This article charts the development of the Palestinian Authority from its creation as an interim authority under the Oslo Accords towards becoming a failed (quasi-)state. By 2009 ¿ 15 years after its inception and ten years after the proposed final status negotiations ¿ the PA was split between a criminalized isolated entity in Gaza under the control of Hamas and an internationally recognized ¿caretaker government¿ in the West Bank under the control of Fatah and donor-supported technocrats. The role of violence ¿ i.e. the power of ¿shock and awe¿ ¿ in the creation of this failed (quasi-)state is emphasized: Israel's 2002 military campaign, Operation Defensive Shield, the sanctions and blockade imposed after the election of Hamas in January 2006, and the violence on the Palestinian street which split the PA in two. The article concludes by arguing that the PA failed (quasi-)state is presiding over the demise of the Palestinian dream of a viable state comprising both the West Bank and Gaza.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) offers an interesting case study of statebuilding in a conflict-country context. Created as an interim administration in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, the PA has been hampered by the statebuilding framework enshrined in the Oslo Accords, its lack of sovereignty, the lack of final status negotiations, and the 'partners for peace' paradigm which is an attempt by donors and international organisations to support who they regard as the 'right' type of elite - that is, those willing to 'make peace' with Israel (as defined by Israel). This article explores the impacts of this paradigm and argues that it has paralysed the formal political process in Palestine and has securitised democracy.

[pt] A tese analisa o processo dialético entre a institucionalização da Autoridade Palestina (autogoverno palestino) e a implementação dos acordos de paz com Israel. Observou-se por um lado, que a estrutura formada para uma solução política do conflito israelense-palestino restringiu a institucionalização da Autoridade Palestina iniciada em 1994. Por outro lado, verificou-se que o processo de formação e consolidação dessa instituição teve impactos na arena doméstica palestina (oposição interna ao autogoverno e governabilidade); e afetou sua capacidade de implementar os termos dos acordos, influenciando, por conseguinte, a evolução do processo de paz israelense- palestino entre 1994 e 2004. Com esse estudo, buscou-se cobrir lacunas da literatura sobre a resolução de conflitos internacionais no que se refere à fase de implementação de acordos e ao grau de institucionalização de um ator envolvido em um processo de paz. / [en] This thesis analyses the dialectic process between the institutionalization of the Palestinian Authority (Palestinian self-government) and the implementation of the peace agreements with Israel. It was observed, on one hand, that the structure created for a political solution for the Israeli- Palestinian conflict constrained the institutionalization of the Palestinian self-government which started in 1994. On the other hand, it was verified that the process of formation and consolidation of this institution had impacts on the Palestinian domestic field (internal opposition and governability); and affected its capability for implementing the terms of the agreements, influencing, in turn, the evolution of the peace process between 1994 and 2004. This study aimed to cover breaches in the literature of international conflict resolution on the implementation phase of the agreements and on the degree of institutionalization of an actor involved in a peace process.

The thesis examines the practice of corruption in the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the period of its establishment until the death of Arafat. Palestinian elite formation from the late Ottoman period until the establishment of the PA was assessed in order to identify the elites that came into power in the PA and the political cultures they came to espouse. The two primary elite groups’ (Outsider elites and Insider counter-elites) conflicting political cultures were assessed in how they influenced the decision making process, the construction, and exhibited institutional behaviour of the PA. With the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) on the 13th of September, 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Government of Israel it established the Palestinian Authority as the government in transition for the Palestinians. The agreements conferred the governing power and leadership role to the PLO Outsider elites (under Arafat). Due to the secret nature and asymmetrical power relation by which the negotiations and agreements were conducted and signed between the PLO Outsider leadership and the Government of Israel, which excluded inputs from Palestinian Insider elites, the culminating PA structure came to exhibit institutional weakness with certain neo-patrimonial behaviour. The political framework by which the Oslo Accords constructed the PA and influenced by international actors warranted institutional-weakness. Moreover, as external actors’ demands for the PA to deal with the declining Peace Process, and address political and security issues increased, PA corruption behaviour became more apparent and proliferated which became indicative of its fundamental problem in that it lacked statehood, lacked authority and legitimacy, and thus resorted to neo-patrimonial and repressive methods to govern. This neo-patrimonial political culture of Arafat and his governing Outsider elites used corruption as a PA political tool for survival thus suppressing a nascent democratic political culture of the Insiders and consequently led to an institutionalisation of corruption in the PA.

