中國在世界貿易舞台上所扮演的角色日益重要，人民幣的均衡水準成為十分熱門的議題。本文為貿易財與非貿易財部門的相對生產力找尋新的代理變數來檢視Balassa-Samuelson效果，以解決中國物價指數因受政府控制而難以反映實際生產力的問題。此外，亦將對人民幣匯率的預期引進實證模型中，以量化分析來探討人民幣是否具有自我實現的行為。本文實證結果顯示人民幣均衡匯率與相對生產力、貿易開放程度、熱錢數目間有長期關係。貿易財與非貿易財相對生產力與熱錢數目的上升可能帶動人民幣升值；貿易開放程度則與均衡匯率呈反向關係。 / As China plays an important role in the world economy, the research on the real exchange rate in China has received a lot of attention. This study chiefly contributes to adopt a more reliable proxy different from previous studies to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect; in addition, we formerly introduce the expectation of Renminbi into the empirical model. This paper empirically investigates the behavior of the real exchange rate in China during the period from 1980 to 2005. Particularly, we provide a single-equation in an empirical framework which takes the specific features and characteristics in China economy into account. The empirical evidence shows that the degree of openness, the volume of hot money, and the relative productivity of traded to nontraded sectors are key factors to the determination of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate in China. Both the increases in the relative productivity and an anticipated appreciation in the real exchange rate eventually may lead to a real appreciation in the currency. In contrast, the influence for opening up to the world economy is that the real exchange rate may depreciate.

China has been in a state that the currency appreciation is needed to restore the external balance. However, it appears that Chinese government worries about that the Renminbi appreciation may decrease the output. This purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate whether the contractionary hypothesis prevailing in developing countries holds for China with quarterly data over the period from 1995Q1 to 2006Q2. We apply VAR models by means of impulse response functions and variance decompositions. The empirical evidences indicate that even taking the spurious correlation into account, the real appreciation of Renminbi leads to a fall in China’s output. Thus, our findings do not support the contractionary devaluation hypothesis. Moreover, the impact of the exchange rate on output is not through the inflation rate. In the short run, real exchange rate shocks have much power in explaining the output’s variation while the U.S interest rate and government spending shocks are determinants to the variation in output in the long run. Particularly, the monetary policy has relatively weak effect on the output and the real exchange rate.

