本研究之目的在於探討金融商品價值變動、公司特性與盈餘管理之關聯性，研究對象2006年1月1日至2009年6月30日金融業以外之上市公司作，並分為兩部分進行分析。第一部份檢視公司特性與其持有金融商品的關係，並觀察全球金融危機是否會影響公司對於金融商品之持有程度。第二部份探討金融商品價值變動以及公司特性是否會影響公司之盈餘管理行為。 本研究結果顯示，管理當局持股愈高、債務比率愈低、公司規模愈大、現金股利率愈高、流動性愈高以及研發費用率愈高之公司，其持有金融商品之程度愈高。產業為電子業之公司較其他產業之公司持有較少之金融商品。全球金融危機發生之後，公司對金融商品之持有程度有明顯下降之情況。 此外，金融資產評價利益、金融資產評價損失與金融負債評價損失與盈餘管理之關係符合損益平穩化之理論；金融商品減損損失與盈餘管理之關係則符合洗大澡之理論。管理當局持股比率愈高時，愈會將裁量性應計向上操縱或向下操縱，而債務比率愈高之公司，愈會將裁量性應計向下操縱。公司資金愈多，管理階層愈不會操縱裁量性應計，但其差異較不明顯。而電子業公司之盈餘管理幅度則小於非電子產業公司。 / This purpose of this study is to explore the relationships between value changes in financial instruments, firm characteristics and earnings management. The study includes two parts and uses a sample of the companies (excluding financial firms) listed at the Taiwan Stock Exchange from January 2006 to June 2009. First, I examine the relationship between company characteristics and their holdings of financial instruments. It also examines whether the global financial crisis affected these companies’ holdings of financial instruments. Secondly, I examine whether the value changes of financial instruments and company characteristics affect the sample companies’ earnings management behavior. The empirical results show that the companies with higher management ownership, lower debt ratio, larger size, higher cash dividend yield, higher liquidity, and higher rates of R&D have tend to hold more financial instruments. Companies in the electronics industry hold less financial instruments. Companies kept less financial instruments decreased after the global financial crisis. In addition, the relationship between valuation gain and loss on financial assets, valuation loss on financial liabilities and earnings management conforms to the theory of income smoothing. And the relationship between financial instruments impairment losses and earnings management is consistent with the big bath theory. Management with higher ownership tends to manipulate more discretionary accruals. Companies with higher debt ratio tend to manipulate discretionary accruals downward. For the companies with more funds, their management manipulates less discretionary accruals, although the difference is less obvious. Earnings management by the companies in the electronics industry is less than those in other industries.

本研究延伸Becker et al. ( 1998 )六大會計師事務所審計效率高於非六大的研究，探討會計師事務所在面對管理階層不同之盈餘管理動機時，也就是當會計師與管理階層兩者間的盈餘報導動機衝突或一致時，會計師事務所的監督功能是否對稱。本研究認為高審計品質的會計師事務所在決定盈餘報導時，會比低審計品質的會計師事務所更加保守，因為高品質之會計師事務所面對審計失敗伴隨而來的訴訟成本遠較其他會計師事務所來的高，使得會計師事務所對於客戶採用增加所得的會計政策會保持較高的專業懷疑態度，抑制客戶虛增盈餘，因此，當管理者產生增加所得的盈餘報導動機時，衝突就會發生；反之，當客戶採用減少所得的會計政策，基於會計上的穩健原則，會計師事務所干涉程度則較低，使客戶較易進行減少所得的盈餘管理，故會計師事務所的監督功能不具對稱性。 而本研究結果顯示，當客戶有增加所得的盈餘管理動機時，代表高審計品質的五大與產業專家會計師事務所的客戶所報導的裁量性應計顯著低於非五大與非產業專家之會計師事務所，表示在會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機有衝突時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質較佳，較能抑制客戶利用裁量性應計進行增加所得的盈餘管理；反之，當客戶有減少所得的盈餘管理動機時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的客戶所報導的裁量性應計也顯著低於非五大與非產業專家之會計師事務所，表示在會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機相一致時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質反而較低，容許客戶利用裁量性應計進行減少所得的盈餘管理。此實證結果支持本研究之假說，當會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機發生衝突(一致)時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質高(低)於非五大與非產業專家會計師事務所，監督功能不具對稱性。 / The research of Becker et al ( 1998 ) found that the big 6 CPA firms’ audit efficiency was higher than the non-big 6 CPA firms’ audit efficiency. This research extends Becker’s research and discusses whether the surveillance function of CPA firms is symmetrical or not when CPA firms face different earnings management motives of the management. In other words, when the earnings management motives between CPAs and management are conflict or consistent, whether will result in different audit quality level or not. We thought that the CPA firms with high audit quality are more conservative than those with low audit quality when deciding the reported earnings. Because the lawsuit cost of the CPA firms with high audit quality is much greater than the lawsuit cost of other CPA firms when facing the audit defeat. Thus the high audit quality