This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.

I den här uppsatsen diskuterar jag, med utgångspunkt i Simon Blackburns kvasirealistiska metaetik, den moraliska motivationen. Jag redogör alltså dels för kvasirealis-men som helhetlig teori, dels för den aktuella motivationsteoretiska argumentationen. De centrala frågeställningarana rör i detta fall det sätt varpå våra värderingar motiverar oss att handla. Har de över huvud taget någon normativ kraft, eller består de enbart i kognitiva till-stånd? Utifrån dessa grundvalar bedömer jag sedan å ena sidan hur Blackburns teori funge-rar på det metaetiska planet, och å den andra för hur den svarar mot våra intuitioner om mo-ralföreställningarnas betydelse för vår handlingskraft. På det hela taget är jag emellertid ne-gativt inställd till teorins praktiska användbarhet. / This paper concerns on the one hand Simon Blackburn’s enterprise of quasi-realism, and on the other the problem of moral motivation. The main question in this second case treats the way whereupon our moral propositions motivate us to act. Do they own any normative force at all, or are they only to be seen as cognitive states? From the starting point of this discussion, I have investigated how the quasi-realist theory could work on the meta-ethical level. I have also tried to decide whether or not it corresponds to our intuitions about the real meaning of our moral judgements. The conclusive position of mine is that the fundamental problems of the theory eliminate its practical applicability.

Denna uppsats är, precis som titeln anger, en analys av sambandet mellan motsägelser och ångest. De nutida vardagsuttrycken för begreppen utreds och granskas med hjälp av känslo- och rationalitetsfilosofiska teorier och distinktioner ifrån Arne Næss och Jean-Paul Sartre. Författaren föreslår en egen definition av ångest och jämför denna med andra filosofers och tankeskolors definitioner av begreppet. Författarens syn på ångest skiljer sig från Sartres, då han menar att ångest kan lösas upp och att den ofta är väldigt specifik och konkret till sin karaktär, medan Sartre menar att ångesten är omöjlig att lösgöra sig ifrån och att den är av ett mycket mer generellt slag. Detta konkreta och specifika element i den ångestdefinition, som författaren vill lägga fram, består i att ångesten uppstår i vissa valsituationer där valalternativen, i någon form, är sinsemellan motsägande och där ett val är tvunget att göras. / This paper is, as the title states, an analysis of the connection between contradictionsand anxiety. The present everyday expressions of these concepts are investigated with the help of philosophical theories from Arne Næss and Jean-Paul Sartre concerning emotions and rationality. The author presents his own definition of anxiety and compares it to other philosophers and thinkers’ definitions of the same concepts, and this way he reaches a conclusion. For example this conclusion diverge with Sartre’s view of anxiety, because the author states that it is possible to get free from anxiety and that it is often something very particular and precice, while Sartre says it is impossible to free yourself from it and that it is very general by nature. This specific element in the author’s definition of anxiety lies in the fact that he thinks of it as something that often occurs in situations with two or more options, and where these options are, amongst themself, contradictory in one form or an other, and where a choice has to be made.

This paper treats George Dickies institutional theory of how to define art. Some alternative theories and their originators are also introduced. According to Dickie something is art because it has been created against a background of an already existing artworld. Dickie has formulated his theory in two different versions, ”the earlier” and ”the later”, which differ somewhat in their design. Both versions is presented and discussed in this paper.