本論文討論的問題是，國際政治因素對於匯率體制與政策有沒有影響？如果有影響，則國際政治因素如何影響匯率體制與匯率政策變化？國際政治因素影響匯率體制與匯率政策變化的程度有多大？我們希望透過以上問題的探討確認國際政治因素與匯率體制和匯率變化有無關係，然後分析國際政治因素透過怎樣的方式與機制來影響匯率體制與匯率政策，進而瞭解匯率變動與國際政治因素之間的因果關係為何？ 在上述問題下，我們有以下的研究假說： （一）匯率體制與名目匯率的變動除了受國內政治因素與經濟因素的影響外，國際政治因素對於匯率的變動亦是有影響。 （二）政府對於匯率政策的思考除了考量國內政治與經濟因素外，也考慮國際政治壓力因素。 （三）市場交易者對於匯率的預期與作為，除了受到總體經濟指標與國內政治局勢發展的影響外，也受到國際政治情勢變化的影響。 （四）國際貿易失衡下，貿易順差國對貿易逆差國依賴度上升，假如貿易逆差國為一強權國家，則強權國家會對貿易順差國有影響力。例如，兩國（A與B兩國）貿易失衡，A國在貿易順差累積大量外匯存底情況下，勢必會使得該國對於B國貿易依賴程度加深。在貿易失衡情況下，如果B國為強權國家，龐大貿易逆差的B國對於A國將會產生影響力。 在這些研究問題與假說下，本文將以人民幣匯率作為研究個案，藉由個案探討去回答上述問題。所以，我們探討人民幣匯率與匯率體制是否受到國際政治壓力？其次是國際社會如何對人民幣施壓？第三是中國政府與決策者如何反應？第四是市場如何反應與考量國際壓力對匯率的影響？最後是提出初步研究結果與結論。 根據本文研究，針對本文研究問題，我們認為： 首先，國際政治因素對匯率體制與名目匯率有沒有影響？而根據研究結果，我們的答案是肯定的。不過這個肯定的答案必須建構在下面的假設上，第一是兩國必須處於貿易失衡的關係，同時貿易逆差國為一強權國家。其次是在假設一之下，政府對匯率政策的思維不只是考量國內經濟與國內政治，也考量國際政治壓力。 其次第二個問題是國際政治因素如何影響匯率體制與匯率水平的變化。根據研究顯示，國際政治影響匯率體制與匯率水平的方式包括：公開施壓、雙邊高層官員會談、國際會議聯合施壓、甚至貿易制裁手段。通常首先透過公開發言的方式對貿易順差國施壓，要求貿易順差國對於經貿失衡現象做出相應措施，其中以調整匯率為主要要求，其次進一步透過雙邊高層官員直接面對面討論相關議題，藉由談判過程直接施加壓力，第三，則是在國際會議場合中和其他國家聯手施壓，對於匯率議題表達一致的立場形成聯合壓力，去迫使貿易順差國調整匯率制度與水平。第四則是威脅貿易制裁，透過提案以及口頭威脅貿易制裁方式，加重施壓的力道，對貿易順差國進一步施壓，最後則是實施貿易制裁。 第三個研究問題是國際政治因素影響匯率體制與名目匯率變化的程度有多大？從中國人民幣的案例中，我們可以發現，中國一開始面對來自國際壓力時就強硬表示不會改變現行匯率體制與水平。其強調由於中國本身經濟發展狀況與國內金融體制不健全，在加上美國貿易赤字並非完全中國所造成的，所以目前並沒有改變的需要。 但隨著不斷增加的雙邊貿易逆差與國際壓力，中國雖然仍沒有改變中國匯率體制與水平，但也開始改變表示願意思考人民幣改革的可能性並將人民幣完全自由浮動，完全由市場供需來決定作為最後終極目標。甚至到最後出其不意的改變人民幣匯率體制並升值2.1％。這顯示在中國改革人民幣過程中，國際政治因素扮演重要的角色，發揮重要影響力。因為在堅持不變的理由中，中國始終以國內經濟因素與中國內部穩定的政治性理由來拒絕國際社會的要求，但在最後改革的說帖中，中國也承認國際壓力是其推動匯率改革的重要因素，可見除了國內經濟與政治面向的考量外，國際政治因素也是具有重大影響力。 / This paper discusses whether exchange rate regimes and exchange rate policies are affected by international politics, as well as how international politics affect exchange rate regimes and exchange rates. By examining these questions, I would like to analyze the mechanism by which international politics affect exchange rates and figure out the relationship among exchange rate regime, policies and international politics. This paper puts forth four hypotheses. First of all, exchange rate regimes and exchange rates are not only affected by domestic politics and economic factors, but they are also affected by international politics. Second, decisions regarding exchange rate policies made by governments are based on international politics, domestic politics and economic factors. Third, the behavior and expectations of market traders are also affected by macro economic index, domestic political situation and international political situation. Forth, under bilateral trade imbalance, state B which is a great power and has large trade deficit with state A has influence on state A. State A and State B have an imbalance trade relationship. State A which has a large trade surplus will increase dependence on state B. Under these hypotheses, the author would like to answer the above questions by discussing the case of the Chinese currency, the Renminbi (RMB). Hence, the case study will ask the following questions. First of all, was the Chinese currency reform made on July 21, 2005 by the Chinese government affected by international politics? Second, how did the international community press the Chinese government to reform exchange rate regime? Third, how did the Chinese government respond to pressures from the international community and market? Fourth, how did market traders respond to and interpret interactions between the Chinese government and the international community. The research achieved the following results. First of all, under hypotheses two and four, exchange rate regimes and policies are affected by international politics. Second, ways which international politics affect exchange rates and regimes are through public pressure, bilateral official talks, trade sanctions, and oral threats. Public pressure is when a state with trade deficit asks a state which has trade surplus to adjust the exchange rate to reduce trade surplus. Bilateral official talks are when decision makers on both sides negotiate with each other for imbalance trade relationship. Exchange rate is an important dimension to negotiation. Trade sanctions are the last step to make the state which has trade surplus adjust exchange rate. Oral threats can be uses with the above mentioned measures. Third, in the case of RMB, the Chinese government rejected the international community’s request to adjust exchange and regime. Because of the weakness of China’s economic development and its unhealthy financial systems, the Chinese government rejected adjustments of exchange rate and regime under pressure from international communities. The Chinese government does not think that the undervalue of Chinese currency is the main reason of U.S. trade deficit and emphasized that there is no need to change RMB exchange rate and regime. With increasing trade surplus and pressure from international community, the Chinese government started to change its attitude towards the issue of RMB exchange rate. The Chinese government expressed that it was willing to consider the possibility of exchange rate reform, and movement of RMB exchange rate was fully determined by market forces. On July 21, 2005, the Chinese government adjusted regime and level of Chinese currency unexpectedly. The reform on July 21, 2005 implied that international politics played an important role in the exchange rate reform. Although the Chinese government denied that exchange rate reform was made under international pressure, international pressure is one of the main reasons behind the Chinese government changing the exchange rate policy according to the U.S. official’s testimony before the committee of Congress. The Chinese government reiterated that reform on July 21, 2005 was carried out according to the development of domestic economic development. But because of that, U.S. officials expressed that Chinese officials made a commitment of reform to them in bilateral talks, so we can understand that the international community has influence on the policy of exchange rate reform in addition to factors of domestic economy and politics.

