This dissertation contains two separate essays on the implications of the complex financial reporting rules of stock option compensation outlined under ASC 718. The first essay examines the effect of the tax benefit from employees' exercise of stock options on the cash effective tax rate. While not explicitly stated, many tax avoidance studies implicitly want to investigate tax avoidance that is the result of firms' intentional choices. Although stock option exercise reduces firms' tax burden, the firm does not control the timing of option exercise and the accompanying tax benefit. When the realized tax benefit deviates from the firm's expected cost, stock option exercise results in unanticipated changes in the cash taxes paid. The cash effective tax rate (CASHETR), a common measure of tax avoidance, reflects both the anticipated and unanticipated cash tax savings from employees' exercise of stock options. CASHETR's inclusion of unanticipated cash tax savings mismeasures intentional tax avoidance. Using both parametric and non-parametric analysis I show that the unanticipated tax benefit from employees' stock option exercise can cause firms to be identified as more aggressive tax avoiders. I also show that, among other differences, firms with greater unanticipated tax benefits from employees' exercise of stock options are more profitable, are less levered, have more extensive R&D, and have larger market-to-book ratios. Because these firm characteristics are often used as controls in studies of tax avoidance, the relationship between them and CASHETR's mismeasurement of intentional tax avoidance creates an endogeneity problem for researchers and could lead to incorrect inferences. I use a research simulation to inform researchers of an implication of this endogeneity concern when CASHETR is used to measure firms' intentional tax avoidance. I construct a hypothetical firm characteristic that is correlated to varying degrees with stock growth. This hypothetical firm characteristic represents a number of firm operating characteristics that could be variables of interest in studies of tax avoidance. Using a common model of tax avoidance, I test the null hypothesis that this hypothetical firm characteristic is not a determinant of tax avoidance. I show CASHETR's inclusion of the unanticipated tax benefits from employees' exercise of stock options leads to inflated rejection rates of the null hypothesis and can change inferences about determinants of intentional tax avoidance. Tax avoidance researchers can avoid the problems caused by the unanticipated tax benefit from stock options in two ways. First, they can use the effective tax rate for financial reporting purposes (GAAPETR). Because the financial reporting rules prohibit firms from including the unanticipated tax benefit from stock options in the calculation of the firm's tax expense, the unanticipated tax benefit from stock options does not affect GAAPETR. Second, researchers can use the excess tax benefit from the exercise of stock options disclosed by firms to adjust CASHETR to remove these unanticipated cash tax savings (CASHETRWITHOUT). The second essay in this dissertation examines the difference between firms' recognized and realized costs from stock option compensation. Under ASC 718 a firm recognizes the estimated value of stock options at their grant date as an expense for financial reporting purposes. This estimate often differs from the realized cost of the stock options, which consists of the cash proceeds forgone because the stock is issued to an option holder at a below-market exercise price. When ASC 718 was implemented, critics contended that these reporting rules allowed firms to avoid recognizing the full amount of wealth transferred from shareholders to employees. Consistent with this concern, I find that the realized cost of stock options exceeds the recognized cost of options for the median firm in my sample by $0.99 million, or 1.46 percent of pretax book income, in each year of my sample period. This translates into a wealth transfer from shareholders to employees in each year of my sample period of three cents per share in excess of recognized costs for the median firm. I also find that the realized cost from stock option compensation exceeds the recognized cost by $7.8 million, or 4.96 percent of pretax book income, in each year of my sample period for twenty-five percent of firms. The shareholders of these firms are transferring to employees 11.58 cents per share in excess of the recognized cost of stock options in each year of the sample period. Overall, these results suggest that firms using stock option compensation generally avoid recognizing the full realized cost of stock options.

