What are appropriate and relevant ways for collaboration and coordination between the three sections of aid work, humanitarian, development, and peace? This question has been topical for the aid community for decades when working in places where all three entities are present (Guinote, 2019). It is sometimes rejected, neglected but some times it is also considered and pursued (Hövelmann, 2020). This study aims to assess and analyze the arguments and breeding grounds for the triple nexus approached work in the DRC, the dynamics of promoting and receiving directions in a headquarters-field office relation exploring the challenges and opportunities between the three sections of HDP. Assessments have been done through conducting interviews remotely with people working on-site in the DRC at national or local offices and headquarters in Sweden and Central Europe. By interviewing eleven people with experience from all three HDP sectors, where a few people come from the donor sector, the goal has been to provide a broad picture of the aid community's perspective. This study's findings and inferences are related to funding structures where a more flexible funding system is requested. There are local involvement findings where signs through this study indicate local initiatives have been implementing the nexus approach for years. In environments such as presented in this study, of interrelating groups of people with differences in working culture, there are also challenges of clashing organizational principles, hegemonic approaches, and the ever topical issue of clear and relevant communication presented in the thesis. Through this assessment, power structures are pertinent to analyze to understand how the triple nexus approach can be further implemented. The agency theory will, in this study, be used as an eyeglass to assess these power relations.

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (L.L.D)" / II n'existe plus de grève dans les services publics sans que soit evoqué, voire réclamé ou exigé le service minimum. Le droit français n'offre qu'une législation très parcellaire et floue en la matière. Malgré de nombreuses propositions de loi, le législateur fait preuve d'inertie. Cette attitude s'explique notamment par la grande difficulté technique de la tâche imposant de concilier les deux principes de valeur constitutionnelle que sont le droit de grève et la continuité des services publics. Cette étude tend a mettre en exergue les interrogations relatives au service minimum et s'efforce de déceler la solution qui serait la mieux adaptée dans le système juridique français. Afin de donner plus de relief à la recherche, le choix a été fait de l'aborder en s'inspirant du droit étranger. Le modèle choisi est originaire du Canada, et plus exactement du Québec. II bénéficie d'un recul d'une vingtaine d'années et offre de ce fait, une expérience riche d'enseignements. La création d'un service minimum applicable aux services publics exige une analyse tant de la notion que de sa mise en ceuvre. Concrètement, iI s'agit d'identifier les fondements du service minimum, de délimiter son champ d'application mais aussi de le définir en termes qualitatif et quantitatif, d'envisager sa mise en ceuvre par la voie négociée avec des acteurs spécifiques et de présenter les moyens permettant d'assurer son effectivité. / Every public sector strike brings up the question of a need for a skeleton service. In this area French law is extremely fragmentary and vague. In spite of numerous attempts to introduce legislation no law has been voted. The main reason has been the considerable technical difficulty in reconciling the two basic constitutional principles ofthe right to strike and the continuity of public services. This study brings into focus the problems and questions arising from the idea of a skeleton service and attempts to identify the most practical solution in the context of French law. To give clearer defmition to the study, the Quebec legislation in this field was used as a model. It has been in force for twenty years and this offers many practical lessons. Setting up a skeleton service in the public sector has to be based on an accurate definition of the notion itself as well as its concrete application. Its underlying principles and field of application have to be defined. Qualitative and quantitative aspects, bargain procedures and partners, necessary resources, all have to be identified.

