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中共對台「和平統一」之研究蔡廷俊, Cai, Ting-Zun Unknown Date (has links)
第一章泛談﹁統一戰線﹂,含﹁統戰﹂淵源、界定、功能;
第二章敘述中共對我復興基地台灣進行﹁統戰﹂策略之演變,內含﹁武裝解於台灣﹂
、﹁和平解放台灣﹂、﹁保釣﹂﹁認同﹂﹁回歸﹂﹁統一﹂等階段;
第三章講述中共當前對台進行﹁和平統一﹂之策略,分析了策略之形成與演變,以及
提示了對台之﹁統戰﹂機構;
第四章詳舉﹁和平統一﹂之內涵,逐一舉述中共主動要求、泡製﹁三通﹂﹁四流﹂﹁
六不﹂之鮮知事例;同時,剖析了中共高度謀略地製造﹁統一﹂輿論:歪曲﹁鄉土文
學﹂、宣傳﹁蔣勻田事件﹂、宣揚﹁陳婉真事件﹂、贊美﹁高雄事件﹂、渲染﹁黃植
誠事件﹂、大提﹁馬璧事件﹂等等﹁拉﹂、﹁打﹂謀略工作;
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兩岸軍事互信機制之研究 / A Study of Military Confidence Building Measures between the Cross-Strait Relationship袁光華 Unknown Date (has links)
一、冷戰時期的兩岸關係發展,受到美國圍堵政策的戰略利益與美中交往下經濟考量的影響,不同時期的兩岸互動關係相當程度反映出當時國際和區域環境的變化。冷戰之後,亞太區域環境,尤其是亞太安全環境出現結構性的變化,就是美國在亞太區域的單極主導地位。
二、1987年11月2日,政府正式宣布,基於傳統倫理及人道立場的考量,允許臺灣民眾赴中國大陸探親,為兩岸互動關係開創一個新的里程碑。但兩岸長期封閉隔閡的大閘,卻隨著探親政策的開放,兩岸之間的交流便起了急遽的變化,使得兩岸關係不再限於單獨探親旅遊,而衍生至經貿、體育、法律、政治等等各層面的互動。
三、自中國大陸建政至今,其「統一臺灣」的最終目標,則未曾變更或終止,其中歷經「武力解決」、「和平統一」及「一國兩制」的時期,現今雖海峽兩岸關係重新定位與改善後,中國大陸仍然堅持不承諾放棄使用武力。尤以1996年的飛彈危機更使得兩岸的敵意加深,為結束兩岸敵對狀態憑添更多的波折。兩岸無法結束敵對狀態,則兩岸根本無法論及建立軍事互信機制。
四、政府當前對「兩岸建立軍事互信機制」的立場,皆表示時機尚未成熟,但無論從國際環境的趨勢、中國歷史的經驗,與臺灣未來的發展來看,兩岸走向統一的路雖不可期,談判協商曠日費時,在建構和平的過程中,軍事互信機制的建立將是兩岸遲早必須面對的課題。
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兩岸和平協議可行性之研究 / Peace Agreement Feasible Study Of Taiwan and Mainland何維國 Unknown Date (has links)
兩岸在10餘年前就曾倡議簽訂和平協議,當時中共的態度強硬,強調台灣是中國的一部分,1995年並宣稱兩岸可在「一個中國原則」下,正式就結束敵對狀態協商、達成協議。然而李登輝總統先是以兩岸可舉行預備性磋商為回應,最後卻推出「兩國論」,終結了兩岸最初的和平協議倡議。
民進黨接續執政後,陳水扁推動台灣公投制憲,中共則祭出反分裂國家法,兩岸對抗更加激烈。然而近10餘年來兩岸的情勢與發展卻有了不同對比,中國大陸迅速崛起,台灣則因政治內耗、封閉鎖國而導致綜合實力下降。而這也迫使馬英九在2008年的總統大選中,將兩岸簽訂和平協議作為政見。也因為其獲得高票當選,就職演說中乃進一步宣布:未來將與大陸就台灣國際空間與兩岸和平協議進行協商。
由於簽訂和平協議對兩岸關係未來的開展具有重大影響,因此本文乃就兩岸和平協議的概念、性質,以及影響的環境因素、主客觀立場、戰略態度、學者的提議、化解方式、兩岸的努力等做一分析探討,以評估兩岸在時空背景改變之下,能否有所妥協、達成或接受何種性質的和平協議。
關鍵詞:和平協議、和平發展、和平統一、一個中國、結束敵對狀態 / Taiwan and Mainland had proposed to sign a peace agreement over 10 years ago. At that time, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held a tough attitude, stressing that Taiwan is a part of China. In 1995, the Mainland declared both sides could negotiate for reaching a peace agreement on officially ending the state of hostility under the “one China principle”. The then-president Lee Teng-hui firstly made such a response that both sides could launch preparatory negotiations, but finally rolled out the “two states theory”, which ended up both sides’initial proposal for a peace agreement.
After the Democratic Progressive Party successively held power, Chen Shui-bian pushed for Taiwan referendum to draw up a constitution, and immediately the CPC proclaimed the Anti-Secession Law, which brought both sides into more intense confrontation. However, in recent 10 years, the situation and development across Taiwan Strait have appeared different changes: the Chinese Mainland is rising rapidly, while Taiwan’s comprehensive strength is on the decline due to internal political friction and closed-door policy. This thus forced Ma Ying-jeou to take the signing for a peace agreement across Taiwan Strait as his political view during the 2008 presidential election. After elected as president by a majority of votes, president Ma, in his inaugural speech, further announced: Taiwan would launch negotiations with the Mainland on the issues of Taiwan’s international space and both sides’peace agreement.
As the signing of peace agreement will cause significant impact on the future development of cross-strait relationship, this paper conducts analyses on the peace agreement’s concept and nature, as well as the influencing environmental factors, subjective and objective stances, strategic attitudes, scholars’ proposals, methods to resolve conflicts and both sides’efforts, in order to evaluate what kind of peace agreenent can be compromised, reached or accepted by both sides under the background of changed times.
Keywords: peace agreement, peaceful development, peaceful reunification, one China, ending up hostility state
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