Localizado na modalidade de aprendizagem um computador por aluno e no contexto da proposta metodológica de PAs (Projetos de Aprendizagem), este estudo tem por objetivo apresentar uma dinâmica de acompanhamento da conceituação a partir da enunciação sobre as produções escritas dos alunos. Parte-se da concepção de enunciação como apropriação ativa da língua, na qual se expõe a compreensão em muitos casos ausente no registro textual. Ferramentas do laptop em utilização na escola pólo do pré-piloto do Projeto UCA (Um Computador por Aluno) em Porto Alegre e o ambiente virtual de aprendizagem Amadis dão suporte ao trabalho. Sustentam a análise o Método Clínico de Piaget e a teoria de reações compensadoras proposta pelo mesmo autor, aplicáveis à amplitude de temas contemplados nos PAs e aos diferentes percursos empreendidos pelos estudantes em suas pesquisas. / Located in 1:1 (one computer per student) learning modality and in the context of Learning Projects methodology, this study aims to present a dynamics of monitoring the process of conceptualization considering students’ written productions. For the purpose of this study, enunciation is understood as an active process of language ownership, which exposes comprehension often lacking in textual speech. Resources from the laptop used in the trial school of UCA (One Computer per Child) Project pre-pilot in Porto Alegre and the virtual learning environment Amadis support the work. The analysis is based on Jean Piaget Clinical Method and on the Cognitive Compensation Reactions theory, proposed by the same author, applicable to the variety of themes covered in the projects and to the different paths taken by students in their researches.

In this thesis we extend BDI logics, which are normal multimodal logics with an arbitrary set of normal modal operators, from three different perspectives. Firstly, based on some recent developments in modal logic, we examine BDI logics from a combining logic perspective and apply combination techniques like fibring/dovetailing for explaining them. The second perspective is to extend the underlying logics so as to include action constructs in an explicit way based on some recent action-related theories. The third perspective is to adopt a non-monotonic logic like defeasible logic to reason about intentions in BDI. As such, the research captured in this thesis is theoretical in nature and situated at the crossroads of various disciplines relevant to Artificial Intelligence (AI). More specifically this thesis makes the following contributions: 1. Combining BDI Logics through fibring/dovetailing: BDI systems modeling rational agents have a combined system of logics of belief, time and intention which in turn are basically combinations of well understood modal logics. The idea behind combining logics is to develop general techniques that allow to produce combinations of existing and well understood logics. To this end we adopt Gabbay's fibring/dovetailing technique to provide a general framework for the combinations of BDI logics. We show that the existing BDI framework is a dovetailed system. Further we give conditions on the fibring function to accommodate interaction axioms of the type G [superscript k,l,m,n] ([diamond][superscript k] [superscript l] [phi] [implies] [superscript m] [diamond][superscript n] [phi]) based on Catach's multimodal semantics. This is a major result when compared with other combining techniques like fusion which fails to accommodate axioms of the above type. 2. Extending the BDI framework to accommodate Composite Actions: Taking motivation from a recent work on BDI theory, we incorporate the notion of composite actions, [pi]-1; [pi]-2 (interpreted as [pi]-1 followed by [pi]-2), to the existing BDI framework. To this end we introduce two new constructs Result and Opportunity which helps in reasoning about the actual execution of such actions. We give a set of axioms that can accommodate the new constructs and analyse the set of commitment axioms as given in the original work in the background of the new framework. 3. Intention reasoning as Defeasible reasoning: We argue for a non-monotonic logic of intention in BDI as opposed to the usual normal modal logic one. Our argument is based on Bratman's policy-based intention. We show that policy-based intention has a defeasible/non-monotonic nature and hence the traditional normal modal logic approach to reason about such intentions fails. We give a formalisation of policy-based intention in the background of defeasible logic. The problem of logical omniscience which usually accompanies normal modal logics is avoided to a great extend through such an approach.

