This research paper makes an attempt at closing the gap in literature by testing agency considerations as an influencing factor for dividend policy of IPO firms. Dividend data of 642 firms from seven countries are used to make statistical interferences about the time it takes an IPO to issue dividend, influenced by different institutional factors of countries. An OLS is used to make these interferences. The results presented here indicate that there is a robust effect of legal enforcement on the time it takes before an IPO firm in a certain country pays its first dividend.

La thèse vise à identifier, dans un premier temps, l’influence du timing de versement des dividendes des sociétés françaises cotées sur les cours boursiers. Elle cherche à identifier, dans un deuxième temps, les déterminants du timing de versement des dividendes. La démarche retenue pour argumenter ces propos est la suivante : dans une première partie, nous avons posé notre cadre théorique. Le positionnement de la thèse dans l’ancrage de la théorie politico-contracteulle et la théorie des signaux nous a orienté vers l’étude du contenu informationnel du timing de versement des dividendes dans un premier temps et à identifier ses déterminants dans un deuxième temps. La seconde partie est consacrée à l’étude empirique réalisée auprès de 69 entreprises initiatrices de dividendes cotées à l’indice SBF 120 durant l’année 2007 afin de répondre à notre premier objectif, et portée sur un échantillon de 57 sociétés françaises distributrices d’un dividende annuel durant la période 2003-2009 afin de répondre à notre second objectif. S’agissant de notre premier objectif, le recours à la méthodologie des études d’évènement a révélé que les cours réagissent à la date de versement des dividendes ce qui confirme que le timing de versement des dividendes possède un contenu informationnel. Quant à notre second objectif, les dispositions réglementaires souples sur la fixation de la date de versement du dividende et son emploi en tant que signal émis de la firme vers le marché posent la question du choix de cette date dans le contexte français à système juridique civil connu pour la protection des intérêts des actionnaires minoritaires. Les résultats de la littérature antérieure restent timides en raison de leur focalisation sur la date de versement du premier dividende – et notamment sur la probabilité d’initier un dividende suite à l’introduction en bourse. Les résultats de notre étude empirique confirment l’impact significatif de la présence d’un actionnaire majoritaire, de la profitabilité, de la liquidité et de la durée de versement du dividende précédent sur la fixation de la date de versement de cette année. Cet impact semble se manifester à travers une limitation de la durée entre la date de l’assemblée des actionnaires et la date de paiement effectif des dividendes et une reconnaissance de cette durée comme étant une bonne nouvelle par rapport aux autres signaux émis par l’entreprise au marché boursier. / The purpose of this study is to identify the informational content of the dividend pay date and its determinants. Namely, is there information in the timing of the dividend payments? The empirical evidence indicates that the market reacts at the dividend pay date. Mean excess returns of stock prices on the pay date are significantly positive and are insignificant and negative around the entire population of dividend pay dates. On the other side we are interested in the determinants of the dividend pay date. Our multivariate analysis shows that the ownership structure, the liquidity of the firm, the result, and the previous timing of dividend payment influence the fixing of the dividend pay date. This impact is shown as shorten as the delay between the date of the general meeting and the dividend pay date. This duration is considered as good news and can be a signal employed to attract new investors in the stock market.

This dissertation consists of 2 essays in the area of corporate finance. The title of my first essay is “Impact of Institutional Investors on Firms’ Financial Constraint and Liquidity”. We can find ample evidences in existing literature which show that institutional investors play a vital role in the corporate world. Many researchers have linked institutional investors to activism, monitoring benefits, mitigating the cost of debt using government bond, spin off activities and improving information asymmetry problem. In the first essay, I would like to add another dimension to institutional investors’ literature by examining institutional investors’ role in mitigating financial constraint problem in the firm. Institutional investors have large financial networks and make large financial investment in firms. Their presence might help firms attract external capital. I am using 2 financial constraint measurements; KZ index (Lamont, Polk, Saa-Requejo, 2001) and bank line of credit (Sufi, 2009). I am also adding additional measurement for financial constraint using notes payable. I find evidences to support the hypotheses that institutional investors’ presence and ownership mitigate financial constraints. The title of my second essay is “Long- and Short-Term Institutional Investors and Payout Policy”. In the second essay, I examine the relationship between the firms’ payout policy and the presence/ownership of certain type of institutional investors. I classify the types of institutional investors using Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification of institutional investors. I find that the presence and the magnitude of long term institutional investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of dividend. I also find that the presence and the magnitude of short term institutional investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of share repurchases. This study suggests that the presence of different types of institutional investors can affect certain type of payout policy. Keywords: Transient; dedicated; monitoring; trading

