and of the Surrealists, in the realm of the unconscious. Man is described as a complexity of heredity, natural instincts and character, especially excessive pride or hybris in the case of Oedipus, all of which influence his behaviour. According to our interpretation, the double determinism (outer and inner) which was separated to facilitate our analysis, is in fact, so interwoven as to form a complex, integral pattern of man's suffering. Sartre also is interested in man; his main concern, as philosopher and dramatist, is man and the human consciousness. The Sartrean philosophy is one of action wherein the existentialist hero, like Orestes, is the opposite of the Cocteau hero who accepts his fate; the former chooses his acts and so creates his own destiny. In chapter three we study the Sartrean revolt against God, a concept necessitated by human need and frailty. According to Les Mouches (1943) and Les Troyennes (1965), spiritual tyranny and moral order are detrimental to freedom since they hold men in bondage. Sartre believes that traditional morality is obsolete; therefore no one can guide man, even less dictate to him as he is free to invent his own values. In chapter four, Sartre's notion of total freedom is examined. The type of liberty advocated in his main play Les Mouches is not a "freedom-from" but a "freedom-for". Man must not consider himself free in the sense that he has no commitment and that he can do what he wants. Sartre wishes to replace this negative approach by a more positive type based on human solidarity and love. Once one recognizes and accepts personal autonomy, one must act in society, for being free in Sartre's terms, is being "free-to-do" and also being "free-in-society". Such a freedom however makes man suffer; he feels the anguish of responsibility and a sense of metaphysical solitude. But Sartre refuses determinism; one is either totally free or not at all. Also, determinism only serves as an alibi to avoid the harsh reality that one is basically free and solely responsible for one's acts which affect the self and society as well. Whichever path is followed, determinism or freedom, both Cocteau and Sartre arrive at the same conclusion: it is possible for him who suffers greatly to eventually attain self-knowledge and dignity, thereby reaching glory or greatness as in the case of Oedipus and Orestes. The apparent pessimism of life and its suffering can thus be transformed into optimism, which in the final analysis is a victory for mankind. / Arts, Faculty of / French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of / Graduate

La question sur la volonté chez Henri Bergson (1859-1941) est étroitement liée à celle de la durée ; la volonté doit être envisagée comme une force (et non seulement comme une faculté) au sein du temps créateur. Dans une telle perspective, le terme de l'effort ou bien plutôt le sentiment d'effort constitue une condition indispensable de la volonté. Notre recherche a comme but principal de démontrer l’affinité entre l’effort volontaire et la conception bergsonienne du temps comme invention. Parallèlement, nous mettons l'effort bergsonien en comparaison avec deux autres théories sur la même notion : avec celle-ci de Maine de Biran (1766-1824) et avec celle-là de WilliamJames (1842-1910). En dépit de la relation de filiation entre Biran et Bergson, selon le premier le temps se produit par l'effort, tandis que Bergson radicalise le temps et l'effort est une condition qui renforcera ce qui existe comme fait ontologique, l'élément du nouveau. Malgré les différences entre la théorie psychologique de James et la durée bergsonienne, les deux philosophes se rencontreront de façon décisive sur le thème de l'expérience de la nouveauté. De toutes manières, pour tous les trois philosophes l'effort constitue un élément essentiel de la volonté (qui surmonte l'intelligence humaine), car c'est grâce à lui que s'actualisent les virtualités de la conscience. / The question about the notion of will in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) is closely related with the principal notion of his thought, the notion of duration. We have to study the notion of will as a force within the creative time and not only as a mental faculty. In this way, the term of the effort in Bergson's philosophy or more accurately the sentiment ofthe effort is the essential condition of the will. The aim of our research is to reveal the affinity between the voluntary effort and the Bergson's conception of the time as invention. At the same time, our purpose is to compare the effort of Bergson with two other theories : with this one of Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and that one William James (1842-1910). Despite the filiation between Biran and Bergson, according the first one, the time is a product of the effort, while Bergson radicalize his conception of time and the effort is a condition which reinforces the ontological fact of the novelty. In spite of the differences between the psychological theory of James and Bergson's duration, the two philosophers will come across each other decisively regarding the topic of the experience of the novelty. In any case, for all the three of them the effort is a principal element of the will, which exceeds the human intelligence, because of the fact that the effort actualizes the potentialities of the conscience.

This diploma thesis deals with the problem of free will and the reliability of an introspective access to action intentions. The traditional questions of free will, responsibility and determinism are currently receiving a lot of attention due to the advances in cognitive sciences. Because of various scientific findings, many authors claim that free will is just an illusion. The purpose of this study is to discuss traditional conceptualization of this topic and point out its problems. As an alternative, I am trying to suggest a compatibilistic theory of freedom and responsibility, which is internally coherent and compatible with scientific evidence. The core of my thesis is a replication and modification of a recent experimental study, investigating voluntary decision-making and an introspective access to one's own intentions. The participants of the experiment performed reflexive actions which they misjudged as intentional. The goal of the theoretical part of my thesis has been accomplished on the basis of examining a voluminous foreign literature. The method involves a philosophical analysis of concepts with an emphasis on contemporary scientific findings. In the empirical part of my work, results were obtained in a cognitive-psychological experiment involving reaction time and evoked potential data acquisition and their analysis. First, a discussion of concepts relevant to the problem of free will is undertaken. An explication of the most significant experiments that question traditional intuitions about the human mind and free will is then given. A detailed description of my experiment follows, including its results and implications. Finally, conclusions about the nature of free will and responsibility are made together with certain suggestions for both the criminal justice system and everyday situations. Although I base the theoretical part of my thesis on the results of many authors, I contribute to it to a substantial degree with my own opinions and arguments. The empirical study is the most significant contribution of mine as its realization demanded i.a. a development of a stimulus presentation software, execution of the experimental tasks with a relatively large number of subjects and a mathematical and statistical evaluation of the acquired data.