The aim of this thesis is to undertake a comparative study of contemporary British and German-language playwriting, with an eye specifically towards possible reasons and solutions for the problematic situation of German-language playtexts in Britain. I will first conduct a stylistic analysis of a selection of British and German-language playwrights, focusing on the differences in representation of interiority through dialogue and narration. I will then introduce a phenomenological lens that will expand this literary analysis by looking at specific stagings of these texts, and at the use of gestures in particular. Tracing the performative implications of dialogue and narration in their relationship with gestures, I will suggest that while dialogue mostly requires metonymical gestures, the phenomenology of narration is better served by a more metaphoric use. This is followed by a chapter on translation, which will look at the specific problems and chances posed by narration and so-called ‘postdramatic’ plays in general. After these theoretical considerations, I will scrutinise my findings in a practical environment in two major steps. The first step is a comparative rehearsal observation of one German and one British director and their work with contemporary playtexts. My main question will be in how far the tendency towards dialogue in British plays and towards narration in German-language plays is matched by corresponding trends in the directors’ formal language. Furthermore, I will contextualise the work of these two directors in the larger field of directing in their respective countries. The second and final step of my practical investigation will be an implementation and testing of the previous theses in two directing projects of my own. I will again focus on rehearsal methodologies, attempting to find out which methodologies are particularly useful for the rehearsal of narrative playtexts and thereby hoping to formulate some first ideas for the specific requirements of German-language playtexts in a British context.

Cotutelle avec l'Université Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris I / Bien que Wittgenstein ait toujours douté de l’intérêt philosophique de ce genre de constat historique, il est généralement admis que l’auteur des Recherches philosophiques est l’inventeur d’une critique dévastatrice du «mythe de l’intériorité », qui représente l’une des tentations les plus constantes de la philosophie moderne. À l’encontre des pensées de la réflexion qui assignent pour tâche à la philosophie de clarifier la signification des concepts obscurs de notre langage (vérité, signification, pensée, etc.) en portant une attention réflexive à nos états mentaux (Locke et James sont de bons exemples de ce paradigme), Wittgenstein a montré qu’une telle entreprise philosophique repose sur une profonde incompréhension du fonctionnement du langage ordinaire et de sa grammaire. Wittgenstein n’est pas le premier à se lancer dans une initiative du genre, mais les moyens utilisés pour s’en acquitter expliquent la place qu’il a occupée dans les débats que n’a cessé de susciter la question de l’intériorité tout au long du vingtième siècle : on ne peut croire à la valeur d’un recours à l’introspection en philosophie qu’en se méprenant profondément sur la nature et le fonctionnement du langage nous permettant d’exprimer notre vie mentale. Étant donné que la phénoménologie husserlienne se propose de résoudre les problèmes philosophiques en adoptant pour méthode la réflexion et la description de l’expérience vécue, il est très tentant de voir en Husserl un héritier de cette tradition philosophique qui se trouve ruinée par les arguments de Wittgenstein. En partant du présupposé que la déconstruction du «mythe de l’intériorité» enclenchée par Wittgenstein est juste en son principe, il s’agira de montrer que l’on ne peut trouver chez Wittgenstein une réfutation implicite de la conception phénoménologique de l’intériorité qu’en faisant une lecture superficielle des Recherches logiques et des Idées directrices. En effet, si l’on sait porter attention aux détails des textes pertinents, on peut déceler chez Husserl une réflexion très fine sur la nature du langage qui débouche éventuellement sur une critique de la conception moderne et empiriste de l’intériorité du sujet très similaire à celle mise en chantier par les i Recherches philosophiques, critique qui, de surcroît, a l’avantage de désamorcer certaines difficultés rencontrées par Wittgenstein. Une telle étude comparative et polémique permettra de tirer deux grandes conclusions à l’égard de la méthode devant être employée en philosophie. Premièrement, il sera démontré que la réflexivité exigée par le discours philosophique se reflète dans l’usage que Husserl et Wittgenstein font des guillemets. Cette observation en apparence triviale permettra d’établir que le discours philosophique repose sur l’usage d’un dispositif typographique banal appartenant à la grammaire de notre langage ordinaire. Ensuite, la supériorité de la méthode « généalogique » de la phénoménologie génétique de Husserl sera mise en relief. Cette dernière a le mérite d’éviter les apories du conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein tout en désamorçant les difficultés soulevées par l’essentialisme de la phénoménologie statique des Idées directrices. / Wittgenstein is typically thought to have put forth a devastating critique of one of the most constant temptations of modern philosophy: the so-called "myth of interiority". Against philosophies of reflexion, which attempt to clarify the meaning of obscure philosophical concepts (e.g. truth, significance, thought, etc.) by reflecting upon our mental states (Locke and James come to mind as examples of this paradigm), Wittgenstein showed that such a philosophical project is premised on a profound misunderstanding of how ordinary language and its grammar function. Although Wittgenstein might not have been the first to propose this kind of criticism, his central role in the last century's debates over the problem of interiority is due to the distinctive means through which he carried out this criticism: believing in the value of introspection within philosophical inquiry requires a profound misunderstanding of the nature and operation of the language through which we express our mental life. Since Husserl's phenomenology purports to solve philosophical problems through description and reflection upon lived experience, it is extremely tempting to see him as an inheritor of the philosophical tradition that Wittgenstein's arguments demolished. Taking as its starting point the assumption that the deconstruction of the "myth of interiority" instigated by Wittgenstein is well founded, this project will attempt to show that Wittgenstein's arguments can only appear to refute Husserl's conception of interiority on the basis of a superficial reading of the Logical Investigations and of the Ideas I. Indeed, upon a close examination of the relevant texts, Husserl's reflexions on the nature of language can be shown to lead him to a critique of the modern and empiricist conception of interiority very similar to Wittgenstein's, a critique that turns out to have the resources to avoid some of the major difficulties that the latter faces. This comparative and polemical study will defend two more general theses about the method that philosophical inquiry ought to rely upon. First, it will be argued that the reflexiveness required for philosophical discourse is illustrated in both Husserl and Wittgenstein's use of quotation marks. This seemingly trivial observation will support the claim that philosophical discourse relies on the use of a banal i typographical devise belonging to the grammar of ordinary language. Second, a case will be made for the the superiority of the "genealogical" method of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, for it manages to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein's conventionalism while also steering clear of the problems incurred by the essentialism of the Ideas I static phenomenology.

