Dans l’ordre juridique international, les organes de protection des droits de la personne sont de nature différente, indépendants et non hiérarchisés. Le phénomène du dialogue juridictionnel est une pratique spontanée qui consiste pour un organe de protection à intégrer dans le processus d’interprétation d’une disposition donnée, des éléments étrangers à son système, qu’il s’agisse de décisions ou d’instruments de protection émanant d’autres organes. Le dialogue est illustré avec la jurisprudence interprétée à l’aide de ces éléments extrasystémiques en matière de prohibition de la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Il est envisagé comme une technique interprétative permettant d’aboutir à des interprétations communes du contenu, du sens et de la portée de cette interdiction, bien que ces interprétations partagées puissent être extensives ou restrictives. L’étude interroge l’étendue et la teneur du pouvoir juridictionnel dans l’ordre juridique international ainsi que sa capacité à aboutir à une convergence normative en matière de protection des droits de la personne, qui découlerait d’une convergence interprétative. Implicitement, le dialogue joue le rôle d’un outil de régulation et de coordination qui s’impose spontanément dans la pratique interprétative des organes internationaux, contribuant à l’émergence d’un objectivisme jurisprudentiel. Ce dernier tend à s’opposer au volontarisme étatique dans un but de protection de l’ordre public international et de garantie des droits de la personne. / In the international legal order, international bodies protecting human rights are both of a different nature and independent. Judicial dialogue consists in referring to decisions or international instruments that are external sources to the system in which the international body has to exercise its power of interpretation. The example of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments will be used to illustrate this spontaneous practice. Judicial dialogue is seen as an interpretive technique, allowing to reach common interpretations of the substance, the meaning and the scope of this prohibition, by reaching a normative convergence through the use of external sources that shows an interpretive convergence in the first place. Nevertheless, the use of external sources does not always lead to extensive interpretations since it can also highlight disagreements in which case restrictive interpretations are inevitable. Finally, it appears that the international jurisprudential dialogue can both contribute to coordinate and harmonize the application and interpretation of international human rights law in order to protect the international public order.

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The aim of this thesis is to study how cannabis is constructed in contemporary Sweden, which policy responses are promoted as rational, and how international cannabis trends are received in this context. The four papers are the result of analyzing empirical material from three different sub-studies: 1) a qualitative study of online discussions about cannabis and drug policy, 2) a qualitative and comparative study of print media articles from 2002 and 2012, and 3) a qualitative study of oral presentations from cannabis information symposia. All papers are based on a social constructionist approach. A point of departure is that attitudes and regulations on cannabis have changed in large parts of the Western world. In Sweden, however, strict prohibition of cannabis is still central in the national drug laws. Some of the main findings can thus be gathered in discussions on continuity and change. In Swedish online discussions, there seems to be a strong desire to change the national cannabis policy in line with international developments. This discussion propagates alternative views on cannabis, in which comparisons to alcohol become vital and more liberal cannabis policies become logical. These discussions are also characterized by continuity, as many arguments for liberal cannabis policies seem to be based on traditional social democratic values and prohibitionist “scaremongering” arguments. Continuity is also what seems to characterize traditional print media, where cannabis is generally portrayed as a potent and illegal drug producing social problems. However, this arena also shows signs of change, as the material from 2012 includes stories on cannabis as an economic asset as well as a recreational substance. Both traditional print media and cannabis information symposia focus on youth consumers, who are seen as particularly vulnerable to cannabis effects. Such constructions seem important for protecting prohibition from international influences and for a continuous discourse centered on the dangers of cannabis. It is concluded that cannabis appears to be able to represent almost anything. As such it can be “used” for any purpose to promote a whole set of ideas related to policy often based on what is considered as scientific evidence. Depending on the context, it thus seems possible that cannabis is medicinal, recreational, harmful, and addictive. If so, and if all of these constructions are in some way “real,” then it is suggested that cannabis necessitates a much more tailored and nuanced response than that which prohibition can offer.

