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1	Morální argumentace v rozvažování soudů při aplikaci práva / Moral arguments in consideration of courts when applying law Šimek, Jiří January 2012 (has links) This thesis deals with relationship of law and morals from the perspective of a judge applying the law. It starts by defining morals as a normative system which determines what is good and what is bad. Bad morals are punished by social sanction. The relationship of content of morals and law can be described as an intersection. There are three possible relationships of the area of law and morals regarding their respective application: (i) area which should be regulated only by moral rules; (ii) area which should be regulated only by law; and (iii) common area for both normative systems. Morals can penetrate reasoning of a judge applying the law at least in three ways: Firstly, Legislator can order the judge to drag a moral norm into his consideration. Such an order is called boni mores (dobré mravy) in Czech legal system (used in Section 3 or Section 39 of Czech Civil Code). Secondly, the school of phenomenology hermeneutics claims that any interpretation, thus interpretation of law as well, is conditioned by existence of so called pre-structures. We cannot get rid of these structures, they create necessary interpretative frame of interpreting individual. Moral feelings or moral attitudes are parts of these pre-structures. Morals can project to the decision-making of judge knowingly or unknowingly through... Právo a morálka; Law and Morals
2	Health research, (bio)technology, regulation & values : operationalising socio-moral values in the legal setting Harmon, Shawn H. E. January 2011 (has links) The rapidly evolving biosciences increasingly rely on the analysis, manipulation and reproduction of the human body. In the health setting, novel biotechnologies offer new methods/avenues for the investigation of wellbeing and the treatment of illness, but they do not just expand the clinician’s toolbox, they increase the very scope of her work. By offering new (and formerly invisible) measures for health, they have created new categories of illhealth (ie: expanding the ways in which humans can be classified as abnormal, unhealthy, or diseased). In doing so, they contain huge marginalising potential. And they are evolving at a pace that the law cannot match. Given this, important questions arise such as: What institutions are acting in this field and what is guiding them? How is health-related research being encouraged and regulated? How does the human subject figure in the bioeconomy? What values are we claiming and vindicating under existing regulatory regimes? What values ought we be emphasising bearing in mind social needs and individual rights? The body of work that forms this submission represents five years of socio-legal research and evolving thought on the topic of how values inform the law and are operationalised through the law and legal institutions. While the publications relied on are diverse, they all pursue small facets of this value inquiry. The first theme addressed – international values and actors – is composed of three papers which explore broad internationally shared values claimed in legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, and institutions such as UNESCO and the EPO. A range of values emerge from these. Papers under the second theme – human participation in health research – explore how we access and use the human body in the modern biosociety/bioeconomy, and how we might better encourage subject participation in, and equitable benefit from, the biomedical research setting. Focusing on population biobanking, it assesses who has rights in the body and what those rights are, and how the existing environment interacts with our claimed values. Papers under the third theme – encouraging stem cell research in Argentina – explore governance instruments and their significance for realising claimed or desired values. These papers are informed by original empirical work conducted in Argentina over a 24-month period during which the Argentine government grappled with the realities of the new biosociety and the (perceived) need to facilitate bioscience research and medical treatment using human tissue. While these papers represent only part of the scholarship deriving from this project, they deploy new evidence on the existing environment and the way forward in that jurisdiction. As argued in the Critical Review, these publications form a broadly coherent and farranging body of interdisciplinary work which persistently questions the link between law and values and how we govern modern bioscience. While there are necessarily descriptive elements, the whole is critically analytical and normatively suggestive. In addition to summarising the aims, objectives, methodology, results and conclusions of these works, and indicating how they form a coherent body of work, the Critical Review goes further. Drawing on evolving thinking and recent scholarship, it argues for a regime less reliant on instruments and more reliant on expert institutions informed by, and charged with protecting, socio-moral values informed by the human rights paradigm. 344.04
