Teismo precedento kaip teisės šaltinio problematika Lietuvoje Santrauka Konstituciniam Teismui paskelbus 2006 m. kovo 28 d. ir 2007 m. spalio 24 d. nutarimus, Lietuvoje precedentas pirmą kartą oficialiai pripažintas privalomu teisės šaltiniu. Lietuvos teisininkų bendruomenėje buvo ir vis dar yra svarstoma, kokos priežastys lėmė, kad bendrosios teisės institutas tapo Lietuvos teisės sistemos dalimi. Darbe, remiantis statutinės teisės normomis, Lietuvos teisės mokslo atstovų darbais, bei konkrečiais pavyzdžiais iš Lietuvos Aukščiausiojo Teismo ir Lietuvos apeliacinio teismo praktikos, stengiamasi ištirti ir atskleisti prielaidas bei aplinkybes, lėmusias precedento susiformavimą dabartinėje Lietuvos teisės sistemoje. Precedento instituto užuomazgų būta jau tarpukario Lietuvoje, tačiau pasireiškus tarybinės teisės intervencijai, jis taip ir liko nesusiformavęs. Vėliau, Lietuvai atkūrus nepriklausomybę, teismų vaidmuo ir jų formuojamos praktikos reikšmė palaipsniui didėjo, kol galiausiai Konstitucinis Teismas konstatavo, jog teismai, spręsdami analogiškas bylas, privalo vadovautis jau sukurtais precedentais, o ne kurti naujus. Tai buvo precedento doktrinos formavimosi Lietuvoje pradžia. / A Precedent as a Source of Law Issues in Lithuania Summary A judicial precedent was established as a binding source of law in the Lithuanian law system by the resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Republic Lithuania, dated 28h March 2006, and the resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, dated 24th October 2007. The question whether the institute of the common law tradition should have had to become a part of Lithuanian law system is still considered and discussed among the Lithuanian lawyers. This paper, which is based on the analysis of legal acts, works of Lithuanian law scientists and decisions of the Supreme Court of Lithuania and the Court of Appeals of Lithuania, seeks to analyse the background and circumstances under which the precedent institute was established in Lithuanian law system. A germ of the precedent already existed in the interwar Lithuania. However, due to the historical reasons and an intervention of the Soviet law, the precedent institute was not further developed. Later, after Lithuania announced independence, the role of Lithuanian courts and their jurisprudence has become important again. Finally, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has stated that the same cases must be decided in the same way, i.e. they have to be decided not by creating new court precedents, competing with the existing ones, but by taking account of the already consolidated ones.

The "law versus politics" debate is central in the study of the Supreme Court's institutional role in US democracy and law making. Research has sought to determine if the Supreme Court is an unconstrained political actor or if it is constrained by precedent. This dissertation contributes to this debate by theorizing that there is not a direct tradeoff; instead, even a politically motivated Court can be constrained by precedent. Given precedent is an internally imposed norm, what incentive does a politically motivated Supreme Court have to adhere to precedent when it results in outcomes that deviate from the Court's most preferred ideological outcome? There has been a lack of theoretical development and empirical testing that would explain the Court's incentive to adhere to precedent. I argue that even a politically motivated Supreme Court has an interest in adhering to precedent as a means of control over the lower courts. The Court has a role as a principal with the Courts of Appeals acting as an agent. The Supreme Court uses precedent as a standard that guides lower court decision-making in thousands of cases that the Court will never hear. The Supreme Court is willing to sacrifice the dispositional outcome (who wins and who loses) in a given case to issue or adhere to a precedent that will better guide lower court decision-making in a given area. To test this theory, this project will construct an original data set using a new measure of precedent. Specifically, "the law" and "precedent" for a case will be coded in terms of the standard of review. The standard of review can be understood as a precise legal statement of which party has the burden of proof or justification in a given case and the nature of that burden. This is an ordinal measure (coded 0-4) based on the Court's finite legal rules in a given area of law (rational basis, heightened rational basis, intermediate, heightened intermediate and strict). This novel understanding better captures the legal content of court opinions.