II n'existe plus de grève dans les services publics sans que soit evoqué, voire réclamé ou exigé le service minimum. Le droit français n'offre qu'une législation très parcellaire et floue en la matière. Malgré de nombreuses propositions de loi, le législateur fait preuve d'inertie. Cette attitude s'explique notamment par la grande difficulté technique de la tâche imposant de concilier les deux principes de valeur constitutionnelle que sont le droit de grève et la continuité des services publics. Cette étude tend a mettre en exergue les interrogations relatives au service minimum et s'efforce de déceler la solution qui serait la mieux adaptée dans le système juridique français. Afin de donner plus de relief à la recherche, le choix a été fait de l'aborder en s'inspirant du droit étranger. Le modèle choisi est originaire du Canada, et plus exactement du Québec. II bénéficie d'un recul d'une vingtaine d'années et offre de ce fait, une expérience riche d'enseignements. La création d'un service minimum applicable aux services publics exige une analyse tant de la notion que de sa mise en ceuvre. Concrètement, iI s'agit d'identifier les fondements du service minimum, de délimiter son champ d'application mais aussi de le définir en termes qualitatif et quantitatif, d'envisager sa mise en ceuvre par la voie négociée avec des acteurs spécifiques et de présenter les moyens permettant d'assurer son effectivité. / Every public sector strike brings up the question of a need for a skeleton service. In this area French law is extremely fragmentary and vague. In spite of numerous attempts to introduce legislation no law has been voted. The main reason has been the considerable technical difficulty in reconciling the two basic constitutional principles ofthe right to strike and the continuity of public services. This study brings into focus the problems and questions arising from the idea of a skeleton service and attempts to identify the most practical solution in the context of French law. To give clearer defmition to the study, the Quebec legislation in this field was used as a model. It has been in force for twenty years and this offers many practical lessons. Setting up a skeleton service in the public sector has to be based on an accurate definition of the notion itself as well as its concrete application. Its underlying principles and field of application have to be defined. Qualitative and quantitative aspects, bargain procedures and partners, necessary resources, all have to be identified. / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (L.L.D)"

