This dissertation identifies institutional positivism and historically grounded pluralism as interpretive trends in the Canadian case law on Indigenous-state relations, and explores tensions between these trends. These are tensions between practices of judicial interpretation, not between theories of interpretation or legal concepts. They are practices developed case- by-case, with interpretive trends emerging over time through series of cases addressing similar issues in related contexts. Institutional positivist approaches insist that judicial recognition of Indigenous legal orders and accommodation of Indigenous interests must take place within established constitutional forms founded on state sovereignty. Historically grounded pluralist approaches show greater willingness to balance principles of state sovereignty against principles of popular sovereignty and of Indigenous priority in Canadian territory. While the two approaches overlap significantly, their differences sometimes lead to contrasting legal conclusions on key issues of, e.g., treaty interpretation, the relationship between Indigenous legal orders and the state legal system, and the jurisdictional dimension of Aboriginal title. This dissertation examines these positivist-pluralist tensions in the context of the current period of ideological transition and rapidly evolving imaginaries of Indigenous-state relations. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the case law to highlight concrete ways in which this ideological transition finds doctrinal expression in both positivist and pluralist modes. Chapters 3 and 4 offer broader reflections on philosophical debates relating to legal positivism and the role of popular sovereignty in constitutional interpretation by Canadian courts. The final chapter then considers the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in Canadian law, with a focus on implementing legislation recently adopted by British Columbia and on two recent judgments that split the Supreme Court of Canada on the proper role of the Canadian judiciary in coordinating Canadian state law with non-state legal orders (Indigenous in one case and international in the other). This concluding chapter explains how the ongoing interplay of positivist and pluralist concerns will inevitably shape the reception of UNDRIP in Canadian law and the ongoing elaboration of Canadian Aboriginal law more generally. / Graduate / 2022-08-26

<p>This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the dominant philosophical theory of law today: Hartian positivism. The arguments proffered are not meant to strike at the underlying methodology of that account. Rather, they are intended to demonstrate that it performs sub-optimally with regard to its own jurisprudential aspirations. More specifically, this thesis contends that the Hartian position is unable to model the law in a way that captures the de facto terms of institutional governance, while also being able to give due theoretical credence to the normative structures and mechanisms that are widely deployed to regulate it. With this conclusion in hand, a new theory of law is suggested – one that seeks to stay true to the methods and aspirations of its predecessor, but which has been constructed so as to surpass its descriptive-explanatory capabilities. In this way, the following dissertation means to push analytic jurisprudence beyond the Hartian pale, and into new areas of theoretical discourse.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

