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<p>Kant's ethical theory is often characterized as one in which freedom is identified with obedience to the moral law. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, however, free will appears to be characterized as the ability to choose either to obey or disobey the moral law. Hence, an evil act could be freely chosen, whereas according to the usual ethical conception, evil appears to have to be interpreted as a manifestation of lack of freedom. The problem treated in this thesis is whether or not Kant's account of radical evil in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is compatible with the conception of free will given in the ethics. If the two conceptions are aspects of one developed theory of free will, does the theory hold together; if they are actually two theories of will, what are the implications for Kant's ethics?</p> <p>Chapter I presents the problem and summarizes the two Prefaces to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as well as its first essay, "On the Radical Evil in Human Nature." Two conunentators, L.W. Beck and J.R. Silber, view Kant as developing one theory of free will. To show that this is so, they focus on Kant's distinction of will into two parts, Wille and Willkür, as a key to resolving possible contradictions. Their arguments are discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III analyzes the primary sources which Beck and Silber bring to corroborate their versions of the theory, and briefly sets forth the arguments of Emil Fackenheirn, who regards the essay in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone as repudiating the ethics. It concludes on the inconclusive note that the problem may be unresolvable.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Rights today are a jumble of conflicting and incompatible claims. Without correction, the concept of rights will be eroded and eventually abandoned. The loss would be tragic, because rights are essential to our long-term planning and success. Incompatible claims have arisen from incommensurable conceptual foundations. Historically and essentially, rights are egoistic. Attempts to justify rights according to other criteria - divine command, human dignity, altruism, utilitarianism - fail on their own terms. Egoism or self-interest is fully compatible with social responsibility and with regard for the interests of others. The nature of rights is examined and ethical diversity is defended. The evolution of rights is traced from Roman antiquity through medieval developments through modern refinements, with particular attention paid to the rights theories of Gerson, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. A will theory of rights is proposed based on contract rather than on natural law and teleology. This will theory is explained using state of nature theory, with reference to Olson's logic of collective action. It is contrasted with the egoistic theories of Rand and Smith, with the utilitarian will theories of Hart and Wellman, and with the interest theories of MacCormick and Kramer. / Philosophy

Le débat philosophique et politique portant sur le multiculturalisme occupe une place importante dans la littérature contemporaine. Ce travail vise à analyser une théorie politique qui propose des solutions aux problèmes que pose le pluralisme, ou multiculturalisme, au sein des États modernes. Nous y abordons principalement la théorie de Will Kymlicka, une théorie basée sur la possibilité de différencier la citoyenneté selon l'appartenance culturelle des individus. Nous proposons une analyse complète des arguments principaux ainsi qu'une critique constructive de la thèse de Kymlicka.

Existentialism has come to be seen as championing human freedom. The yearning for freedom does indeed run throughout this tradition together with an anti-metaphysical sentiment which lends itself to the rejection of a determinism which views human beings as mechanisms. But it would be a mistake to think that an existentialist necessarily advocates the doctrine of free will. A distinction must be made between free will and the idea of freedom as it appears in the writings of the major existentialists. Free will is to commonly understood to be a requirement for moral accountability. It is the metaphysics, or what Freidrich Nietzsche would call "the mythology" behind every act of blaming a huinan being. Out of the four major existentialists-Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre-Sartre is the only philosopher who seems to defend this metaphysics. "Existential Freedom," although compatible with the thesis of free will, does not necessitate it. Rather, it invites us to move beyond the guilt ridden ideas of responsibility associated with the moral subject, and embrace a grand responsibility for our future.

