This thesis argues that the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have been wildly misinterpreted and mischaracterized in the contemporary field of political theory. By comparing Marx and Engels’s original writings with multiple contemporary Marxist perspectives, I find that contemporary Marxist theory bears little resemblance to that of Marx and Engels. I prove that the popular characterizations of Marxism as teleological and Marx as an idealist are incorrect, finding that most critics neglect to consider the possibility of a scientific, non-teleological determinism. In place of the contradictory interpretations proposed by contemporary theorists, I illuminate several overlooked elements of Marx’s work and present a more accurate model for understanding communism. With it, I make the case that Marxism is not teleological or prophetic, but has also not been disproven by history. Unless they are someday proven wrong, Marx and Engels’s work alone stands as a coherent and factual scientific analysis of the current mode of production—and is the only way out of it.

Result of this work is a reconstruction of proof, that non-deterministic linear time is strictly more powerful than deterministic linear time. We focus on completeness and clarity either of proof itself, either of all auxiliary propositions, which lead to this result.

Este trabalho pretende avaliar, em caráter exploratório, em que medida os alunos dos primeiros e últimos anos de Psicologia de diferentes instituições de ensino tendem a aceitar ou, inversamente, rejeitar a idéia do determinismo infantil. Para tal avaliação, foi proposta uma escala do tipo Likert, denominada Escala de Determinismo Infantil - EDI, composta por quinze afirmativas, fundamentadas em diferentes concepções teóricas, frente as quais o aluno deve se posicionar, concordando ou discordando. Visando pautar as discussões e avaliações precedentes, realizou-se revisão bibliográfica, na qual são apresentados e discutidos autores e pesquisas que contribuem para a idéia do determinismo infantil e de autores e pesquisas que, contrariamente, criticam ou questionam esta mesma idéia. Além disso, acrescentou-se capítulo em que se discute se a concepção determinista em apreço corresponde a uma representação social. Buscou-se também discutir, em capítulo introdutório, o contexto sócio-histórico que marcou o estudo das primeiras experiências, favorecendo-se a crença na mencionada concepção. Após a revisão bibliográfica acima comentada, realizou-se a apresentação e discussão do método, caracterizandose os sujeitos, o material e o procedimento envolvidos na pesquisa. Seguiu-se a apresentação dos resultados, obtidos por meio da aplicação e posterior análise estatística dos dados provenientes da EDI. Por fim, foi realizada discussão dos resultados, refletindo-se sobre as possíveis implicações destes na formação e futura atuação dos profissionais de Psicologia / This work pretends to evaluate, in a exploring way, how the students from the first and last year of Psychology by different institution of education tend to accept or, inversally, to reject the idea about infant determinism. To this evaluation, was made a proposal one likert scale, named Infant Determinism Scale- EDI, composed by fifteen affirmative, based in different theoretical conception, in front of these the students must to take a position, agreeing or disagreeing. Search for to list the discussion and preceding valuations, was maked bibliographyc revision, in which are introducing and discussing authors and search that contributing to the infant determinism idea and by authors and investigations that, on the contrary, make criticism or question this same idea. Besides, was added chapter in which are discussing if the determinism idea in focus correspond to an social representation. Was looked for to discuss, in an introductory chapter, the social-historical context that marked the study of the first experience, favouring the mention idea. After the bibliographic revision commented above, was accomplished the presentation and discussion of the method, characterizing the subjects, the material and the procedure involved in the search. Was followed the result presentation obtained by the application and subsequent statistics datum from the EDI. Finnally, was realized result discussion, thinking about these possible implications in the formation and future actuation of psychology professionals

<p>Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen.</p> / <p>This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.</p>