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the stock price behaviour of firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) around corporate events relating to final cash dividend change announcements over the period 2004 to 2009. Declared for the financial year-end, final cash dividend announcements either represent an increase, a reduction or no change relative to the previous year’s announcement. In this paper we analyse the stock price behaviour of firms that announced dividend reductions before and during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 (GFC 2007). The pre-crisis analysis focuses on dividend reduction effects on share price during normal economic times and crisis analysis focuses on effects during economic downturn. We refer to the pre and during crises effects as firm-specific and systemic effects respectively. Studies about the general effect of dividend announcements on shareholder value are well documented; however our study is motivated by the fact that there has not been an abundance of forthcoming research in South Africa pertaining to how share prices have reacted to dividend reductions before and during the GFC 2007. We employ an event study methodology in the context of this emerging market to assess the share price behaviour to dividend reductions. Integral to an event study methodology in the corporate context, is the analysis of abnormal performance around the event date. Abnormal performance is measured by employing three widely used quantitative approaches namely, the market-adjusted, market model and the buy-and-hold abnormal return approaches. Based on daily closing share price information collected from iNet Bridge database, abnormal performance is calculated from 2004 to 2009 while controlling for the contemporaneous effect of earnings announcements (earnings data collected from Bloomberg database) occurring within 10 trading days of dividend announcement. The analysis shows that the market reaction is not statistically significant on the announcement day and that more negative returns occur during the pre-crisis period. Volatility of abnormal returns is higher during the pre-crisis period. The research does not support the Irrelevance Theory but seems to support the signalling hypothesis.

This study investigates payouts in Swedish family firms by focusing on both the level and speed of adjustment of dividends. In addition, the use of dual-class shares in family firms is examined to further identify potential drivers of payout differences between family-controlled companies and non-family firms. Agency theory and previous studies suggest that high and stable payouts are used by controlling families to mitigate minority shareholders’ concerns of being expropriated. We find that family firms in Sweden do not differ from non-family firms in their payouts. The results could be seen as an indication of expropriation if minority shareholders should be compensated for higher agency costs, but it could also be that family control does not worsen agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. Rather, other ownership structures such as the use of dual-class shares to gain control in excess of ownership seem to be associated with higher levels of payouts. Neither do family firms smooth their dividends more than non-family firms. Instead, they adapt towards their target dividend at a higher pace.

Syfte: Valet av utdelningspolitik är ett av de viktigaste och svåraste finansiella beslut som företag ställs inför. Samtidigt blir socialt ansvarstagande (CSR) en allt viktigare fråga för företagens lönsamhet då konsumenter och övriga intressenter blir allt mer medvetna och ställer allt högre krav på företagens ansvarstagande. Men om det finns ett samband mellan dessa två högt aktuella punkterna är oklart. Denna studie avser att studera hur CSR-nivå påverkar utdelningspolitiken, samt om olika dimensioner av CSR har olika effekt.   Metod: Studien tillhör kvantitativ forskning och tar avstamp från positivismen med en hypotetisk-deduktiv ansats. Studien är utförd med sekundärdata för åren 2009–2017 inhämtat från databasen Thomson Reuters. Urvalet består utav 207 europeiska börsnoterade företag och analysen genomfördes i statistikprogrammet IBM SPSS.   Resultat & slutsats: Studien visar att CSR inte påverkar beslutet om utdelning ska ges men har en positiv effekt på utdelning i de företag som ger utdelning, vilket indikerar att CSR inte reducerar utdelningen. Dimensionerna samhälle och bolagsstyrning har en positiv effekt på utdelning, medan miljödimensionen inte har något samband, vilket indikerar att aggregerad CSR kan ge missvisande resultat. Resultaten ger stöd för signaleringsteorin men inte för agentteorin.   Examensarbetets bidrag: Studien ger ett teoretiskt bidrag till den företagsekonomiska forskningen genom att studera och därmed även utveckla kunskapen om hur CSR-nivå, både aggregerat och uppdelat i dimensioner, påverkar utdelningspolitik. Studien ger ett praktiskt bidrag genom att hjälpa investerare i sina val och visa att spendera resurser på CSR inte reducerar kassaflödet som går till ägarna.   