本文主要從國際貿易、資本流動與貨幣政策三個因素，分析中國貨幣當局對人民幣匯率政策的選擇行為。在國際貿易因素方面，人民幣匯率政策的選擇受到出口競爭力、產業結構調整與貿易夥伴壓力的影響；在資本流動因素方面，人民幣匯率政策的選擇受到資本開放程度的影響，而資本開放程度又與金融體制的市場化程度有關；在貨幣政策因素方面，人民幣匯率政策的選擇受到貨幣政策自主性，以及宏觀調控有效性的影響。 本文研究發現，中國貨幣當局對人民幣匯率政策的選擇，是在制度轉型與結構調整的限制條件下，與出口貿易競爭力、資本自由流動和貨幣政策自主性三者之間相對重要性的權衡結果。在1994年至1997年期間，人民幣匯率政策選擇實質目標法，意即匯率政策服從於貿易政策，目的在增加出口競爭力與創造外匯收入。1997年至2005年前間，人民幣匯率政策選擇名目錨方法，意即匯率政策服從於穩定政策，目的在防範金融危機與總體經濟失衡，人民幣緊釘美元出現了「超穩定現象」。2005年以來，由於釘住美元的弊端與成本日益上升，包括人民幣低估造成出口高速成長所帶來的貿易夥伴促升壓力，資本管制效力下降造成熱錢流入所帶來的升值壓力，以及貨幣政策自主性下降造成宏觀調控效果不佳所帶來的升值壓力，中國貨幣當局調整了釘住美元的匯率政策，選擇了較具彈性的參考通貨籃的管理浮動匯率政策。不過，由於調整幅度不大，人民幣匯率的升值幅度在匯改初期相當有限，但從2006年5月以來升值幅度有稍微擴大的趨勢。展望未來，中國貨幣當局對於人民幣匯率將採取「緩中趨升」的政策，在此過程中，國際貿易、資本流動與貨幣政策三個因素仍將深深地影響人民幣匯率政策的選擇。

貨幣政策的調整向來摻雜很多國際與國內經濟、政治因素的考量，尤其隨者中國不斷增加的貿易順差與外匯儲備的大量積累，使得美國國內要求縮小中美貿易逆差的聲浪愈來愈大，而人民幣匯率問題又在此一不平衡貿易結構中佔有重要的地位。 美國本土製造業是要求人民幣大幅度升值的主要政治力量，它們遊說美國國會和行政部門，企圖迫使美國政府向中國施壓，特別是在每兩年一次的選舉壓力下，美國政府將傾向於發動對外國貿易夥伴的攻擊，藉以轉移自己受到的政治壓力。對中國而言，人民幣匯率的變動則主要是中國政府考慮政治與經濟穩定後的產物。面對來自美國方面要求人民幣升值的壓力，中國政府的可能選擇是，逐步改變匯率水準和形成機制，並創造一系列制度條件，使之與經濟成長方式以及對應的社會目標相一致。和美國相比，政治因素在中國匯率政策中的作用可能更強，因為除了經濟後果外，匯率政策的調整還意味著社會問題與政權穩定的政治考量。在人民幣匯率問題這一場利益博弈中，表面上代表國家利益的政府政策，實際上卻是中美兩國內部強勢壓力集團之利益與政策制定者之利益的融合。 美國是利益團體政治最為發達的國家。美國三權分立的基本權力架構與競爭性的選舉制度，乃是利益集團政治欣欣向榮的泉源。因此，美國的任何一項公共政策都是在不同利益團體的激烈競爭下，在利益團體與立法機關、行政部門間艱難的討價還價基礎上達成的。而中國政府則因享有較大的政治和經濟自主權，政府在匯率問題的態度更能決定政策的走向與選擇。基於中美兩國在匯率議題上的觀點與立場迥異，彼此之間的衝突與博奕過程也就難以避免了。

