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Showing 1 to 6 of 6 (0.03 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"HLA part"" "subject:"HLA art""
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[en] IS COERCIVENESS AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF LAW? / [pt] É A COERCITIVIDADE UMA PROPRIEDADE ESSENCIAL DO DIREITO?30 August 2018 (has links)
[pt] A coercitividade é sem dúvidas um dos elementos mais salientes do direito. Não só o direito ordena a realização de condutas, mas também faz ameaças e autoriza o uso da força para fazer cumprir as suas ordens. Impostos, taxas, sequestro de bens, cassação de direitos e o encarceramento são práticas presentes em todos sistemas jurídicos paradigmáticos. Apesar da saliência da coerção nos sistemas jurídicos, a grande maioria dos filósofos do direito contemporâneos pensa que a coercitividade não é uma propriedade essencial do direito, isto é, não é uma propriedade que está presente em todas as circunstâncias nas quais o direito existe. O argumento geralmente utilizado por esses filósofos é o de que é possível haver direito sem coerção, pois é possível haver uma circunstância na qual haja somente indivíduos cooperativos. Nessa circunstância a introdução da coerção se torna desnecessária, pois tais indivíduos seguem o direito a despeito da coerção. Neste trabalho defendo que uma versão do argumento normalmente utilizado para defender essa tese - o argumento dos homens perplexos - não funciona. As objeções apresentadas pretendem mostrar que há coerção em uma circunstância na qual só existem homens perplexos e também que a instituição existente nessa circunstância não é uma instância genuína de direito. No curso deste trabalho esclareço o que é o homem perplexo e também faço algumas considerações sobre a coerção visando a dispersar algumas confusões. / [en] Coerciveness is doubtlessly one of law s most salient elements. Law not only orders the performance of conducts, but also makes threats and authorizes the use of force to enforce its orders. Taxes, fees, restraint of assets, revocation of rights and imprisonment are existing practices in all paradigmatic legal systems. Despite the salience of coercion in all legal systems, the great majority of contemporary legal philosophers think that coerciveness is not an essential property of law, that is, it is not a property present in all circumstances in which law exists. The argument normally used by those philosophers is that it is possible to have law without coercion, because it is possible to have a circumstance composed solely by cooperative subjects. In this circumstance, the introduction of coercion becomes unnecessary, for such subjects follow the law regardless of coercion. In this work, I argue that one version of the argument normally used by those philosophers to defend this thesis - the puzzled men argument - does not
work. The objections presented aim to show that there is coercion in a circumstance composed solely by puzzled men, and that the existing institution in this circumstance is not a genuine instance of law. During this work, I clarify what the puzzled man is and make some considerations about coercion aiming to
dispel some confusions.
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The Role of the 'Legal Rule' in Indonesian Law: environmental law and the reformasi of water managementWaddell, Sarah Kathleen January 2004 (has links)
In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.
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The Role of the 'Legal Rule' in Indonesian Law: environmental law and the reformasi of water managementWaddell, Sarah Kathleen January 2004 (has links)
In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.
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Normative Political Communities: Foundations for a Hartian Theory of State and Non-State LawFabra-Zamora, Jorge L. January 2019 (has links)
This dissertation outlines a theory of law capable of explaining both the legal systems of domestic states and other types of legal phenomena different from state law that I will call non-state legal phenomena. Central examples of non-state law include indigenous and customary laws, the international legal order, the European Union, and transnational commercial law. This theoretical framework aims to formulate and resolve questions about the common features shared by different types of legality and the distinctive legal character of non-state legal phenomena. It also sets the stage for doctrinal and politico-moral inquiries about these phenomena.
My account draws liberally from central themes of HLA Hart’s theory of state law that I deem applicable outside the domestic context. One key idea is the notion of normative order or unified complexes of interrelated rules that regulate specific domains of action. The refined Hartian view that I develop here distinguishes between two kinds of normative orders, sets and systems, which differ in their characteristic features and that allow for different doctrinal and moral inquiries. While these tools can be used to explain both state and non-state normative phenomena, I shall consider as law the normative orders of political communities, i.e. groups whose participants efficaciously employ intense forms of social pressure to secure conformity to norms that regulate pressing politico-moral issues. With these elements in place, the legal domain can be characterized as a constellation of sets and systems that constitute political communities at the state, non-domestic, international, supra-national, and potentially global levels.
The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets the stage of this inquiry. Chapter 2 explicates the key insights of the Hartian framework. Chapter 3 defends the applicability of this framework to non-state contexts. Chapter 4 illustrates its explanatory virtues by applying it to two regimes of international trade law. The conclusion summarizes the central insights of this view and highlights the avenues for future research. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation outlines a theory of law capable of explaining both state and non-state legal phenomena. This theoretical framework aims to formulate and resolve questions about the common features shared by different types of legality and the distinctive legal character of non-state legal phenomena, and to help to set the stage for further inquiries about them. My account draws liberally from HLA Hart’s theory of state law. The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets the stage of this inquiry. Chapter 2 explicates the key insights of the Hartian framework. Chapter 3 defends the applicability of this framework to non-state contexts. Chapter 4 illustrates its explanatory virtues by applying it to two regimes of international trade law. The conclusion summarizes the central insights of this view and highlights the avenues for future research.
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Implied constitutional principlesZhou, Han-Ru January 2012 (has links)
This thesis challenges some of the current limits to the grounds for judicial review of legislation accepted by most Canadian jurists. More specifically, it makes a common law-based argument in favour of the priority over legislation of principles which are implied from the Imperial Constitution Acts 1867-1982 and which originally derive from the English constitution – namely implied constitutional principles. The argument faces two main interrelated legal objections: Parliamentary sovereignty and the Framers’ intentions. The first objection is rebutted by arguing that Parliamentary sovereignty possesses an ability to change in a way that can incorporate substantive legal limitations. The most prevalent common law-based theories of change to Parliamentary sovereignty suggest that the courts can authoritatively determine if implied constitutional principles can check legislation. The second objection is rebutted by reference to the notion of progressive interpretation as conceived under Hartian and Dworkinian theories of law and adjudication. Under these theories, progressive interpretation is an aspect of the courts’ best overall interpretation of the constitution, which includes implied constitutional principles. Such progressive interpretation can result in these principles constraining legislative authority. Justification of the progressive interpretation of implied constitutional principles can be based on the rule of law from which derive a number of these principles. One plausible conception of the Canadian rule of law is that it rejects the view that implied constitutional principles can prevail when in conflict with legislation. However, the better conception is that, as an attempt to adapt implied constitutional principles to relevant changes in society and to protect their underlying values, the judiciary should interpret these principles as capable of checking legislation to the extent that they form part of the core content of the rule of law. Such a conception and an operation of implied constitutional principles can properly be explained by Hartian or Dworkinian common law-based progressive interpretation of these principles and by their relationship with legislative authority.
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A Pragmatic Standard of Legal ValidityTyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links)
American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.
These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.
In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method.
This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.
The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.
The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.
Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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