This thesis is centrally concerned with the current nee-liberal world order and its effects upon society. It is concerned to expose the contradictions and weaknesses within the knowledge systems that underpin our political reality. It considers economics as the determining discourse of neo-liberal politics, analytic biology as its determining discourse of individual persons, and analytic and neo-pragmatist philosophy as its leading systems of thought. In each case it finds a linear rationalism compatible with the determinist materialism of noo-Darwinism, and indeed explicitly invoking Darwin. This seems to vindicate Manuel Castells's fmding of this 'Knowledge Society' as driven by 'an abstract, universal instrumentalism'. The thought systems of this economic liberalism have seen politics subsumed within economics, de-humanising most of the institutions of the earlier Liberal tradition, to the detriment of both freedom and democracy. But it disputes Castells's assumption that this is a necessary reality and finds in neo-liberal education the exception to this dehumanising trend. Revitalised as 'Mode 2' knowledge production, this form of teaching, learning and research is found to be ideally suited to challenge the underpinnings of the very social order which initially produced it. The thesis as a whole is designed to employ Mode 2 methods in order to support this contention. Using this approach it seeks to demonstrate that in place of neo-Darwinism the ideas of the South African natural scientist Eugene Marais, concerning the significance of conscious thought itself within evolution, can provide a more convincing epistemoloy than the behaviourism and materialism of analytic biology. It finds John Maynard Keynes's acceptance of economics as a moral and not a natural science, more logically convincing and more inherently useful for social reconstruction than the current mathematicisation of economic theory. Prevalent philosophical approaches appear to serve only to reinforce the systems of thought already found (and found wanting) in politics, biology and economics. But again these philosophies are shown to be vulnerable to a Mode 2 critique, particularly employing the ontological understanding of the contemporary pragmatist philosopher Joseph Margolis, whose strong version of relativism allows for both bivalent and multivalent truth values more appropriate to understanding the complex realities of ethical and democratic societies. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

Este trabalho pretende avaliar, em caráter exploratório, em que medida os alunos dos primeiros e últimos anos de Psicologia de diferentes instituições de ensino tendem a aceitar ou, inversamente, rejeitar a idéia do determinismo infantil. Para tal avaliação, foi proposta uma escala do tipo Likert, denominada Escala de Determinismo Infantil - EDI, composta por quinze afirmativas, fundamentadas em diferentes concepções teóricas, frente as quais o aluno deve se posicionar, concordando ou discordando. Visando pautar as discussões e avaliações precedentes, realizou-se revisão bibliográfica, na qual são apresentados e discutidos autores e pesquisas que contribuem para a idéia do determinismo infantil e de autores e pesquisas que, contrariamente, criticam ou questionam esta mesma idéia. Além disso, acrescentou-se capítulo em que se discute se a concepção determinista em apreço corresponde a uma representação social. Buscou-se também discutir, em capítulo introdutório, o contexto sócio-histórico que marcou o estudo das primeiras experiências, favorecendo-se a crença na mencionada concepção. Após a revisão bibliográfica acima comentada, realizou-se a apresentação e discussão do método, caracterizandose os sujeitos, o material e o procedimento envolvidos na pesquisa. Seguiu-se a apresentação dos resultados, obtidos por meio da aplicação e posterior análise estatística dos dados provenientes da EDI. Por fim, foi realizada discussão dos resultados, refletindo-se sobre as possíveis implicações destes na formação e futura atuação dos profissionais de Psicologia / This work pretends to evaluate, in a exploring way, how the students from the first and last year of Psychology by different institution of education tend to accept or, inversally, to reject the idea about infant determinism. To this evaluation, was made a proposal one likert scale, named Infant Determinism Scale- EDI, composed by fifteen affirmative, based in different theoretical conception, in front of these the students must to take a position, agreeing or disagreeing. Search for to list the discussion and preceding valuations, was maked bibliographyc revision, in which are introducing and discussing authors and search that contributing to the infant determinism idea and by authors and investigations that, on the contrary, make criticism or question this same idea. Besides, was added chapter in which are discussing if the determinism idea in focus correspond to an social representation. Was looked for to discuss, in an introductory chapter, the social-historical context that marked the study of the first experience, favouring the mention idea. After the bibliographic revision commented above, was accomplished the presentation and discussion of the method, characterizing the subjects, the material and the procedure involved in the search. Was followed the result presentation obtained by the application and subsequent statistics datum from the EDI. Finnally, was realized result discussion, thinking about these possible implications in the formation and future actuation of psychology professionals

