DIAS, Antonio Francisco Lopes. Emancipação e democracia em Marx. 2009. 180f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2009. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-03T11:36:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_dis_afldias.pdf: 1345971 bytes, checksum: df26a0ddb230b9091d2a77f245648197 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-10-04T15:52:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_dis_afldias.pdf: 1345971 bytes, checksum: df26a0ddb230b9091d2a77f245648197 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-04T15:52:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_dis_afldias.pdf: 1345971 bytes, checksum: df26a0ddb230b9091d2a77f245648197 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / The thought philosophic and politic of Marx can be appropriate qualified as defensor of effective human-social emancipation and of democracy. Specially in the period of 1843-48, Marx formulates a set of ideas, arguments, thesis, propositions, with the aim refuting concepts and practices that puts against to human emancipation. For Marx, the theories should be elaborated with base in a critical analyse of material reality in that the man lives. Adopting this criterion, he denounces the creed in the State as sphere that realises the common interest of the being, that the State is the partial power of the bourgeois class, therefore essential antidemocratic, it is inapt to offer conditions for the effect of liberty and equality, what he comprehends as theoretic and pratical principles that the denominates “universal human emancipation” and “real” and “true democracy”. Second Marx, when it is not enought, the State is allied of bourgeois private property, that in conformity to his valuation is the main material objetion to the human emancipation and democracy, that he advocates. According to Marx, the private property manages to the man does not recognise the work as activity that engenders the social life. The work while activity strange, that is, work under the private property rules, impedes the person to work freeand conscious, so to recognise as social being. Against to this situation, Marx proporse a radical (social) revolution, with the purpose to liberate the man. Such revolution, initial, consist in a human conscientiouness or explanation, so a kind of theoretical emancipation, that impels to act, in an revolutionary way to abolis hall barriers to the concretion of human autonomy. In conformity to Marx, the final objective of the revolution is to establish the necessary conditions to the advent of communist society as place of effective human emancipation and radical democracy, direct. / O pensamento filosófico-político de Marx pode, apropriadamente, ser adjetivado como defensor da efetiva emancipação humano-social e da democracia. Notadamente no período de 1843-48, Marx formula um conjunto de idéias, argumentos, teses etc., visando a refutar teorias e práticas que se contrapunham à emancipação dos homens. Para Marx, as teorias devem ser elaboradas com base em uma análise crítica da realidade material em que vivem os homens. Adotando este critério, ele denuncia as crenças no Estado como esfera que realiza os interesses comuns dos indivíduos; que o Estado, na medida em que é poder parcial, da classe burguesa, portanto essencialmente antidemocrático, é incapaz de oferecer condições para a efetivação da liberdade e da igualdade, compreendidas por ele como princípios teórico-práticos do que denomina de “emancipação humana universal” e de “real” e “verdadeira democracia”. Segundo Marx, não bastasse isto, o Estado é aliado da propriedade privada burguesa que, na avaliação dele, é o principal obstáculo material à forma de emancipação humana e de democracia que advoga. A propriedade privada, segundo Marx, faz com que o homem não reconheça o trabalho como atividade que engendra a vida genérica (social). O trabalho enquanto atividade estranhada, isto é, trabalho sob os ditames da propriedade privada impede o indivíduo de trabalhar livre e conscientemente, portanto, de se reconhecer como ser social. Contra esta situação, Marx propõe uma revolução (social) radical, com o objetivo de libertar o homem. Tal revolução, inicialmente, consiste na conscientização ou esclarecimento dos homens, numa espécie de emancipação teórica, que os impele a agir, de forma revolucionária, para abolir todas as barreiras à concretização da autonomia dos homens. O objetivo final da revolução é, conforme Marx, estabelecer condições necessárias para o advento da sociedade comunista como lugar da efetiva emancipação humana e da democracia radical, direta.