Cette thèse présente l’évolution temporelle du lien entre les variables politiques et la mobilité des élites administratives dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada. Considérant la relation entre le gouvernement et l’administration comme une relation mandant-mandataire (principal-agent), la littérature en administration publique décrit l'influence de diverses dynamiques politiques – par exemple un changement de parti au pouvoir – sur le degré d’intervention des gouvernements dans la dotation du personnel administratif. S’appuyant sur la notion de marché bureaucratique (Public Service Bargain) de Hood et Lodge (2006), la présente thèse estime que la relation entre les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité des fonctionnaires s’inscrit dans un contexte sociohistorique. Plutôt que de percevoir l’ensemble des relations politico-administratives comme présentant les caractéristiques de la théorie mandant-mandataire, avec de nombreux conflits pour l’atteinte des objectifs et une grande asymétrie des informations, cette thèse suggère que la mesure dans laquelle diverses dynamiques politiques poussent les gouvernements à procéder à des mises à pied ou à des nominations stratégiques varie avec le temps, en suivant les changements dans ce qui entoure les relations politico-administratives. Les statistiques descriptives et la régression logistique sont principalement utilisées pour analyser l’association entre les variables politiques et la mobilité, à l’aide d’une base de données originale repostant des changements de sous-ministres dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada de 1920 à 2013. Les résultats empiriques permettent de conclure que l’influence des dynamiques politiques sur la mobilité des fonctionnaires varie en fonction des différents marchés bureaucratiques. Avant la mise en place d’une fonction publique professionnelle, où les relations politico-administratives s’inscrivaient dans un spoils bargain, les changements de gouvernement entraînaient une importante rotation des fonctionnaires. Cette pratique est conforme à un marché bureaucratique où les critères de compétences des fonctionnaires sont indéfinis, et où les fonctionnaires sont loyaux au parti au pouvoir. Dès la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, jusqu’aux années 1980, l’association entre les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité diminue grandement. Cette pratique correspond au marché bureaucratique de Schaffer (Schafferian bargain), où les gouvernements favorisent la connaissance technique des politiques et la bonne volonté des fonctionnaires à donner des conseils avisés aux membres du gouvernement, peu importe le parti au pouvoir. Dès les années 1980, les dynamiques politiques sont de nouveau associées à la mobilité. Or, non seulement les changements de parti, mais également l’élection de nouveaux chefs à la tête de ceux-ci entraînent une plus grande mobilité. Cette pratique va dans le sens du managerial bargain, où les nominations sont utilisées pour encourager l’allégeance à l’agenda gouvernemental et la compétence est comprise comme étant la bonne gestion du personnel et des ressources dans le but de répondre aux directives du gouvernement. Étudiant les actions stratégiques des gouvernements dans leur contexte sociohistorique, cette étude contribue de manière originale à l’administration publique et à la politique canadienne, en démontrant que les dynamiques politiques jouent un rôle quant à la mobilité des fonctionnaires, bien que la nature de ces dynamiques et l’étendue de leurs effets varient selon les époques, qui présentent des marchés bureaucratiques distincts. / This dissertation studies temporal variances in the relationship between political variables and the mobility of administrative elites in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies. Conceptualizing the association between the government and the bureaucracy as a principal-agent relationship, research in public administration has identified how various political dynamics – such as a transition in the governing party – affects the extent to which governments interfere in the staffing of bureaucratic personnel; removing incumbents and replacing them with persons who are believed to be loyal to government’s policy agenda. This dissertation contributes to this literature by identifying the historical contingencies with which political dynamics effect mobility. Drawing upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain (PSB), the relationship between political dynamics and mobility is situated within a more precise social-historical context. Rather than approaching political-administrative relationships as universally reflecting the specifications of principal-agent theory – exhibiting a high incidence of goal conflict and information asymmetry – this work claims that the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically dismiss and appoint personnel has varied over time, in tandem with shifts in the contours of political-administrative relationships; specifically, the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and its loyalty. Primarily using descriptive statistics and logistic regression the association between political variables and mobility is tested with an original dataset of deputy minister turnover in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the effect that political dynamics have on bureaucratic mobility has varied over time across distinct PSBs. Prior to the development of the modern professional bureaucracy, where political-administrative relationships reflected a spoils bargain, transitions in the governing party resulted in increased mobility. Such actions are congruent with a PSB where the nature of governance is of a minimal character; there are no specifications concerning the bureaucracy’s competency; and the bureaucracy’s loyalty is of a partisan nature towards the governing party. Starting in the postwar period and lasting until the 1980s, the association between political dynamics and mobility is significantly reduced. Such is congruent with a Schafferian bargain where governments encourage technical knowledge of policies and a willingness amongst bureaucrats to provide frank counsel to government office holders, regardless of the party in power. Starting in the 1980s however, political dynamics are once again positively associated with mobility. Yet now, not only transitions in party, but all newly elected heads of government lead to increased mobility. This is consistent with a managerial bargain where appointments are used to encourage loyalty to the government’s policy agenda and competency is understood as the ability to manage personnel and resources to realizing the directives dictated by the government. Situating the strategic actions of governments within their social-historical context, this work makes original contributions to the fields of public administration and Canadian politics by showing that when it comes to bureaucratic mobility, political dynamics matter; but which dynamics, and the extent of their effects, vary over time across distinct PSBs.

Esta dissertação investiga a relação entre eficiência econômica e reclamações trabalhistas. Especificamente, neste trabalho desenvolvemos um modelo teórico baseado na Teoria dos Jogos que explica o funcionamento econômico dos casos de reclamações trabalhistas, com ênfase na escolha entre soluções negociadas ou litigiosas para as mesmas. O texto dá atenção especial ao sistema existente no Brasil das Câmaras de Conciliação Prévia. Também testamos empiricamente as conclusões teóricas do modelo, para obter apoio empírico às suas previsões. Com base nas evidências obtidas, sugerimos alguns aperfeiçoamentos para melhorar o funcionamento das regras de solução das reclamações trabalhistas para extrair maior eficiência econômica destes procedimentos. / This dissertation investigates the relationship between economic efficiency and labor complaints. Specifically, this work developed a theoretical model based on Games Theory which explains the economic functioning of labor complaints cases, with emphasis on the choice between negotiated or litigant solutions to them. The text gives special attention to the existing system in Brazil called Câmaras de Conciliação Prévia (Prior Conciliation Boards). Moreover, we also have tested empirically the conclusions of the theoretical model, aiming to find empirical support to its forecasts. Based on the evidence obtained, we suggest some improvements to the functioning of the labor complaints solution rules, in order to extract greater economic efficiency from these procedures.