A dissertação tem como objeto o abuso do direito de voto na assembleia geral de credores. A Lei de Recuperação e Falência pauta-se pela adoção de soluções consensuais entre o devedor em crise e seus credores. Para tanto, cabe aos credores aceitar ou não o plano de recuperação judicial proposto pelo devedor. Entretanto, embora a lei seja pródiga em declarações de princípios, é sucinta quanto à estruturação do procedimento deliberativo. Confia-se na regra majoritária, e não são estabelecidas garantias estruturais à higidez do procedimento. A adoção da regra majoritária, contudo, nem sempre proporciona soluções equânimes. O direito societário dá exemplos de que o direito de voto pode ser exercido como instrumento para a obtenção de benefícios particulares ou para infligir danos à coletividade ou aos seus membros. Esse tipo de comportamento abusivo deve ser reprimido pelo direito. A dissertação busca determinar, dessa forma, em que situações o exercício do direito de voto pelos credores na deliberação acerca do plano de recuperação judicial poderá ser considerado abusivo. O trabalho está estruturado em cinco capítulos. No primeiro, investiga-se a natureza da coletividade de credores, concluindo-se que constitui uma comunhão de interesses. Em decorrência do início do procedimento concursal, surgem entre os credores deveres recíprocos de lealdade. No segundo capítulo, o instituto do abuso do direito é analisado em sua evolução histórica, demonstrando que também o abuso do direito de voto pelo credor é proibido pelo ordenamento jurídico. Questiona-se, então, a quais limites está adstrito o credor no exercício do voto. Em excurso necessário, ressalta-se a necessidade de que, além de ser avaliado o abuso do direito do voto pelo credor, seja avaliada a legalidade do plano. No terceiro capítulo, são abordadas as hipóteses de impedimento de voto, que delimitam quais credores são legitimados ao voto; ademais, discutem-se a possibilidade de aplicação analógica de regras societárias de impedimento de voto à assembleia de credores e hipóteses polêmicas de impedimento de voto pouco abordadas pela doutrina. No capítulo quatro, cerne do trabalho, apresenta-se casuística do abuso do direito de voto, e discutem-se quais os critérios para sua aferição. No capítulo quinto, são analisadas as possíveis sanções ao abuso do direito de voto. / This study aims to analyse the abuse of voting rights within the creditors meeting. The Brazilian Insolvency Law Act fosters the adoption of consensual agreements between the debtor facing an economic crisis and his creditors. For achieving this end, creditors must deliberate about the judicial recuperation plan proposed by the debtor. The Act provides declarations of principles, but it has limited concern regarding the structure of the voting procedure. Furthermore, it contains the belief that the majority of the creditors will decide for the best result. There are practically no structural guarantees being provided for with regard to the procedure. However, the majority principle does not always yields adequate solutions. Corporate law offers many examples illustrating the misuse of voting rights, either to obtain personal benefits or to inflict damages on the collectivity. This kind of behavior is condemned by Law. This study establishes the situations in which the exercise of voting rights in the creditors meeting may be regarded as abusive. The study is divided into five chapters. In the first one, the nature of the collectivity of creditors is investigated, concluding that a community of interests emerges as a result of the begin of the insolvency procedure. Based on this community of interests, fidutiary duties upon the creditors arise. In the second chapter, the institute of the abuse of right is historically analysed, with the conclusion that the abuse of voting rights by the creditors is prohibited. The parameters for the proper use of voting rights are analised . In a necessary excursus, it is showed that the legality of the plan must be also analysed by the court. In the third chapter, cases of voting prohibition are discussed, and so is the possibility of analogically applying corporate law rules on voting prohibition. In addition, some polemical cases are presented. In the fourth chapter, core of this study, both cases of abuse of voting rights and criteria for measuring this abuse are discussed. In the fifth chapter, possible sanctions to the abuse of voting rights are described.