Bien que Wittgenstein ait toujours douté de l’intérêt philosophique de ce genre de constat historique, il est généralement admis que l’auteur des Recherches philosophiques est l’inventeur d’une critique dévastatrice du «mythe de l’intériorité », qui représente l’une des tentations les plus constantes de la philosophie moderne. À l’encontre des pensées de la réflexion qui assignent pour tâche à la philosophie de clarifier la signification des concepts obscurs de notre langage (vérité, signification, pensée, etc.) en portant une attention réflexive à nos états mentaux (Locke et James sont de bons exemples de ce paradigme), Wittgenstein a montré qu’une telle entreprise philosophique repose sur une profonde incompréhension du fonctionnement du langage ordinaire et de sa grammaire. Wittgenstein n’est pas le premier à se lancer dans une initiative du genre, mais les moyens utilisés pour s’en acquitter expliquent la place qu’il a occupée dans les débats que n’a cessé de susciter la question de l’intériorité tout au long du vingtième siècle : on ne peut croire à la valeur d’un recours à l’introspection en philosophie qu’en se méprenant profondément sur la nature et le fonctionnement du langage nous permettant d’exprimer notre vie mentale. Étant donné que la phénoménologie husserlienne se propose de résoudre les problèmes philosophiques en adoptant pour méthode la réflexion et la description de l’expérience vécue, il est très tentant de voir en Husserl un héritier de cette tradition philosophique qui se trouve ruinée par les arguments de Wittgenstein. En partant du présupposé que la déconstruction du «mythe de l’intériorité» enclenchée par Wittgenstein est juste en son principe, il s’agira de montrer que l’on ne peut trouver chez Wittgenstein une réfutation implicite de la conception phénoménologique de l’intériorité qu’en faisant une lecture superficielle des Recherches logiques et des Idées directrices. En effet, si l’on sait porter attention aux détails des textes pertinents, on peut déceler chez Husserl une réflexion très fine sur la nature du langage qui débouche éventuellement sur une critique de la conception moderne et empiriste de l’intériorité du sujet très similaire à celle mise en chantier par les i Recherches philosophiques, critique qui, de surcroît, a l’avantage de désamorcer certaines difficultés rencontrées par Wittgenstein. Une telle étude comparative et polémique permettra de tirer deux grandes conclusions à l’égard de la méthode devant être employée en philosophie. Premièrement, il sera démontré que la réflexivité exigée par le discours philosophique se reflète dans l’usage que Husserl et Wittgenstein font des guillemets. Cette observation en apparence triviale permettra d’établir que le discours philosophique repose sur l’usage d’un dispositif typographique banal appartenant à la grammaire de notre langage ordinaire. Ensuite, la supériorité de la méthode « généalogique » de la phénoménologie génétique de Husserl sera mise en relief. Cette dernière a le mérite d’éviter les apories du conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein tout en désamorçant les difficultés soulevées par l’essentialisme de la phénoménologie statique des Idées directrices. / Wittgenstein is typically thought to have put forth a devastating critique of one of the most constant temptations of modern philosophy: the so-called "myth of interiority". Against philosophies of reflexion, which attempt to clarify the meaning of obscure philosophical concepts (e.g. truth, significance, thought, etc.) by reflecting upon our mental states (Locke and James come to mind as examples of this paradigm), Wittgenstein showed that such a philosophical project is premised on a profound misunderstanding of how ordinary language and its grammar function. Although Wittgenstein might not have been the first to propose this kind of criticism, his central role in the last century's debates over the problem of interiority is due to the distinctive means through which he carried out this criticism: believing in the value of introspection within philosophical inquiry requires a profound misunderstanding of the nature and operation of the language through which we express our mental life. Since Husserl's phenomenology purports to solve philosophical problems through description and reflection upon lived experience, it is extremely tempting to see him as an inheritor of the philosophical tradition that Wittgenstein's arguments demolished. Taking as its starting point the assumption that the deconstruction of the "myth of interiority" instigated by Wittgenstein is well founded, this project will attempt to show that Wittgenstein's arguments can only appear to refute Husserl's conception of interiority on the basis of a superficial reading of the Logical Investigations and of the Ideas I. Indeed, upon a close examination of the relevant texts, Husserl's reflexions on the nature of language can be shown to lead him to a critique of the modern and empiricist conception of interiority very similar to Wittgenstein's, a critique that turns out to have the resources to avoid some of the major difficulties that the latter faces. This comparative and polemical study will defend two more general theses about the method that philosophical inquiry ought to rely upon. First, it will be argued that the reflexiveness required for philosophical discourse is illustrated in both Husserl and Wittgenstein's use of quotation marks. This seemingly trivial observation will support the claim that philosophical discourse relies on the use of a banal i typographical devise belonging to the grammar of ordinary language. Second, a case will be made for the the superiority of the "genealogical" method of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, for it manages to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein's conventionalism while also steering clear of the problems incurred by the essentialism of the Ideas I static phenomenology. / Cotutelle avec l'Université Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris I

