À très peu de philosophes l’histoire de la pensée occidentale a accordé une place aussi significative qu’à Socrate : nous apprenons tout naturellement à l’édifier comme héros de la rationalité et à reconnaître en lui la figure même du philosophe critique. À plusieurs égards, cette représentation élogieuse nous paraît justifiée, bien que, d’un autre point de vue, elle puisse nous faire sombrer dans la confusion, dès lors que notre regard porte simultanément, et comme pour produire un contraste, sur l’image d’un Socrate se soumettant au daimonion, son étrange signe divin. Comment pouvons-nous justifier, à partir du corpus platonicien, à la fois l’engagement de Socrate vis-à-vis de la rationalité et sa soumission à un phénomène en apparence irrationnel ? De cette question troublante est née la présente étude qui se consacre donc au problème de l’articulation entre le rapport de Socrate aux dieux et son rapport à la raison critique. Plus précisément, nous avons cherché à déterminer s’il existait, sur le plan épistémologique, une hiérarchie entre le daimonion et la méthode d’investigation rationnelle propre à Socrate, l’elenchos. Une telle étude exégétique nécessitait, dans un premier temps, une analyse systématique et approfondie des quelques passages sur le signe divin. Nous avons ensuite exposé deux solutions paradigmatiques au problème du double engagement contradictoire de Socrate, celle de G. Vlastos ainsi que celle de T.C. Brickhouse et N.D. Smith. Enfin, nous avons augmenté cette seconde partie d’un examen spécifique du Phèdre et du Timée, de même que d’un survol des modes de divination pour satisfaire un triple objectif : situer le signe divin en regard de la mantique traditionnelle, déterminer le rôle attribué par Platon à la raison dans le processus divinatoire, et être ainsi en mesure de trancher notre question principale. / To very few philosophers the history of the Western thought granted a place as significant as to Socrates: we quite naturally learn how to identify him as a hero of rationality and to recognize in him the very figure of the critical philosopher. In several respects, this representation of praise appears justified to us, although, from another point of view, it can make us sink in confusion, since our glance carries simultaneously, and like producing a contrast, on the image of Socrates obeying to the daimonion, his uncanny divine sign. How can we justify, starting from the Platonic corpus, both the engagement of Socrates with respect to rationality and his subordination to a seemingly irrational phenomenon? From this disconcerting question was born the present study which is thus devoted to the problem of the articulation between the relation of Socrates to the gods and his relation to the critical reason. More precisely, we sought to determine if there existed, on the epistemological level, a hierarchy between the daimonion and the method of rational investigation peculiar to Socrates, the elenchos. Such an exegetic study required, initially, a systematic and thorough analysis of the few passages related to the divine sign. We then adduced two paradigmatic solutions, that of G. Vlastos as well as that of T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith. Lastly, we added to this second part besides a specific examination of Phaedrus and Timaeus, also a broad survey of the modes of divination, satisfying a triple aim: to make sense of the divine sign in comparison with the traditional art of mantic, to determine the role allotted by Plato to the reason in the divinatory process, and thus to be able to solve our principal question.

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Hannah Arendt argues that political action is only meaningful through the disclosure of who the actor uniquely is, and that this disclosure is the basis of human dignity. Arendt’s notion of performative disclosure helps us to rethink the individuated actor, not as a sovereign and self-transparent subject whose action expresses an authentic individual essence or constative what, but rather as a decentered and ecstatic who whose action reveals meaningful dimensions of the world and of the actor’s unique situation in history, through the performance of acts and speech before public spectators. The idea that no actor can stand in a position of control with respect to his life story extends to a critical displacement of the notion of freedom understood as sovereignty and of political projects that attempt to make history. Action, as praxis and not poiesis, is best understood through Arendt’s metaphor of performance, rather than productive art. There are new interpretive possibilities for Arendt’s theory of action, especially if we trace appearances of the ancient Greek daimon in Arendt’s publications and lecture notes, and among works that Arendt confronted: Plato’s Socratic dialogues and the myth of Er, Heidegger’s notion of aletheia as Dasein’s disclosure of Being, Jaspers’ valid personality, and Kant’s notion of aesthetic genius. The daimon implies that the public realm is a spiritual realm, that action is a form of connection to the divine, and that the actor is a decentered discloser of transcendent meanings and new possibilities within the world. The daimon also shows moral deliberation to be more vital to meaningful action than Arendt suggests prior to The Life of the Mind, so that the distinctions usually read in Arendt between actor and spectator, as well as those between acting, thinking, and judging, may be productively occluded. Arendt’s struggle to re-invigorate action’s disclosive capacity is at the center of her entire project. It sheds light on her critique of the world-alienating aspects of Marx, her insistent protection of a distinct political sphere from the private and the social spheres, and her rejection of Hegel’s philosophy of history in favor of a fragmentary historiography inspired by Kafka and Benjamin.