Trying to do two things at once decreases performance of one or both tasks in many cases compared to the situation when one performs each task by itself. The present thesis deals with the question why and in which cases these dual-task costs emerge and moreover, whether there are cases in which people are able to process two cognitive tasks at the same time without costs. In four experiments the influence of stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility, S-R modality pairings, interindividual differences, and practice on parallel processing ability of two tasks are examined. Results show that parallel processing is possible. Nevertheless, dual-task costs emerge when: the personal processing strategy is serial, the two tasks have not been practiced together, S-R compatibility of both tasks is low (e.g. when a left target has to be responded with a right key press and in the other task an auditorily presented “A” has to be responded by saying “B”), and modality pairings of both tasks are Non Standard (i.e., visual-spatial stimuli are responded vocally whereas auditory-verbal stimuli are responded manually). Results are explained with respect to executive-based (S-R compatibility) and content-based crosstalk (S-R modality pairings) between tasks. Finally, an alternative information processing account with respect to the central stage of response selection (i.e., the translation of the stimulus to the response) is presented. / Versucht man zwei Aufgaben zur gleichen Zeit zu erledigen, so verschlechtert sich die Leistung einer oder beider Aufgabe(n) im Vergleich zur Situation, in der man beide Aufgaben einzeln erledigt. Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, warum und unter welchen Umständen diese Doppelaufgabenkosten entstehen. Darüber hinaus geht sie der Frage nach, ob es Aufgabenkombinationen gibt, für die parallele Verarbeitung ohne Kosten gezeigt werden kann. In vier Experimenten wurde der Einfluss von Stimulus-Reaktion (S-R) Kompatibilität, S-R Modalitätspaarungen, interindividueller Unterschiede und Training auf das Parallelverarbeitungspotential zweier Aufgaben untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass parallele Verarbeitung generell möglich ist. Dennoch entstehen Doppelaufgabenkosten, wenn die persönliche Verarbeitungsstrategie seriell ist, die beiden Aufgaben nicht genügend zusammen trainiert wurden, die S-R Kompatibilität beider Aufgaben gering ist (z.B. wenn ein linker Zielreiz mit einem Druck auf die rechten Taste beantwortet und in der anderen Aufgabe ein auditiv präsentiertes „A“ mit der Aussprache eines „Bs“ beantwortet werden muss) und die Modalitätspaarungen beider Aufgaben Nicht-Standard sind (d.h. visuell-räumliche Stimuli mit vokalen und auditiv-verbale Stimuli mit manuellen Reaktionen beantwortet werden müssen). Die gewonnenen Ergebnisse werden durch „Crosstalk“ der exekutiven Signale (S-R Kompatibilität) und durch inhaltsbasierten „Crosstalk“ (S-R Modalitätspaarungen) erklärt. Weiterhin wird ein alternatives Modell der Informationsverarbeitung mit Hinblick auf die zentrale Phase der Antwortauswahl (d.h. die Phase in der die Stimulusinformation in eine Antwort übersetzt wird) vorgestellt.

The auditory brainstem is comprised of a number of synapses specialized for the transmission of high-fidelity synaptic signals. Within the first three postnatal weeks, these pathways acquire the ability to process high-frequency signals without compromising timing information. However, little is known regarding developmental adaptations which confer this ability. Situated in the sound localization pathway, the calyx of Held-medial nucleus of the trapezoid body synapse provides an ideal model for investigating such adaptations as both the pre- and postsynaptic neurons are accessible to electrophysiological experimentation. Using this synapse, we have shown herein that the spatial coupling between voltage-gated calcium channels (VGCCs) and synaptic vesicles (SVs) tightens during development. Immature synapses use a loosely-coupled arrangement of many N- and P/Q-type VGCCs (“microdomain” modality) while mature synapses use a tightly-coupled arrangement of fewer P/Q-type VGCCs, to release SVs (“nanodomain” modality). As a consequence of this tightening, synaptic delay (SD) shortens. By fluorescence- and electron microscopy of SVs near active zones, we further identified the filamentous protein septin 5 as a molecular substrate, differentiating the two release modalities, which may act as a spatial barrier separating VGCCs and SVs in immature synapses. Finally, we have demonstrated that changes in release modality affect the nature of short-term plasticity observed at this synapse. Using trains of action potentials as presynaptic voltage-commands, we showed that, downstream of calcium influx, the microdomain modality promotes short-term facilitation in excitatory postsynaptic currents (IEPSC), and calcium-dependent decreases in SD, with these being absent in synapses employing the nanodomain modality. In contrast, we found that as a result of depletion of SVs, short-term depression of IEPSC dominates in synapses using the nanodomain modality, and correlates with calcium-dependent increases in SD. These findings imply that the type of release modality has a significant impact on the strength and timing of synaptic responses. The microdomain modality imparts greater dynamic range in timing and strength, but does so at the cost of efficiency and fidelity, while the nanodomain modality is a key accomplishment consolidating the high-fidelity abilities of this synapse.