A wall might appear as basic, a clean surface without an identity of its own, nothing but a clean slate upon which to leave any impression. Though the walls surrounding us are all but anonymous. They are built with a structure making them stand tall and strong. They are filled with insulation to keep us warm and sheltered. They are hard and they are soft. They can allow us to isolate ourselves from each other or they are fragile enough to let us know someone is on the other side. They cover the basic necessities of our houses, and we in return cover them to make our spaces less anonymous. There is softness hidden in your walls mainly aims to highlight the textile components of architecture which we usually never see. While we tend to view textiles mostly as decoration, they constantly perform in a lot of various ways all around us. In this project I have worked with prefabricated building materials that according to me have textile qualities, but they aren’t viewed as textile. Or I have tried to adapt textile techniques to non-textile materials to test them in new ways. The wall as the leading actor has first and foremost been used as a conversation partner for the material exploration and contextualization. The main material used is wool sheep insulation though many other materials have been put to the test throughout the process.

For whom do we draw buildings? Why does contemporary architecture look the way it does?Why are certain aesthetics considered more valid than others? With this project, I propose Dirty Geometry: norm-bending design that could challenge conventions within the field of architecture. It is an investigation of concepts such as ugliness, beauty, architecture and the human body, interiority, femininity and ”bad taste”. The purpose is to, with the aid of parametric design processes, make Stockholm less boring and more dirty. Dirty Geometry is both the creative process sprung from one’s personal desires, and the resulting design. It aims to celebrate the weird, playful and colorful in an empowering way. This thesis project draws a lot of inspiration from camp aesthetics and drag culture, because of the way humour is used in a subversive way to question gender identities, power structures and norms.

Cette recherche vise à cerner la complexité du concept du soi (heauton) dans la philosophie stoïcienne de l’empereur Marc Aurèle. Dans un premier temps, il s’agira de poser les bases de la physique stoïcienne qui nous permettent de saisir le paradoxe de l’existence d’individualités singulières au sein du grand Tout universel. Nous étudierons, pour ce faire, la théorie corporéiste stoïcienne ainsi que les concepts d’idia poiotês et d’oikeiôsis forgés par l’ancien stoïcisme, mais aussi la prohairesis épictéenne. Cela nous conduira à traiter du concept d’hêgemonikon central dans la conception du soi chez Marc Aurèle. Dans un deuxième temps, nous aborderons les caractéristiques de la partie dirigeante de l’âme par l’entremise de l’étude des disciplines du soi et de son altérité intérieure. Ainsi nous verrons comment le soi ne se présente pas comme un donné fixe, mais comme un espace relationnel en développement constant. Finalement, nous nous pencherons sur la question de la construction du soi, ce qui nous mènera à considérer l’importance du travail sur soi pour l’empereur Marc Aurèle. La problématique qui guidera notre recherche est celle qui vise à saisir ce qui constitue essentiellement le soi alors que celui-ci se présente comme un espace en aménagement constant, ouvert à l’altérité et qui n’est pas donné une fois pour toutes, mais construit. / This research aims to identify the complexity of the concept of the self in the Stoic philosophy of Emperor Marcus Aurelius. First, we will lay the bases of Stoic physics which allow us to grasp the paradox of the existence of singular individualities within the great universal Whole. To do this, we will study the Stoic corporeist theory as well as the concepts of idia poiotês and oikeiôsis forged by ancient Stoicism, but also the Epictean prohairesis. This will lead us to address the concept of hêgemonikon which is central in the conception of the self for Marcus Aurelius. Secondly, we will approach the characteristics of the ruling part of the soul through the study of the disciplines of the self and its interior otherness. Thus, we will see how the self is not a fixed datum, but a relational space in constant evolution. Finally, we will address the question of self-construction, which will lead us to consider the importance of the work on oneself for Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The question that will guide our research is to grasp what essentially constitutes the self when it is presented as a space in constant development, open to otherness and which is not given once and for all but constructed.