Cette thèse analyse les relations de pouvoir qui se jouent autour des enjeux environnementaux (gestion de l'eau et changement climatique) dans le processus de construction étatique de l'Autorité palestinienne, entité gouvernementale sous régime d'aide et marquée par l'occupation israélienne. Elle mobilise la sociologie de l'action publique, la political ecology et les science and technology studies afin d'étudier les processus multi-échelles de co-construction de l'ordre social et de l'environnement à travers les savoirs, la définition des problèmes et les politiques adoptées pour y répondre. Cette recherche analyse les liens entre l'aide internationale, le développement, l'environnement et la volonté de consolidation du pouvoir de l'Autorité palestinienne. Elle se penche sur la circulation et l'hybridation des savoirs et des solutions d'action publique. En dehors de l'action des décideurs nationaux et internationaux, d'autres acteurs (ONG, organisations humanitaires) interviennent et mobilisent d'autres représentations des problèmes environnementaux et des solutions à apporter en interactions avec leurs représentations du territoire et du conflit. Cette thèse se fonde sur une série d'entretiens et de discussions informelles, la littérature grise sur le sujet et de nombreuses observations participantes. / This thesis analyses the power relations involved in environmental issues (water management and climate change) and the process of state building of the Palestinian Authority, an entity dependent on international aid and under israeli occupation. This thesis mobilises sociology of public action, political ecology and science and technology studies in order to examine the multi-level processes of co-construction of social order and environment through knowledges, problems definition and public policies adopted to tackle them. This research analyses the interactions between international aid, development and environment and the objective of empowerment of the Palestinian Authority. It focuses on the circulation and hybridisation of knowledge and public policy solutions. Beyond national and international decision makers, other actors such as NGOs or humanitarian organisations participate and mobilise other representations of environmental problems and solutions in relation with their representations of the territory and the conflict. This thesis is based on a series of interviews, informal discussions, grey literature dealing with the subject and observational work.

Nach dem Oslo prozess im Gaza-Streifen und Westjordanland (weiter WJGS), die palästinensische Selbstverwaltung eingesetzt wurde. Die wichtigste Frage, eine Antwort auf die diese Dissertation zu geben versucht, ist: Hat es diese Regierung geschafft, sich in ihrem ersten Jahrzehnt (1994 - 2004) zu einer staatlichen, im Sinne von einer differenzierten, zentralisierten und autonomen Organisation zu entwickeln, die das Gewaltmonopol innehat und in der Lage ist, landesweit verbindliche Gesetze zu etablieren? Die Realität nach dem Oslo-Prozess: Tatsächlich fand eine Konzentration der Macht in den Händen Arafats und einer kleinen regierenden Elite in seinem Umkreis statt. Dies geschah auf Kosten der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung, welcher der Zugang zu staatlichen Institutionen auf nationaler Ebene verwehrt wurde. Dieser Zustand der Marginalisierung der Bevölkerungsmehrheit hemmte die Durchsetzung eines demokratischen Systems nach den Prinzipien Gewaltenteilung, Verantwortlichkeit und Transparenz und erstickte die rechtsstaatlichen Ansätze im Keim. Arafat und die kleine Elite in seinem Gefolge verhinderten nicht nur den Aufstieg eines demokratischen und rechtsstaatlichen Systems, sondern auch das Aufkommen eines Verwaltungssystems, das nach fairen Prinzipien (Leistung, Kompetenz) und nicht nach informellen/persönlichen Kriterien besetzt wurde, klare Spezialisierungen und Hierarchien aufwies sowie durchschaubar war, wie Max Weber vorschlägt. Näher betrachtet, erschwerten der Friedensprozess von Oslo und seine Vereinbarungen den Aufbau von stabilen und reaktionsfähigen politischen Institutionen genauso wie den eines professionellen Verwaltungssystems. Dies geschah, da der Prozess Menschen demobilisierte (aus der Unfähigkeit heraus, die Bestrebungen Palästinas, ein selbstbestimmter souveräner Staat zu werden, wahrzunehmen), außerdem ermöglichte er Arafat und dessen kleiner Machtelite, die Macht bei sich zu konzentrieren und ein halbautokratisches, von patrimonialen Zügen gekennzeichnetes Regime einzuführen, das dem Machthaber ermöglichte, öffentliche Fonds und Institutionen auszunutzen, um sich Loyalität zu sichern und seinem Regime Legitimität zu verschaffen. Als Antwort darauf stärkten die Gegner des Prozesses von Oslo und Arafats, also die Hamas, der Islamische Djihad und PFLP ihre Institutionen und begannen parallel zu den Institutionen der Autonomiebehörde parastaatliche Funktionen auszuüben. Am wichtigsten ist die Tatsache, dass diese Institutionen von den Milizen der politischen Parteien, denen sie angegliedert sind, beschützt werden. Zum Beispiel wird die Al Salah Islamic Society von den Izz El Din El Kassam Brigaden dem militärischen Flügel derHamas beschützt. Die 'Freunde der Märtyrer' sind dem Islamischen Djihad angegliedert und werden vom militanten Flügel der Gruppe, den Al Quds Brigaden beschützt. Dementsprechend ist der Staat - im Sinne einer zentralen Organisation mit Macht zur Autoritätsausübung und einem Gewaltmonopol (wie Joel Migdal vorschlägt) nicht präsent auf der politischen Bühne in Palästina. / In 1994, the Palestinian self-government was established on the Gaza Strip and West Bank (hereinafter WBGS) as result of Oslo process. One of its main challenges of that government was how to deal with this debilitating heritage whilst promoting institutions and institutional capacity building, both of which began gaining momentum from 1994 onwards. However, the reality of the Oslo process has meant that in fact what has occurred is a concentration of power into the hand of the ruling elite (Arafat and the small elite around him) at the expense of the majority of population who were denied access to national level institutions of state functions. This state of the political marginalization (or denationalization) of the majority of population hindered the emergence of a democratic political system based on the principles of the separation of powers, accountability, and transparency, and stifled the emergence of the rule of law. Arafat and the small elite around him had not only hindered the emergence of a democratic political system, and stifled the emergence of the rule of law, but also the emergence of a bureaucratic system with a recruitment system based on achievement rather than informal/irrational criteria (competence), highly specialized and differentiated administrative role of civil servants (differentiation), and well established and thoroughly understandable system of super-ordination and sub-ordination (hierarchy) as Max Weber suggests. In response, the opponents of Oslo process & Arafat- Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and PFLP-had strengthened their institutions, and started to practice Para-state functions parallel to PA institutions (as chapter V shows). These instituions are protected by the militia of the political party with which it is affiliated, like Izz El Din El Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, and others. Accordingly, State- in the term of central organization with the power of issuing authoritative binding legal rules and monopolizing coercion (as Joel Migdal suggests)- was absent from the Palestinian scene.