nÃo hà / O presente trabalho tem por finalidade esboÃar o conceito de liberdade humana no pensamento de Marx. Para tanto, faz-se necessÃrio a explicitaÃÃo de dois outros conceitos essenciais para a compreensÃo do que seja a liberdade para Marx, que à o trabalho e a polÃtica. O trabalho, enquanto ato gÃnese da socialidade humana, à o ato que possibilita a real efetivaÃÃo da liberdade do homem, pois, para que ele possa se afirmar livre, o mesmo tem que suprimir as suas carÃncias. Para isso, ele tem que transformar a natureza e ao transformÃ-la, por meio do trabalho, ele tambÃm transforma a sua prÃpria natureza, adquirindo novas habilidades; mas, o problema conforme Marx à que o trabalho dentro da lÃgica do capital passa a ser estranho ao trabalhador, nÃo permitindo ao mesmo o reconhecer-se no objeto, nem no seu processo de produÃÃo, acarretando assim a perda da sua universalidade, bem como do seu estranhamento frente aos outros indivÃduos. Isso implicarà na propriedade privada dos meios de produÃÃo e na divisÃo forÃada do trabalho. E a polÃtica, que para Marx se configura como a criadora dos feixes sociais, possibilitando a comunidade a sua auto-gestÃo e afirmando, por conseguinte, as liberdades individuais; porÃm na modernidade passarà a ser exercida por poucos, atravÃs da polÃtica representativa que cinde os indivÃduos em cidadÃos e burgueses, sobrepondo o Estado polÃtico aos seus membros, que configurarà segundo Marx, como o comità privado da burguesia. Para que a liberdade humana se exteriorize, à conditio sine qua non a superaÃÃo dessa forma de trabalho estranhado e dessa polÃtica representativa moderna, que sà serà possÃvel no comunismo, jà que o mesmo à o reino dos homens necessitados, livres, emancipados. à o reino do tempo livre para que os indivÃduos possam se produzir e reproduzir de maneira diversificada, que possibilite a sua fruiÃÃo do corpo e do espÃrito, a sua plena emancipaÃÃo humano-social. / The present work aims at delineating the concept of human freedom in Marxâs thinking. To this end, it is necessary that two other essential concepts be expounded in order to help with the understanding of what freedom is for Marx, namely, work and politics. Work, as the first expression of human society, is the act that shapes up manâs freedom in an actual configuration; for in order that he is able to claim that he is free he has first to eliminate his needs. To this end, he has to change nature, and in this process, by means of the work, he will also change his own nature by acquiring new skills; but, according to Marx, the problem is that the work within the logic of capital becomes strange to the worker, and the worker is not able to see himself neither in the object nor in the production process which generates the loss of his universality as well as his estrangement before other individuals. This will lead to private ownership of means of production and forced division of work. And politics, that for Marx is shaped as a generator of social conglomerates, makes possible that a community administer itself having as an upshot individual freedom; which, in the present, will be exercised by only a few by means of representative politics that separate individuals between citizens and bourgeois, positioning the political State over its members which will configure, according to Marx, the private bourgeois committee. In order that human freedom is exteriorized the sine qua non condition is that this model of estranged work and modern representative politics be superseded and this will only be possible with Communism which is the kingdom of the needy, free and emancipated men. It is the kingdom of free time where individuals may produce and reproduce in a diverse manner that would entail satisfaction of body and soul, full human and social emancipation.