Uppsatsen är en litteraturstudie och syftar till att kritiskt belysa den nu pågående gymnasiereformen ur ett utbildningshistoriskt perspektiv med särskilt fokus på enhetlighet, jämlikhet och likvärdighet, för att se likheter med och avvikelser från tidigare strävanden. Reformen analyseras sedan ur ett liberalt jämlikhetsperspektiv efter John Rawls’ teori om rättvisa. I rättviseanalysen fokuserar jag särskilt differ-entieringen av gymnasiet i högskoleförberedande respektive icke högskoleförbered-ande program.    I min utbildningshistoriska analys visar jag hur reformen är ett trendbrott i svensk utbildningspolitisk tradition dels genom att ange kunskapsnivån i skolan som främsta orsak till reformen och inte sociala aspekter, dels eftersom den innebär en återgång till en differentierad gymnasieskola. Samtidigt visar det sig att utbildningspolitiken är klassiskt borgerlig och i det avseendet är reformen inte överraskande.    En rättvis skolstruktur erkänner den kultur- och kunskapstradition som eleverna är en del av, för dem tidigt in i denna tradition, och lär dem efterhand att använda sina kunskaper på ett personligt sätt. En rättvis struktur överlämnar allt mer ansvar till individen att själv välja sitt liv i enlighet med sina drömmar och mål i takt med att personen blir äldre. Min rättviseanalys leder till slutsatsen att reformen är rättfärdig-ad eftersom regeringen identifierar problem redan i grundskolan och sätter in extra resurser där för att höja kvaliteten. Förutsatt att elever har möjlighet att komplettera sin yrkesutbildning med högskolebehörighet både under och efter gymnasiet, vilket regeringen har utlovat, menar jag att GY 2011 är en rättvis struktur som bättre tar hänsyn till individens livsmål än den utgående gymnasieskolan.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Revised work with minor emendations approved by supervisor. / This dissertation considers three broad issues which emerge from the sustainability discourse. First is the nature of the discourse itself, particularly the underlying philosophical positions which are represented. Second, is the nature of the highly complex types of problem which the discourse exposes. And third is whether the engineering profession, as it is practised currently, is adequate to deal with such problems. The sustainability discourse exposes two distinct, fundamentally irreconcilable philosophical positions. The first, “sustainable development”, considers humanity to be privileged in relation to all other species and ecosystems. It is only incumbent upon us to look after the environment to the extent to which it is in our interests to do so. The second, “sustainability”, sees humanity as having no special moral privilege and recognises the moral status of other species, ecosystems, and even wilderness areas. Thus, sustainability imposes upon us a moral obligation to take their status into account and not to degrade or to destroy them. These two conflicting positions give rise to extremely complex problems. An innovative taxonomy of problem complexity has been developed which identifies three broad categories of problem. Of particular interest in this dissertation is the most complex of these, referred to here as the Type 3 problem. The Type 3 problem recognises the systemic complexity of the problem situation but also includes differences of the domain of interests as a fundamental, constituent part of the problem itself. Hence, established systems analysis techniques and reductionist approaches do not work. The domain of interests will typically have disparate ideas and positions, which may be entirely irreconcilable. The dissertation explores the development of philosophy of science, particularly in the last 70 years. It is noted that, unlike the philosophy of science, the philosophy of engineering has not been influenced by developments of critical theory, cultural theory, and postmodernism, which have had significant impact in late 20th-century Western society. This is seen as a constraint on the practice of engineering. Thus, a set of philosophical principles for sustainable engineering practice is developed. Such a change in the philosophy underlying the practice of engineering is seen as necessary if engineers are to engage with and contribute to the resolution of Type 3 problems. Two particular challenges must be overcome, if Type 3 problems are to be satisfactorily resolved. First, issues of belief, values, and morals are central to this problem type and must be included in problem consideration. And second, the problem situation is usually so complex that it challenges the capacity of human cognition to deal with it. Consequently, extensive consideration is given to cognitive and behavioural psychology, in particular to choice, judgement and decision-making in uncertainty. A novel problem-structuring approach is developed on three levels. A set philosophical foundation is established; a theoretical framework, based on general systems theory and established behavioural and cognitive psychological theory, is devised; and a set of tools is proposed to model Type 3 complex problems as a dynamic systems. The approach is different to other systems approaches, in that it enables qualitative exploration of the system to plausible, hypothetical disturbances. The problem-structuring approach is applied in a case study, which relates to the development of a water subsystem for a major metropolis (Sydney, Australia). The technique is also used to critique existing infrastructure planning processes and to propose an alternative approach.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Revised work with minor emendations approved by supervisor. / This dissertation considers three broad issues which emerge from the sustainability discourse. First is the nature of the discourse itself, particularly the underlying philosophical positions which are represented. Second, is the nature of the highly complex types of problem which the discourse exposes. And third is whether the engineering profession, as it is practised currently, is adequate to deal with such problems. The sustainability discourse exposes two distinct, fundamentally irreconcilable philosophical positions. The first, “sustainable development”, considers humanity to be privileged in relation to all other species and ecosystems. It is only incumbent upon us to look after the environment to the extent to which it is in our interests to do so. The second, “sustainability”, sees humanity as having no special moral privilege and recognises the moral status of other species, ecosystems, and even wilderness areas. Thus, sustainability imposes upon us a moral obligation to take their status into account and not to degrade or to destroy them. These two conflicting positions give rise to extremely complex problems. An innovative taxonomy of problem complexity has been developed which identifies three broad categories of problem. Of particular interest in this dissertation is the most complex of these, referred to here as the Type 3 problem. The Type 3 problem recognises the systemic complexity of the problem situation but also includes differences of the domain of interests as a fundamental, constituent part of the problem itself. Hence, established systems analysis techniques and reductionist approaches do not work. The domain of interests will typically have disparate ideas and positions, which may be entirely irreconcilable. The dissertation explores the development of philosophy of science, particularly in the last 70 years. It is noted that, unlike the philosophy of science, the philosophy of engineering has not been influenced by developments of critical theory, cultural theory, and postmodernism, which have had significant impact in late 20th-century Western society. This is seen as a constraint on the practice of engineering. Thus, a set of philosophical principles for sustainable engineering practice is developed. Such a change in the philosophy underlying the practice of engineering is seen as necessary if engineers are to engage with and contribute to the resolution of Type 3 problems. Two particular challenges must be overcome, if Type 3 problems are to be satisfactorily resolved. First, issues of belief, values, and morals are central to this problem type and must be included in problem consideration. And second, the problem situation is usually so complex that it challenges the capacity of human cognition to deal with it. Consequently, extensive consideration is given to cognitive and behavioural psychology, in particular to choice, judgement and decision-making in uncertainty. A novel problem-structuring approach is developed on three levels. A set philosophical foundation is established; a theoretical framework, based on general systems theory and established behavioural and cognitive psychological theory, is devised; and a set of tools is proposed to model Type 3 complex problems as a dynamic systems. The approach is different to other systems approaches, in that it enables qualitative exploration of the system to plausible, hypothetical disturbances. The problem-structuring approach is applied in a case study, which relates to the development of a water subsystem for a major metropolis (Sydney, Australia). The technique is also used to critique existing infrastructure planning processes and to propose an alternative approach.

Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2016-04-07T13:42:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1049801 bytes, checksum: 6ed9ebb17f4ea9e39be7c6da6791b42b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-07T13:42:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1049801 bytes, checksum: 6ed9ebb17f4ea9e39be7c6da6791b42b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-23 / The aim of this thesis is to analyze the question of moral choice from a critical view of Marxism. The originality of Marx’s thinking is to criticize the idealist philosophies. This current considers it is impossible to understand the established moral values in society or the process of its establishment, without first understanding the environment and the conflicts of that society. Thus, it isn't the thesisproblem of discussing the moral argument as an ontological given, prefixed and closed, but placing the moral and human interests as facts entered in the history and not outside it. According to founders of Marxism, if the human being is the result of conditions, it is, therefore, to make them [these conditions] human. / Esta tese de doutorado tem como objeto discutir o problema da escolha moral a partir de um exame crítico do marxismo. A originalidade desse sistema de pensamento consistiu em criticar as filosofias meramente especulativas. Esta corrente entende que é impossível compreender os valores morais estabelecidos na sociedade ou o processo de seu estabelecimento, sem, primeiramente, se compreender o ambiente e os conflitos desta mesma sociedade. Assim, não é intenção da tese discutir a moral como um dado ontológico, prefixado e rígido, mas sim situando a moral e aos interesses humanos como dados inseridos na história e não fora dela. Como os fundadores do marxismo assinalaram, se o ser humano é fruto das condições, trata-se, pois de tornar humana essas condições.