Le monde actuel, instable et incertain tant financièrement que juridiquement, créé un nouvel impératif, celui de la performance. Dans ce contexte, la performance juridique de l’entreprise désigne son aptitude à déployer des ressources juridiques et à les articuler avec d’autres ressources pour atteindre ses objectifs, notamment ses objectifs stratégiques. Par nos travaux, nous tentons d’étendre cette théorie aux individus et d’illustrer ses apports en l’appliquant aux mécanismes juridiques des stock-options et des actions gratuites. Partant du postulat que le droit constitue un instrument de la performance, nous voyons dans la performance juridique l’expression de l’aptitude des entreprises et des individus à sécuriser et optimiser leurs ressources, capacités et opportunités juridiques, afin de contribuer à réaliser leurs objectifs stratégiques. Nous exprimons ainsi l’idée d’une performance juridique à travers deux critères cumulatifs : la sécurisation et l’optimisation juridiques. / Today’s unstable and unpredictable world, from a financial and a legal point of view, creates a new requirement, the performance. In this context, the company’s legal performance refers to its ability of develop legal resources and to connect it to other resources to reach its goals, especially strategic aims. Through our work, we attempt to extend this theory to individuals and to illustrate its contributions through an application to the stock-options and the free share awards legal schemes. Based on the assumption that the Law constitutes a tool for performance, we see the legal performance as the expression of the companies and individuals’ ability to secure and optimize their legal resources, capabilities and opportunities, in order to satisfy their strategic goals. Then, we convey the idea of a legal performance throughout two cumulative criteria: the legal certainty and the legal optimization.

Accountants agree that nonqualified stock options are compensatory. However, only a limited amount of remuneration cost is recognized on the date that such options are granted; frequently, there is no recognition. Hence, the income numbers reported by grantor firms may be over-stated owing to such lack of recognition. In this regard, the objective of this study is to estimate the value of compensation implied in grants of stock options, and to present evidence pertaining to the materiality of the impact these estimates have on income from continuing operations of selected firms. The Black and Scholes option pricing model was selected to estimate the value of a stock option. This formula provides a probabilistic point estimate of the market value of a call option. A restrictive set of assumptions underlie the derivation of this formula, but empirical studies indicate that alterations of the model to accommodate violations of these assumptions fail to impart greater predictive ability. The standard Black and Scholes formula was used to estimate the compensation implied in grants of stock options during 1978 for a non-random sample of 171 firms. These estimates were adjusted for amounts related to such grants that had already been recorded. Since most firms granted options having exercise prices equal to the market prices of the optioned shares, such adjustments were infrequent. The resulting incremental compensation estimate was divided by income from continuing operations, giving an option compensation index for each enterprise in the sample. Assuming 10 percent, 5 percent, and 3 percent materiality thresholds, income from continuing operations is materially reduced for 16 percent, 31 percent, and 47 percent of the sampled firms, respectively. A statistical analysis suggests systematic association between the magnitude of the compensation index and the classification of the industry in which the enterprise operates. Other statistical tests indicate that estimates of compensation implied in grants of stock options are material for large firms in the manufacturing and retail sectors, and for small firms in the manufacturing, retail, and banking-finance sectors. These statistical results must be interpreted circumspectly owing to the non-random sample. Nevertheless, this evidence supports a re-examination of the accounting methods for stock options.

M.Comm. / In the case of share purchase schemes, the employer assists the employee to buy shares through a trust. If the interest on the loan is at a rate lower than the standard rate for tax purposes, the employee will be taxed on the difference between the standard and actual rate charged. An alternative for buying ordinary shares is to buy convertible preference shares in the Company. A scheme involving convertible debentures has the same basic principles as convertible preference shares, but the South African Revenue Services might use section 8A of the Act as it seems as if only a right to ordinary shares is offered to the employee. If the company does not have the means to administrate any of the schemes summarised above, they can make use of a phantom share scheme. With this scheme there is no actual buying or selling of shares, but "bonuses" are calculated with reference to the movement in the share price. These incentives are treated as normal bonuses for tax purposes in the hands of the employer and employee. To provide the employees with a tax effective scheme is just as important as providing a share incentive scheme. Companies, therefore, have to consider all the schemes available and the tax implications before implementing a share incentive scheme.

