The central objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how the concept—or concepts—of the public/private divide actively shapes the conditions of migrant domestic work in Europe. In doing so, I aim to show how European states’ current treatment of migrant domestic work is ethically problematic, and that a sufficient moral response to this dilemma entails a re-evaluation of any operative notions of the public/private distinction. The premise of my thesis is that migrants working as domestics suffer human rights abuses due to two distinct but inseparable factors: their gender-based mode of employment and their legal status. I will make the claim that states fail to prevent these abuses, and secure the conditions necessary for the fulfillment of migrants’ human rights, because they assume a morally problematic understanding of the public/private distinction.  In arguing for a re-evaluation of the public/private sphere, I will likewise propose that certain revisions be accordingly made in several levels and domains of legislation—regional and national, as well as labor and immigration. Less concrete, though no less important, is my contention that receiving and sending countries alike need to undertake a more profound re-examination of the moral status of domestic work, and, more fundamentally, care work itself.

The thesis „Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy with regard to its feministic orientation” represents Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the good life, demonstrates it as a feminist philosophy and locates it in the context of feminist theory. It is shown that Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach in connection with her reflections about the political liberalism and communitarianism is an important contribution for a feministic ethic of equality. Martha Nussbaum combines questions of justice with a theory of the good life. In her demand for the ethicing of the political, lies the relevance of her philosophy for feminism.

The objective for this study is to examine whether it is possible to use the method of reflective equilibrium in order to enhance the usefulness of public debates as a support for political decision-making. Since public debates from political quarters are seen as an important tool for policy-making, the need for a rational assessment of the views put forward in such debates are important. And since reflective equilibrium aims for coherence between judgments on different levels – intuitions, principles and theories, which all are put forward in public debates – the point of departure for this theses is that this method could be useful for the matter of bringing some kind of structure to public debates. The analysis in this study shows that there actually are similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium and the course of public debates, since they both are characterized by the fact that viewpoints are mutually scrutinized in the light of one another. Further, it is argued that a more systematic applying of the method of reflective equilibrium would further the justification force of the outcome of public debates, since the method stresses the need of rationality and the importance of taking all relevant opinions into consideration. Therefore, the conclusion is that applying reflective equilibrium to public debates could make the political decision-making more democratic.

Ought we to enhance our cognitive capacities beyond the normal human range? There is no denying that it might be a good idea to level out differences between people with respect to cognitive capacities, and there is no denying that some persons' reaching beyond normal capacities may have some good side-effects on society at large (but also bad side-effects, of course). But is there any direct gain to be made by having ones cognitive capacities enhanced? Will this as such make our lives go better? No, I argue, or, at least, there doesn't seem to exist any evidence suggesting that it would. And it doesn't matter whether we consider the question from a narrow hedonistic perspective, from a more refined hedonistic perspective, from a desire-satisfaction view, or if we adopt some reasonable objective list view of what makes a life go well. Only on an extremely perfectionist — and implausible —view of what makes our lives go well could any direct value in cognitive enhancement find support. Finally, there are no good reasons to do with our sense of identity to enhance even our capacity to remember. So, cognitive enhancement as such would not make our lives go any better. / <p>Author count: 1</p>

<p>Global poverty is a pressing moral issue that necessitates serious moral reflection. It is inextricably connected with the issue of global justice. In today’s world where there are obvious extreme economic inequalities that impoverishes millions of people in many poor countries, the need for a sound principle of global justice is morally necessary. This thesis proposes Thomas Pogge’s idea of cosmopolitan justice as a feasible and relevant theory which can help and guide in alleviating severe worldwide poverty. Pogge emphasizes the stringent negative duty not to impose, sustain and profit from a global order that deprives the poor of their basic necessities necessary for them to lead a worthwhile human life. Many people are not aware that in participating in an unjust global order, they seriously harm the global poor more than their failure to provide assistance for the poor’s basic needs. So the greater responsibility of restructuring global order in order to meet the demands of global justice lies mainly in the hands of developed nations and their citizens who have profited from the present global arrangement and who have more than adequate means to help those who are deeply affected by extreme global economic inequalities. The stronger obligation not to harm the global poor must be performed by those who make decisions and policies at the global institutional level. They are the ones who decide the fate of the global poor and they are the ones who can easily change the rules underlying the present global order. The first step to poverty eradication and the overseeing that continuous efforts are exerted to realize this aim of helping the global poor are theirs to perform immediately. This task is not optional. It is urgent and a moral necessity.</p>

