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1	Liability Rules: An Economic Taxonomy / Reglas de responsabilidad: Una taxonomía económica Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Parisi, Francesco 12 April 2018 (has links) The analysis of tort law is one of the most well-developed applications of economic methodology in the study of law. in this essay, we provide an overview of the economic approach to tort law, analyzing the effects of liability rules on care incentives. We catalogue a variety of possible tort regimes, systematically breaking down possible assignments of liability in terms of primary and secondary rules, and describe how their permutations distribute the costs of accidents (and the concomitant incentives to exercise precautionary care). We further consider what factual circumstances may render one tort regime preferable to another from the perspective of policymakers. / El análisis de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual ha sido unade las aplicaciones más y mejor desarrolladas aplicaciones de la metodología económica en el estudio del Derecho. e n el presente ensayo, ofrecemos un vistazo general de la aproximación económica a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, analizando los efectos de las reglas de responsabilidad en los incentivos de precaución. Catalogamos una variedad de regímenes de responsabilidad, desglosando sistemáticamente las posibles asignaciones de responsabilidad en términos de reglas primarias y secundarias; asi como describimos como sus transformaciones distribuyen los costos de los accidentes (y los incentivos concomitantes para tomar las medidas precautorias). Consideramos luego que circunstancias empíricas o facticas pueden determinar que un régimen de responsabilidad extracontractual sea preferido sobre otro desde la perspectiva del legislador. Law Torts Law & Economics Primary Rules Secondary Rules Negligence Strict Liability Rresponsabilidad Extracontractual Análisis Económico del Derecho Reglas Primarias Reglas Secundarias Negligencia Responsabilidad Objetiva
2	L’Union européenne et la Suisse : recherches sur l’institutionnalisation d’une relation entre l’UE et un État tiers / Switzerland and the European Union : research on the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third country Mazille, Clémentine 05 December 2014 (has links) La relation entre l’Union européenne et la Suisse est celle d’une ambivalenceentre l’intériorité et l’extériorité de la Suisse par rapport à l’Union européenne, tension querend prégnant l’effet de l’écoulement du temps. Une analyse de l’interaction entre lesubjectivisme et l’objectivisme caractérisant cette relation permet d’expliquer juridiquementcette tension, et de qualifier le développement de la relation Suisse-UE. Il existe entrel’Union européenne et la Suisse un phénomène d’objectivisation du droit, profondément liéà l’utilisation du droit de l’Union européenne pour fonder les règles applicables. Cephénomène se prolonge au niveau institutionnel : les négociations en cours visent àrenforcer l’homogénéité du droit de la relation Suisse-UE sur le droit de l’UE. Pourtant, cephénomène d’objectivisation se heurte à certaines limites : l’ensemble formé entre l’Unioneuropéenne et la Suisse ne peut prétendre qu’à un développement intrinsèquement limité,parce qu’il ne bénéficie pas d’une « idée d’oeuvre » propre, mais emprunte celle del’Union européenne. La tension résultant entre le maintien dans le temps d’un phénomèned’objectivisation et les limites inhérentes de l’objectivité possible, semble alors être lamanifestation de la liberté politique, qui se pose dans un ensemble qui se construit, sanspouvoir se déployer dans la mesure du commun. / The relationship between Switzerland and the European Union can bedescribed as a tension between the interiority and the exteriority of the former to the latter.This ambivalence is emphasised by the effect of the passage of time. The interactionbetween objectivism and subjectivism can explain both the legal analysis of this tension asthe evolution of the relationship. One can point to the existence of a legal objectivizationphenomenon linked to the use of European Union law in order to determine the applicablelaw between the two parties. This phenomenon extends to the institutional part of therelationship as well: the ongoing negotiations are to strengthen the homogeneity of the lawapplied in the EU-Switzerland relationship by aligning it on European Union law. However,the evolution of this objectivization phenomenon is limited. The evolution of thegroup/ensemble formed by the European Union and Switzerland has an innate boundaryas it is lacking its own “idée d’oeuvre”, thus following that of the European Union. Thetension between the ongoing objectivization phenomenon and its innate limits seems toreflect the issue of political liberty. As the group/ensemble is still evolving and raisespolitically related issues, political liberty cannot unfold. Union européenne Suisse Accords Intégration Communauté Règles primaires Règles secondaires Institution European Union Switzerland Agreements Integration Community Primary rules Secondary rules Institution 340