A outorga de opções de compra de ações ao administrador de uma companhia é tradicionalmente vista como uma prática de governança corporativa salutar, na medida em que contribui para a superação do conflito de agência existente entre executivos e acionistas. No entanto, esta dissertação de mestrado tem como objetivo oferecer uma visão alternativa ao tema. Pretende-se demonstrar que, caso este incentivo não seja estruturado e acompanhado corretamente, o seu uso pode levar à destruição de valor da companhia. Deste modo, exploram-se, nos dois capítulos iniciais, as bases jurídicas e econômicas da concessão de opções de compra de ações. No capítulo seguinte são abordados quatro aspectos fundamentais desta questão, os quais, surpreendentemente, são ignorados pela doutrina nacional. São eles: o custo das opções de compra de ações, as limitações dos seus benefícios, os seus principais problemas e as possíveis explicações para a realização de tais outorgas. No quarto capítulo, discutem-se as falhas das estratégias legais disponíveis para o controle das distorções surgidas no contexto da outorga de opções de compra de ações. Na parte final desta dissertação, são apresentadas as conclusões sobre o tema, propondo-se que o regulamento de listagem nos segmentos de práticas de governança corporativa da BM&FBOVESPA seja alterado para contemplar regras específicas quanto à outorga de opções de compra de ações. Adicionalmente, os anexos à dissertação resumem os principais resultados de uma extensa pesquisa a respeito das características da remuneração dos administradores e dos incentivos baseados em ações adotados pelas companhias abertas brasileiras. / Granting of stock options to a companys manager is generally seen as a positive corporate governance practice as it helps to overcome the agency problem between shareholders and executives. This thesis however aims to offer an alternative approach to this subject. Its purpose is to demonstrate that, to the extent that this incentive is not properly designed and monitored, it may lead to destruction of companys value. Therefore, the first two chapters explore the legal and economical foundations of the stock options grants. The next chapter discusses four fundamental aspects of this matter, which, surprisingly enough, are ignored by the Brazilian legal literature. They are the following: the cost of granting stock options, the shortcomings of its benefits, its main problems and the plausible explanations for such grants. The flaws of the legal strategies available to control the distortions caused by stock options are discussed in the fourth chapter. In the final part of the thesis, the conclusions of this study are presented and an amendment to the corporate governance listing rules of BM&FBOVESPA is suggested, in order to address specific rules regarding stock options grants. Additionally, the schedules to this thesis summarize the main findings of an extensive research on the characteristics of executive compensation and stock-based incentives adopted by Brazilian listed companies.

Os planos de stock options designam uma forma de remuneração flexível que oferta opções de compra de ações a trabalhadores. Essas opções caucionam o direito de escolher se se compra, ou não, um determinado bloco de ações da empregadora, ou de uma empresa do grupo econômico a que ela pertença, pelo preço que tais ações possuíam, quando o plano foi proposto, o qual, em regra, é consideravelmente inferior ao valor que o mercado atribui às mesmas ações, no momento do exercício da opção. Fruto do atual estágio de desenvolvimento econômico, os planos de stock options buscam alinhar interesses entre trabalhadores e acionistas, direcionando os esforços de ambas as partes, no sentido de valorizar a companhia e, em contrapartida, todos os atores envolvidos no sucesso empresarial compartilham os resultados desse empenho conjunto. Assim, os mencionados planos apresentam-se tanto como uma forma de remunerar, fidelizar e motivar trabalhadores; quanto como um mecanismo voltado a aumentar a produtividade da empresa e reduzir os custos da produção. Essa ambivalência é alcançada em razão de o ativo econômico dado ao trabalhador, como contraprestação pelo trabalho executado, ser lastreado por ações da companhia. A questão central desta dissertação é desvendar a natureza jurídica das opções de compra de ações a trabalhadores. Para tanto, analisam-se: (i) as opções de compra de ações existentes no mercado de capitais, diferenciando-as das ações que as lastreiam; (ii) a estrutura dos planos de stock options; e (iii) a compatibilidade entre as opções de compra de ações oriundas de planos de stock options e os caracteres essenciais a toda prestação salarial. Com esse subsídio, é possível demonstrar que os argumentos reiteradamente utilizados para fundamentar a exclusão da natureza salarial das opções remuneratórias decorrem da confusão que se faz entre os valores mobiliários opções de compra de ações e as ações subjacentes a essas opções. Por fim, pode-se concluir que a natureza jurídica das opções de compra de ações ofertadas a empregados é salarial, uma vez que elas são dadas gratuitamente pelo empregador, como uma retribuição pelo contrato de trabalho, sem vulnerar o salário do trabalhador a riscos distintos daqueles inerentes a toda remuneração flexível. / The stock options plans are a kind of flexible compensation that offers stock options to the employees. These options ensure the right of the employee to choose whether to buy or not buy a delimited block of shares issued by the company that he works for, or by another company that belongs to the same economic group of the employer company, at the price that such shares had when the plan was proposed to the employee, which price is, in general, considerably lower than the value that the stock market assigns to the same shares at the moment of the strike of the option by the employee. Result of the current stage of economic development, the stock options plans seek to equalize the interests between employees and shareholders, directing the efforts of both parties towards the valorization of the company and, in return, all actors involved in the success of the company share the results of this joint commitment. Thus, these plans emerge as a way to compensate, to ensure the loyalty and to motivate the employees and also as a mechanism to increase the company\'s productivity and to reduce production costs. This ambivalence is achieved due to fact that the economic asset given to the employee as compensation for the work performed is backed by the company\'s shares. The central question of this dissertation is to reveal the legal nature of the employees` stock options. For that purpose, this dissertation analyzes: (i) the stock options existing in the capital market, distinguishing them from the shares that underlie such options; (ii) the structure of the stock option plans; and (iii) the compatibility between stock options arising from stock option plans and the essential elements of any salary compensation. With this subsidy, it can be demonstrated that the arguments repeatedly used to justify that the stock options do not have the legal nature of salary originate from the confusion that is made between the securities stock options and the shares that underlie such options. Finally, it can be concluded that the stock options offered to employees have the legal nature of salary, once they are given for free by the employer, as a retribution for the employment contract, without exposing the employee\'s salary to risks distinct from those inherent to any flexible compensation.