A idéia de culpa está impregnada no pensamento ocidental, permeando todos os âmbitos das ciências humanas. Em sede de Direito penal, surge como forma de restrição da responsabilidade pelo resultado delitivo. Com a consolidação da racionalidade penal moderna, todavia, associa-se fortemente com a pena aflitiva, servindo a um só tempo como requisito e medida da mesma, isto é, porque o Direito penal administra uma sanção particular, a pena aflitiva, mister que o delito contenha um requisito a mais que os demais ilícitos a culpabilidade -, cuja intensidade terá repercussão direta na fixação da reprimenda. A primeira noção acabada de culpabilidade no seio da teoria do delito, conseqüentemente, é da atribuição de uma pena a quem agiu livremente em contradição ao ordenamento jurídico, situação que torna do condenado um merecedor da mesma. Está calcada em uma imagem iluminista de ser humano: livre, igual e racional; em uma imagem consensualista de sociedade, cujos bens jurídicos essenciais, em grande parte herdados do Direito natural, seriam igualmente valorados por seus membros; e, finalmente, em uma percepção da pena como espelho do mau uso da razão representado no delito. Em que pese a evolução doutrinária da culpabilidade, tais premissas, aqui denominadas ilustrativamente de pilares, mantém-se inalterados. A Criminologia, porém, demonstra que tal imagem de sujeito não se sustenta; que a sociedade é heterogênea; que os bens jurídicos são escolhas políticas e que a pena aflitiva tem efeitos deletérios tão ou mais graves quanto os do crime. Tem-se, assim, uma contradição entre o discurso e a prática do Direito penal, com um superávit punitivo, anverso de seu déficit ético. Possível correção de rota estaria na desvinculação entre delito e pena aflitiva, redefinindo-se o Direito penal, a culpabilidade e o processo penal com vistas à recomposição dos danos de relacionamento, com explícito desprezo à pena aflitiva. Dentro do marco da racionalidade penal moderna, todavia, é possível vislumbrar o fortalecimento da culpabilidade em vista das criticas criminológicas, sobretudo em sede de erro de proibição e de inexigibilidade de conduta diversa. Limitando o poder punitivo, a dogmática cumpriria a única missão viável no Estado Democrático de Direito, com resgate ético do Direito penal. / The idea of guilt is deeply rooted in western thinking, permeating all areas of humanities. In criminal law, it appears as a restriction of liability by the offense result. With the consolidation of modern criminal rationality, however, it is strongly associated to a painful penalty, serving at the same time as its requirement and extent, that is, because Criminal Law manages a particular penalty, the painful penalty, it is necessary that the offense contains an additional requirement to other illegal acts - guilt - whose intensity will have direct impact on the setting of the reprimand. The first built notion of guilt within the theory of Criminal Law, therefore, is the award of a penalty to those who freely acted in contradiction to the legal system, which makes the criminal someone who deserves such punishment. This is based on the Enlightment Age image of a human being: free, equal and rational; on a consensual society image, whose legal essential goods, largely inherited from Natural Law, would also be valued by its members; and finally, on the perception of the penalty as the mirror image of the misuse of reason, represented by the crime. Despite the doctrinal evolution of guilt, such assumptions, here called pillars, remain unchanged. Criminology, however, demonstrates that such image does not hold; that society is heterogeneous; that legal assets are political choices and that the painful penalty has side effects possibly far more serious than the crime itself. Thus there is a contradiction between the discourse and practice of Criminal Law, with a punitive surplus, opposite to its ethical deficit. A possible track correction would be the untying of crime and punishment, redefining Criminal Law, guilt and criminal prosecution with the purpose of rebuilding the relationship damages with explicit contempt with respect to the painful penalty. Within the framework of modern criminal rationality, however, it is possible to see the strengthening of guilt in the presence of criminological criticism, especially in the presence of the error as to prohibition and exculpation. Limiting punitive power, the dogmatic would meetthe only viable mission in a Democratic State of Law, with the rescue of an ethical criminal law.

The principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination in labor relations Abstract This dissertation focuses on the analysis of the legal regulation of the Czech Republic containing the principle of equal treatment of employees and the prohibition of their discrimination in labor relations. The other objective is to compare the legal regulations of other European Union Member States and to apply the principle of equal treatment and non- discrimination in practice, including the abundant case law of The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and the less case law of the Czech courts. The content of this dissertation above all is an introduction of the principle of equal treatment and non- discrimination, differentiation of material and formal equality including specification of individual discriminatory reasons and an introduction of the most important legal sources in the international legislation, standards of the European anti-discriminatory law and domestic legal adjustment. Another part describes the rules of equal treatment and the ban of discrimination applied in real life in the area of remuneration in terms of rewarding somebody the same amount for the work of same value, and a possibility of achieving a functional or other types of promotion without...