[pt] O neoconstitucionalismo presente no Estado Contemporâneo - marcado pela diversidade, multiculturalismo e complexidade - teve como marco as atrocidades cometidas durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial e se caracteriza por fatores como a expansão dos direitos humanos e fundamentais e a normatização das Constituições Democráticas que apresentam em sua essência uma elevada carga axiológica e principiológica, conferindo caráter mais aberto ao texto legal, colocando o indivíduo no centro o ordenamento jurídico. Esse cenário resultou na reformulação não somente do conceito de jurisdição, mas de todo o direito processual, rompendo com o tecnicismo inerente a esse ramo do direito. Ao superar o clássico modelo subsuntivo e adotar o método interpretativo deliberativo de aplicação do direito, o neoconstitucionalismo fortaleceu o Poder Judiciário e conferiu maior liberdade aos juízes na interpretação e ressignificação da norma diante do caso concreto, conformando-a com a realidade sócio-políticojurídica. Esse movimento de resgate das teorias hermenêuticas aqueceu a discussão sobre segurança jurídica, uma vez que potencializou a divergência de entendimento jurisprudencial nos países adeptos ao sistema de civil law, como é o caso do Brasil. A adoção da teoria dos precedentes judiciais vinculantes - inerente ao sistema jurídico do common law - no Brasil, apresenta-se como instrumento de uniformização da jurisprudência capaz de garantir a segurança jurídica ao elevar o grau de previsibilidade, estabilidade e confiabilidade do direito, permitindo aos cidadãos planejar suas ações e prever seus resultados. / [en] The neoconstitutionalism present in the Contemporary State - marked by diversity, multiculturalism and complexity - had as a landmark atrocities committed during the Second World War and is characterized by factors such as the expansion of human and fundamental rights and the regulation of the Democratic Constitutions which present in their being an axiological and principled high load , giving more open to legal text character by placing the individual at the center of the legal system. This scenario resulted in reshaping not only the concept of jurisdiction, but of the entire procedural law, breaking the technicality inherent in this field of law. By overcoming the classical model and adopting the interpretive-deliberative method of applying the law, neoconstitutionalism strengthened the judiciary and gave greater freedom to judges in interpretation and reframing the norm face the case, conforming with the legal socio-political reality. This movement of redemption of hermeneutical theories heated discussion about legal security, once it enhanced the divergence of legal understanding in the civil law system countries, such as Brazil. The adoption of the theory of binding judicial precedent - inherent in the legal system of common law - in Brazil, presents itself as an instrument of unification of jurisprudence able to guarantee legal certainty by raising the degree of predictability, stability and reliability of the law, allowing citizens plan their actions and predict their results.

Submitted by Edileide Reis (leyde-landy@hotmail.com) on 2013-04-17T11:51:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Matheus Gomes.pdf: 1179924 bytes, checksum: ad6756cdc25ba45223f12d819c5212b2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-09T17:44:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Matheus Gomes.pdf: 1179924 bytes, checksum: ad6756cdc25ba45223f12d819c5212b2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-09T17:44:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Matheus Gomes.pdf: 1179924 bytes, checksum: ad6756cdc25ba45223f12d819c5212b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo instigar no pensamento da comunidade jurídica uma reflexão crítica e pragmática sobre a nova perspectiva pela qual é percebido o fenômeno dos precedentes judiciais na engrenagem do sistema jurídico brasileiro. Não restam dúvidas de que o papel desempenhado pelos precedentes judiciais no ordenamento jurídico pátrio mudou substancialmente nos últimos anos é dizer os precedentes judiciais passaram da condição de mais um dos parâmetros às vezes de somenos importância a serem considerados quando do julgamento das ações para o mais importante e muitas vezes o único parâmetro a ser considerado pelos julgadores na formação de seu convencimento e fundamentação de suas decisões. Neste sentido demonstrar-se-á que passam os precedentes judiciais agora a serem dotados de um poder normativo para além do próprio efeito vinculante este último peculiar a alguns deles. Será possível notar ainda as implicações destas mudanças para a própria idéia de legitimidade democrática do poder judiciário e o papel deste como agente na implementação da Democracia. Para tanto trabalhar-se-á inicialmente com o conceito lógico-jurídico de precedentes judiciais bem assim sua concepção e evolução histórica no direito comparado e no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. Após passa-se à apresentação de algumas noções conceituais as razões jurídicas políticas e pragmáticas que orientam as modificações legislativas e jurisprudenciais que conduzem os precedentes judiciais a desempenharem papel central no sistema jurídico pátrio. Apresenta-se oportunamente um panorama da superação da separação hermética das duas grandes famílias do direito -civil law e common law - bem como a flagrante adoção da uma teoria do stare decisis no direito brasileiro. Neste sentido arrolar-se-ão alguns exemplos constantes em nossos textos legais que confirmam esta afirmação. Nesta esteira