The convex pay-off structure of executive stock options (ESO) incentivizes CEOs to increase their firm stock-return volatility, thereby increasing their wealth in option portfolio. In this paper, I address two research questions. I first test if this managerial incentive induces executives to take on more risky projects in R&D that increases stock- return volatility, hence, boosting their personal wealth. I derive vega to measure managerial incentive, and vega is a dollar change in ESO for a 0.01 change in stock- return volatility. I find that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between vega and R&D investment, which suggests that managers whose wealth is closely tied to stock options are more incentivized to invest in risky R&D projects to increase their wealth and stock-return volatility. This result is statistically significant and robust after adjusting for inflation and controlling for firm and industry-fixed effects. With this finding, I proceed to test if managerial risk-taking incentive for R&D investments translate to future earnings. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) establish that future earnings is a function of both tangible and intangible assets, and R&D increases with firm’s subsequent earnings. Since R&D spending changes with managerial incentive, I test if the interactive variable of vega and R&D has a positive effect on firm’s future earnings. I find that managerial incentive for undertaking R&D investments has a positive and statistically significant association with future earnings under industry-fixed effects specifications. When controlling for firm-fixed effects, the result yielded similar results to that of industry-fixed effects, but with less statistical significance. Lastly, for robustness check, I run the regression with a balanced panel data of tenured-CEOs, who stay with the firm for five years. I find that the result is positive and statistically significant for industry-fixed effects. However, for firm-fixed effects, I only find statistical significance at year t+k (k=3). This suggests that the realization of R&D investment to future earnings is not prevalent throughout all years when R&D decisions are made by incentivized, long-standing CEOs.