<p>Michel Foucault's philosophy took the form of a series of historicallygrounded "genealogical" studies of the interconnections between knowledge and various social practices in contemporary society. This work is a reading of "the good11-to use Charles Taylor's term-in Foucault's genealogies.</p> <p> According to the American social-historian David Rothman, "history is a liberating discipline for it reminds us that there is nothing inevitable about the institutions and procedures that surround us. In developing my reading of "the good" in Foucault's genealogies I have endeavoured to translate the spirit of this claim into the proposition that Foucault's genealogies were an expression of his desire to increase human freedom through historical critique; i.e., that Foucault's ethics were embodied in his philosophy which constitutes "a practice of freedom".</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The problem of how one can reconcile the omnipotence and omniscience of God with human freedom has penetrated a good deal of philosophical and theological thought. On occasion it has even been reduced to a unsolvable problem unworthy of consideration. Saint Augustine, however, clearly did not think this was the case. Augustine defends human freedom as a good which must be preserved even if it does allow for the possibility of evil. David R. Griffin, on the other hand, maintains that men cannot exert their own will, when they are considered to be subject to the will of an omnipotent.God and that the occurence of evil in the world must ultimately be allowed by God. William L. Rowe also maintains that there is a problem in claiming that human beings are free, but this time, because of God's omniscience rather than His omnipotence. Rowe argues that since whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen and He knows that evil will happen, man's decision to sin is not one of freedom but of necessity. These are generally considered the two main arguments for opposing Augustine's Free Will Defense, and although Rowe eventually shows the inadequacies of the 'omniscience argument', his presentation of the traditional view is most valuable. It is the contention of this paper that neither divine omnipotence nor omniscience, when considered independently, present sufficient evidence to seriously jeopardize Augustine's position, and this, can only partially be achieved by combining these divine attributes and pitting them against the possibility of human freedom. This thesis is defended by a demonstration of the weaknesses of the independent arguments which are overcome, or at least strengthened, when combined. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / O pensamento filosÃfico-polÃtico de Marx pode, apropriadamente, ser adjetivado como defensor da efetiva emancipaÃÃo humano-social e da democracia. Notadamente no perÃodo de 1843-48, Marx formula um conjunto de idÃias, argumentos, teses etc., visando a refutar teorias e prÃticas que se contrapunham à emancipaÃÃo dos homens. Para Marx, as teorias devem ser elaboradas com base em uma anÃlise crÃtica da realidade material em que vivem os homens. Adotando este critÃrio, ele denuncia as crenÃas no Estado como esfera que realiza os interesses comuns dos indivÃduos; que o Estado, na medida em que à poder parcial, da classe burguesa, portanto essencialmente antidemocrÃtico, à incapaz de oferecer condiÃÃes para a efetivaÃÃo da liberdade e da igualdade, compreendidas por ele como princÃpios teÃrico-prÃticos do que denomina de âemancipaÃÃo humana universalâ e de ârealâ e âverdadeira democraciaâ. Segundo Marx, nÃo bastasse isto, o Estado à aliado da propriedade privada burguesa que, na avaliaÃÃo dele, à o principal obstÃculo material à forma de emancipaÃÃo humana e de democracia que advoga. A propriedade privada, segundo Marx, faz com que o homem nÃo reconheÃa o trabalho como atividade que engendra a vida genÃrica (social). O trabalho enquanto atividade estranhada, isto Ã, trabalho sob os ditames da propriedade privada impede o indivÃduo de trabalhar livre e conscientemente, portanto, de se reconhecer como ser social. Contra esta situaÃÃo, Marx propÃe uma revoluÃÃo (social) radical, com o objetivo de libertar o homem. Tal revoluÃÃo, inicialmente, consiste na conscientizaÃÃo ou esclarecimento dos homens, numa espÃcie de emancipaÃÃo teÃrica, que os impele a agir, de forma revolucionÃria, para abolir todas as barreiras à concretizaÃÃo da autonomia dos homens. O objetivo final da revoluÃÃo Ã, conforme Marx, estabelecer condiÃÃes necessÃrias para o advento da sociedade comunista