3	Filosofia da linguagem do século XX no conceito de direito de Herbert Hart Campos, Fernando Rosa January 2018 (has links) A presente dissertação de mestrado tenta estabelecer como e em qual medida o Conceito de Direito de Herbert Hart é influenciado por teorias da linguagem do século XX. Com este objetivo, são primeiro analisadas as passagens do livro e as considerações do autor que indicam uma influência de teses próprias da filosofia da linguagem em sua obra. Após, são expostas algumas intepretações do tema, tanto no sentido de concordar que existe esta relação entre as teses de Hart e a filosofia da linguagem do século 20, quanto no sentido de negar este vínculo. Especial atenção é atribuída a interpretação de Ronald Dworkin do tema, tendo em vista a sua relevância histórica e o fato do autor reconhecer a vinculação referida e a utilizá-la como base para críticas das teses do Conceito de direito. Estabelecidas estas interpretações divergentes, são então expostas as principais ideias e propostas dos filósofos da linguagem do ambiente acadêmico de Oxford, tendo em vista a relação e proximidade de Hart a estes autores. Expostas estas teses, diferentes pontos da carreira bibliográfica de Hart são analisados, com o objetivo de traçar a relação dos escritos do autor com as teorias recém vistas e de tentar estabelecer a evolução da linha argumentativa que culminou no Conceito de Direito. Uma vez que os argumentos dessa obra forem analisados e um entendimento específico dessas teses for defendido, as críticas de Dworkin e de outros autores são revistas. Este exercício, por fim, mostra como o entendimento defendido neste trabalho serve também como defesa contra algumas caracterizações da obra de Hart que considero equivocadas. / The main goal of this paper is to establish to what extent the work “The Concept of Law” was influenced by philosophical theories of language from the 20th century. First are considered some passages of this work, together with some pronouncements of its author Herbert Hart that appear to confirm that his theses were so influenced. Then are shown some interpretations that recognize the influence between the author and theses from the philosophy of language, together with other interpretations that deny this relationship. Special attention is given to the perception of Ronald Dworkin of the subject given its historical relevance and the fact that it recognize a relationship between these theses and uses it as basis for criticism of the arguments expressed in The Concept of Law. Once these distinctive interpretations are stablished, the main ideas and goals of the Oxford language philosophers, given their relationship and proximity to Hart, are exposed. Once these theses are dealt with, varied moments of the bibliography of Herbert Hart are considered in order to show the connection between his works and the language theses here exposed. After these point are considered and a distinct understanding of the subject is developed the criticism of Dworkin and other authors are retaken. This last point aims to show how the understanding developed in this paper also develops a defense of Hart’s theory from some mischaracterizations of his work. Dworkin, Ronald : Filosofia do direito Filosofia da linguagem Moral Filosofia do direito Filosofia H.L.A Hart Separability between law and morals Hart – Dworkin debate Philosophical method
4	O método dos indícios formais de Martin Heidegger e a contribuição da moral como condição de possibilidade para uma adequada aplicação do direito Costa, Marcelo Cacinotti 14 December 2015 (has links) Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-04-18T18:20:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Cacinotti Costa_.pdf: 2247842 bytes, checksum: ad864c82d79f75219c566126c27f6458 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-18T18:20:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Cacinotti Costa_.pdf: 2247842 bytes, checksum: ad864c82d79f75219c566126c27f6458 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-14 / Nenhuma / A partir de premissas filosóficas de Martin