CPA firms maintain the higher specialized suspicion on their customers who use the accounting policy to increase their earnings and restrain their earnings management. Therefore, when the management has the motive to increase reported earnings, the conflict will occur; on the contrary, when the management has the motive to decrease reported earnings, the CPA firms will tolerate their customers making earnings management to decrease the reported earnings base on the conservatism of accounting, so the surveillance function of CPA firms will decline and become not symmetry. According to our research, we find that when the management has the motive to increase reported earnings, the reported discretionary accruals of the management audited by the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms are much lower than those audited by the non-big 5 and non- industrial expert CPA firms. It means when the motive of earnings reporting between the CPA firms and management is conflict, the audit quality of the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is much better, and they can restrain their customer using the discretionary accruals to increase their earnings. On the other hand, when the management has the motive to decrease reported earnings, the reported discretionary accruals of the management audited by the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms are also much lower than those audited by the non-big 5 and non- industrial expert CPA firms. It means when the motive of earnings reporting between the CPA firms and management is consistent, the audit quality of the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is much lower instead, and they tolerate their customer using the discretionary accruals to decrease their earnings. This result of statistics test supports our hypotheses. When the earnings reporting motive between the CPA firms and the management is conflict ( consistent ), the audit quality of big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is higher ( lower ) than other CPA firms’ audit quality. The surveillance function does not have the symmetry.

美國在2001年10月爆發了安達信(Anderson)-安隆（Enron）案，對整個企業界造成極大的衝擊，提供非審計服務究竟是否會影響財務報表品質引起廣泛討論。 因證期會於民國九十二年一月三十日新修正「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第二十二條，使得資訊相對過往較易取得，雖因研究限制使得樣本不具良好代表性，但在某種程度上仍能提供一定的參考價值，故本研究擬仿效Frankel et al. (2002)之研究，探討在台灣會計師提供非審計服務及審計服務是否會對財務報表品質造成影響；本研究以Threshold（公司實際每股盈餘-分析師預測每股盈餘）及裁量性應計(discretionary accrual)做為財務報表品質之代理變數。 本研究發現上市公司並未因審計公費及非審計公費較高而有進行盈餘管理，但上櫃公司卻會因審計公費及非審計公費較高而進行盈餘管理。 / The collapse of Enron and the conflict of interest surrounding their auditors Arthur Anderson, particularly the effect non-audit fees on the quality of the audited financial statements, have resulted in numerous changes to the regulations effectively limiting the level of non-audit service accounting firms can offer to their clients. The Taiwan SEC enacted new regulations forcing public companies that meet certain criteria, to disclose the level of audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting firms. This resulted in the availability of information that was previously unobtainable. However, concerns still remain, as research is restricted because the number of companies reporting represents a small percentage of the companies in Taiwan. Nonetheless, this research hopes to use the data from the reporting companies to examine the relationship between the quality of the financial statement and the level of fees paid to accounting firms. We intent to use an adaptation of the Frankel et al. (2002) model to study the companies in Taiwan. Using data provided by the companies we intend to demonstrate a causal relationship between the level of non-audit fees and the quality of the accounting statement. We used Threshold and discretionary accrual to represent the quality of the financial statement. We found that for the companies listed on the TAIEX there was no relationship between the quality of the financial statements and the level of audit and non-audit fees; however for companies trading on the OTC market we found there was a causal relationship.