como lugar da efetiva emancipaÃÃo humana e da democracia radical, direta. / The thought philosophic and politic of Marx can be appropriate qualified as defensor of effective human-social emancipation and of democracy. Specially in the period of 1843-48, Marx formulates a set of ideas, arguments, thesis, propositions, with the aim refuting concepts and practices that puts against to human emancipation. For Marx, the theories should be elaborated with base in a critical analyse of material reality in that the man lives. Adopting this criterion, he denounces the creed in the State as sphere that realises the common interest of the being, that the State is the partial power of the bourgeois class, therefore essential antidemocratic, it is inapt to offer conditions for the effect of liberty and equality, what he comprehends as theoretic and pratical principles that the denominates âuniversal human emancipationâ and ârealâ and âtrue democracyâ. Second Marx, when it is not enought, the State is allied of bourgeois private property, that in conformity to his valuation is the main material objetion to the human emancipation and democracy, that he advocates. According to Marx, the private property manages to the man does not recognise the work as activity that engenders the social life. The work while activity strange, that is, work under the private property rules, impedes the person to work freeand conscious, so to recognise as social being. Against to this situation, Marx proporse a radical (social) revolution, with the purpose to liberate the man. Such revolution, initial, consist in a human conscientiouness or explanation, so a kind of theoretical emancipation, that impels to act, in an revolutionary way to abolis hall barriers to the concretion of human autonomy. In conformity to Marx, the final objective of the revolution is to establish the necessary conditions to the advent of communist society as place of effective human emancipation and radical democracy, direct.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-09-28T20:22:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 rafaelcesarpitt.pdf: 614374 bytes, checksum: 1b9f6879969fed4b545f9fb3e86f37c7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Diamantino Mayra (mayra.diamantino@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-09-30T13:52:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 rafaelcesarpitt.pdf: 614374 bytes, checksum: 1b9f6879969fed4b545f9fb3e86f37c7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-30T13:52:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 rafaelcesarpitt.pdf: 614374 bytes, checksum: 1b9f6879969fed4b545f9fb3e86f37c7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-23 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A teodiceia é o conceito utilizado na modernidade filosófica para designar uma defesa ou justificativa da perfeição divina diante do problema do mal. O objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar que o livro de Schelling de 1809, a Freiheitsschrift, dispensa a elaboração de uma teodiceia ao oferecer um sistema da razão no qual o problema do mal é devidamente compreendido dentro da esfera da liberdade humana. Esse feito permite a Schelling demonstrar os atributos divinos da vida e da personalidade, ao mesmo tempo em que aponta para a ausência de relação entre Deus e o mal. Esse vazio entre o criador e o mal é possível, por um lado, pela concepção de criação, enquanto desdobramento do ser divino e, por outro lado, pela possibilidade do mal fundada exclusivamente na liberdade humana. O resultado desse vazio é a consequente dispensabilidade da defesa de Deus diante do problema do mal. / Theodicy is the concept used in modernt philosophy to describe a defense or justification of divine perfection before the problem of evil. The objective of this work is to show that the book of Schelling of 1809, the Freiheitsschrift, dispenses the preparation of a theodicy while offering a system of the reason in which the problem of the evil is properly understood inside the sphere of the human freedom. This achievement allows Schelling demonstrate the divine attributes of life and personality, while pointing to the absence of relationship between God and evil. This emptiness between the creator and evil is possible, firstly, through the conception of creation as an unfolding of the divine being and, secondly, through the possibility of evil founded exclusively on human freedom. The result of this emptiness is the dispensability of the subsequent defense of God before the problem of evil.