Förslag till fortsatt forskning: I studien har endast ett mått för utdelning används men inom litteraturen förekommer flera. Det skulle därmed vara intressant att använda flera olika mått för att se att detta inte förändrar resultaten. Även andra mått på CSR samt andra dimensioner skulle vara intressant att studera. Slutligen skulle det även kunna vara intressant att inkludera andra områden/länder i en liknande studie. / Aim: The choice of dividend policy is one of the most important and difficult financial decisions that a firm must face. Concurrently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is becoming an increasingly more crucial question for the profitability of a firm, since consumers and other stakeholders are becoming more aware and have rising demands on the level of responsibility taken by firms. But if there is any correlation between these two highly current topics is unclear. This study aims to study how CSR-level affects the dividend policy, and if different dimensions of CSR have different effects.   Method: The study belongs to quantitative research and applies a positivistic research philosophy with a hypothetical-deductive approach. The study is made with secondary data for the years 2009-2017 retrieved from the database Thomson Reuters. The sample consists of 207 public European firms and the analysis was conducted in the statistics program IBM SPSS.   Result & Conclusions: The study show that CSR does not affect the decision whatever dividend should be distributed but has a positive effect on dividend in firms that does pay dividend, which indicate that CSR does not reduce dividend. The dimensions social and government have positive effects on dividend, while the dimension environment has no effect, which indicates that aggregated CSR can give misleading results. The results support signalling theory but not agent theory.   Contribution of the thesis: The study gives a theoretical contribution to business research by examining and therefore develop the knowledge about how CSR-level, both aggregated and divided in dimensions, affects dividend policy. The study gives a practical contribution by helping investors in their choices and show that spending resources on CSR does not reduce cash flows to owners.   Suggestions for future research: This study has only included one measurement for dividend but in the literature many occurs. Is could therefore be of interest to use several different measurements to see if this changes the results. Also, other measurements for CSR and other dimensions could be interesting to study. Finally, it could also be interesting to include other areas/countries in a similar study.

A alta concentração da propriedade e de controle nas empresas brasileiras, aliada à baixa proteção legal aos acionistas, pode gerar conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários. De acordo com a literatura fundamentada pela Teoria de Agência, o pagamento de dividendos poderia minimizar tais conflitos. Para a literatura de governança corporativa, por sua vez, empresas com melhores práticas de governança corporativa ofereceriam proteção mais forte aos seus acionistas, de modo que estes teriam poder para pressionar os gestores a pagar dividendos mais elevados. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo investigar empiricamente se as empresas brasileiras utilizam a política de dividendos para minimizar os conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários e se boas práticas de governança corporativa aumentam a proteção aos acionistas. Para atingir o objetivo proposto, foram realizados testes econométricos para um modelo não explorado em estudos anteriores. Neste, foram incluídas, além das variáveis de controle justificadas pela literatura (possíveis determinantes da política de pagamento de dividendos), duas variáveis proxies para conflitos de agência: excesso de direito de voto em relação ao direito sobre o fluxo de caixa em posse do maior acionista e fluxo de caixa livre para os acionistas e uma variável proxy para melhores práticas de governança corporativa. As estimações foram realizadas usando o método Tobit em painel com informações, referentes ao período de 2000 a 2013, de 466 empresas brasileiras não financeiras listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que as empresas brasileiras de capital aberto não utilizam a política de dividendos como mecanismo de redução dos conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Esses resultados podem ser considerados robustos, uma vez que foram observados em especificações alternativas e quase todas as variáveis de controle foram estatisticamente significativas e apresentaram relações com o índice de payout conforme previsto pela literatura teórica e evidências da literatura empírica. Os resultados também mostraram indícios de que o baixo enforcement da legislação brasileira e os incentivos criados pela BM&FBOVESPA não garantem proteção aos acionistas, sinalizando a necessidade de realização de melhorias no sistema legal brasileiro / The high concentration of ownership and control in Brazilian companies, combined with low legal protection to shareholders, can generate agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. According to the literature grounded by the Agency Theory, the payment of dividends could minimize such conflicts. For the corporate governance literature, in turn, companies with best corporate governance practices would offer stronger protection to its shareholders, so that they would be able to pressure managers to pay higher dividends. In this context, this study aimed to empirically investigate whether Brazilian companies use the dividend policy to minimize the agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders and whether good corporate governance practices increase shareholder protection. To achieve this purpose, have been conducted econometric tests for a model not explored in previous studies. In this were included, besides the control variables justified by the literature (possible determinants of