demonstrar-se-á o novo caminho hermenêutico do direito propondo como respaldo democrático para as alterações alhures mencionadas a imperiosidade de uma interpretação aberta do direito cuja participação representativa dos cidadãos ultrapasse da condição de um direito potestativo para um poder-dever jurídico a ser seguido pelos julgadores. Assente tais premissas restarão demonstradas algumas alternativas procedimentais a serem implementadas nos processos judiciais donde advierem precedentes judiciais com efeito normativo e portanto com eficácia erga omnes de modo que estes sejam consentâneos com o devido processo legal. Neste particular apresentar-se-á a imprescibilidade da participação da figura do amicus curiae neste novo perfil jurídico de construção de precedentes judiciais em que este possui como escopo primaz dotar tal atividade judicante de legitimidade e conforme o princípio democrático bem assim de igual maneira assegurar uma mobilidade do sistema evitando desse modo um engessamento dogmático e assim um distanciamento do direito da realidade que o cerca. / Salvador

In classical international law, States alone were the makers and subjects of the law. Times have changed. Contemporary international law admits, not only States as its subjects but also individuals and international organisations; it controls not just the needs of States but also the needs of individuals as it continues to venture into areas which, in the classical era, were exclusively reserved to domestic law. The fact that international law now applies to entities other than States is no longer a subject of controversy both in theory and practice. On the contrary, the question relating to whether international law could originate from a source other than through the consent of States in the positivist sense of the law has remained a question of controversy. The question has been made more complex by the multiplicity of international institutions created by States and vested with authority to perform the functions entrusted to them under international law. The functions they perform influence the behaviours and expectations of both States and individuals; but the powers they exercise belong to the States which delegated the powers. Since the powers are delegated by States, it should follow that the powers be confined by the very fact of delegation to the functions for which the powers had been granted. Such powers cannot be used for any other purpose, perhaps. With this in mind, the question sought to be answered in this work is whether the powers granted to International Court of Justice to “decide disputes” – article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court) – implicates the power of judicial lawmaking. In other words, whether rules and principles arising from the decisions of the Court can be properly referred to as rules and principles of international law. The question becomes quite intriguing when placed within the context of article 38(1)(d) and article 59 of the Statute of the Court on the one hand, and the practice of the Court and of the States appearing before it on the other hand. Articles 38(1)(d) provides: “subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” By article 59: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”. Notwithstanding the language of the above provisions, it is shown in this work that like judges in municipal law, judges in the ICJ lay down rules and principles having legal implications for the decisions in subsequent cases as well as for the conduct of States, in general, regarding areas within the degrees of the settled case-law of the Court. It is accordingly argued that to the extent that rules and principles in the decisions of the Court are relevant as rules and principles of international law (in subsequent decisions of the Court) to the determination of international law rights and obligations of States, judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d) are a source of international law. This is notwithstanding the unhelpful language of paragraph (d) and the influence of article 59. Concerning article 59, the writer argues that the article has no bearing on the authority of judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d); its real function being to protect the legal rights and interests of States from a decision given in a case to which they were not parties.

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-07-10T23:32:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 49b.pdf: 2090969 bytes, checksum: dbf6ad23f373f46416bf9239fd31bd03 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-10T23:32:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 49b.pdf: 2090969 bytes, checksum: dbf6ad23f373f46416bf9239fd31bd03 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-09 / Nenhuma / O presente estudo mostra algumas diferenças conceituais existentes entre as duas grandes famílias de direito existentes no ocidente – common law e civil law. Para tanto, por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica em fonte primárias relativas a tradição da common law busca evidenciar os principais pontos relativos a sua formação, bem como algumas peculiaridades existentes no Reino Unido e nos Estados Unidos da América quanto aos precedentes. O principal ponto de averiguação consiste na formação de precedentes, overruling e distinguish dos mesmos, o que implica em uma busca pela origem, definição e operação, tanto na vinculação hierárquica vertical e como na horizontal. Assim, para além das diferenças entre as tradições, a constituição dos quadros jurídicos (magistratura e advocacia) desvenda muito