Ce mémoire est consacré à l’analyse du mensonge chez Kant. Or, comme la Métaphysique des moeurs est subdivisée en deux volets, le premier portant sur le droit et le second sur la moralité proprement dite, nous nous sommes proposé d’envisager le mensonge selon ces deux points de vue, en commençant par le second. En nous appuyant sur les textes de Kant qui envisagent le mensonge comme faute morale, les Leçons d’éthique, la Fondation de la Métaphysique des Moeurs, la Doctrine de la Vertu, nous montrons que Kant condamne moralement le mensonge parce qu’en lui-même, le mensonge constitue la plus grave violation du devoir de l’homme envers lui-même : la sincérité. L’homme qui n’est pas sincère, c’est-à-dire qui dit délibérément le contraire de ce qu’il pense non seulement va à l’encontre de la finalité inhérente à la communication, mais aussi, par le mensonge, l’homme renonce à sa personnalité. En renonçant ainsi à sa personnalité, l’homme cesse d’être un homme véritable, c’est-à-dire celui en qui la pensée et le dit coïncident, il devient un semblant d’homme, c’est-à-dire celui qui délibérément dit le contraire de ce qu’il pense. En s’appuyant sur le texte de Kant qui envisage le mensonge au point de vue du droit, D’un prétendu droit de mentir par humanité, nous avons mis en évidence que l’argument central de Kant est de montrer que toute tentative de tolérer un droit de mentir rendrait la société impossible. C’est qu’un droit de mentir condamnerait à jamais l’humanité à l’état de nature, parce que la confiance qu’exige le contrat originel qui marque l’entrée dans l’état de droit n’aurait plus aucun sens. De même, un droit de mentir ruinerait tous les contrats, qui reposent, pour leur effectivité, sur la confiance. Au fond, un droit de mentir est contraire même au droit. Nous avons montré en conclusion de mémoire en quoi la position de Kant restait encore, de nos jours, actuelle. Une grande partie de ce mémoire a été réservée au texte polémique de 1796 D’un prétendu droit de mentir par humanité. Ayant montré en quoi consiste la position de Kant, contrairement à celle de Constant, nous avons analysé les nombreux commentaires qui ont été consacrés à ce texte polémique, qui opposa Kant et Benjamin Consstant, afin de montrer que l’interprétation de la position de Kant sur le mensonge varie selon qu’on revendique exclusivement sa philosophie morale ou sa philosophie du droit. / This essay is dedicated to the analysis of Kant’s thought on the notion of lying. As the Métaphysique des moeurs is divided in two parts, the first dealing with the second on morality, the essay treats the lie through these two angles. Based on Kant’s texts discussing the lie as a moral fault, i.e. the Leçons d’éthique, the Fondation de la Métaphysique des Moeurs and the Doctrine de la Vertu, one can note that Kant morally condemns lying mainly because it constitutes, in itself, the most serious violation of the human’s duty towards himself: sincerity. The individual who is not sincere, that is to say who deliberately says the opposite of what he thinks, not only goes against the inherent purpose of communication but also abandons his personality. In so doing, the human ceases to be a real human, that is to say where his thought and saying coincides, and becomes a semblance of human, namely someone who deliberately says the opposite of what he thinks. Referring to Kant’s treatment of lying from a legal point of view, i.e. D’un prétendu droit de mentir par humanité, one sees the idea that any attempt to tolerate a right to lie would make society impossible. Indeed, a right to lie would forever condemn humanity to a state of nature in that the confidence that is required in the original contract, marking the transition to a rule of law, would loss its meaning. In addition, a right to lie would ruin all contracts that rest, for their efficiency, on confidence. In other words, a right to lie is also contrary to law. The essay ends by showing how Kant’s position still holds meaning in the present world. A major part of this essay focuses on the controversial text of 1796, entitled D’un prétendu droit de mentir par humanité. While having shown of what consists Kant’s position, contrary to that of Constant, we analyzed many commentaries which were devoted to this polemical text, opposing Kant and Benjamin Constant, in order to show that the interpretation of the position of Kant on lying varies according to whether his moral philosophy or his philosophy of the right is exclusively mobilized.

Cette thèse examine le rapport complexe entre Habermas et Derrida en s'interrogeant sur l'évolution, durant les années 1980, d'une relation conflictuelle en un lien amical et collaboratif. Elle analyse leurs œuvres afin d'évaluer la convergence et la divergence entre leurs pensées. Nous avons essayé en premier lieu de dessiner les contours de la scène culturelle en Allemagne et en France à partir de l'année 1945. Cette approche nous a permis de mieux comprendre la philosophie de chacun d'eux et d'étudier la continuité et la discontinuité, la tension et l'échange philosophique, entre les philosophies allemandes et françaises. Même si notre thèse se divise en huit parties, elle s'étend sur deux champs d'investigation: l'un théorique et l'autre pratique. Concernant le champ théorique, cette thèse se penche sur la querelle franco-allemande relative au débat modernité/post-modernité, dans laquelle ils s'engagèrent et développèrent des critiques sévères l'un à l'égard à l'autre. La question de la modernité nous invite à mettre en question certaines idées générales, notamment celle selon laquelle Habermas serait un défenseur du projet de la modernité, tandis que Derrida serait un post-moderne hostile à la modernité et aux Lumières. Au sujet de leurs philosophies pratiques nous avons effectué une approche comparative de leurs idées sur la morale, l'éthique, la théorie du droit et la philosophie politique. Cette comparaison nous a permis de comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles ils se sont réconciliés et se sont intervenus ensemble pour atteindre certains objectifs politiques, mais aussi juridiques: la réforme du droit international. / This work examines the complex relationship between Habermas and Derrida by shedding light on the shift from a less pleasant interaction in the 1980s to a rather friendly and collaborative affiliation later in an attempt to highlight comparable areas of interest as well as evaluate areas of convergence and divergence among the two great minds. Intuitively, a philosophical eye looks deep to examine to womb where thoughts are born. We lay out the scene in post WWII Germany and France, both fertile lands for such phenomena. This allows us to garner a sharper image of how the two philosophers evolved within their backgrounds and influenced one another. Two focal points, theory and practice, are covered in eight sections. We will address the Franco German quarrel of Modernity vs. Post Modernity revealing the critique so-called Modernist Habermas and supposed Post Modernist Derrida bathed one another with, and, there, we tackle the question of ideology. The later point, practice, reveals a deep assessment of the two philosophers' stances on morality, ethics, philosophy of law, and politics. We conclude with an analysis of the two's collaboration, as they share comparable fundamentals, and inspect the fruit of that effort, which achieved not only political reform but legal in the shape of a Reform of International Law.