<p>Abstract</p><p>This essay has as its purpose to discuss the current legal regulation of the concept of humanitarian intervention. The inconsistencies in the debate over the legal status of this concept, and the legal uncertainty it brings to the acts of states and the lives of their nationals is a motivating factor for the writing of this essay. However, it has been clear from the outset that the concept of humanitarian intervention is intricately connected to political and moral ideas and values. Thus, the attitude taken towards this doctrine will be highly dependent on the perspectives of the state, government or single author representing it.</p><p>Following this starting point, the aim of this essay is not to present a single answer as to whether humanitarian intervention is, or is not, legal, but to research, compare and analyze the different arguments put forward in this subject in international law today. Hopefully, this will provide the reader of this essay with some insight into the sources of international law of today and how the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, the prohibition of force and the protection of human rights relate to the concept of humanitarian intervention.</p><p>A frank overview of the UN Charter does not support use of force except in the case of self-defence or without a Security Council mandate. Because of the unique character of the Charter and the UN system itself, any interpretation of the Charter will have to consider not only the letter of the Charter but its founding purposes and principles, as well as its function and tasks in international society today. Taking into account this wider perception of the Charter, there have been propositions to interpret the key articles and principles on the use of force in the Charter in such a way that the concept of humanitarian intervention completely circumvents the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. This interpretation, however, has been rejected by the currently most authoritative writers in international law and has received a, to say the least, mixed support among the community of states. The main reason for this is that such an interpretation of the Charter overlooks the travaux preparatoires of the Charter as well as the purposes and functions of the UN, and would produce a result contrary to the peace-building aims of the UN.</p><p>As regards the state practice connected to the relevant regulations of the UN Charter, this essay has shown that the consistency, generality and uniformity of this practise is not sufficient to conclude that a new interpretative regime has been accepted by the states that would allow for humanitarian intervention beyond what is provided for today by the explicit support of the UN Charter. Neither has the claims of a customary rule allowing humanitarian intervention, independent of the rules of the UN Charter, been proved to exist as a result of consistent state practice and an accompanying opinio juris. Still, states have been seen to resort to the use of force claiming a right to humanitarian intervention, and there is recognition of such a doctrine in the writing of several authors. This perception may partly be a consequence of the American dominance in the writing on the subject, and the selectivity that such a limited perspective brings to the overview of the legal position of humanitarian intervention. However, there is proof in the practice of the UN and the instruments concluded by states within the UN system of a new perspective of the state and its responsibility towards its own citizens. Coupled with the emergence of human rights instruments within the UN, there is a possibility that this perspective will bring changes in the values and workings of the UN system and the community of states as a whole. This change may perhaps in the future allow for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme humanitarian distress.</p><p>However, the risks of misuse of such a new right, as well as the difficulties of formulating a set of criteria for this doctrine that would encompass the will and interests of all states demand that such a development, however mindful of the urgency of the human suffering necessary to counter with such a doctrine, will have to take its time and be conducted with great care to produce a sustainable result.</p>

<p><font face="Times New Roman"><font face="Times New Roman"> <p align="left">As a case study, the paper analyzes the Bank&rsquo / s role in the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Oil Pipeline project (the project) in which the Bank has been involved since the year 2000. The paper presents the lessons, challenges and implications from this protection of human rights.</p> </font></font></p>

Title: Law of Marketing – A Descriptive Study of Marketing in Sweden and Italy with focal point on TV-commercials (Marknadsföringsrätt – En deskriptiv studie av marknadsföring I Sverig och Italien med inriktning på TV-reklam)   Number of pages: 34   Author: Astrid Lidman   Tutor: Göran Svensson   Course: Media and Communication C   Period: Fall -09   University: Division of Media and Communication, Department of Information Science, Uppsala University   Purpose/Aim: My goal with this study is to see the differences and similarities that can be found in the Swedish and Italian Law of Marketing. I want to compare the results to see how our different laws are still able to reach the same results concerning the protecting of our public from bad advertisement.   Material/Methods: I’ve been reading laws concerning marketing. I started out my research from different commissions from EU. Then I found the equivalent laws to those commissions in both Sweden and Italy I was able to see how the two different states apply the commissions to their legal system. By doing so I also got a starting-point by getting the most important laws in both the Swedish and Italian legal system concerning marketing and commercials on TV.   Main results: Since both Sweden and Italy apply the commissions from EU to their legal system, the differences were only superficial. Due to the commissions the base, of what is consider as bad marketing, was virtually the same. And when looking at the big picture they both achieved almost the same protection to their public that I think can be considered reaching high standards. The differences lay in the protection of commercials on TV towards children, and that Sweden has a little bit more regulation during the discussions about the protection concerning sexual discrimination.   Keywords: Laws of Marketing, TV-commercials, prohibition of children’s commercials, inappropriate business methods, misleading advertisement, commissions, EU.