The auditory brainstem is comprised of a number of synapses specialized for the transmission of high-fidelity synaptic signals. Within the first three postnatal weeks, these pathways acquire the ability to process high-frequency signals without compromising timing information. However, little is known regarding developmental adaptations which confer this ability. Situated in the sound localization pathway, the calyx of Held-medial nucleus of the trapezoid body synapse provides an ideal model for investigating such adaptations as both the pre- and postsynaptic neurons are accessible to electrophysiological experimentation. Using this synapse, we have shown herein that the spatial coupling between voltage-gated calcium channels (VGCCs) and synaptic vesicles (SVs) tightens during development. Immature synapses use a loosely-coupled arrangement of many N- and P/Q-type VGCCs (“microdomain” modality) while mature synapses use a tightly-coupled arrangement of fewer P/Q-type VGCCs, to release SVs (“nanodomain” modality). As a consequence of this tightening, synaptic delay (SD) shortens. By fluorescence- and electron microscopy of SVs near active zones, we further identified the filamentous protein septin 5 as a molecular substrate, differentiating the two release modalities, which may act as a spatial barrier separating VGCCs and SVs in immature synapses. Finally, we have demonstrated that changes in release modality affect the nature of short-term plasticity observed at this synapse. Using trains of action potentials as presynaptic voltage-commands, we showed that, downstream of calcium influx, the microdomain modality promotes short-term facilitation in excitatory postsynaptic currents (IEPSC), and calcium-dependent decreases in SD, with these being absent in synapses employing the nanodomain modality. In contrast, we found that as a result of depletion of SVs, short-term depression of IEPSC dominates in synapses using the nanodomain modality, and correlates with calcium-dependent increases in SD. These findings imply that the type of release modality has a significant impact on the strength and timing of synaptic responses. The microdomain modality imparts greater dynamic range in timing and strength, but does so at the cost of efficiency and fidelity, while the nanodomain modality is a key accomplishment consolidating the high-fidelity abilities of this synapse.

Few studies have investigated the credibility of computer simulations, from the user’s perspective. This thesis tackles the credibility question, construed as inextricably linked to the judgments of actors who deal with simulations. The theoretical part of this work consists in a typology of credibility-related judgments pertaining to various media . This analysis leads to the development of a judgment construct applying specifically to interactive simulation, and based on the notion of verisimilitude, the quality of appearing true or real. The empirical part is an exploratory study that investigated the perceptions of potential users of a simulation-based learning environment (the VPLab). This study aimed to show the pertinence of verisimilitude in examining credibility discourse, and to explore themes for future research. Its specific objectives were to uncover: (1) users’ preoccupations and representations relating to the VPLab’s verisimilitude, (2) the cues enabling users to make judgments about the VPLab, and (3) the roles played by such cues in the expression of judgments. Following a qualitative and descriptive approach, the investigation included in-depth interviews with thirteen university science students. As part of the results, several varied research themes were developed and the complex nature of user verisimilitude judgments was highlighted. Furthermore, connections appeared between these judgments and individual traits of users, such as prior use of certain computer applications. The influence of various aspects of the environment on its verisimilitude was also considered. ----- [Version française] ---->>>> Peu d’ouvrages traitent de la crédibilité des simulations informatiques, du point de vue de leurs utilisateurs. Ce mémoire examine cette question sous l’angle des jugements de divers acteurs concernés par ces technologies. Son volet théorique définit une typologie de jugements associés à la crédibilité de divers media et propose un concept de jugement propre aux simulations interactives, fondé sur la notion de vraisemblance. Son volet empirique consiste en une étude exploratoire des perceptions des utilisateurs potentiels d’un environnement d’apprentissage fondé sur la simulation (le laboratoire virtuel de physique). Cette étude visait à démontrer la pertinence du concept de jugement de vraisemblance dans l’analyse de discours traitant de crédibilité, et à explorer des pistes de recherche future dans ce domaine. Les objectifs spécifiques de l’étude étaient de mettre au jour (1) les préoccupations et représentations des utilisateurs à l’égard de la vraisemblance de l’environnement, (2) les repères sur lesquels ils s’appuient pour poser des jugements et (3) les rôles que jouent ces repères dans ceux-ci. L’approche qualitative et descriptive retenue s’appuyait principalement sur des entrevues en profondeur auprès de treize étudiants universitaires. L’étude a permis d’explorer de nombreux thèmes de recherche inédits; ses résultats ont mis en relief le caractère complexe des jugements et fait apparaître des relations entre ces derniers et des caractéristiques des utilisateurs, telles que leurs antécédents en matière d’usage d’applications informatiques. L’influence de divers éléments ou caractéristiques de l’environnement sur les jugements a également été examinée.