sobre a operação e construção do direito. Quanto ao Brasil delineiam-se alguns aspectos relevantes de sua história que contribuem para a compreensão do presente momento de crise no/do Poder Judiciário. Faz-se esse percurso para entender o porquê da existência dos recursos extraordinários e a problemática formação da federação brasileira e a concentração das competências legislativas materiais e processuais a cargo da União. Nesse cenário é importante a análise de como as modificações introduzidas pelo constituinte reformador têm a capacidade de solucionar os gargalos enfrentados pelo Poder Judiciário e em que medida a ideia de vinculação aqui implementadas refletem a experiência da common law ou tem mais similitude à tradição portuguesa dos assentos. Propõe-se, por fim, uma ideia de vinculação diferente da existente (súmulas vinculantes e de condensação de jurisprudência) a ser adotada no Brasil, que mais se aproxime a existente na common law, em que se valoriza o caso decidido e se parte para a vinculação aos motivos determinantes da decisão, ideia que tem semelhança a ratio decidendi, mas não é o mesmo que ela, em razão da forma como são realizados os julgamentos. A tentativa é de ver aquilo que pode ser útil, sem exaltação de uma tradição como melhor do que a outra, mas sim na compreensão das peculiaridades que a experiência dos precedentes na common law podem ajudar para uma vinculação que venha contribuir para uma melhor prestação jurisdicional, com uma racionalização no acesso ao Poder Judiciário, juntamente com uma otimização dos julgamentos dos tribunais de superposição para que seja viável a existência de vinculação e expansão erga omnes dos motivos determinantes das decisões. / The present study shows some conceptual differences between the two biggest families of law existing in the western - common law and civil law . The research is done through bibliographic search in primary sources of the common law tradition seeking to highlight the key points about the background as well as some peculiarities existing in the United Kingdom and the United States of America about binding precedents. The main point of investigation is the shaping of precedents, overruling and distinguish of them, which implies a search for the origin, definition and operation in its vertical and horizontal binding power. Thus, in addition to the differences between the traditions, the establishment of the judicial careers (judges and lawyers) reveals much about the operation and construction of law. About Brazil the study tries to outline some relevant aspects of its history that contributes to understand the present crisis in / of the Judiciary. In this journey tries to understand the reason for the existence of extraordinary appeal and the problematic organization of the Brazilian federation that concentrates the substantive and procedural legislative powers in charge of the federal government. In this scenario it is important to analyze how the changes introduced by the legislative power are able to solve the problems faced by the judiciary and how the idea of binding implemented here reflect the experience of the common law or has more similarity to the Portuguese tradition. By the end it is proposed a idea of stare decisis that is different from the one that exists here nowadays (binding precedents and jurisprudence condensation), which is closest to the common law tradition, where the ratio decidendi of the decided case provides to further cases the determinants reasons to the decision. The attempt is to see what can be useful, without exaltation of one tradition as better than the other, but rather in understanding the peculiarities that the experience of precedent in common law can help to provide a stare decisis that contributes to a better judicial adjudication with rationalization of access to the judiciary, together with an optimization of the judgments of the courts of superposition to be feasible to have binding judgments – erga omnes – and expansion of the determining reasons of the decisions.

Submitted by Isaac Francisco de Souza Dias (isaac.souzadias@ufpe.br) on 2016-06-09T16:56:25Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Ravi Peixoto - A MODULAÇÃO DA EFICÁCIA TEMPORAL NA REVOGAÇÃO DE PRECEDENTES.pdf: 2067408 bytes, checksum: b2eccff39cee9338ce4ec73063273b01 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-09T16:56:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Ravi Peixoto - A MODULAÇÃO DA EFICÁCIA TEMPORAL NA REVOGAÇÃO DE PRECEDENTES.pdf: 2067408 bytes, checksum: b2eccff39cee9338ce4ec73063273b01 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-25 / CAPES / O direito brasileiro ingressa, atualmente, em um sistema que passa a adotar os precedentes judiciais como uma fonte do direito cada vez mais relevante, inclusive, concedendo-lhes eficácia vinculante. Isso faz com que surja uma grande preocupação com a forma de manejo e as suas técnicas específicas. Uma delas é o overruling, que é a técnica de superação de precedentes. Um ponto extremamente relevante dentro do estudo da superação de precedentes é o da sua eficácia temporal. Na grande maioria dos países, é adotada, como regra, a eficácia retroativa, muito embora a tendência pareça ser a de admissão de que, em alguns casos, possa haver a modulação desses efeitos. No Brasil, ainda sob a égide do CPC/1973 e anteriormente ao início da vigência do CPC/2015, enquanto o STF admitia a modulação de efeitos, o STJ apontava a inexistência de autorização legal. Há de se enfrentar ainda o problema dos fundamentos da modulação, as suas possibilidades e os seus aspectos processuais. Em termos de