本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下，若有違監理標準之虞時，其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機，以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力，以保障被保險人的權益，並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前，邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸，即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額，未達實收資本之45%時，主管機關應命其於限期內，以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者，保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重，分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司，其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況，以跨過清償能力標竿，避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外，保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限，以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金，預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨，保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下，是否會安於目前的投資限制，而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此，本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券，以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理，年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債，以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。 　　在研究設計上，為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響，本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中，研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次，將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型，以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下：一、在產險業，保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者，其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看，大小公司行為仍有所差異，即相較於大公司，小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論，建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況，並確認其清償能力之品質。 / This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements.

近幾年來，財務弊案層出不窮，管理當局參與創造性會計的情事日益嚴重，資本市場陷入紀律危機，徒增成本。為喚醒投資者對於盈餘品質的關注，以及對盈餘管理有更客觀的瞭解，本研究提出兩種不同基礎之盈餘品質分類法，並探討台灣上市公司在盈餘品質分類法下，財務特性與盈餘管理成分的差異。 以往國內文獻多個別探討盈餘品質的內涵，或盈餘管理的現象；將盈餘品質與盈餘管理兩大主題做結合，乃新嘗試。研究主要分為兩大部分，第一部份定義盈餘品質，而第二部分深入盈餘管理的課題。 研究以2002年第3季到2004年第3季，381家台灣上市公司，共3429個樣本點，進行迴歸模型分析。 首先將樣本以：一、盈餘對營運現金流量的關係，及二、應收帳款成長率對營收成長率的比較，共兩種基礎，區分盈餘品質。在區分盈餘品質後，以盈餘品質測試盈餘評價能力與持續性。發現以盈餘對營運現金流量關係作為基礎之盈餘品質，具有增額評價能力，而以應收帳款成長率對營收成長率的比較做為基礎者，無增額評價能力。而兩種盈餘品質對盈餘持續性有顯著貢獻。 第二部分將樣本分為盈餘平滑企業與非盈餘平滑企業，探討盈餘評價功能之強弱，發現在盈餘平滑與盈餘非平滑兩組別中，盈餘平滑化並不影響盈餘評價能力。接著導入盈餘品質，觀察在交叉分組下盈餘評價功能的差異，發現高盈餘品質結合盈餘非平滑化（Quality Non-Smoother）的組別中，有最高盈餘評價係數。盈餘進一步拆解成三個組成份子：營運現金流量，裁量性應計數，與非裁量性應計數。其中，觀察重點在於裁量性應計數，研究同樣加入盈餘品質，測試其評價能力與持續性。發現裁量性應計數具有評價功能，而在兩種盈餘品質指標分類下，高盈餘品質之裁量性應計數，並無增量評價貢獻；在持續性方面，兩種盈餘品質指標同樣對裁量性應計數有正向貢獻。 為測試盈餘品質在盈餘管理誘因下的反應，最後將盈餘管理誘因區分為達成損益兩平與超越前期盈餘兩項目標，並加入盈餘品質，觀察其交互作用。發現在「達成損益兩平」與「超越前期盈餘」兩種盈餘目標下，盈餘管理現象的確存在。加入盈餘品質變數後，在兩種盈餘品質變數之作用下，對「達成損益兩平」與「超越前期盈餘」兩項管理誘因均有抑制作用。 / During the last few years, there have been numerous cases of financial ma-nipulation and scandals of firms and the situation of the managing authority par-ticipating in creative accounting has become worsen which has posed enormous disciplinary risks and unnecessary costs on the entire capital market. In order to invoke the concern of investors towards earning quality and to objectively under-stand more broadly about earning management, this study focused on two dif-ferent earning quality categorization based on different basis. The other aim of this study was to discuss the differences of financial characteristics and earning management that arise under two different earning quality categorizations. Most of the local existing literature discussed separately on the essence of earning management or the phenomenon of earning management; this study would be a completely new attempt, which combined the above-mentioned two topics into one study. The first part of this study focused on the definition of earn-ing quality and the second part discussed in detail on issues concerning earning management. A regression analysis was conducted on 381 publicly listed firms in Taiwan during the period from the third quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2004 and the total sample points were 3429. Firstly, the samples were processed and the samples’ earning qualities were categorized based on: 1. the comparison between earning and operating cash flow; 2. the comparison between the growth rate of account receivables and the growth rate of revenue. After the categorization of earning qualities, earning qual-ity was used to test the ability of earning valuation and the persistence of the earning. It was revealed in this study that the earning quality based on the com-parison