Heidegger (indícios formais), o presente trabalho visa estabelecer as bases para a construção de uma teoria interpretativa adequada para o Direito, principalmente no que se refere ao sentido das coisas (conceitos jurídicos), sem jamais perder de vista a democracia e o respeito à Constituição. A ideia é reconstruir um pouco da trajetória heideggeriana em direção à fenomenologia da faticidade, como instrumento pensado para superação do avanço da metafísica e, consequentemente, do relativismo no Direito. Aborda-se um novo conceito de mundo vivido, caracterizado pela experiência da vida fática. Nesse contexto, a Filosofia recebe importância singular, já que é a partir dela que se torna possível transcender em direção ao novo e ao diferente. Pensar o sentido das coisas significa abandonar a relação sujeito-objeto, valorizar o tempo e deixar que o sentido aconteça na linguagem, a partir da força da tradição histórica (Gadamer). Para tanto, promove-se uma discussão sobre os efeitos do senso comum na comunidade jurídica, cuja superação perpassa necessariamente por uma destruição fenomenológica. A crise no Direito, representada principalmente pelo protagonismo judicial, é apresentada como uma questão de democracia, ideia defendida através de uma aproximação com o pensamento de Ronald Dworkin, assim como pela perspectiva teórica adotada no Brasil por Lenio Streck. A hermenêutica heideggeriana é apresentada pelo método dos indícios formais, pensado no âmbito interpretativo como forma de superação da relativização/entificação dos sentidos. O caráter interpretativo dos indícios formais e a sua função referencial ganha força na medida em que se compreendem os prejuízos da própria cognição, a concepção prévia, o círculo hermenêutico e, como não poderia deixar de ser, da própria noção do Dasein. Embora já em condições de distinguir o comportamento interpretativo típico da tradição metafísica (ôntico) do comportamento interpretativo ontológico, o método das indicações formais anseia por mais. É necessário não desprezar o tempo para todo o intento interpretativo, situação que se intensifica quando é necessário estabelecer conceitos para chegar a resultados, como no Direito. A tese que o Direito e a moral são co-originários ganha força na medida em que se analisam algumas teorias jurídico-filosófica: i) A dimensão moral no Direito em Otfried Höffe (Justiça Política); ii) A dimensão ética do Direito e a autoridade moral da Constituição; iii) A dimensão moral do Direito em Ronald Dworkin. De acordo com a co-originariedade entre Direito e moral, a construção da interpretação jurídica de uma comunidade não se contenta exclusivamente com a forma ou com o procedimento. Isso porque, se faz necessário um compromisso ético-moral de substancialidade democrática, que perpassa a responsabilidade de todos os partícipes. / The present work aims, from philosophical premises of Martin Heidegger (formal evidences), lay the foundation for building a proper interpretive theory for the law, especially in what regards to the meaning of things (legal concepts), without ever losing view of democracy and respect for the Constitution. The idea is to reconstruct some of Heidegger's trajectory towards the phenomenology of facticity as an instrument designed to overcome the metaphysical advancement and hence relativism. It approaches a new concept of lived world, characterized by the experience of factual life. In this context, Philosophy receives singular importance, since it is from there that it is possible to transcend towards the new and the different. Think about the meaning of things means abandoning the subject-object relationship, cherish the time and let the sense happens in language, from the force of historical tradition (Gadamer). To this end, it promotes a discussion about the effects of common sense in the legal community, whose overcome permeates, necessarily, by a phenomenological destruction. The crisis in the law, mainly represented by the judicial role, is presented as a question of democracy, idea that is defended through a contrast with the thought of Ronald Dworkin, and an approach to the perspective adopted in Brazil for Lenio Streck. Heidegger's hermeneutics is presented by the method of formal evidences, thought in the interpretive framework as a way of overcoming the relativization/entification of the senses. The interpretative character of formal evidences and its prohibitive-referential function gains strength to the extent that they understand the losses of cognition itself, the previous design, the hermeneutical circle and, as it couldn´t stop being , the own notion of Dasein. Although longer able to distinguish the typical