dividend payout policy), two proxies for agency conflicts: excess voting right in relation to cash flow rights in the possession of greater shareholder and free cash flow to shareholders and a proxy variable for best corporate governance practices.000 The estimates were made using the Tobit method panel with information relating to the period from 2000 to 2013, 466 non-financial Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. The results suggest that the publicly traded Brazilian companies do not use the dividend policy as a mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. These results can be considered robust, as were observed in alternative specifications and almost all control variables were statistically significant and had relations with the payout ratio as predicted by theoretical literature and evidence of the empirical literature. The results also showed evidence that the low enforcement of Brazilian legislation and the incentives created by BM & FBOVESPA does not guarantee protection to shareholders, pointing to the need of improvements in the Brazilian legal system

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-07-06T17:22:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Maicon Bazzan Schwerz.pdf: 1153930 bytes, checksum: df437153daa7fb2e93debe47794e9388 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-06T17:22:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maicon Bazzan Schwerz.pdf: 1153930 bytes, checksum: df437153daa7fb2e93debe47794e9388 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-25 / Nenhuma / Este estudo testou a hipótese da teoria da sinalização de que dividendos (neste estudo foram considerados também os proventos de Juros sobre Capital Próprio) transmitem informação, utilizando duas abordagens. A população objeto da análise foi composta pelas empresas que estiveram presentes na carteira teórica do Ibovespa referente aos meses de Setembro a Dezembro de 2013, perfazendo um total de 73 ações de 67 empresas. Foi observado o comportamento das empresas no período de 01/01/2005 à 31/12/2012. Na primeira abordagem foram testadas se as variações na distribuição de resultados (pagamentos de proventos) sinalizam efetivas mudanças no comportamento dos resultados dos anos seguintes a essa alteração. Para testar a hipótese que as empresas utilizam-se da sua distribuição de proventos para sinalizar seus resultados futuros, foram utilizados o teste de independência, utilizando a curva qui-quadrado. Os resultados encontrados indicam que as empresas utilizam da sua distribuição de proventos para sinalizar seus resultados futuros, num nível de significância de 15%, corroborando a hipótese que dividendos transmitem informação. Na segunda abordagem foram realizados testes para verificar como os investidores interpretam as variações de pagamentos de proventos realizadas pelas empresas. Foram testados como o mercado se comporta antes e após as empresas alterarem sua política de distribuição de resultados. Foram definidas, além da data do anúncio de proventos, duas janelas de evento, a primeira compreende as data -1 e 0 e 1 (3 pregões)e a segunda janela de 11 pregões incluindo a data de divulgação de distribuição de proventos, para buscar vazamento de informações e para verificar a possibilidade de arbitragem na janela de estudo. Os resultados encontrados indicaram que existe relação entre a política de distribuição de lucros e o retorno das ações. / This study tested the hypothesis that dividends (in this study were also considered the proceeds of Interest on Equity) transmit information using two approaches. The object of the analysis population consisted of the companies that were present at the Ibovespa index for the months of September to December 2013, a total of 73 shares of 67 companies. The behavior of firms in the period from 01/01/2005 to 31/12/2012 was observed. In the first approach were tested whether variations in the distribution of results (payment of dividends) actual changes in behavior indicate the results of the years following this change. To test the hypothesis that companies use up its distribution of dividends to signal future results, the test of independence were used, using the chi-square curve. The results indicate that companies use its distribution of dividends to signal future results, a significance level of 15 %, thus supporting the hypothesis that dividends convey information. In the second approach tests to see how investors interpret the variations in payments of dividends made by the companies were conducted. We tested how the market behaves before and after companies to change their policy of profit distribution. The announcement dividends date, and two other windows were defined, the first includes the date -1 and 0 and 1 (3 sessions) and the second window of 11 trading days including the date of disclosure of benefit distribution, to seek information leaks and to verify the possibility of arbitration the study window. The results indicated that there is a relationship between the policy of distribution of profits and stock returns.