Thesis (DAppLing)--Macquarie University, Faculty of Human Sciences, Dept. of Linguistics, 2009. / Bibliography: p. 208-233.

No description available.

Cette suite d'essais analyse la conception de la monnaie en droit, cherchant à isoler l'originalité de sa nature abstraite. La tradition juridique caractérise la monnaie à la fois comme un fait et comme un droit parce qu'elle présuppose un sens substantif au nom commun 'monnaie', étant ainsi incapable d'admettre que la monnaie, par sa place unique dans les catégories du droit, est le mécanisme qui suppose l'avenir indéterminé en y enchâssant le présent. La difficulté de la monnaie est que, comme catégorie, elle n'est pas incluse aux catégories usuelles de droit privé. Son caractère abstrait l'empêche d'ailleurs d'être incluse parmi les objets qui ont une extension. La monnaie se définit plutôt par négation relativement aux catégories usuelles. Elle est donc reconnaissable entre toutes. Dans la relation sujet-objet, la monnaie versée n'est évidemment pas un sujet. Dans son sens strict, la monnaie réfère aujourd'hui au papier-monnaie. Il est vrai que ce dernier existe matériellement puisqu'il est tangible. Mais paradoxalement, en tant qu'objet, la monnaie est ni une somme, ni une obligation en nature, ni un bien, ni une représentation de dette, ni une mesure, ni consomptible, ni fongible au sens pertinent de ces mots. Comment saisir la substance d'une notion qui se soustrait aux catégories usuelles de la doctrine? Voilà la difficulté fondamentale de la thèse. Répétons son mode original de définition: la monnaie n'est pas identique à une somme due, mais - en étant payée - elle en éteint une; conversement, la somme due n'est pas identique à la monnaie perçue, mais -lorsque payée en trop - cette dernière est déclarée indue et sujette à répétition (l'indu devient dû). La définition de la monnaie procède par 'corécurrence' : elle définit quelque chose d'indéterminé puisqu'un membre de la définition réfère à l'autre et viceversa. Sa nature s'exprime par sa fonction dans la structure des prestations. Mais la doctrine la traite d'abord comme une somme due, sans distinguer outre mesure ce type de dette des autres prestations. Or, à titre d'exécution d'une obligation, une somme d'argent non seulement éteint d'autant les montants, dus à une époque ou l'autre, mais, puisque ces derniers sont appariés aux obligations en nature en tant que prix dû en contrepartie des prestations caractérisées à être effectuées, la perception des sommes d'argent conduit encore à la mobilité des biens parmi les personnes. D'où le paradoxe: une somme d'argent est destinée à circuler précisément pour être la fin des sommes dues. La doctrine enseigne la thèse unitaire du paiement des obligations (en son acception large du droit civil) : sont mis dans un même sac les faits exécutés pour satisfaire à des obligations en nature et les paiements de sommes d'argent dues. Or, elles sont en premier dues, puis payées. Ils sont dits former un ensemble. Ce sac est le temps lui-même. Il s'agit d'une interprétation de l'univers des prestations, précisément une interprétation de la notion d'univers où l'actualité homogène d'un ensemble exclut de faire une place à l'éventualité de valeurs futures par contraste aux valeurs passées. Pour réduire la notion d'univers à celle d'ensemble actuel, l'astuce est de fermer la dualité 'ensemble/membre' en substituant au membre l'ensemble: l'un des objets inclus à l'ensemble doit être à la fois un élément existant de l'ensemble et la collection de tous ses éléments, constituant ainsi la jonction substantive sous-jacente à cette dualité. IV Cet objet fondateur est d'habitude nommé le zéro de l'ensemble. Traitant ainsi l'ensemble des exécutions des obligations, il doit y avoir un élément qui ait à la fois la nature d'une promesse et celle d'un fait. Cet élément est la monnaie. Ainsi, la monnaie a une nature double, à la fois concept et référent du concept. La somme due est exécutée en monnaie et, conversement, la monnaie est la somme transférée à titre de paiement: substituant une définition dans l'autre, l'exécution de la somme due est la somme transférée, une formule conduisant à la régression infinie. Qui donc est le débiteur de cette somme transférée depuis aussi longtemps que la monnaie a circulé et circulera? La difficulté conceptuelle de la monnaie est de comprendre cette métamorphose, où l'exécution d'un fait en satisfaction d'une obligation se révèle elle même être une promesse. Pourquoi alors distinguer une obligation et son exécution? La monnaie cumule la