2008年發生全球金融危機，造成各國經濟大幅衰退。中國大陸於2009年開始積極推動人民幣國際化，希望降低對外貿易與跨境資本流動對美元的依賴程度。中國大陸雖有龐大的境外人民幣資金池，但由於欠缺人民幣回流管道，因而人民幣資金至今仍無法雙向流動。因此，中國大陸於2014年11月17日推動滬港通試點，建立滬港股票交易互聯互通機制，試行中國大陸金融帳開放成效，以作為日後擴大試點開放政策的參考。 本研究結果發現，經由滬港通試點試辦，改革中國大陸資本市場，可避免對中國大陸金融市場造成重大影響，實現人民幣跨境計價及結算功能，並建構良好的人民幣回流機制。 / The world economy declines substantially, influenced by the global financial crisis in 2008. In order to reduce the dependence of cross-border fund flows and foreign trades on the US dollar, the mainland China reinforces its efforts in promoting the Renminbi (RMB) internationalization in 2009. But, due to the capital control, the free fund flows of the RMB are not feasible even if there is a massive RMB pool worldwide. In order for the liberalization of financial account, the mainland China built Shanghai - Hong Kong Stock Connect on November 17, 2014, as a reference of further expansion of the offshore use of the RMB in the future. This study shows that, reforms on China’s domestic capital market are crucial to avoid the significant impact of Shanghai - Hong Kong Stock Connect, as the openness of capital account, on the domestic financial markets. The financial reforms can also improve the cross-border settlement functions of the RMB to increase RMB denomination in trades, and reinforce the freer flows of the RMB.

本文觀察到於越戰結束後，東亞呈現一個沒有霸權的狀態，然而，近來中國經濟的成長，使得人民幣國際化可能成為一項在東亞新出現的國際公共財。因此，筆者欲透過檢視東亞體系的現況與人民幣的國際化，嘗試對傳統霸權穩定理論中，對於霸權與公共財出現關係之部分進行修正，並重新檢視霸權的存在與一項新國際公共財提供之間的關聯性。 本文檢視東亞體系自戰後以來的演變與現況，並分別探討東亞體系中的三大行為者－中、美、日於體系中的角色轉變與其對於東亞體系的認知，最終本文提出「隱性霸權」的概念來為東亞體系下一註腳。 提出「隱性霸權」之概念後，本文進一步檢視人民幣國際化迄今為止的政策與現況，並透過8項貨幣國際化指標來評估人民幣目前的國際化程度。本文發現，人民幣目前的國際化程度比起世界其他主要貨幣，國際化程度仍相對較低，然而，本文認為由於中國本身的特殊條件，人民幣的國際化不是能或不能的問題，而只是何時的問題。因此，人民幣成為東亞體系中的國際公共財指日可待。 綜合上述討論，本文提出對於傳統霸權穩定理論的修正，指出於東亞體系中人民幣的國際化，讓傳統霸權穩定理論中，需要在體系內有一超強存在，國際公共財才得以出線的論述有修正之必要，此外，雖體系中有霸權存在將使公共財出現的可能性大幅上升，然而並不代表沒有霸權存在，公共財便不會出現。

The impact of own-country and cross-border events on asset markets is an important subject. We examine the co-movement of conditional volatilities in Korean won, Chinese yuan and Taiwanese dollar NDF markets. Using a multivariate GARCH model, we test whether the announcement of Chinese yuan’s appreciation on 21st July, 2005 affects the co-movements of Asian NDF rates. Our findings show Japanese yen spot rate has influences on three Asian NDF markets. Furthermore the most liquid Korean NDF rate also affects Chinese yuan and Taiwanese NDF markets. Our results are consistent with the findings that Asian NDF markets also show strong co-movements, especially after the announcement date of Chinese yuan’s appreciation on 21st July, 2005.