[pt] Pretende-se propor um paradigma ecológico alternativo ao paradigma da modernidade que, estruturado sob uma racionalidade instrumental, produziu um conhecimento mecanicista e fragmentado, a partir de um pensamento disjuntor e reducionista, baseado na concepção da natureza como ser inanimado e pronto para a dominação do homem. Tal visão de mundo, validada pela ciência, legitimou o uso insustentável dos recursos naturais e a ideia mitológica de progresso ilimitado, responsáveis pela deflagração, no século XX, de grave crise ambiental, que produziu sérias injustiças socioambientais entre países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento, bem como no próprio âmbito interno das nações. Embora tenha sido atribuído ao meio ambiente uma perspectiva integrada da relação homem-natureza, com a conscientização ambiental iniciada na década de 1970 e consolidada com a constitucionalização brasileira do Direito Ambiental, ocorrida em 1988 - que abraçou um olhar antropocêntrico alargado -, a estrutura jurídica como um todo ainda se revela fundamentalmente arraigada na doutrina positivista, amparada no pensamento simplificador, possuindo como fundamentos a certeza, a previsibilidade, a segurança e a ordem. Sucede que o Direito Ambiental se baseia em aspectos como incerteza, imprevisibilidade, insegurança e desordem e, por isso, não consegue dialogar com o sistema jurídico em si, que valoriza aspectos opostos àqueles concernentes ao meio ambiente e à sua tutela. Além de promover a baixa efetividade do Direito Ambiental, a disparidade mencionada induz e legitima movimentos de retrocesso ambiental, haja vista que a legislação ambiental, embora contenha em si elementos finalísticos de tutela ao meio ambiente, é de difícil implementação na prática, caracterizando, assim, a função simbólica do direito ambiental. É preciso, pois, romper com o paradigma moderno em favor do paradigma da complexidade, ecologizando todo o sistema jurídico, de modo a transformar a racionalidade dominante em uma racionalidade ambiental, por meio da inserção de regras, princípios e valores que modifiquem as mentalidades e ideologias das instituições, governos, estabelecimentos de ensino e paradigmas de conhecimento, com o intuito de construir um futuro sustentável, equitativo, plural e democrático. / [en] This dissertation intends to propose an alternative ecological paradigm to the paradigm of modernity that, structured under an instrumental rationality, produced a mechanistic and fragmented knowledge, starting from a breaker and reductionist thinking, based on the conception of nature as an inanimate being and ready for the domination of the men. This world-view, validated by science, legitimized an unsustainable use of natural resources and a mythological idea of unlimited progress, responsible for the emergence, in the twentieth century, of a serious environmental crisis, that produced serious socio-environmental injustices between developed and developing countries, as well as within the internal realm of nations. Although an integrated perspective of the human-nature relationship with an environmental awareness has begun in the 1970s and has been consolidated with the brazilian constitutionalization of Environmental Law in 1988 - which embraced a broad anthropocentric view -, the legal structure as a whole still remains fundamentally rooted in the positivist doctrine, supported by simplistic thinking, having as its foundation certainty, predictability, security and order. It turns out that environmental law is based on aspects such as uncertainty, unpredictability, insecurity and disorder and, therefore, it can not dialogue with the legal system itself, which values aspects opposed to those concerning the environment and its protection. Besides promoting the low effectiveness of Environmental Law, such disparity induces and legitimizes environmental backtracking movements, given that environmental legislation, although it contains in itself final elements of protection of the environment, it is difficult to be implemented in practice, thus characterizing the symbolic function of environmental law. It is necessary, therefore, to break with the modern paradigm in favor of the paradigm of complexity, greening all the legal system, in order to transform the dominant rationality into an environmental rationality, through the insertion of rules, principles and values that modify mentalities and ideologies of institutions, governments, educational establishments and knowledge paradigms, with the aim of building a sustainable, equitable, plural and democratic future.

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- La Trobe University, 2006. / Research. "A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, La Trobe Law, Faculty of Law and Management, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria". Includes bibliographical references (leaves 318-338). Also available via the World Wide Web.

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.

This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method. / En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método.

Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline. / El derecho, en un contexto transnacional, pierde los rasgos con los que lo hemos configurado desde la modernidad. Las clásicas distinciones entre lo nacional y lo internacional, lo público y lo privado, lo sustantivo y lo procedimental, lo jurídico y lo político, lo social y lo jurídico abandonan su rigidez en un entramado de normas, órdenes, instituciones y agentes que se entremezclan y superponen de modos diversos y cambiantes. Carecemos de una teoría del derecho capaz de explicar y evaluar esta realidad jurídica desbordante. No es suficiente una reflexión teórica sobre el derecho internacional. Lo transnacional apela a una pluralidad de actores y de espacios jurídicos que interaccionan para crear, interpretar y ejecutar normas con las que se identifican mutuamente. Lo transnacional no se refiere solo a lo global o a lo supranacional, sino a la interdependencia de ambos con lo local y los espacios de tránsito. Ello se traduce en un cambio de enfoque o de perspectiva que se exige a cada operador jurídico: la gestión de la interrelación entre órdenes diversos orientada a la creación de espacios para la aproximación, la contestación y la innovación es una exigencia normativa y debe ser ponderada con el resto de valores jurídicos. A partir de ahí cambia el significado de los conceptos a los que ha de orientar su atención la teoría jurídica. El trabajo se refiere a cuatro de dichos conceptos que considero esenciales: grupo social o comunidad, relaciones entre órdenes e interlegalidad, coerción y diversidad normativa. El modo en que los cambios necesarios tienen cabida en la teoría elaborada desde las grandes tradiciones de la iusfilosofía es abordado en la última parte del trabajo, considerando que lo que tienen en común el positivismo jurídico, la teoría socio-jurídica y el realismo jurídico puede ser una aproximación adecuada para la revisión de nuestra disciplina.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.