3	Les bases philosophiques du positivisme juridique de H.L.A. Hart / The philosophical foundations of H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism Bligh, Grégory 07 December 2016 (has links) Cette thèse cherche à reconstituer les bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), figure majeure du positivisme juridique anglo-saxon au XXe siècle, et professeur de jurisprudence à l'université d'Oxford de 1952 à 1968. Ses travaux demeurent largement méconnus en France.Dégager les sources philosophiques du « positivisme analytique » de Hart permettra, premièrement, de reconstruire le dialogue entre le juriste d'Oxford et certaines figures importantes de la théorie du droit continentale. Hart oppose d’importantes critiques à certaines formes continentales de positivisme juridique, comme le normativisme de Hans Kelsen ou le réalisme scandinave d'Alf Ross. Cependant, cette thèse montrera également qu'il est possible d'établir des rapprochements étroits entre la pensée de Hart et celle du juriste francophone Chaïm Perelman. L'étude des bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de Hart offre ainsi des points de contact intéressants entre ces différentes cultures juridiques.Deuxièmement, cette thèse cherche à faire ressortir l'influence déterminante de la philosophie du langage ordinaire qui se développa à Oxford au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Notre propos s'appuiera notamment sur un « premier corpus » de textes philosophiques publiés avant son accession à la chaire de jurisprudence en 1952, ainsi que sur les travaux préparatoires à son ouvrage The Concept of Law (1961). Nous défendons l'idée que ses prises de position philosophiques se retrouvent dans sa réflexion juridique et permettent de comprendre la cohérence de son œuvre, ainsi que la forme d'empirisme juridique qui sous-tend sa conception de la notion de Constitution. / This thesis bears on the implicit epistemology and methodological considerations underlying the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the major representative of XXth century legal positivism in the English speaking world, and Oxford chair of jurisprudence (1952-1968). His work remains little known in France.We will seek to answer the view that Hart might not really have been durably influenced by ordinary language philosophy. We will address these questions by examining a corpus of earlier (overlooked) articles which he published as a young Oxford linguistic philosopher. This “early work” consists of the articles which Hart published before he in was elected to the Oxford chair of jurisprudence. Our view is that the work in general philosophy which he did in this early period is crucial to understand some of the positions which he defends in his legal writings. This thesis will thus show that Hart was active in the epistemological debate opposing the Oxford philosophers and the British representatives of logical atomism and logical empiricism. It will also show that these early positions are carried over into his later jurisprudence, including his major work The Concept of Law (1961).Shedding light on these philosophical foundations of Hart’s legal theory will ultimately allow us to reconstruct the debate opposing his own “analytical positivism” and Continental forms of positivism, such as Hans Kelsen’s normativism or Alf Ross Scandinavian legal realism. It will also allow us to draw important parallels between Hartian legal theory and that of the francophone philosopher Chaïm Perelman. Philosophie du langage ordinaire Positivisme logique Descartes Aristote Constitution Coutume Norme fondamentale Règles primaires et secondaires Normativité Empirisme Ordinary language philosophy Logical positivism Descartes Aristotle Constitution Custom Basic norm Primary and secondary rules Internal aspect of rules Normativity Empiricism
4	La codification du droit de la responsabilité des organisations internationales : étude des travaux de la Commission du droit international relatifs au projet d’articles sur la responsabilité des organisations internationales / Codification of the law of responsibility of international organizations : study of the work of the International Law Commission on the draft articles on responsibility of international organizations Alata, Ayham 08 December 2014 (has links) Enfin, le droit international dispose d’un ensemble de règles relatives à la responsabilité des organisations internationales pour fait internationalement illicite. Après 10 ans de travail, la Commission du droit international est parvenue, en 2011, à élaborer un projet d'articles codifiant les règles en la matière. La tâche était pourtant délicate : assujettir ces entités dont la nature et le fonctionnement sont différents des Etats, à un ensemble de règles unique dans le domaine de la responsabilité internationale. L’objet de cette étude porte sur l’œuvre de codification effectuée par la Commission dans le projet d’articles. Il s’agit plus précisément d’analyser les techniques de codification utilisées par la Commission dans l’élaboration des règles applicables : s’agit-il d’une codification stricto sensu de la pratique ou bien de l’élaboration de nouvelles règles relevant du « développement progressif » du droit international ? La réponse apportée à cette question suppose préalablement de définir les sources de la codification en ce qui concerne chacune des dispositions du projet d’articles, en se demandant si elle concrétise une pratique bien établie des organisations internationales, ou au contraire une transposition des règles du projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat, adaptées aux particularités des organisations internationales. L’autorité du projet d’articles ne semble pas, à l’heure actuelle, faire