[pt] O tema da liberdade humana é vasto e complexo, podendo ser analisado sob diversas perspectivas. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo refletir, à luz da antropologia teológica, sobre os desafios postos pela mentalidade contemporânea à vivência cristã da liberdade na dinâmica da autonomia, responsabilidade e discernimento. O trabalho, de caráter interdisciplinar, se desenvolveu a partir de análise bibliográfica. Metodologicamente, os resultados da pesquisa estão dispostos em três etapas. A primeira elucida as caracterizações que a liberdade humana foi assumindo em decorrência das transformações socioculturais ocorridas na modernidade/pós-modernidade. Aponta fenômenos que viabilizam os paradoxos extremos da liberdade que vivemos em tempos atuais. Dentre os quais, a generalização de um individualismo radical que desencadeou a crise do compromisso comunitário. A segunda etapa apresenta a concepção de liberdade que emerge a partir da reflexão bíblico-teológica contemporânea. Neste sentido, a economia da salvação se apresenta como a história da autocompreensão progressiva do ser humano como um ser de liberdade. A terceira etapa constata o desafio cultural, social, espiritual, ecológico, que temos diante de nós. Acusa uma necessária e urgente educação para a verdadeira liberdade, por meio da formação integral da pessoa humana, a partir da reconstrução do tecido das suas relações fundamentais; indica a exigência de uma ética da responsabilidade orientada para os deveres do futuro, em prol da vida humana e extra-humana; propõe a evangelização da sensibilidade para aprender a discernir. Deus acredita na capacidade de liberdade do ser humano e por isso envia o seu Espírito aos que aceitam ser livres. / [en] The theme of human freedom is vast and complex, and can be analysed from different perspectives. This dissertation aims to reflect, in the light of theological anthropology, on the challenges posed by the contemporary mentality to the Christian experience of freedom in the dynamics of autonomy, responsibility and discernment. The work, of an interdisciplinary nature, was based on a bibliographical analysis. Methodologically, the results of the research are divided into three stages. The first elucidates the characterisations that human freedom has taken on as a result of the socio-cultural transformations that have taken place in modernity/post-modernity. It points out phenomena that make possible the extreme paradoxes of freedom that we live in today. These include the generalisation of a radical individualism that has triggered a crisis of community commitment. The second stage presents the concept of freedom that emerges from contemporary biblical-theological reflection. In this sense, the economy of salvation is presented as the history of the progressive self-understanding of the human being as a being of freedom. The third stage recognises the cultural, social, spiritual and ecological challenge facing us. It calls for a necessary and urgent education for true freedom, through the integral formation of the human person, starting from the reconstruction of the fabric of their fundamental relationships; it indicates the need for an ethic of responsibility oriented towards the duties of the future, in favour of human and extra-human life; it proposes the evangelisation of sensitivity in order to learn to discern. God believes in the human being s capacity for freedom and therefore sends his Spirit to those who accept being free.

L’évocation de la Renaissance italienne des XVe et XVIe siècles est souvent synonyme de la propagation d’une nouvelle pensée de l’homme, exaltant les valeurs oubliées de l’excellence et de la liberté humaines. Chez un philosophe comme Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), la question de la liberté ne se présente pas aussi facilement que chez d’autres grands auteurs des Quattrocento et Cinquecento (tel Marsile Ficin ou Pic de la Mirandole). Sa défiance héroïque envers l’autorité ecclésiastique et son exécution par l’Inquisition, le 17 février 1600, sur le campo dei Fiori, illustrent sa longue lutte pour libérer la philosophie des entraves de la religion révélée. Bruno peut se targuer d’être l’un des premiers penseurs depuis l’Antiquité à intégrer une cosmologie, une physique, une psychologie et une éthique dans un système de philosophie (la nova filosofia). Malgré une terminologie parfois fluctuante et des contradictions souvent apparentes, la philosophie de Bruno possède une réelle cohérence interne et peut être regardée comme annonçant celle de Spinoza. Or à la différence du déterminisme de ce dernier, Bruno soutient que l’homme est doté d’un libre arbitre, s’opposant en cela aux thèses de Luther et abondant dans le sens d’Erasme. Son affirmation d’une liberté humaine intimement liée aux problèmes éthiques et religieux de son époque n’est toutefois pas sans provoquer certaines tensions au regard de sa conception métaphysique d’un univers infini en acte. L’objet de ce travail est d’analyser la thèse brunienne de la compossibilité de la liberté humaine avec la nécessité divine qui s’exprime dans un univers métamorphique et infini, en recherchant, dans une première partie, les sources de son compatibilisme et en interprétant, dans une seconde partie, la manière dont Bruno concilie liberté et nécessité. / The evocation of the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is often synonymous with the spread of a new human thought, exalting the forgotten values of human excellence and freedom. For a philosopher like Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), the problem of freedom does not arise as easily as it does for other great authors of Quattrocento and Cinquecento (such as Marsilio Ficino or Pico della Mirandola). His heroic defiance of ecclesiastical authority and his execution by the Inquisition on 17 February 1600 onto the Campo de’ Fiori, exemplifies his long struggle to free philosophy from the trammels of revealed religion. Bruno can claim to be the first thinker since Antiquity to integrate a cosmology, physics, ethics and psychology into a system of philosophy (nova filosofia). Despite sometimes inconsistent terminology and often apparent contradictions, Bruno’s philosophy has a real inner coherence and can be seen as announcing Spinoza’s. However, unlike the latter’s determinism, Bruno maintains that human being is endowed with a free will, opposing Luther’s theses and agreeing with Erasmus. Nonetheless, his affirmation of human freedom, intimately linked to the ethical and religious problems of his time, is not without causing tensions with regard to his metaphysical conception of the actual infinity in the universe. The purpose of this work is to analyse the brunian thesis of the compossibility of human freedom with the divine necessity expressed in a metamorphic and infinite universe, by seeking, in a first part, the sources of its compatibility and by interpreting, in a second part, the way in which Bruno reconciles liberty and necessity.

