影響企業決策的因素隨著時代變遷轉趨複雜，技術演進、財務管理、人力資源，甚至於終端產品發展趨勢牽動整個企業決策方向。同業間的競爭以資訊透明層度影響彼此決策。賽局理論（Game Theory）探討的就是聰明又自私的人如何在策略性佈局中採取行動及與對手互動。如果財務管理是考量企業自身的條件與價值，賽局理論則是加入外部因素包括產業與自身互動關係討論決策模式。本研究以DRAM（Dynamic Random Access Memory 動態隨機存取記憶體）產業為例，每一世代的支本支出皆以百億計，快速推進的製程技術造成產量大增，影響價格崩跌令廠商大幅虧損。本文以賽局理論為基礎討論最適資本結構下的生產規模。藉由廠商選擇有利於企業的發展策略進而控制資本支出，讓企業維持生產規模最適狀態進而達成價格維持的目的。 本研究以賽局理論為主軸討論產業內業者競合關係，應用納許均衡討論企業有利決策形成過程，就過去五年內DRAM價格崩跌與產能擴增的速度來印證囚犯的困境，從經濟學的寡佔市場理論來討論DRAM產業內的定價關係，運用A. Cournot古諾雙占模型推廣為基礎來討論產能分配均衡。財務管理中最適資本結構下股價最高，以當時的資本負債比為參考，如果以資本額為股東權益來計算在資產＝負債＋業主權益的恆等式下求出該企業應該有的資產、負債規模。在該目標下進行資本結構與負債管理，達成企業最適產能規模。

博奕理論(Game Theory) 由經濟學研究方法所導出: 公設人是理性的, 并以數學演繹 邏輯推演, 而建構出來的決策模型。由於邏輯系統嚴密, 同時大量采用數學語言, 降 低文字語意的模棱, 而使得政治學之研究更有朝向真正科學地步之新契機。無奈的, 這種新發展的政治模型, 在國外雖已進行三十餘年, 國內則尚在起步。本文企圖較有 系統地全面引介這種理論模型, 以便替國內博奕論研究催生。 本文內容偏次, 除了第一章敘述博奕理論之基本知識如理性公設、效用理論及博奕結 構, 第六章對博奕論之優缺及適用性做一總評外, 中間四章完全以討論各種決策法為 主。第二章探討均衡的策略選擇, 包括兩人博奕的單純及混合策略解求法; 第三章穩 定的可能策略組, 則以求解核心(Core)及穩定組(Stable Set)為主; 第四章聯盟間的 合縱連橫, 剖析數量原則(Size Principle)、議價組合(Bargaining Set)及競價解(C ompetitive Solution); 第五章公平的價值分配, 則就談判合解的得失值分配以及各 聯盟實力指標的權力指數進行探討。 在案例研究方面, 本文共列舉五個, 包括民國七十八年天安門學生運動之均衡解、臺 北市空氣污染的囚犯困境分析、民國七十六年民進黨黨主席之爭的核心解及權力指數 分析、西德政黨間的合縱連橫分析以及民國七十九年中正堂學生運動合作解分析。

為瞭解兒童在認知發展行為的表現，本研究招募國小一年級學童56名，五年級學童32名參與實驗進行。應用囚犯困境賽局與最後通牒賽局之架構設計兩個遊戲，來檢測兒童在合作與分享行為之表現。分析受試者之背叛比率、提供數量、拒絕比率等實驗資料，來檢測年齡、性別以及長幼關係是否會造成顯著影響。 實驗結果發現： （1）年齡較大兒童較傾向較合作且拒絕比率較低，這個結果和認知發展理論的結論一致。 （2）受試者資料在性別效果的假設檢定結果都不顯著。 （3）年齡較小兒童的平均提供數量都大於一半，這個結果和最後通牒賽局的理論預測相反。（4）對手為不同年齡時的背叛比率和拒絕比率都比對手為同年齡時低，這個結果支持國小開設混齡教育課程。 / This paper studies children’s behavior in an ultimatum game and a prisoner’s dilemma game with 56 children of age 7 and 32 children of age 11. With the experimental data of defect ratio, offer quantity and rejection ratio, we tested the age, sex and seniority effects under these two games. The experimental findings are as follows. （1）The older children are more cooperative and have lower rejection ratio than younger ones. These results are consistent with the developmental psychology theories. （2） We observe no significant sex effect in the three tests. （3） For younger children, the average offer quantity is higher than fifty percent, this is different from theoretical prediction and literature results.（4）We found that for pairs consisting of subjects of different ages, The defect ratio and rejection ratio are lower than pairs of the same age subjects. This evidence may provide support for mixed-age education program for some courses in elementary school.