La communauté internationale et le droit international sont confrontés à un défi majeur : trouver une solution mettant un terme au conflit israélo-palestinien. L’étude du conflit israélo-palestinien à la lumière du droit international montre les nombreuses difficultés relatives à l’émergence d’un Etat palestinien. En effet, ce dernier est une source de violation du droit international du fait notamment des manquements aux droits fondamentaux qui ne cessent de sévir sur ce territoire. Les violations commises à l’encontre du droit international remontent à l’époque du mandat britannique et sont finalement caractérisées par l’impunité des entités qui les ont commises. Cela permet donc de mettre en évidence les lacunes où même les faiblesses du droit international, plus précisément celles de l’ONU qui se trouve en difficultés face à un manquement constant à ces principes et à ces décisions. On a cherché à pallier à cette situation infernale par l’usage de techniques qu’offre le droit international dont l’objectif est de mettre un terme à un conflit. Il existe une technique qui paraît être la plus appropriée pour le conflit israélo-palestinien, il s’agit de la fameuse technique de la négociation. Cependant le processus de paix ayant débuté en 1990 se trouve aujourd’hui presque oublié.Malgré tout cela, la création d’un Etat palestinien se trouve être la base de la solution du conflit israélo-palestinien. Cette présente étude cherche à démontrer, sur la base de la définition de l’Etat selon le droit international, que la Palestine dispose d’une part, d’éléments avérés, mais imparfaits, permettant à cette dernière de constituer un Etat selon le droit international, et d’autre part que cette dernière ne peut accéder au rang d’Etat dans la mesure où certains éléments nécessaires à la constitution d’un État demeurent contestables. Ce qui manque à la Palestine pour se constituer en Etat c’est l’effectivité. / The international community and the international law are facing a great challenge: find the solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in light of international law shows many difficulties related to the emergence of a Palestinian state. Indeed, this conflict is a source of violation of international law specifically a violation of human rights that continues to strike in this area. Violations against international law go back to the time of the British mandate and are finally characterized by the impunity towards the entities that have committed them. Therefore, this allows us to highlight the weaknesses of international law, more specifically those of the United Nations that is confronted with the constant breach of its principles and decisions. We have tried to overcome this infernal situation by using the techniques offered by the international law that aims to put an end to a conflict. There is a technique that seems to be the most appropriate for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict known as the negotiation. However, the peace process that began in 1990 is now almost forgotten.Despite all this, the creation of a Palestinian state is the base to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This present study aims to demonstrate, based on the definition of the State under international law, that Palestine has, on one hand, confirmed elements/components that are imperfect, allowing the latter to constitute a State under international law, and on the other, that it can’t achieve statehood to the extent that certain elements necessary for statehood remain questionable. What Palestine is missing is effectiveness.

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