<p>This thesis is an examination of the concept of human development and does a comparative study of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Sen rectifies the emphasis on income by welfare economics, and argues for the ‘equality of capability’; a goal that he says can be achieved by means of the intrinsic and instrumental role of democracy. However, the author notes that Sen’s development paradigm is inadequate as an account for what constitutes the kind of well-being that is fully human and asserts that Sen’s framework should be concretized politically. In view of this, the author argues that Nussbaum’s articulation of a ‘threshold of capabilities’, anchored on her reading Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing and Marx’s insight on human dignity, is a politically realistic human development framework. Nussbaum thinks that the essential human capabilities are entitlements that must be constitutionally guaranteed to ensure a decent and dignified human life for all. As a response to the reality of pluralism, Nussbaum says that the universality of these entitlements can be secured by means of an overlapping consensus. Furthermore, the extreme poverty in many nations which exposes women and children to much vulnerability has provoked the author to inquire about the applicability of Nussbaum’s framework to the global arena. As such, the thesis argues for the radical expansion of the Human Development Index used by the United Nations Development Program in measuring the quality of human life, notably the inclusion of political liberties and gender equality. In addition to this, the study puts forward the argument that global human development is best achieved through democracy, and asserts that global institutions have a moral duty to protect and promote the central human capabilities.</p>

The problems of the world today are global and thus we must act on a global level to solve them. We need to establish a perpetual and global peace and we also need to create global justice. How is this to be done? In 2008 the philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö tried to provide an answer on these questions in the book Global Democracy – The Case for a World Government. In his book Tännsjö argues for an institutional cosmopolitan approach, trying to convince us that a world government would guarantee both a global and perpetual peace, as well as global justice. In this thesis I will present Tännsjö´s main argument and then share my thoughts and give my critique on them.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the critique Richard Shusterman is raising towards Maurice Merleau-Pontys view on consciousness of bodily sensations and habit. Richard Shusterman critique towards Merleau-Ponty is found to have no other basis than Shusterman own subjective view on what the task of philosophy is.

Denna uppsats är en granskning av Robert Kanes libertarianska teori om viljeansträngningar, hur dessa kan lösa det problem som det så kallade turargumentet utgör för en libertariansk händelse-kausal teori och om hans teori ger en bra redogörelse för fri vilja, framför allt i samband med moraliska konflikter. Jag undersöker också Randolphs Clarkes kritik mot Kanes teori, som bland annat går ut på att de dubbla viljeansträngningarna är irrationella, att de inte behövs för att bemöta turargumentet och att Kanes teori inte tillför tillräckligt mycket för att ge en typ av fri vilja som vi inte redan skulle kunna ha i en deterministisk värld. Jag kommer fram till att Kanes teori kan bemöta turargumentet på ett ganska bra sätt, men att den inte tillför något som skulle kunna ge fri vilja även om fri vilja skulle vara omöjlig i en deterministisk värld. Som libertariansk teori misslyckas den alltså.

I denna uppsats diskuterar författaren dels om det är möjligt för kollektiv att klassificeras som autonoma entiteter, och dels huruvida det är möjligt för en kollektiv entitet att ha vissa moraliska egenskaper som kollektivets ingående individer saknar. Enligt David Copps kollektiva moraliska autonomites så är detta möjligt. I framställningen presenteras det ett antal invändningar mot Copp riktade av Seumas Miller, som författaren delvis vänder sig mot.