nature catégorique d'une chose matérielle délivrée - autrefois l'or, aujourd'hui le papier-monnaie - et la nature d'une somme due; cette façon de penser mène à réifier les dettes, à leur conférer une existence matérielle. Mais devoir l'argent est fondamentalement la durée du terme d'une relation entre deux personnes. Et payer la monnaie est l'extinction de ce terme. Alors paradoxalement, l'exprimant dans une dualité catégorique, la monnaie a une durée et en même temps n'en a pas. Cette postulation d'une union des termes opposés d'une dualité n'est pas sans précédent. Pour aider le lecteur à s'en rendre compte, je documente que le thème de la migration de la valeur pécuniaire des choses par la médiation de la monnaie dans le paiement des sommes dues rappelle celui de la métempsycose (migration de l'âme) utilisée pour conceptualiser le fondement de la Couronne médiévale, le don de Dieu qui sacrait la continuité des règnes successifs d'une lignée héréditaire de régents. À cette époque, on conceptualisait la continuité historique d'un peuple par les deux corps du roi; sa nature cumulait à la fois celle d'un individu et celle de l'ensemble des individus soumis à son règne. Unique entre tous, on considérait que l'un des individus était un ensemble d'un. Cette attitude platonique était crue nécessaire en droit public pour résoudre la difficulté conceptuelle de la continuité historique d'une communauté en dépit de la nature temporelle de ses membres; elle recevait son écho en droit privé. La thèse unitaire du paiement d'obligations - où, tout comme en économique, la capacité de permutation de biens est elle-même considérée être un bien ordinaire - semble reposer sur cette même conception d'une nécessaire nature double. Dans l'univers des prestations, selon la doctrine, un ensemble infini de valeurs successives formées sur une période de temps indéfinie est considéré être fondé sur un objet transcendant qui cumule les faces opposées d'une dualité: à la fois somme (d'argent) et chose, à la fois droit et fait accompli en exécution d'une obligation, à la fois fait et valeur future. Ce paradigme traditionnel est indifférent à la dualité des prestations: non pécuniaire et pécuniaire. TI y arrive en substantivant la non-existence d'une somme. L'explication proposée ici en est une de structure. L'univers des prestations serait plutôt une dichotomie de deux dualités distinctes: 10 une dualité catégorique, celle de l'exécution de prestations particulières - où avoir fait quelque chose et ne pas l'avoir fait sont des action et abstention caractérisées, et 20 une dualité modale (circulaire), devoir un montant libellé en iv-a devise ou (exclusivement) ne pas le devoir, l'avoir payé ou non. L'obligation de livrer une prestation caractérisée à quelqu'un est appariée à la somme d'argent due par ce dernier en contrepartie de cela; on alterne d'une obligation non pécuniaire à la promesse de payer un montant d'argent sans que quiconque puisse cumuler le beurre et l'argent du beurre à un instant donné. Mais encore, une somme due en suit une autre au travers de la monnaie, cette dernière étant toujours le revers de la somme due. Il n'est pas nécessaire de dire que la monnaie existe, ni de dire qu'elle n'existe pas; il suffit de dire qu'elle éteint la somme due. Non seulement la somme due - versée (renversée) en monnaie - est éteinte, mais encore par le nominalisme elle peut toujours acquitter de nouveau une somme d'autant; il suffit qu'un créancier accepte qu'on la lui doive plutôt que de s'en remettre au troc de choses existantes. Cette nouvelle perspective du paiement des obligations distingue deux types de raisonnements. La vérification catégorique rétrospective d'une exécution en nature survenue se démarque de la modalité où la conséquence juridique de l'extinction d'une somme due se retourne en la possibilité a priori de réitérer cette conséquence encore contre une somme pouvant pourtant n'être pas encore déterminée. La possibilité d'une continuité historique n'a pas la nature finie d'un fait. L'objet qu'est la monnaie déborde de la notion ordinaire d'objet puisqu'il est circulaire: la 'monnaie' est "éteindre une somme (due) puis (est encore) monnaie". Dans la lignée héréditaire des sommes, constituées pour être éteintes, éteintes pour être constituées, la monnaie est ni le prédécesseur, ni un successeur particulier; elle est la fonction qui ouvre continuellement l'éventualité d'autres successeurs. La monnaie est une abstraction et sa nature unique est confirmée au Canada depuis 1967. Une fois la convertibilité du papier-monnaie