fundamentos, os mais relevantes são a segurança jurídica e o princípio da proteção da confiança legítima. No trabalho existe o estudo específico da segurança jurídica e também da confiança legítima para que se possa utilizá-las na modulação temporal dos efeitos na superação de precedentes. Posteriormente, tem-se o estudo da teoria dos precedentes e as suas técnicas para, então, adentrar especificamente no tema dos efeitos temporais da superação de precedentes e a sua fundamentação material a partir de um estudo da jurisprudência do STF e das diversas construções doutrinárias Por fim, é realizado um estudo específico acerca dos aspectos processuais da eficácia temporal na superação de precedentes. / The brazilian law is starting to enter in a system that adopts the judicial precedents as a relevant source of the law, turning them obligatory. That raises a concern about the way to use them and its proper techniques. One of them is the overruling. A point very important in the overruling is its temporal effects, and the possibility to change them. In most countries, it is adopted the rule of the retroactivity effect, even so, it seems to exist the possibility to change them. In Brazil, when the CPC/1973 was applicable and before the beggining of application of the CPC/2015, meanwhile the STF accepted the possibility to change the temporal effects of the overruling, the STJ points that there is no legal authorization. There is also the need to take care of the problem of the reasoning of the changing of the temporal effects in the overruling, its possibilities and its procedural aspects. In the terms of fundaments, the most important are the principle of legal certainty and the legitimate expectations. In this paper there are specific chapters destined to the study of the legal certainty and the legitimate expectative. After that, the theory of precedents and its techniques are studied so that becomes possible to study the changing of the effects of the overruling and its reasoning based on study from decisions of the STF and doctrinal constructions. In the last chapter, the objective is to study the procedural aspect of the prospective overruling.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

A presente tese examina o papel do precedente judicial no sistema processual brasileiro, à luz das recentes reformas introduzidas na legislação, constitucional e infraconstitucional, com o duplo objetivo de dotar o precedente de maior valor e de uniformizar a jurisprudência, as quais demonstram que o momento é de desconstrução de paradigmas. Após delimitar o tema e discorrer sobre a sua importância, traçamos as premissas essenciais do estudo, definindo o que seja precedente judicial e jurisprudência, identificando as funções da jurisprudência e analisando a importância de uniformizá-la, para o fim de garantir maior isonomia e segurança jurídica aos jurisdicionados e de diminuir o tempo do litígio (CAPÍTULO 1). Em seguida, fazemos uma breve abordagem do assunto do ponto de vista histórico (CAPÍTULO 2) e sob a perspectiva da common law (CAPÍTULO 3). Passamos então para os dois capítulos centrais da tese. Analisamos o papel do precedente judicial no atual ordenamento, de acordo com a sua carga de eficácia, a saber, vinculante, quase vinculante e persuasiva (CAPÍTULO 4); e examinamos os demais meios de uniformização da jurisprudência, focando inclusive no problema dos Juizados Especiais Estaduais e Federais (CAPÍTULO 5). Finalmente, discorremos acerca de nossas conclusões, demonstrando que, apesar de o precedente judicial e a jurisprudência desempenharem papel relevante no nosso ordenamento (que configura um verdadeiro sistema misto, em que a lei reina, mas a jurisprudência governa), não há ainda premissas muito bem definidas, sendo necessárias alterações, de lege lata e de lege ferenda, para que seja conferido tratamento sistemático e harmônico ao assunto. / The present thesis analyzes the judicial precedent role within the Brazilian procedural system, in light of the recent reforms introduced in the legislation, either constitutional or infraconstitutional, with an aim at adding value to the precedent and standardizing jurisprudence, both of which make it evident that this is the moment for unbuilding of paradigms. After delimitating the matter and discussing its importance, we have outlined the assumptions which are essential for the study, defining what judicial precedent and jurisprudence are, identifying the functions of jurisprudence and analyzing the importance of standardizing it, so as to ensure greater isonomy and judicial assurance to those who are granted a jurisdiction and to reduce the litigation time (CHAPTER 1). Following, we have briefly approached the matter under a historical point of view (CHAPTER 2) and under the perspective of the common law (CHAPTER 3). And then we went to the two core chapters of the thesis. We have analyzed the role that the judicial precedent plays in the existing legal system, in accordance with its effectiveness, that is, binding, almost binding and persuasive (CHAPTER 4); and examined the other means for standardization of jurisprudence, with focus including on the issue of State and Federal Special Courts (CHAPTER 5). Finally, we have explained our conclusions, showing that, despite the judicial precedent and jurisprudence playing a relevant role in our legal system (which constitutes a real mixed system, where the law reigns, but the jurisprudence governs), there are no well-defined assumptions, yet, a few adjustments being necessary, lege lata and lege ferenda, so that a systematic and harmonic treatment can be given to the matter