Syftet med denna systematiska litteraturstudie var att bidra med insikt i matematikångest i matematikundervisning i yngre åldrar genom att besvara frågeställningarna ”Vilka faktorer orsakar matematikångest hos elever i årskurs F-6?” och ”Vad kan lärare göra för att motverka matematikångest hos elever i årskurs F-6?”. Frågorna har besvarats med hjälp av Banduras teori om reciprok determinism. Resultatet visade att matematikångest ofta orsakades av flera faktorer samtidigt, såsom personliga faktorer, miljömässiga faktorer samt beteenderelaterade faktorer. För att motverka matematikångest behöver läraren göra någon förändring i den miljömässiga faktorn, för att i sin tur kunna påverka på elevernas personliga nivå. Lärare kan dock inte genomföra allt på egen hand, utan kan behöva ta hjälp av övrig personal på skolan, föräldrar samt av eleverna själva i kampen mot matematikångest. / The aim of this systematic literature study was to contribute with insight on mathematics anxiety in mathematics education in younger students by answering the research questions “Which factors causes mathematics anxiety in students in grade F-6?” and “What can teachers do to counteract mathematics anxiety in students in grade F-6?”. The questions were answered with help from Bandura’s theory on reciprocal determinism. The results showed that mathematics anxiety was often caused by several factors simultaneously, such as personal, environmental, and behavioral factors. To counteract mathematics anxiety, teachers need to make some form of change in the environmental factor, to be able to affect the students on the personal level. However, teachers are not able to do all of this by themselves, they need help from the school colleagues, parents, and the students themselves in the battle against mathematics anxiety

The objective was to examine students’ attitudes versus the concepts of free will and determinism, and to juxtapose these to anxiety and religiosity.An online survey was filled in by 162 Swedish students aged between 18 and 20 in an upper secondary high school. To measure the concepts of free will and determinism the Paulhus &amp; Carey FAD-Plus scale (2011) has been used. Anxiety was measured with two types of the short STAI-index.The factor analysis did not support the idea of an extra division of the original FAD-plus index into the factors ‘free will without moral responsibility’ and the fac-tor ‘moral responsibility’. Some minor sex differences were notices in that females scored higher on fatalistic determinism as well as anxiety. The correlation be-tween free will and scientific determinism were very small negative and not sig-nificant, implying that the two concepts are compatible to at least some respond-ents. The same week correspondence were noticed between scientific determin-ism and moral, showing that the dichotomy between the concepts having low support among students.The traditionally seen opposite concepts of fatalistic and scientific determin-ism were surprisingly positively and significant corresponding.Conclusion of the survey results support the view that the question on free will and determinism is more complex than a simple two way street as shown by Paulhus &amp; Carey (2011) and Nichols &amp; Knobe (2007). Moral responsibility is strongly connected to free will, but is not negatively correlated to determinism showing an interesting paradox in the traditional view of these concepts.