abandonnée, la monnaie n'est plus une promesse de payer: la banque centrale n'est plus tenue de délivrer l'or à la demande du porteur, ni d'échanger le billet de banque en billets du Dominion. Le papiermonnaie est, depuis, trivialement remplacé seulement par du papier-monnaie. Enfin, l'abstraction monétaire donne à la banque centrale une personnalité morale inédite. Si la Couronne est créancière des uns et débitrice aux autres, alors en contraste la banque centrale qui n'est pas une banque - est ni créancière, ni débitrice du papier-monnaie. La problématique de l'inclusion de la monnaie dans les catégories traditionnelles du droit a une solution inédite. La monnaie s'offre en complément des concepts du discours juridique. L'encaissement d'une somme due emporte comme conséquence la fin de son terme, mais encore il en appelle à nouveau une autre, éventuellement. Ainsi, la monnaie est le bain de renouvellement des sommes. Sa qualification ni ... ni... louvoie entre les deux termes en les niant alternativement. / This series of essays analyses the concept of money in the law, seeking to isolate its unique and highly abstract nature. Traditionallaw teaching characterizes money both as a fact and as a right premised as it is on the idea that common nouns like 'money' must have substantive meaning; it is thereby unable to accept that money, by virtue of its unique place amongst the categories of private law, is the mechanism supposing the indeterminate future by embedding the present into it. The difficulty with money is that, as a category, it is not included amongst the usual categories ofprivate law. Its abstract character prevents it from being included amongst objects that have extension. Rather money is defined by negation with respect to the usuallegal categories. It is thereby uniquely recognizable. In the subject-object relationship, paid money is obviously not a subject. In its strict meaning, money refers today to paper-money. It is true that the latter does exist physically because it is tangible. But paradoxicalIy, as an object, money is neither a sum owed, nor an obligation in kind, nor a good, nor representing a debt, nor a measurement, nor consumable, nor fungible in the relevant sense ofthose terms. How does one capture the substance of a notion that defies the usual categories of legal discourse? That is the fundamental difficulty of the thesis. The entirely unique way of defining money bears repeating: Cash money is not identical to a sum owed but extinguishes one as it is being paid; conversely, a sum owed is not identical with money received, since when money is paid without obligation, the sum can be recovered as undue (the undue becomes due). The definition ofmoney proceeds by 'corecurrence': it defines something indeterminate, in that one definition refers to the other and vice versa. Its nature stems from its function in the structure of prestations. But the legal scholarship treats it principally as a sum owed, without further distinguishing this type of debt from other prestations. Now, as the performance of an obligation, a sum ofmoney not only as much pays off any amount, due at one time or another, but, because those are paired to obligations in kind as the price owed in consideration ofparticular performances to be accomplished; the cashing of sums of money still conducts the movement of goods among persons. Whence a paradox: A sum of money is destined to circulate precise1y to extinguish sums (due). Legal scholarship generally teaches the thesis of unity of performance of obligations (payment in its broad civillaw meaning): AlI acts accomplished in the performance of obligations in kind and all payments of sums of money are put in the same bag. Now, they are first owed, then received. These operations are said to form a single set. This bag is time itself. 1t is an interpretation of the universe of prestations, more precise1y an interpretation of the notion of universe where the homogeneous actuality of a set excludes to give place to the possibility of future values by contrast to past values. To close the notion of a universe to that of an actual vi set, the trick is to close the duality 'set/member' by replacing the member by the set: one of the objects included in the set must be at once an existing element of the set and be the collection of aIl its elements, constituting thereby the substantive junction underlying this duality. This foundational object is usually called the zero of the set. In the set of performances of obligations (prestations) with which we are