<p>Summary</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine what effect the IFRS 2 has on earnings, equity, financial strength and return on equity for listed Swedish companies with active stock option plans. The purpose is further to investigate the companies’ attitudes towards IFRS 2 and to find out if companies tend to deviate from stock option plans due to the changed accounting rules. We also want to examine the view of IFRS 2 from an auditor’s perspective.</p><p>We have used a deductive approach and a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods with a view to get a completely clear picture within the field of study. The questionnaire aims at measuring the same characteristics among the companies to find causal links, and the interviews are made to obtain a high internal validity so that connections between the body of regulations and the companies’ opinions and actions appear. The purpose of the theory chapter is to give the reader an understanding of what stock option plans are and why they are frequently used within companies. The IFRS 2 constitutes the base of the theory chapter. The international debate gives the reader a feeling for how common stock option plans are in the United States and what arguments there are for and against the expensing of stock options, which will be introduced in the United States in 2006. In our empirical chapter, we present the information collected from fifty-six companies by a questionnaire, followed by the interviews from the two companies that we have been in deeper contact with. We also present the opinions by the representatives from the two audit firms. The empirical chapter finishes with a calculation of the two interviewed companies changes in return on equity.</p><p>The conclusion of this thesis is that the IFRS 2 is considered complicated by many companies. There is a lack of knowledge about the new standard among the companies and, for that reason; they are forced to seek help by audit firms, which result in large administrative costs, especially for smaller companies. We have observed that the attitude towards the IFRS 2 therefore differs depending on the company’s size. The IFRS 2 has a negative effect on net income for most of the companies with the exception of those who offer their employees stock options at market value, or have valued their stock option plans according to the “intrinsic method”. The change in return on equity has only a marginal effect for most companies. Further conclusions are that companies will not deviate from stock option programs as long as they are well-working incentives, but they may look them over more carefully and compare them to other alternatives. The audit firms are positive to the IFRS 2 and think that expensing stock options will lead to better comparability.</p><p>Keywords: IFRS 2, Financial Strength, profitability, Stock options</p> / <p>Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka vilka effekter införandet av IFRS 2 har på resultat, eget kapital, soliditet och räntabilitet för svenska börsnoterade bolag som har aktiva optionsprogram. Syftet är vidare att undersöka börsnoterade bolags attityd till IFRS 2, samt om det finns tendenser att frångå optionsprogram som ersättningsform p.g.a. de ändrade redovisningsreglerna. Vi vill även ta reda på hur revisorer ser på IFRS 2.</p><p>Vi har använt oss av den deduktiva strategin och en blandning av en kvantitativ och en kvalitativ undersökningsmetod, i syfte att få en så fullständig klarhet som möjligt inom ämnesområdet. Enkätundersökningen strävar efter att mäta samma egenskaper hos undersökningsobjekten för att finna orsak-samband, medan intervjuerna syftar till att ge en hög intern giltighet så att samband mellan regelverk, åsikter och agerande framträder. Vi vill, genom informationen i teorikapitlet, att läsaren ska få en förståelse för vad optionsprogram är och varför det används inom företag. IFRS 2 och dess omfattning utgör grunden i teorikapitlet och syftar till att redogöra för vilken redovisningsteori som tillämpas i och med IFRS 2. Genom den internationella debatten vill vi att läsaren ska få en känsla för hur vanligt optionsprogram är i USA och vilka argument det finns för och mot införandet av kostnadsföring av optionsprogram, som sker i USA innan 2006 års utgång. I vårt empirikapitel presenterar vi enkätundersökningen där femtiosex svenska börsnoterade företag har medverkat. Därefter introduceras intervjuerna från de båda företagen vi varit i kontakt med, för att sedan följas åt av reflektioner från revisionsbyråernas två representanter. Empirin avslutas med en beräkning av de två intervjuade företagens räntabilitetsförändring.</p><p>Vi har kommit fram till att IFRS 2 anses vara komplicerad av många företag och har framförallt för små företag medfört stora administrativa kostnader då många blir tvungna att söka hjälp hos revisionsbyråer. Attityden gentemot IFRS 2 verkar därför skifta beroende på företagens storlek. Resultatet har påverkats negativt för de flesta företag med undantag för dem som erbjuder sina anställda optioner till marknadsvärde eller tidigare har värderat optionerna enligt ”intrinsic-metoden”. Räntabilitetsförändringen har endast en marginell påverkan för de flesta företag. Så länge optionsprogrammen är väl fungerande incitament så har vi inte sett några tendenser till att företagen verkar frångå sina optionsprogram. Vi tror däremot att företagen hädanefter kommer se över sina optionsprogram noggrannare så att inte kostnaderna blir för stora. Det är möjligt att andra typer av incitament kommer bli vanligare t.ex. aktieköpsplaner. Revisionsbyråerna är mycket positiva till IFRS 2 och anser att jämförbarheten företag emellan har ökat sedan dess införande.</p><p>Nyckelord: IFRS 2, Soliditet, Räntabilitet, egetkapitalreglerade - kontantreglerade ersättningar</p>

Recent corporate scandals and subsequent regulatory actions have heightened both the academic communities and the public's interest in corporate governance issues. Academics have long argued that voting rights constitute a critical component of a system of corporate governance. We provide evidence on the importance of one aspect of the firm's corporate governance system, namely shareholders' voting rights, by examining the determinants of the decision to grant equity-based compensation to the employees of the firm with or without shareholder approval. We find that poorly-performing firms and poorly-governed firms are more likely to adopt equity-based compensation plans without shareholder approval. Furthermore, when we examine financial performance subsequent to adoption of equity-based compensation plans, we find that poorly-governed firms that adopt equity-based compensation plans without consulting shareholder do not appear to gain any significant benefits associated with the incentives the plans are supposed to provide. In fact, in the year after an equity-based compensation plan is adopted, these firms perform worse than firms that have good systems of corporate governance or firms that place equity-based compensation plans to a shareholder vote. Overall, our results suggest that shareholder voting rights are an important tool of corporate governa

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