interpretive behavior of the metaphysical tradition (ontic) of the ontological interpretative behavior, the method of formal indications craves more. Hence the interdependent relationship of the method of formal statements with morality. It´s necessary don´t waste the time for any interpretive intent, situation that is intensified when it is necessary to establish concepts for reaching results, as in the Law. The thesis that Law and morality are co-originating gains strength as we analyze some legal and philosophical theories: i) The moral dimension in Law in Otfried Höffe (Justice Policy); ii) The ethical dimension of Law and the moral authority of the Constitution; iii) The moral dimension of Law Ronald Dworkin. According to co-originating between Law and morality, the construction of the legal interpretation of a community is not content only with the form or the procedure, that because it is necessary an ethical and moral commitment to democratic substantiality that permeates the responsibility of all participants. Indícios formais no direito Sentido das coisas Democracia constitucional Conceitos interpretativos Hermenêutica jurídica Co-originariedade entre direito e moral Formal evidence in law Sense of things Constitutional democracy Interpretative concepts Legal interpretation Co-originating between law and morals
5	Challenges for Legal Philosophy in the 21st Century / Desafíos para la filosofía del derecho del Siglo XXI Ródenas, Ángeles 10 April 2018 (has links) This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method. / En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método. Argumentative Theory Of Law Postpositivism Legal Positivism Philosophy Of Law Legal Method Ethical Skepticism Law And Morals Teoría Argumentativa Del Derecho Pospositivismo Positivismo Jurídico Filosofía Del Derecho Método Jurídico Escepticismo Ético Derecho Y Moral
6	A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity Tyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links) American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. natural law theory legal positivism HLA Hart William Blackstone John Locke Jeremy Bentham John Austin Galileo Socrates Trotsky Athens Soviet law Stuart dynasty John Dewey Dewey Commission Sidney Hook Congregation of the Holy Office Galileo Affair trial of Socrates Moscow Trials trial of Galileo heresy trial of Trotsky reason autonomy consent philosophy of law pragmatism Kant Inquisition ostracism Anaxagoras Protagoras Alcibiades Arginusae Pericles Peloponnesian War Solon Ephialtes Apology Plato Herodotus Xenophon Plutarch Roscoe Pound common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law The Path of the Law Learned Hand Christopher Columbus Langdell Ronald Dworkin Lon Fuller Lenin Stalin King Rex Sergei Kirov Permanent Revolution Socialism in One Country Great Terror Dekulakization Holomodor Terror Famine Italian positivist school Harold J. Berman Gustav Radbruch Ramon Mercader Trotsky assassination Marteman Ryutin Old Bolsheviks Genrikh Yagoda Pope Urban VIII Walter Duranty Harold Denny New York Times Joseph E. Davies Mission to Moscow New Republic John F. Finerty Lev Sedov Military Collegium Vasili Ulrikh Gaspare Borgia Cardinal Robert Bellarmine Pericles Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi Cardinal Francesco Barberini Cardinal Maffeo Barberini Siderius Nuncius Starry Messenger Accademia dei Lincei Letters on Sunspots Friar Tommaso Caccini Niccolo Lorini Commentaries on the Laws of England Second Treatise on Civil Government Henry de Bracton Sir Edward Coke Sir John Fortescue Matthew Hale Ranulf de Glanvil James I Charles I James II Charles II ship money forest fines distraint of knighthood impositions dispensing power royal prerogative Duke of Buckingham Oliver Cromwell Bishops Wars William Prynne Great Migration Declaration of Indulgence Settlement Act Test Act Protectorate Clarendon Code Quaker Act William and Mary English Civil War Puritan Revolution Glorious Revolution Thirty Years' War Earl of Shaftesbuty William Laud Historiomatrix Long Parliament Rump Parliament Barebones Parliament sociological jurisprudence Red Terror war communism New Economic Policy 1926 Criminal Code Kirov Amendments judicial discretion semantic sting The Concept of Law Fragments on Government The Province of Jurisprudence Determined A Fragment on Government Anarchical Fallacies primary rules secondary rules rule of recognition legal validity internal point of view external point of view law as prediction the bad man perspective on law life of the law page of history Basilikon Doron Trew Law of Free Monarchies

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