The purpose of this research is to determine the effect of divorce on the will and motivation of the child in the middle childhood phase. Instruments are identified for adaptation and use in determining the effect of divorce. In addition, ways of equipping the educational psychologist to facilitate the child's adjustment during and after the divorce process are examined. A literature study was undertaken to determine the theoretical context of the effect of divorce. A study was also undertaken of the cognitive development of the child in the middle childhood phase, which could shed some light on the reactions of the child during the divorce of his or her parents. The results of the empirical investigation showed that the child in the middle childhood phase can exhibit intrinsic motivation during the divorce process. It is, however, the external factors accompanying divorce that could cause the child to display a reduced will or motivation. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (Voorligting)

Today the conception of human rights is an idea that preserves its intransitive, inalienable and indivisible quality with a cross-cultural reference. The idea of human rights, entering our lives from the 18th century onwards, has gained a worldwide recognition through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The idea occupies place both at the level of rules and principles as a project and at the level of our daily problem solutions, modifications and the daily course of our lives as a pragmatics. The political framework provides the idea of human rights such a justification that it constitutes a significant part of our decisions, thoughts and actions. On the other hand, the grounds of the idea has been questioned as a part of the Enlightenment project since it was first articulated and especially in recent decades certain radical criticisms originating from Nietzche&rsquo / s thought became prevalent. The thesis questions this easy alliance between Nietzsche and radical attacks to human rights thought. In the first chapter, I first provided a brief historical overview of the idea of human rights. Then, I had a closer look towards the principles of universality, equality, autonomy and is-ought distinction with special reference to Kantian formulations of these concepts and in the second chapter, I elaborate Nietzsche&rsquo / s perception of these same principles and our understanding of conventional morality in general, to reach an articulated answer to the question: Would Nietzsche be categorically against human rights? I conclude that his philosophical attitude to these four principles differ from each other. In this context the thesis regards Nietzschean informal structures over the Kantian formal ones as complementary for a full grasp of the idea of human rights by offering a connection of the transitionality between Kant and Nietzsche.

The purpose of this research is to determine the effect of divorce on the will and motivation of the child in the middle childhood phase. Instruments are identified for adaptation and use in determining the effect of divorce. In addition, ways of equipping the educational psychologist to facilitate the child's adjustment during and after the divorce process are examined. A literature study was undertaken to determine the theoretical context of the effect of divorce. A study was also undertaken of the cognitive development of the child in the middle childhood phase, which could shed some light on the reactions of the child during the divorce of his or her parents. The results of the empirical investigation showed that the child in the middle childhood phase can exhibit intrinsic motivation during the divorce process. It is, however, the external factors accompanying divorce that could cause the child to display a reduced will or motivation. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (Voorligting)

Souvent conceptualisée comme l’envers ou l’opposé de la raison, la folie, presque toujours synonyme de débordement, semble vouée à outrepasser toute limite définitoire ou conceptuelle posée par la pensée rationnelle. Cette pulsion de délimitation ou de classification inhérente à la rationalité, trouve dans le genre l’une de ses expressions les plus représentatives. Partant du constat que la folie ne cesse de transgresser les frontières traditionnelles de genre, ce travail étudie les liens entre les représentations littéraires de la maladie mentale et les questions de genre sexué (« gender ») comme littéraire, dans un corpus composé de romans, nouvelles et pièces de théâtre de six auteurs (Janet Frame, Jenny Diski, Sarah Kane, Ian McEwan, Anthony Neilson et Will Self), publiés entre 1951 et 2004. Animées par une dynamique toujours renouvelée de subversion des catégories établies, ces oeuvres invitent à une réflexion sur le rapport particulier qu’entretient la folie à la frontière, qui de simple ligne de démarcation ou de séparation se fait point de contact, puis espace à part entière. À travers leurs représentations de la folie, les récits étudiés privilégient le plus souvent, en effet, une esthétique et une épistémologie de l’entre. Cette réflexion s’articule donc principalement autour des images et des usages de la liminalité dans ces histoires de fous et de folles qui, au fil de leur (re)définition de l’appartenance et de l’identité des textes et des individus, esquissent une cartographie mobile des « contrées à venir » dont Deleuze et Guattari font la destination de toute écriture. / Traditionally conceptualised as the underside or the outside of reason, madness most often rhymes with excess; as such, it continually threatens to transgress all definitional or conceptual limits set by rational thought. Indeed, at the core of rationality is an impulse to delimit and classify, of which categories of genre and gender are quintessential examples. Starting from the observation that depicting madness regularly entails crossing, questioning and redefining genre and gender boundaries, this work investigates how literary representations of madness relate to the classification and conceptualisation of gender and genre in a selection of novels, short stories and plays by six different writers – Janet Frame, Jenny Diski, Sarah Kane, Ian McEwan, Anthony Neilson, and Will Self – published between 1951 and 2004. With the subversion of established categories as their central aim and dynamics, these works call for an exploration of the specific way in which depictions of madness, by using the border as one of their core motifs, impact the conceptualisation of borders. No longer a mere demarcation or dividing line between spaces, or simply a meeting point, the border becomes a full-blown space for individuals and texts to inhabit. Indeed, through their representations of madness, the borderline stories under study seem to embrace and promote both an aesthetics and an epistemology of the in-between. This work therefore focuses on the images and uses of liminality in stories of madmen and madwomen that, by remapping textual and sexual identities, have begun to chart these “lands to come” which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, are the true destination of all writing.