The purpose of this study was to define Philosophical Counselling (PC) or, more specifically, PC as practised in South Africa. This was done through allowing South African philosophical counsellors to tell their stories about PC. The epistemological framework was that of social constructionism. The study involved a series of in-depth interviews with three South African philosophical counsellors. The major themes that emerged from the participants’ stories seemed to centre around: the existential need for the other; the conceptual need for the other; engaging with the other methodically; and caring for the other. While their stories largely resonate with current and overwhelmingly European and North American conceptions of PC, they also seem to provide a uniquely South African impetus to revise these conceptions. Moreover, the findings of this study may facilitate a dialogue between philosophical counsellors and their colleagues in related professions, especially psychotherapists. / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)

This work deals with education for virtues in Ancient Greece and Rome and is looking for common elements that can be traced in current educational practice as a reference to this education. It focuses on several important philosophers: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca and Quintilianus. It examines the virtues which were considered to be the most important, how one can reach them and if they can be learned. The final chapter describes how the antique education for virtue influenced the contemporary Czech education, particularly in the General educational programme for basic education and General educational programme for high schools.

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Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 GilbertoBO_DISSERT.pdf: 1123549 bytes, checksum: bb1ea048d72b5dc112eb9e938ec8e0ee (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-12-07 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / The work, here present, has as its objective to present in a clear and distinct manner the object of study of Michel Foucault in his last years of teaching at the College de France, namely, the care of the self. We present the care of the self in its birth, in its origin, from the character Socrates and its development until the beginning of the Christian age. With a keen eye, we present Foucault with a work of return and rescue of the care of the self to the personal and academic discussions; we propose, from the self care, to the contemporary subject a problematization of their life so that from this questioning he creates for herself ways of life that are coherence, knowledge and care with which he has of must particular, his himself. Passing by the sources that served as the source of study for Foucault to sketch the birth of care of the self, we design the form with which Foucault has dealt with the documents that speak of the care of self. We present Socrates as one who by excellence ensures that the other will give birth to the forms of knowledge and care of the self or, in other words, we present the care of the self socratic-foucauldian as a constant worry of the other to pay attention to ways in which he conducts her life, it creates for themselves ways of being and, therefore, creates ethics of existence. We present, finally, the care of the self as the cause of continuous immanence of modes of subjectivation of the subject that configure themselves in a non-accepting a determined essence, but a continually updated form . The care of the self leads to a single relationship and educator of modes of subjectivation of the subject; he creates, on the dynamics of temporality, ethical ways of living, which are sustained by an internal coherence of the subject with herself; he admits no stationary nature in the training of the subject, always wants a more beautiful work of himself; he is not isolation, he needs and is made with the other. The care of the self is the principle and the telos of battles and conquests of the subject within his temporality and existence / O trabalho, aqui desenvolvido, tem por objetivo apresentar o objeto de estudo de Michel Foucault em seus ?ltimos anos de ensino no Coll?ge de France, a saber, o cuidado de si. Apresentamos o cuidado de si em seu nascer, em sua origem, a partir do personagem S?crates e seu desenvolvimento at? o in?cio da era crist?. Com um olhar atento, apresentamos com Foucault um trabalho de retorno e resgate do cuidado de si ?s discuss?es pessoais e acad?micas; propomos, a partir do cuidado de si, ao sujeito contempor?neo uma problematiza??o de sua vida para que desta problematiza??o ele crie para si mesmo modos de vida que sejam coer?ncia, conhecimento e cuidado com o que ele tem de mais particular, seu si mesmo. Passando pelas fontes que serviram de fonte de estudo para Foucault esbo?ar o nascimento do cuidado de si, vamos desenhando a forma com a qual Foucault tratou os documentos que falam do cuidado de si. Apresentamos S?crates como aquele que por excel?ncia faz com que os outros d?em ? luz a formas de conhecimento e cuidado pr?prios ou, em outras palavras, apresentamos o cuidado de si socr?tico-foucaultiano como um constante inquietar o outro a prestar aten??o aos modos como ele conduz sua vida, cria para si modos de ser e, consequentemente, cria ?ticas de exist?ncia. Apresentamos, enfim, o cuidado de si como causa de cont?nua iman?ncia de modos de subjetiva??o do sujeito que se configuram em um n?o aceitar uma ess?ncia determinada, mas uma forma continuamente atualizada. O cuidado de si conduz a uma rela??o ?nica e formadora de modos de subjetiva??o do sujeito; ele cria, na din?mica da temporalidade, formas ?ticas de viver que se sustentam por uma coer?ncia interna do sujeito com ele mesmo; ele n?o admite estaticidade na forma??o do sujeito, deseja sempre uma obra de si mais bela; ele n?o ? isolamento, necessita e se faz com o outro. O cuidado de si ? o princ?pio e o telos das batalhas e conquistas do sujeito dentro de sua temporalidade e exist?ncia