A patent is often characterized as a bargain between an inventor and society. Generally, for a patent to be considered valid, an invention must satisfy three broad criteria: it must be new, useful, and non-obvious. This paper focuses on the requirement of non-obviousness. It explores the criterion from inception to its current state and suggests a potential refinement. A multi-jurisdictional snap-shot is presented focusing on the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Canada. It is submitted that the non-obvious prerequisite contains a problematic level of uncertainty. The law of obviousness lacks a baseline standard. To achieve certainty, it is suggested that the law adopt the principles pertaining to patenting combinations and aggregates. Ultimately the law of patents, inclusive of the doctrine of obviousness, must be fashioned and administered in a manner that respects the quid pro quo that has guided the law for many years.

A patent is often characterized as a bargain between an inventor and society. Generally, for a patent to be considered valid, an invention must satisfy three broad criteria: it must be new, useful, and non-obvious. This paper focuses on the requirement of non-obviousness. It explores the criterion from inception to its current state and suggests a potential refinement. A multi-jurisdictional snap-shot is presented focusing on the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Canada. It is submitted that the non-obvious prerequisite contains a problematic level of uncertainty. The law of obviousness lacks a baseline standard. To achieve certainty, it is suggested that the law adopt the principles pertaining to patenting combinations and aggregates. Ultimately the law of patents, inclusive of the doctrine of obviousness, must be fashioned and administered in a manner that respects the quid pro quo that has guided the law for many years.

International trade ties the world together and is hypothetically fair and equal. In reality, it is highly asymmetrical and poses a significant challenge for developing countries. A massive sea change occurred in the international trade regime during the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1986 to 1994. Developing countries as a whole began to embrace liberal trade policies which seemed to be the only alternative to failing import substitution industrialization (ISI). An historical comparative account describing and explaining this transformation of developing countries’ attitudes toward the GATT is used in this dissertation to provide an alternative explanation for the transition of developing countries from having little interest in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations to sharply changing course and adopting neo-liberal policies which supported the conclusion of the Round. Three theoretical approaches seek to explain why this change occurred, including: liberal trade theory (economic reforms), dependency theory (external forces) and constructivism (the role epistemic communities). The Uruguay Round negotiations were dynamic and heavily influenced by two power-house developing economies, India and Brazil, who were initially opposed to the Round itself. Kenya found itself in a starkly different situation with minimal ability to participate or influence negotiations. These three countries constitute the study’s illustrative case studies. As negotiations progressed, India and Brazil changed course and agreed to the Round’s ‘single-undertaking’ and the ‘inequitable Grand Bargain’ between the developed and developing economies. This subsequently led to other developing countries following suit through a powerful demonstration effect in a trade-off between the inclusion of trade in services and intellectual property for reforms in agriculture and textiles & clothing. While economic reforms began to occur and attitudes began to change during the Uruguay Round itself, assessing developing countries during the Round found that no single theoretical approach can explain developing countries’ transformation; rather each had their own trajectory for their economic reforms. A multi-dimensional conclusion provides the most comprehensive account of this transformation of the global trade regime.