Le philosophe et théologien saint Anselme de Cantorbéry (1033—1109) offre une pensée riche de la liberté qui a été influente au Moyen Âge. Katherin A. Rogers a récemment jugé bon de mettre Anselme en dialogue avec la philosophie contemporaine par rapport au débat sur le libre arbitre. La présente étude approuve ce projet, mais rejette le rapprochement que Rogers opère entre Anselme et Harry G. Frankfurt (1929—) avec son Interprétation Hiérarchique. Cette étude se donne pour tâche, dans un premier temps, de reprendre à zéro une étude historique sur la liberté chez Anselme en l’abordant par différents angles d’approche dans chacun de ses cinq chapitres, et dans un deuxième temps et de manière secondaire, de mener à bien une conversation entre Anselme et la philosophie contemporaine analytique sur le libre arbitre. À travers ces chapitres sur la pensée anselmienne, l’on verra : ce qui constitue le fondement de la morale, de la causalité, de la possibilité, et de la nécessité ; les distinctions et les concepts autour desquels s’articule le problème de la liberté, notamment la distinction entre faire sponte et naturaliter ; qu’Anselme se classe parmi les penseurs libertariens par rapport au libre arbitre, mais avec d’importantes qualifications ; le concept de la liberté du choix et sa force insurpassable ; les différents sens du mot « volonté », soit la volonté-instrument, la volonté-usus, et les affections de la volonté ; ainsi que la solution qu’Anselme apporte au problème de la possibilité du mal. Dans une conclusion, plutôt que de rapprocher Anselme de Frankfurt, on l’associera avec la théorie nommée agent-causation, dont Roderick M. Chisholm (1916—1999) est un des plus grands représentants. / The philosopher and theologian Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033—1109) offers a rich framework for thinking about freedom that has been influential in the Middle Ages. Katherin A. Rogers has recently judged right to put Anselm in dialogue with contemporary philosophy with regard to the debate on free will. The present study approves this project, but rejects the attempt to link Anselm with Harry G. Frankfurt (1929—) that Rogers operates with her Hierarchical Interpretation. This study gives itself the task, firstly, to rework from scratch a historical study on freedom in Anselm by tackling the subject from different vantage points in each of its five chapters, and secondly as well as secondarily, to establish communication between Anselm and contemporary analytical philosophy on the topic of free will. Throughout these chapters on Anselm’s philosophy, the following will be seen: what constitutes the foundation of morality, causality, possibility, and necessity; distinctions and concepts around which the problem of freedom articulates itself, in particular the distinction between doing sponte and naturaliter; that Anselm can be classified as a libertarian thinker regarding free will, but with important qualifications; the concept of freedom of choice and its unsurpassable strength; the three different senses of the word “will”: instrument of the will, usus of the will, and the affections of the will; as well as the solution that Anselm gives to the problem of the possibility of evil. In a conclusion, instead of bringing Anselm closer to Frankfurt, it is with the so-called agent-causation theory that he will be associated with, of which Roderick M. Chisholm (1916—1999) is one of the main upholders.