This diploma thesis deals with my stay at C.P.I. Tino Grandío, Guntín, Spain where I participate in classes of English as the SOCRATES/ COMENIUS language assistant in the school year 2006/2007. The Socrates programme as well as the Spanish system of education is presented in the theoretical section of this diploma work. Another part of this section is constituted by the presentation of the Common European Framework of Reference and the European Language Portfolio and their incorporation into the Spanish and Czech curricula. The practical section focuses on the presentation of my host institution C.P.I. Tino Grandío, in particular on its technical facilities, the course books employed in classes or on the aims of teaching English in general. The following part of the practical section contains examples of activities employed in classes of English where I participated as assistant. In this part, I also mention what the assistantship brought to me, what impact did it have on my host school and I comment on the problems encountered during my assistantship. In the final part, I evaluate the whole assistantship at C.P.I. Tino Grandío.

I denna uppsats undersöker jag hur två olika tolkningar av den sokratiska frivillighetsparadoxen ingen gör fel frivilligt påverkar möjligheten att förstå Platons dialog Staten. Min hypotes är att de två tolkningarna av frivillighetsparadoxen kastar ljus över diskussionen i Staten, och att det är nödvändigt att förstå frivillighetsparadoxens roll för att förstå vad som står på spel i Staten. I uppsatsen ämnar jag visa att ett möjligt sätt att läsa Staten är att tolka Sokrates och de övriga samtalsdeltagarnas uttalanden baserat på kontexten, eftersom vissa uttalanden är polemiska i sin karaktär, medan andra är traditionella. Jag argumenterar för att såväl den traditionella synen på Sokrates som den polemiska dito är korrekta analyser av Sokrates filosofiska gärning, men inte heltäckande sådana, eftersom Sokrates ibland är polemisk – mot de som kvickt måste nedkämpas – och ibland är instruerande på traditionellt manér, mot de som kan förbättras genom det filosofiska samtalet. Detta sätt att läsa Staten skiljer sig från andra genom att läsaren bör avstå a priori-uppfattningar om Sokrates, Thrasymakos eller Glaukons och Adeimantos ståndpunkter till förmån för att tolka beteenden hos samtalsdeltagarna samt deras uppfattningar, vilka förmedlas av texten.

The aim of this study is to examine and analyse how the Alexandrian prefect Orestes of late antiquity and his management of the events of 414-415 were depicted in the ancient sources: Socrates Scholasticus, John of Nikiu and Damascius. By applying S. Brownes rhetoric analysis to remove the authors “filters” in their depiction and then applying French & Ravens bases of power to analyse how prefect Orestes power were depicted. Th analyses also applies the bases of power on bishop Cyril and philosopher Hypatia as the study found it difficult to analyses the prefect without them. The result of the analysis and discussion mainly found that the depiction of the prefect Orestes is affected by the rhetoric “filterers” of the three ancient authors. The study also found that the depiction of prefect Orestes and how he managed the events between 414-415 is always dependent on the office of prefectures authority and power. This what French & Raven call legitimate power. Prefect Orestes actions were based on the office of prefecture authority and power, in accordance to the social structure and cultural rules. He was always depicted as the prefect not the person Orestes.