Esta dissertação investiga a relação entre eficiência econômica e reclamações trabalhistas. Especificamente, neste trabalho desenvolvemos um modelo teórico baseado na Teoria dos Jogos que explica o funcionamento econômico dos casos de reclamações trabalhistas, com ênfase na escolha entre soluções negociadas ou litigiosas para as mesmas. O texto dá atenção especial ao sistema existente no Brasil das Câmaras de Conciliação Prévia. Também testamos empiricamente as conclusões teóricas do modelo, para obter apoio empírico às suas previsões. Com base nas evidências obtidas, sugerimos alguns aperfeiçoamentos para melhorar o funcionamento das regras de solução das reclamações trabalhistas para extrair maior eficiência econômica destes procedimentos. / This dissertation investigates the relationship between economic efficiency and labor complaints. Specifically, this work developed a theoretical model based on Games Theory which explains the economic functioning of labor complaints cases, with emphasis on the choice between negotiated or litigant solutions to them. The text gives special attention to the existing system in Brazil called Câmaras de Conciliação Prévia (Prior Conciliation Boards). Moreover, we also have tested empirically the conclusions of the theoretical model, aiming to find empirical support to its forecasts. Based on the evidence obtained, we suggest some improvements to the functioning of the labor complaints solution rules, in order to extract greater economic efficiency from these procedures.

[pt] Esta pesquisa modela a estratégia exploratória sequencial de prospectos de óleo e gás em diferentes níveis de incerteza. Considera a consolidação da carteira pelo conceito de revelação da informação e as vantagens do uso da teoria do Valor da Informação para a sequência ótima de perfuração. Inclui a incerteza de preços com o Movimento Geométrico Browniano para o preço spot do barril de petróleo. Dado o tempo do contrato de concessão de exploração de petróleo, são analisados os valores das opções de investir nos ativos e no portfólio exploratório. Além dessas incertezas, o modelo considera o efeito competitivo de outra empresa em um jogo conhecido como Guerra de Atrito, examinado com uso de diversos estudos de caso. Esse jogo ocorre quando os ativos têm correlações e as empresas aguardam informação pública e gratuita de ocorrência de hidrocarboneto da perfuração do ativo pela operadora vizinha. Os resultados apontam que é melhor para a empresa analisar suas oportunidades exploratórias com a teoria das opções reais, sendo melhor a análise por portfólio exploratório, que combina o valor da espera com o valor da informação. Os efeitos da interação estratégica são relevantes, essencialmente quando os portfólios das duas empresas têm os gatilhos exploratórios similares. Em jogos assimétricos, o que define a degeneração para ação de perfurar de uma das operadoras é a relação entre os gatilhos exploratórios e os gatilhos de perfuração simultânea, efeito que também pode ser analisado na comparação do benefício da espera por informações das empresas em conflito. Caso haja perpetuação na guerra de atrito, é proposto uma mudança para o jogo de barganha cooperativa. Nessa mudança, deve haver troca de informações entre as empresas em negociação, sendo a informação privada de melhor qualidade que a informação pública, elevando a medida de aprendizado dos ativos da carteira. No caso de pequena melhora na medida de aprendizado, a mudança para a barganha cooperativa já se torna vantajosa para ambos os jogadores. / [en] This research models the sequential exploratory strategy of oil and gas prospects at different levels of uncertainty. To do so, it considers portfolio consolidation by the concept of information disclosure and the advantages of using Information Value theory for the optimal drilling sequence. The price uncertainty of the spot price of a barrel of oil is modeled as a Geometric Brownian Motion. Given the length of the oil exploration concession contract, the option values of investing in the assets and exploration portfolio are analyzed. In addition to these uncertainties, the model considers the competitive effect of another company in a game known as the War of Attrition, examined using several case studies. This game occurs when assets are correlated, and companies wait as free-riders for information of hydrocarbon occurrence from the drilling of the asset by the neighboring operator. The results point out that the firm should analyze its exploratory opportunities under the real options approach, and improves with exploratory portfolio analysis, which combines the value of waiting with the value of information. The impact of strategic interactions is relevant, especially when the two firms portfolios have similar exploratory triggers. In asymmetric games, the ratio between the exploratory triggers and the simultaneous drilling triggers defines the degeneration to drilling action of one of the operators. This effect can also be analyzed when comparing the benefit of waiting for information from the conflicting companies. If there is perpetuation in the war of attrition, agents can change to a cooperative bargaining game. In this case, there should be an information exchange between the trading firms, with private information being more relevant than public information. In the case of a marginal improvement in the learning measure, the change to cooperative bargaining already becomes advantageous for both players.