自1994年以來，人民幣對美元匯率始終維持在8.28：1美元。近年來，在中國對經常帳外匯收入之法定結匯要求下，其強勁出口貿易迫使中國不斷提高貨幣供給，收購出口廠商源源不斷之美元結匯需求，以維持固定匯率，進而造成人民幣匯率被低估及累積驚人外匯存底之結果。 惟此一運作方式引來美國產業團體及國會議員高分貝抗議，主張人民幣固定且低估匯率，提高中國產品之出口競爭力，使中國出口商享有不公平之貿易競爭優勢，損害美國製造業及勞工之權益，符合WTO所禁止之禁止性補貼規範，並違反IMF避免操控匯率之義務，故促美國貿易代表署調查並向WTO提出控訴。惟美國產業團體及國會議員之訴求已遭美國貿易代表署拒絕。 本文先以美國產業團體之訴求為出發點，並以WTO及IMF兩大組織之合作關係連貫後續討論：人民幣固定且低估匯率之措施是否符合WTO禁止性補貼之規範？是否違反IMF避免操控匯率之義務？前者以補貼三項要件「財務補助」、「受有利益」及「特定性」加以檢驗，後者則以「操控匯率」之定義及目前學者、IMF及美國財政部之判斷定之。最後做出構成禁止性補貼之可能性高、操控匯率之義務違反可能性高兩個結論。 中國已明確表示其匯率改革有其自訂時間表，需與國內金融改革、相關配套措施之建立及經濟發展情況相配合，不會受制於外國壓力而逕予改革。為解決此一問題，本文再就美國單邊貿易報復措施法案、中美雙邊財政外交及各種多邊場域協商等方式中，提出較適解決此貿易爭端之建議。 / Since 1994, China has fixed the exchange rate of yuan around 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar. China requires its citizens and firms to exchange their dollars for yuan, so the strong exports and trade surplus enforce the Chinese government to add money supply to acquire the increasing dollars. As a result, China can peg and undervalue the exchange rate of yuan to dollar and accumulate astonishing foreign reserves. This situation arise the objection of American manufacturing alliance and Congressmen. They assert the pegged and undervalued yuan increase the competitiveness of China’s products, allow the China’s export companies to have unfair trade advantages, damage the benefits of American manufactures and workers. Besides, this regime constitutes the prohibited subsidy of WTO and violates the IMF obligation of avoidance of currency manipulation. They urged the USTR to investigate and launch a dispute settlement in WTO but had been refused. This article starts from the appeal of American alliance and use the cooperation between WTO and IMF to link the following discussion: is the regime of fixed and undervalued yuan consistent with the prohibited subsidy regulations in WTO and is the regime against the IMF obligation of avoidance of currency manipulation? The former one is examined by three elements: ‘‘financial contribution’’. ‘‘benefits’’ and ‘‘specific’’ while the latter one is tested by the definition of currency manipulation and the exchange rate reports of IMF and U.S. Treasury. The answers are positive both. China has asserted that she has her own time table and will not surrender to the pressure of foreign countries. This article then tries to use unilateral trade retaliatory measures, bilateral financial diplomacy and other multilateral consultations to find the proper resolutions.

在中國經濟居世界要角，人民幣國際化受重視，以及目前研究人民幣國際化政策文獻稀少下，本文希冀以中國政府立場，研究其對人民幣國際化的評估，瞭解中國政府對於人民幣國際化實行的思維，並整理研究推行人民幣國際化的相關具體政策及人民幣國際化的近期成效。根據研究結果，人民幣國際化的產生來自於江澤民所提出的「走出去」戰略思維。人民幣國際化政策包括經常項目可兌換、資本項目可兌換以及離岸金融市場的建立；1996年12月1日中國簽署國際貨幣基金組織第八條款，實現經常項目可兌換，所實行的政策包括匯率併軌及管理浮動匯率制度、銀行結售匯制度、取消指令性購匯、取消經常性用匯限制、建立銀行間外匯市場等；2000年後，中國政府積極推進資本項目可兌換，目前已對資本市場證劵、信貸操作及直接投資部分放寬；至於離岸金融市場在香港已有良好發展。而人民幣國際化成效部分，無論是在經常項目、資本項目、香港離岸金融市場、跨境貿易人民幣結算及貨幣互換協議等皆有顯著進展。