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T16:45:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Patricia Leite de Moraes Cioffi.pdf: 1179769 bytes, checksum: 3aee8b90f46bed4c2da3c3d5ec85a205 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-25 / This study used Ohlson´s model (1995, 2001) of firm valuation, which does connection between accounting data and market values, in order to test the dividend signaling effect in two aspects: in the effective value and in the valuation of Brazilian firms. In the sample it was considered BM&FBovespa listed companies, from 1997 to 2007. First, it was verified if dividends could be considered as a proxy for information that helps predict future abnormal earnings, in order to test the signaling effect in the equity market value of the firms. Further, it was examined the dividend relevance in the analysts forecasts. The purpose was to prove if dividends could have a signaling effect in the analysts valuation, and if they could reduce information asymmetry, that is forecast errors. The results evidenced the dividend positive pricing in the firm values, according to studies made abroad Rees (1997), Fama e French (1998), Giner e Rees (1999) e Akbar e Stark (2003) e Hand e Landsman (2005) and also in Brazil Correia e Amaral (2002), Novis e Saito (2003), Bruni et al. (2003) e Famá et al. (2008). However, this positive result could not be addressed to the signaling effect of future profit expectation. But, the evidences led to consider dividends as relevant to investors because of risk aversion, according to Bird in the Hand Theory, presented by Gordon and Lintner (1968). Regarding the analyst forecasts, the dividend signaling was confirmed. It was found that signaling effect occurred because of the less information asymmetry provided by firms that distribute dividends. It meant that the forecast errors were smaller for these companies. Moreover, the analysts´ future revenue expectations reflected that other information still not figured in the financial statements, beyond past performance and dividends, was not controlled in the adopted model / O estudo utilizou o Modelo de Ohlson (1995, 2001) de avaliação de empresas, que faz uma conexão entre dados contábeis e valores de mercado, para testar o efeito de sinalização dos dividendos em dois aspectos: no valor efetivo e na avaliação de empresas brasileiras. Na amostra foram consideradas as empresas abertas negociadas na BM&FBovespa, no período de 1997 a 2007. Primeiramente, verificou-se se os dividendos poderiam ser considerados como uma proxy para outras informações que colaboram para a previsão de retornos anormais futuros, com o objetivo de testar o efeito de sinalização no valor de mercado das empresas. Posteriormente, foi examinada a relevância dos dividendos nas previsões de analistas. O propósito foi comprovar se os dividendos poderiam ter efeito de sinalização nas avaliações dos analistas e se poderiam reduzir a assimetria informacional, ou seja, os erros de previsão. Os resultados evidenciaram que os dividendos têm efeito positivo no valor das empresas, de acordo com estudos feitos no exterior Rees (1997), Fama e French (1998), Giner e Rees (1999) e Akbar e Stark (2003) e Hand e Landsman (2005) e também no Brasil Correia e Amaral (2002), Novis e Saito (2003), Bruni et al. (2003) e Famá et al. (2008). Entretanto, este resultado positivo não pôde ser atribuído ao efeito de sinalização de lucratividade futura. Mas, as evidências levaram a considerar os proventos como relevantes aos investidores em razão da aversão ao risco, conforme a Teoria do Pássaro na Mão, apresentada por Gordon e Lintner (1968). Em relação às projeções de analistas, evidenciou-se a sinalização de dividendos. Constatou-se que o efeito de sinalização ocorreu por causa da menor assimetria informacional proporcionada por empresas que provêm dividendos. Isto significou que os erros nas previsões foram menores para estas empresas. Ademais, a expectativa de lucros futuros feitas por analistas refletiram que outras informações ainda não contempladas nas demonstrações financeiras, além do desempenho passado e dos dividendos, não foram controladas pelo modelo adotado

Na atualidade existe uma necessidade de repensar políticas voltadas para o desenvolvimento devido a que o milagre resgitrado por os baby boomers no século passado começa a desaparecer. Por isto, o objetivo deste trabalho é medir o impacto econômico e demográfico dos elderly boomers sobre o crescimento económico, adicionando duas variáveis na equação geral de Solow- Swan. Além disso, medir o impacto da participação das mulheres na força de trabalho como uma das fontes possível para mitigar este declínio (separado por edade e sexo). Os principais ressultados foram: que evidenciá-se una redução do 34% no crecimento explicado pelo factor puramente demográfico (força laboral) em relação com o abservado nos anos 80-90. Evidenciáse também para o grupo de mulheres maiores de 25+ que tem um coeficiente negativo -0,24 (cresciemnto taxa de emprego) sobre o crescimento econômico (PIB per-capita), isto deve-se a que embora as mulheres tenham um maior crescimento em sua força laboral do que os homens, as mulheres empregadas não cresce na mesma proporção, isto em grande parte pela fraqueça institucional e ausência apertura econômica ainda na maioria dos países. / At present there is a necessity to rethink development policies because the miracle registered by the baby boomers in the last century begins to disappear. For this reason, the objective of this work is to measure economic and demographic impact of elderly boomers on economic growth by adding two variables in the general Solow-Swan equation. Also, measuring the impact of women participation in the workforce as one of the possible ways to mitigate this decline (disaggregate by sex and age). The main results were: a 34% reduction in growth explained by the purely demographic factor (labor force) in relation to the observed in the years 80-90. To group of women over 25+ who have a negative coefficient -0.24 (growth rate of employment) on economic growth (GDP per-capita), this is due to the fact that although women have a higher labor force growth than men, the number of women employments do not increase in the same proportion, this is largely due to institutional weakness and lack of economic openness in most countries.