dealing here, there must similarly be an element in the nature of both a promise and a fact. That element is money. So money has a dual nature, both concept and referent of the concept. The sum owed is performed in money and, conversely, money is the sum transferred as payment: substituting one definition in the other, the performance of the sum owed is the sum transferred, a formula leading to infinite regression. Who then is the debtor of this sum transferred for as long as money did and will circulate? The conceptual difficulty with money is to understand this metamorphosis, where the performance of a fact in satisfaction of an obligation reveals itselfto be a promise. Why then bother to distinguish a promise from the performance of it? Money cumulates the categorical nature of a physical thing being delivered - in olden days gold, today paper-money - and the nature of a sum owed; this way of thinking would tend to reify debts, to confer them physical existence. Yet to owe money is fundamentally the duration of the term of a relationship between two persons. And to pay money is to put an end to this term. So paradoxically, to express it in a categorical duality, money has duration and at the same time it has none. Such a union of the polar opposites of a duality is not unprecedented. To help the reader realise this, l document how the theme of migration ofpecuniary value ofthings by means ofmoney being given in payment of amounts owed is reminiscent of metempsychosis (migration of the soul) used to conceptualise the foundation of the medieval Crown, the gift ofGod that consecrated the continuity of successive reigns of an hereditary line of regents. At that time, the historical continuity of the people was conceptualised by the King's two bodies: both that of an individual and that of the set of individuals subject to his reign. Unique amongst aIl, one foundational individual was considered to constitute a set of one. This platonic attitude was believed necessary in public law to resolve the conceptual difficulty of the historical continuity of a community despite the temporal nature of its individuals; it was put to similar use in private law with respect to money. The thesis of unity of performance of obligations - where, like in economics, the capacity to exchange goods is considered an ordinary good itself - appears to rely on the same conception of a necessary dual nature. In the universe of prestations, according to traditionallegal scholarship, an infinite set of successive values taking shape over an indefinite period of time is viewed as founded on a transcendental object which cumulates the opposite faces ofa duality: both sum (of money) and thing, both right and act accomplished in the performance of an obligation, both fact and future value. This traditional paradigm disregard the duality of prestations: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. It does so by giving a substantive value to the non vi-a existence of a sumo The explanation proposed here is one of structure. The universe of prestations is rather a dichotomy of two distinct dualities: 10 a categorieal duality, that of the performance of specifie prestations - where to have done something and not to have done it are characterised action and abstention, and 20 a modal (circular) duality: to owe an amount in currency or (exclusively) not to owe it, to have paid it or not. The obligation to deliver a particular performance to someone is paired to the sum of money owed by him in consideration of it; we altemate from nonpecuniary obligation to promises to pay an amount of money without one being able to have his cake and eat it too at any time. But still, one amount owed follow another thru money, money always being the tuming over of the sum owed. We are not obliged to state that money exists, or that it does not; it suffiees to say that it extinguishes the sum owed. Not only is the sum owed extinguished upon money being tumed (paid) in, but by virtue of nominalism it still can extinguish anew a further sum of same amount; it is sufficient that a creditor accept to be owed a sum ofmoney rather than to revert to the barter ofphysical things. This new reading of the payment of obligations draw apart two types of reasoning. The categorieal proof of a past specifie performance is different from the modality where the legal consequence of the extinction of a sum due is tumed over into the a priori possibility to still reiterate that same consequence against a sum that now may not yet be determined. The possibility of an