l’unanimité, et dans ce contexte, la présente étude portant sur le rapport entre codification et développement progressif dans l’œuvre de codification de la CDI permet d’apprécier l’autorité substantielle propre à chacune des dispositions du projet d’articles. D’autant qu’on ne sait absolument pas si une convention de codification sera adoptée, qui pourra ériger les dispositions du projet d’articles en normes juridiquement obligatoires. / The international law has finally a set of rules on the responsibility of the international organizations for internationally wrongful acts. After 10 years of work, the International Law Commission was able in 2011 to elaborate a draft articles codifying the rules on the matter. However the task was difficult: subject these entities, whose nature and functioning is different from States to a single set of rules in the field of international responsibility. The purpose of this study focuses on the work of codification made by the Commission in the draft articles. This is specifically to analyze the techniques of codification used by the Commission in the elaboration of the applicable rules: is it a codification sticto sensu of the practice or a creation of new rules under the "progressive development" of the international law? The answer to this question presupposes to define the sources of codification in each of the provisions of the draft articles concerned, wondering if it embodies a well-established practice of international organizations, or rather a transposition of the rules of the draft articles on States responsibility, adapted to the features of international organizations. At present the authority of the draft articles does not seem to have unanimity, and in this context, the present study on the relation between codification and progressive development in the codification work of ILC can appreciate the substantial own authority of each provisions of the draft articles. Especially that no one knows if a codification convention will be adopted, which will set the provisions of the draft articles up as legally binding norms. Attribution Codification Développement progressif Commission du Droit International Contre-Mesures Invocation de la responsabilité Fait internationalement illicite Manquement Organisations internationales Pratique Règles primaires Règles secondaires Responsabilité internationale Responsabilité subsidiaire Attribution Codification Countermeasures Internationally wrongful act International Law Commission International organizations International responsibility Invocation of responsibility Failure Practice Primary rules Progressive development Secondary rules Subsidiary responsibility 340
5	A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity Tyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links) American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. natural law theory legal positivism HLA Hart William Blackstone John Locke Jeremy Bentham John Austin Galileo Socrates Trotsky Athens Soviet law Stuart dynasty John Dewey Dewey Commission Sidney Hook Congregation of the Holy Office Galileo Affair trial of Socrates Moscow Trials trial of Galileo heresy trial of Trotsky reason autonomy consent philosophy of law pragmatism Kant Inquisition ostracism Anaxagoras Protagoras Alcibiades Arginusae Pericles Peloponnesian War Solon Ephialtes Apology Plato Herodotus Xenophon Plutarch Roscoe Pound common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law The Path of the Law Learned Hand Christopher Columbus Langdell Ronald Dworkin Lon Fuller Lenin Stalin King Rex Sergei Kirov Permanent Revolution Socialism in One Country Great Terror Dekulakization Holomodor Terror Famine Italian positivist school Harold J. Berman Gustav Radbruch Ramon Mercader Trotsky assassination Marteman Ryutin Old Bolsheviks Genrikh Yagoda Pope Urban VIII Walter Duranty Harold Denny New York Times Joseph E. Davies Mission to Moscow New Republic John F. Finerty Lev Sedov Military Collegium Vasili Ulrikh Gaspare Borgia Cardinal Robert Bellarmine Pericles Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi Cardinal Francesco Barberini Cardinal Maffeo Barberini Siderius Nuncius Starry Messenger Accademia dei Lincei Letters on Sunspots Friar Tommaso Caccini Niccolo Lorini Commentaries on the Laws of England Second Treatise on Civil Government Henry de Bracton Sir Edward Coke Sir John Fortescue Matthew Hale Ranulf de Glanvil James I Charles I James II Charles II ship money forest fines distraint of knighthood impositions dispensing power royal prerogative Duke of Buckingham Oliver Cromwell Bishops Wars William Prynne Great Migration Declaration of Indulgence Settlement Act Test Act Protectorate Clarendon Code Quaker Act William and Mary English Civil War Puritan Revolution Glorious Revolution Thirty Years' War Earl of Shaftesbuty William Laud Historiomatrix Long Parliament Rump Parliament Barebones Parliament sociological jurisprudence Red Terror war communism New Economic Policy 1926 Criminal Code Kirov Amendments judicial discretion semantic sting The Concept of Law Fragments on Government The Province of Jurisprudence Determined A Fragment on Government Anarchical Fallacies primary rules secondary rules rule of recognition legal validity internal point of view external point of view law as prediction the bad man perspective on law life of the law page of history Basilikon Doron Trew Law of Free Monarchies

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