Abstract This essay has as its purpose to discuss the current legal regulation of the concept of humanitarian intervention. The inconsistencies in the debate over the legal status of this concept, and the legal uncertainty it brings to the acts of states and the lives of their nationals is a motivating factor for the writing of this essay. However, it has been clear from the outset that the concept of humanitarian intervention is intricately connected to political and moral ideas and values. Thus, the attitude taken towards this doctrine will be highly dependent on the perspectives of the state, government or single author representing it. Following this starting point, the aim of this essay is not to present a single answer as to whether humanitarian intervention is, or is not, legal, but to research, compare and analyze the different arguments put forward in this subject in international law today. Hopefully, this will provide the reader of this essay with some insight into the sources of international law of today and how the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, the prohibition of force and the protection of human rights relate to the concept of humanitarian intervention. A frank overview of the UN Charter does not support use of force except in the case of self-defence or without a Security Council mandate. Because of the unique character of the Charter and the UN system itself, any interpretation of the Charter will have to consider not only the letter of the Charter but its founding purposes and principles, as well as its function and tasks in international society today. Taking into account this wider perception of the Charter, there have been propositions to interpret the key articles and principles on the use of force in the Charter in such a way that the concept of humanitarian intervention completely circumvents the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. This interpretation, however, has been rejected by the currently most authoritative writers in international law and has received a, to say the least, mixed support among the community of states. The main reason for this is that such an interpretation of the Charter overlooks the travaux preparatoires of the Charter as well as the purposes and functions of the UN, and would produce a result contrary to the peace-building aims of the UN. As regards the state practice connected to the relevant regulations of the UN Charter, this essay has shown that the consistency, generality and uniformity of this practise is not sufficient to conclude that a new interpretative regime has been accepted by the states that would allow for humanitarian intervention beyond what is provided for today by the explicit support of the UN Charter. Neither has the claims of a customary rule allowing humanitarian intervention, independent of the rules of the UN Charter, been proved to exist as a result of consistent state practice and an accompanying opinio juris. Still, states have been seen to resort to the use of force claiming a right to humanitarian intervention, and there is recognition of such a doctrine in the writing of several authors. This perception may partly be a consequence of the American dominance in the writing on the subject, and the selectivity that such a limited perspective brings to the overview of the legal position of humanitarian intervention. However, there is proof in the practice of the UN and the instruments concluded by states within the UN system of a new perspective of the state and its responsibility towards its own citizens. Coupled with the emergence of human rights instruments within the UN, there is a possibility that this perspective will bring changes in the values and workings of the UN system and the community of states as a whole. This change may perhaps in the future allow for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme humanitarian distress. However, the risks of misuse of such a new right, as well as the difficulties of formulating a set of criteria for this doctrine that would encompass the will and interests of all states demand that such a development, however mindful of the urgency of the human suffering necessary to counter with such a doctrine, will have to take its time and be conducted with great care to produce a sustainable result.