between earning and operating cash flow could greatly enhance the abil-ity of earning valuation. On other hand, the earning quality based on the compari-son between the growth rate of account receivables and the growth rate of reve-nue failed to enhance the earning valuation. However, both categories of earning qualities had significant contribution to the persistence of earning. The second part of the study separated the samples into earning smoothing firms and non-earning smoothing firms in order to discuss the power of the ability of earning valuation. The results showed that earning smoothing did not have any impact on ability of earning valuation. The next step was to introduce earning quality into this part of the study and to observe the differences in the ability of earning valuation that arise from cross grouping. It was revealed that the group of high earning quality combining non-smoother had the highest earning valuation coefficient. Earning was further decomposed into three components: operating cash flow, discretional accruals and non-discretional accruals. The focus was on the observation of discretional accruals, and in this part of the study, the earning quality was also introduced in order to test the ability to valuate and the persis-tence of earning. It was discovered that discretional accruals possessed the func-tion of valuation. Furthermore, under the categorization of earning quality indexes with two different bases, discretional accruals with high earning quality had no contribution toward the ability to enhance valuation; however, about the persis-tence, both earning quality indexes had positive contribution toward discretional accruals. Finally, in order to test the reactions of earning quality under the influence of the incentives of earning management, the incentives of earning management were categorized into two groups with two different goals: 1. to reach breakeven; 2. to exceed prior period earning. The earning quality was also introduced to ob-serve the interactions. It was observed that under the two different goals in earn-ing, the phenomenon of earning management did indeed exist. After including the variable of earning quality, under the influences of two different categories of earning quality variables, there was some kind of suppressive effects on the management incentives of “reaching breakeven” and “earning that surpasses the prior period earning”.

本研究以實徵性會計理論為基礎，測試在現金增資此一會計數字被使用來評估公司績效的事件中，上市公司是否有動機美化申請增資所使用的會計報表，亦即採用增加盈餘的裁量性應計項目，或是控制營業外交易以增加盈餘的方式進行盈餘的操縱以順利通過證管會的審查。同時，本研究亦檢定上市公司是否在增資結束後，由於應計項目的自動迴轉，而使其裁量性應計項目的變動為負。同時本研究亦透過三個假說來檢定現金增資前的操縱行為受某些公司特徵或增資時的經濟狀況等因素之影響是否顯著。 　　本研究的分析過程分成三大部份：第一部分的檢驗在了解現金增資公司的營業收入變動狀況，以Wilcoxon signed rank統計檢定法確定樣本公司的營業收入是否有顯著的變動；第二部分為整體性的探討上市公司增資之前，是否採用增加盈餘之裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額，同時探討增資後上述會計項目變數變化的情形，本研究採用Wilcoxon signed rank檢定法，檢定增資前後裁量性應計項目和營業外收益變動的差異；第三部分乃將樣本分為二組，以Wilcoxon rank sum檢定法，分別檢定高、低內部人持股比率，股市景氣榮枯期增資，以及大、小規模等二組樣本公司在增資前，其盈餘操縱行為是否有顯著差異？ 　　本研究所得到的結論如下： 　　1.樣本公司在增資前後期間營業收入淨額均顯著地持續增加。 　　2.樣本公司在增資前一年的確採取增加盈餘的裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額，且增資後一年，裁量性應計項目因迴轉而有負向的變動，但此盈餘操縱行為未達統計顯著性。 　　3.樣本公司在增資當年裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額均呈顯著的正向變動，可能的解釋是：(1)來自樣本公司在年初或年中季報的操縱行為；(2)公司在增資後有較高的「政治敏感性」。進一步測試發現：公司的確在增資前一季、增資完成當季和後一季，均有盈餘操縱的行為。 　　4.在股市景氣繁榮期增資的樣本公司，的確較顯著地採用了提高盈餘的裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額。而代理成本較高和規模較小的公司，分別較代理成本低和規模大的公司，傾向在增資前進行盈餘管理行為，但此行為並未達統計顯著性。

本研究主要採用Francis et al.（2005）所提出之應計品質衡量模型作為應計品質的衡量指標，以2003-2007國內上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討應計品質與公司現金持有間之關聯性。本研究另將應計品質拆為裁量性應計品質與非裁量性應計品質，分別探討其對公司現金持有之影響。 　　本研究實證結果顯示，應計品質與公司現金持有率呈顯著負相關。亦即公司應計品質越高，越能有效降低公司及投資者之間的資訊不對稱，進而使公司籌資成本降低，而可持有較少的現金。此外，裁量性應計品質、非裁量性應計品質與公司現金持有率之間均呈顯著負相關，且非裁量性應計品質對公司現金持有率之影響大於裁量性應計品質。 　　根據上述結果，本研究建議管理階層應重視公司之應計品質，並利用裁量性應計項目來提升盈餘數字的品質，以作為公司績效的適當指標。亦即管理階層應使盈餘數字更能可靠、更即時的反映公司的經營績效，並避免以投機目的使用裁量性應計項目。換言之，公司可藉由應計品質之提升，降低資訊不對稱的程度，進而改善公司的現金管理、減少資源閒置及增進投資的效果。 / This study mainly uses the accruals quality measurement model proposed by Francis et al. (2005) to empirically examine the effect of accruals quality on cash holdings of the sampled listed companies at the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM) from 2003 to 2007. This study also distinguishes between accruals quality driven by economic fundamentals (Innate AQ) versus management choices (discretionary AQ) and assesses their individual effects on corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show that accruals quality is negatively associated with cash holdings. That is, the firms with good accruals quality may reduce the negative effect of information asymmetry and adverse selection and, therefore, reduce their level of cash holdings as a result of lower cost of raising capital. In addition, discretionary accruals quality and innate accruals quality are significantly negatively related to cash holdings, and, on average, the innate component of accruals quality has a significantly larger effect on cash holdings than the discretionary component of accruals quality. Our findings suggest that management should be concerned about accruals quality because a higher accruals quality may help firms to improve their cash management, reduce unproductive cash levels, and increase their investment effectiveness.

本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理，以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質，探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性，以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權，此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性，或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質，其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上，為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果，乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較，以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。 　　研究結果顯示，門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻，且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義，係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言，在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下，仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期，即可知管理者之誠意，不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加，則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下，易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言，在我國家族企業居多之情形下，增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息，值得投資人注意，尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。 　　面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字，審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理，審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法，以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下，盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性，故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加（減低）盈餘價值攸關性，因而增加（減低）盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表，較低的資訊公信力，使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色，因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident. 　　The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages. 　　Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

非審計服務究竟是否會影響會計師獨立性，長久以來即為各界關注焦點。本研究第一部分將驗證非審計服務對會計師獨立性的影響。此外，有別於美國要求全面揭露審計、非審計公費資訊，我國規定公開發行公司若符合一定門檻應揭露支付給會計師的各項公費資訊，本研究第二部份將探討我國採門檻制的公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊的公司，其會計師的獨立性是否會不同於無需揭露公司。最後一部份則為市場反應測試，探討市場是否能對公費資訊進行判斷，判斷公司刻意隱藏的情形並給予負面的評價。 實證果發現非審計服務的提供對會計師獨立性產生負面影響，而在我國採門檻制公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊公司進行盈餘管理的可能性越大，若我國之公費揭露政策若能改為全面性揭露將對會計師獨立產生正面影響。此外，市場反應部份結果顯示投資人並未考慮公費資訊的內涵。 關鍵詞：非審計服務、門檻制公費揭露、會計師獨立性、裁量性應計 / Whether or not the purchase of non audit services (NAS) impairs audit independence is the focus of a growing body of accounting research in the U.S. Using the data of Taiwanese list firms, this paper examines whether the association holds in environment other than that of the United States. In addition, compared to that in the U.S., Taiwanese Securities and Futures Bureau requires firm to disclose information on the audit and nonaudit fees under some circumstances. The second objective of this paper, therefore, is to explore whether some firms meeting the disclosure threshold have an incentive to avoid the disclosure requirement by concealing audit fee from external investors and regulators, and whether there is difference in the independence between firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise and firms disclosing nonaudit fees. Finally, I investigate whether premium given by market participants varies among these two groups. We find that the purchase of NAS impairs audit independence, consistent with prior studies. We also document that firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise are more likely to conduct earnings management relative to other firms, as predicted. Finally, our empirical results show that market participants are not able to distinguish these two groups. Key words: non-audit services, disclosure threshold, audit independence, discretionary accruals