In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions. The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism. Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism. / I den här avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en tes som jag kallar “praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism”. Enligt praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är det så att en agent med praktisk frihet är tillräckligt fri för att vara en moralisk agent och moraliskt ansvarig. Praktisk frihet är ett koncept vi ursprungligen hittar hos Kant. Det används också av en del nutida Kantianer. Kant argumenterade för att vi kan betrakta världen från antingen ett praktiskt eller ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Det teoretiska perspektivet är det vi har när vi gör förutsägelser och hittar kausala förklaringar, medan det praktiska är det vi har när vi väljer och handlar. Vi kan se att vi är fria när vi ser på tillvaron ur det praktiska perspektivet. Determinismen kan inte hota vår praktiska frihet, för vi måste välja våra handlingar oavsett om allting i slutändan är determinerat. I denna avhandling definierar jag praktisk frihet på följande sätt: En agent har minimal praktisk frihet om och endast om han måste välja sina handlingar, och han tror att hans vilja är effektiv när det gäller att realisera de handlingsalternativ han funderat över och väljer mellan. En agent har maximal praktisk frihet om och endast om han har minimal praktisk frihet, hans vilja verkligen är effektiv, han har full information om de alternativ han funderar över, och alla alternativ han inte tänkt på är sådana att hans egna värderingar inte ger honom ett övervägande skäl att välja ett av dessa alternativ snarare än det han faktiskt väljer. Jag argumenterar för att praktisk frihet så definierat är tillräckligt med frihet för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar eftersom moralen är handlingsvägledande. Det betyder att rätt och fel är koncept som ska användas i övervägning av olika handlingsalternativ och rådgivning. Tredje-persons-omdömen om ifall någon handlade rätt eller fel måste vara sådana att de hypotetiskt sett skulle kunna fungera som råd; egenskapen att vara rätt eller fel kan inte förändras beroende på om vi ger råd eller bara faller omdömen. Detta är ett starkt skäl för att betrakta faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare som irrelevanta när man faller omdömen om rätt och fel, och ifall någon hade en annan sorts frihet än den praktiska är irrelevant för övervägare och rådgivare. Vi har också prima facie skäl att betrakta moraliskt ansvar som knutet till rätt och fel, så att agenter är klandervärda när de gjorde fel (eller subjektivt fel, eller vad som skulle ha varit fel givet den information agenten hade osv) och berömvärda när de gjorde rätt (subjektivt rätt osv). Att det finns prima facie skäl för att betrakta praktisk frihet som tillräckligt för moraliskt ansvar utesluter förstås inte att det finns övervägande skäl för den motsatta ståndpunkten. Jag visar dock att inga klassiska argument för inkompatibilism om determinism och moraliskt ansvar fungerar när man riktar dem mot praktisk-perpsektiv-kompatibilism. Alla sådana argument förutsätter vad som skulle bevisas, nämligen att faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare är moraliskt relevanta, och att pålitliga moraliska intuitioner uppstår när vi betraktar agenter från ett teoretiskt snarare än praktiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuterar denna avhandling relationen mellan metaetik och kompatibilism. Praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är kompatibel med samtliga metaetiska teorier, medan det finns flera metaetiska teorier som implicerar att inkompatibilismen är falsk, och åtminstone en som implicerar att vissa kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Enligt en speciell Kantiansk konstruktivistisk teori så finns det rätt- och felaktiga handlingar och moraliskt ansvar på grund av att det finns praktisk frihet. Om detta är den sanna metaetiska teorin, så följer det att praktisk frihet är tillräckligt för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar, och att inte bara inkompatibilism men andra kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Beroende på vilken metaetisk teori som är den sanna, kan det alltså vara så att de föregående argumenten är överflödiga för att bevisa praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism. Det kan vara så att denna tes helt enkelt följer från den sanna metaetiska teorin.

Journalistiken har de senaste åren utmanats av digitaliseringen samt samhällsförändringar och industrin går mot en negativ trend. Detta är en fallstudie som undersöker vilka villkor och förutsättningar digitaliseringen ställer på rollen som journalist för att försöka ge ökad förståelse om hur tekniken formar framtidens journalister. Undersökningen utfördes genom kvalitativa intervjuer av journalister och redaktörer inom branschen. Teori hämtades främst från relevant litteratur inom informatik och medieteknik, vilket blev fallstudiens ryggrad. Resultatet av denna studie visar på att digitaliseringen främst ställer krav på multikompetens och flexibilitet för rollen som journalist. Digitaliseringen snarare utmanar organisationens företagskultur och journalistens personliga värderingar och ideal än omformatering av rollen. Studien pekar på att socioteknisk determinism är det som avgör framtiden för rollen som journalist och journalistiken som helhet. Således ges förslag till vidare forskning om hur samhället kan använda sig av digitaliseringen för att enklare hantera vad studien kallar “Generationscykeln”. / Journalism has in recent years been challenged by digitalisation and societal changes and the industry is moving towards a negative trend. This is a case study that examines the terms and conditions digitalisation applies to the role of journalists in order to try to gain a better understanding of how technology shapes the journalists of the future. The survey was conducted through qualitative interviews of journalists and editors in the industry. The theory was mainly derived from relevant literature in informatics and media technology, which became the backbone of the case study. The results of this study shows that digitalisation primarily sets demands on multicompetence and flexibility on the role of a journalist. Digitization challenges the organization's corporate culture and the journalist's personal values ​​and ideals rather than reformatting the role. The study points out that sociotechnical determinism is what determines the future of the role of journalist and journalism as a whole. Thus, suggestions are made for further research on how society can use digitalization to more easily manage what the study calls the "Generation Cycle”.