This study seeks to examine the precise way it may be said that God takes risks in creating and governing this world. In order to articulate this model of providence various texts of scripture are studied which have either been overlooked or interpreted differently in discussions of divine providence. These texts reveal a deity who enters into genuine give-and-take relations with creatures, a God who is genuinely responsive and who may be said to take risks in that God does not get everything he desires in these relationships. Furthermore, the traditional texts used to defend the no-risk view of providence are examined and shown that they do not, in fact, teach the idea that God is the cause of everything which happens in the world such that the divine will is never thwarted in the leas detail. The biblical teaching of God in reciprocal relations with his creatures is then discussed in theological and philosophical terms. The nature of God is here understood as loving, wise, faithful yet free, almighty, competent and resourceful. These ideas are explicated in light of the more traditional theological/philosophical understanding of God. Finally, some of the implications of this relational model of God are examined to see the ways in which it may be said that God takes risks and whose will may be thwarted. The crucial watershed in this regard is whether or not there is any conditionality in the godhead. The no-risk view denies, while the risk model affirms, that some aspects of God's will, knowledge, and actions are contingent. In order to grasp the differences between the two models the doctrines and practices involved in salvation, the problem of evil, prayer and guidance are examined to see what each model says about them. It is claimed that· .the relational or risk model is superior to the no-risk model both in terms of theoretical coherence and the practice of the Christian life. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / Th. D. (Sytematic Theology)

This study seeks to examine the precise way it may be said that God takes risks in creating and governing this world. In order to articulate this model of providence various texts of scripture are studied which have either been overlooked or interpreted differently in discussions of divine providence. These texts reveal a deity who enters into genuine give-and-take relations with creatures, a God who is genuinely responsive and who may be said to take risks in that God does not get everything he desires in these relationships. Furthermore, the traditional texts used to defend the no-risk view of providence are examined and shown that they do not, in fact, teach the idea that God is the cause of everything which happens in the world such that the divine will is never thwarted in the leas detail. The biblical teaching of God in reciprocal relations with his creatures is then discussed in theological and philosophical terms. The nature of God is here understood as loving, wise, faithful yet free, almighty, competent and resourceful. These ideas are explicated in light of the more traditional theological/philosophical understanding of God. Finally, some of the implications of this relational model of God are examined to see the ways in which it may be said that God takes risks and whose will may be thwarted. The crucial watershed in this regard is whether or not there is any conditionality in the godhead. The no-risk view denies, while the risk model affirms, that some aspects of God's will, knowledge, and actions are contingent. In order to grasp the differences between the two models the doctrines and practices involved in salvation, the problem of evil, prayer and guidance are examined to see what each model says about them. It is claimed that· .the relational or risk model is superior to the no-risk model both in terms of theoretical coherence and the practice of the Christian life. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / Th. D. (Sytematic Theology)