Though feminist scholars criticize Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones series as they feel that Bridget’s diary minimizes her work, close analysis reveals that Bridget’s work is equally important to her as her relationships. The novels charts Bridget’s linear progression toward autonomy and creative freedom, and her work mistakes function as ironic commentary on the creative industries. Though she critiques the entertainment industry, she validates its accessibility to a variety of audiences, particularly through adaptations. Throughout the series, Bridget documents her own life into her diary, and, in the final two novels, adapts her past diaries for a new purpose. The diary form departs from Austen’s more distanced narrator as well as from the traditional scholarship on the diary, which dictates the diary as a way to work through trauma. Fielding alters the diary form, and through her use of interiority, creates a complex protagonist whose success does not make her inaccessible.

Captured atmospheres - Rooms and interiors that tell a story in the absence of people är en undersökning av min konstnärliga praktik, återkommande teman, idéer och intressen samt bestående influenser. Genom en längre process där jag gick igenom många års samlande av texter, citat, bilder och idéer som har inspirerat och influerat mitt arbete, försökte jag skapa mig en överblick eller förståelse av denna samling och hur den reflekterar min konstnärliga praktik. I denna process valde jag ut de texter, citat och bilder som jag känner står mig närmast de ideér och verk som jag arbetat med under de senaste åren. Den utvalda samlingen kom att handla om atmosfär, stämningar, rumslighet, psykiska upplevelser, frånvaro och existens. Arbetet består av en Artist book-del där jag jobbat med att i en Artist book-format uttrycka de stämningar, atmosfärer och rumsupplevelser - som inspirerar mig och driver min konstnärliga praktik - med bilder, citat och texter från min samling. Den andra delen av arbetet består av en text där jag försöker uttrycka samma idéer och intressen i essäformat. / [I examensarbetet ingår utställningen "We have a visitor":] The exhibition - We have a visitor - is an installation based on the story of a murder case that was solved by PSI phenomena. A woman was murdered and the police had nothing to go on until another woman reported that she had been possessed by the murdered woman and gave details of the murder and the murderer that led to the case being solved. The installation shows two empty rooms; one through a large flat screen TV dropped on the floor displaying still images from a peculiar angle of a room environment, as if the camera (or somebody) is laying on the floor. A voice speaks to us, through the subtitles in the video, describing her own murder. The TV screen is placed on a piece of carpet cut in a shape emphasising the strange angle of the filmed room and points to a screen print on the wall displaying another angle of the same room. The viewer is standing in the portrayed room. The second room, projected onto a large temporary freestanding wall, display shots from a filmed bedroom, focusing on the top of the bed as if someone is laying there. Then, the camera pans to a window, as if expecting someone's arrival. Suddenly, the view drifts upwards, above the bed towards the ceiling. Next, a yellow entity takes over the image and the view descends back to the bed. The entity holds the space for a moment before vanishing as unexpectedly as it arrived. The installation deals with questions surroundng spatial atmospheres and if rooms and interiors somehow could hold or capture atmospheres or feelings after its subjects have left. Material/Teknik/Mått: Videoverk på monitor på specialskuren filtmatta, screentryck, videoprojection på fristående vägg och digitalt tryck. I anslutning till installationen visade jag ckså en Artist book med samma titel som installationen. Verk i utställningen: 1. They found my body (video installation 2013) 2. The room responded with a resounding silence (screentryck, 2013). 3. Room study (Possession) (Video projection, 2013). 4. Could not possibly be explained by normal means (digitalt tryck, 2013) / <p>Examensarbetet består av en skriftlig del och en gestaltande del. Alternativ titel anger namnet förden gestaltande delen. Tryckta publikationer finns tillgängliga på Kungl Konsthögskolans bibliotek. </p>