historieal continuity does not have the finite nature of a fact. Money as an object transcends the concept of an ordinary object because it is circular: 'money' is "the end of a sum (owed) and (is still) money". In the hereditary line of sums, created to be extinguished or extinguished to be created, money is neither the predecessor nor a particular successor; it is the function of continuously opening up the possibility of further successors. Money is an abstraction and its unique character is confirmed in Canada since 1967. Once the convertibility of paper-money is dropped, money is no longer a promissory note: no longer does the central bank undertakes to exchange a bank note for gold or Dominion bonds. Paper-money is now trivially replaced only by paper-money. Finally, the abstract character ofmoney gives the central bank an most unusual status as a legal person. If the Crown is creditor of sorne persons and debtor to others, then by contrast the central bank - who is not a bank - is neither creditor, nor debtor ofpaper-money. The problem of fitting money within the traditional categories of the law does have an unexpected ending. Money presents itself as the complement of the concepts oflegal discourse. The cashing in of a sum triggers the end of its term, but still it calls one anew, eventually. So money is the bath of renewal of sums. In being characterised as neither... nor... it hops between the two terms by altematively negating them. / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"

The thesis deals with epistemic modality and its realizations in English and Lithuanian. It focuses on the quantitative and qualitative parameters of equivalence between the lexical exponents of epistemic modality in the two languages. The axis of contrast is laid on the auxiliary and adverb strategies (van der Auwera et al. 2005): a probe is made into the cross-linguistic distribution and behavior of the central English modal auxiliaries of possibility and necessity and epistemic stance adverbials as opposed to their counterparts in Lithuanian. It is a contrastive analysis based on the data obtained from a self-compiled bi-directional parallel corpus of fiction texts and their translations into Lithuanian and English. The findings show that, despite the existence of the same adverbial and verb strategies for epistemic meaning realization in the two languages, their implementation differs. Lithuanian shows a significantly higher frequency of adverbials as opposed to English. Due to the high degree of grammaticalization, English usually favors modal auxiliaries for expressing epistemic modality. The findings show that epistemic meaning can be determined by various constraints, the most important of which are complement stativity and subject specification. The analysis of the translational paradigm could suggest that the boundaries between low and high degree of probability can be blurred in Lithuanian. The abundance of inserted modal adverbials and the phenomenon of zero... [to full text] / Disertacijoje tiriamas episteminis modalumas ir jo raiškos priemonės anglų ir lietuvių kalbose. Abiejose kalbose esama įvairių kalbinių priemonių episteminiam modalumui reikšti, tačiau darbe daugiausia dėmesio skiriama episteminį modalumą koduojančių modalinių veiksmažodžių ir modalinių adverbialų bei jų vertimo atitikmenų analizei. Pagrindinis šio darbo tikslas – taikant lygiagrečiųjų ir palyginamųjų tekstynų metodiką aptarti kiekybinius ir kokybinius episteminio modalumo raiškos ekvivalentiškumo parametrus anglų ir lietuvių kalbose. Remiantis van der Auweros et al. (2005) tyrimo modeliu, bandoma nustatyti, kokia episteminio modalumo raiškos strategija – modalinių veiksmažodžių ar adverbialų – vyrauja anglų ir lietuvių kalbose. Tuo tikslu buvo sudarytas dvikalbis dvikryptis paralelusis tekstynas iš grožinės literatūros originalių tekstų ir jų vertimų į lietuvių ir anglų kalbas. Išanalizavus empirinę medžiagą, prieita prie tokių išvadų: episteminio modalumo raiška anglų ir lietuvių kalbose skiriasi. Anglų kalboje dėl palyginti didelės gramatiškėjimo įtakos episteminis modalumas dažniausiai reiškiamas modaliniais veiksmažodžiais, o lietuvių kalboje vyrauja adverbialinė raiškos strategija. Episteminė reikšmė glaudžiai susijusi su veiksmažodžių komplementų ir subjekto specifikacija. Vertimų paradigmų analizė rodo, kad lietuvių kalboje modalinės tikimybės laipsniai skiriami ne taip griežtai ir jos ribos ne tokios ryškios, o praleidimo ir įterpimo atvejai vertime gali būti... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]