本研究由個人參與社區發展行動的動機與選擇決策作為研究的重心，以理性選擇行為模式為理論基礎，探討社區發展上如何才能克服集體行動的困境，建立永續性的自主治理機制。由於社區事務具有小規模共用資源（Common-Pool Resources；CPRs）的特性，在功能上及產權上無法分割，在使用上無排他性（non- exclusive）但具有某種程度的敵對性（rivalry），過度取用將產生資源耗竭的現象。因此本研究援引共用資源分析方法（Common-Pool Resources Approach）作為分析架構，從個人選擇與互動形式、外部環境與技術的變量以及組織與執行機制三方面，探討社區居民是否形成自主治理的集體行動及其影響變量。 本研究採用多重個案研究的複現方法，選取了三處遭遇特定事件觸發了社群共同議題，而由外力團隊協助建立治理組織之社區，作為實證研究之個案。包括：（1）南投縣中寮鄉的農村社區在歷經九二一大地震後，面對土地資源永續利用與產業轉型的議題；（2）桃園縣龍潭鄉百年大鎮大型住宅社區因社區組織不健全，導致社區環境出現安全問題；（3）台北縣鶯歌鎮陶瓷老街因政策獲選為形象商圈，店家面臨商圈環境管理與商圈行銷議題。 / Base on the theory of reasonable choice behavior mode, the study focus on the resident’s individual motive and decision making process trying to identify the solutions of breaking the bottlenecks of collective actions and build up the sustainable self-government mechanism. The community affairs are small scale common-pool resources CPRs) therefore we cannot clearly dive up their ownerships and functions. In the aspects of usage, the community affairs are non-exclusive but kind of rivalry. It will be decreased if being over-deprived. Thus, this study adopted the common-pool resources approach as the analytical structure to explore if the community residents have organized the collective actions of self-government and the influence variables form 3 major aspects of “individual choice vs. interactive form”, “external environment vs. technical variables” and “organization vs. enforcement mechanism ”. The study took 3 occasional events which touched off some common agenda in the community and have the residents established the organizations of governance by the assistance of external teams as the impractical cases. The three cases included: (1)The agenda faced by rural villages on the aspects of land sustainable usage and industrial transformation in Jhingliao Township of Nantou County, (2) The safety problems brought by the poor community organization of the big scale residential community—Netown in Longtan Township of Taoyuan County.(3) The marketing and business district environment management issues brought by being selected as the official model business district in the Yingge Township of Taipei County.

許多企業的經理人一直在尋求有效的政策以促進員工彼此分享知識。在組織中實施激勵知識分享的政策，因為存在著許多的個人與組織的因素，兩者相互作用會影響組織的成員知識分享的行為，政策的效果很難掌握。在實務上，不同的組織激勵的政策或手段的效果，欲通過田野調查或實驗設計來評估政策所帶來效果及對組織成員行為的影響不容易實現。因此，本研究嘗試運用一項新穎的研究策略-代理人基塑模(agent-based modeling)，經由建構一個人造的世界來模擬組織成員知識分享的行為。在這個人造的社會中，研究者考慮了知識分享的報酬、組織成員的行為策略、行為策略的學習與適應機制、不同組織的群體能力水準、互動的網路、知識的選擇模式與不同的組織激勵政策設計等變數，藉以設計相關的實驗。模擬的結果產生了的幾項有趣的發現： (1) 當分享知識的報酬愈高時，代理人知識分享行為會愈多，無論是在那一種的互動網路、群體能力或分享知識的選擇模式的情況之下。(2) 代理人的互動網路是一項重要影響因素，互動網路扮演著知識流通與行為策略學習的管道，它同時會影響個體知識分享的報酬與行為策略的學習。它可能促成不分享的策略的擴散，可能會提升組織激勵的效果，也可能會增強激勵所帶來的副作用。(3) 個體的知識分享與吸收的能力如果存有差異，則能力較好的代理人將會局部地吸引能力較差的互動對象採用他的策略，即使他所用的不是可以獲致最佳報酬策略。(4) 為促進組織成員分享知識，定期審視固定獎勵的作法可以導致比較好的效果，不但可以提升分享知識的行為，也使代理人比較願意採用傾向分享知識的策略，促成組織信任的氣氛。但是，在某些情況下，可能造成反效果。(5) 最後，根據實驗的結果與研究的發現，研究者建構了一個知識分享之組織行為模型，以做為後續實證研究之參考架構。 / Mangers always look for effective policies to prompt knowledge sharing between members in an organization. It is difficult to evaluate the effect of incentive policies for stimulating knowledge sharing because there are many individual and organizational factors. In practice, it is not easy to assess the effects of different incentive policies or methods by the methods of experiment or field investigation. Therefore, a novel research strategy is applied in this study, which is called agent-based modeling. An artificial world was constructed to simulate the knowledge sharing interactions between members in an organization. This study considers some parameters including the payoff of knowledge sharing, the strategies of members, the learning and adaption mechanism of strategies, collective capabilities, interactive network, the selection methods of sharing knowledge and incentive policies to design experiments in the agent-based model. The results of simulations produced some interesting findings: (1) the higher the payoff of sharing knowledge, the more the actions of sharing knowledge is in spite of any kind of interactive networks, collective capabilities, and the selection methods of sharing knowledge. (2) Interactive Network of agents is an important factor, which plays a role of channel of knowledge transition and strategy learning. It simultaneously affects the payoff of knowledge sharing and learning of strategy. It maybe results in the diffusion of strategy of not sharing knowledge, or enhances the effect and side effect brought by incentive policies. (3) Because of difference between agents’ capabilities, agents with better capabilities will locally attract the ones with worse capabilities to learn their strategies, which even are not the best. (4) To enable sharing knowledge between members in an organization, periodic reward will get better results. It does not only increase the action of sharing knowledge, but also make agents to adop the strategies trending toward sharing knowledge. Periodic reward is helpful to form a trustful organization climate. However, in some circumstances, it may get minus effects. (5) Finally, according to experimental results and research findings, an organization behavior model of knowledge sharing has been constructed for the empirical studies in the future.