預算制度乃現今企業廣泛採用的管理會計技術之一，而預算參與(Budgeting Participations) 則係預制度之一項重要特徵。是否增加員工在制定預算目標時之參與程度，即便能增進員工之預算績效表現？在學術研究上，迄今尚未獲致一致性的結論。再者，員工是否會假預算參與之便，而使組織產生預算虛估(Budget Slack)的情形，在實證結果上亦未有定論。本研究主題之一，即在探討預算目標參與程度是否對預算績效以及預算虛估產生影響。 本研究主題之二，則在探討酬勞計劃(Compensation Scheme) 對績效及預算虛估之可能影響。本研究採實驗設計方式，並以二因子變異數分析及二因子共變數分析進行統計檢定。研究結果發現：酬勞計劃對績效及預算虛估之影響達到5%顯著水準，亦即酬勞計劃之不同設計，會影響員工在預算績效上之表現及預算虛估金額之大小。至於預算目標參與程度對績效及預算虛估之研究假設，則未獲得本實證研究之支持。

本研究目的為：(一)從人格特質及環境交互論的觀點，探討排除同理心的影響之後， 處於不同熟識度、酬勞（情境變項）的情況下，不同自我肯定度的大學生（個人特質 ）在答應請託行為上的差異。(二)修訂同理心量表與編製人情事件量表。(三)瞭解此 二種量表與自我肯定量表的相關。 本研究採 2×2×2 三因子實驗設計， 問卷研究對象為二百二十三位大學女生，其中 的一百零四位再要求參與實驗。研究者先行訓練四個實驗同謀，再於實驗室內設計自 然的請託情境一研究者隨機操弄受試者與同謀者熟識情形的高低、有無酬勞一以了解 不同自我肯定者在不同情境下，答應請託行為是否不同。統計方法除採變異數分析外 ，還有積差相關、因素分析及 t檢定。 本研究結果發現(一)在雙方越熟識的情況下，越會答應對方的請託。(二)是否參與實 驗的大學生，在自我肯定量表與同理心量表上沒有差異。(三)自我肯定量表得分越高 的受試者，在人情事件量表上的得分越低。

近年來，公司治理逐漸成為國際間熱門而普及的研究課題，國際經濟合作暨發展組織(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development，簡稱 OECD) 亦分別於民國87年及93年提出了公司治理之原則架構，為各國政府與國際性組織提供公司良善治理之方向。而我國為加速推動上市(櫃)企業之公司治理，協助企業健全發展及保障投資人權益，金融監督管理委員會於民國(以下同)102 年 12 月發佈 以五年為期之「強化我國公司治理藍圖」，並將辦理公司治理評鑑列為重點工作項目。 本研究主要是想透過台灣約前三十大上市、上櫃生技產業公司概況，了解公司的營業績效和公司治理的情形，針對公開資訊站中提供的各項公司資訊如：董事會的組成或特性、公司酬勞分布、股票交易資訊等多方項討論，作分析，找出各項變數對公司營業狀況的關係。 首先將各項變數做相關分析，看變數之間的關聯性，並透過公司股價來看公司的營利情形和其他變數的相關性，由於公司股價可能具有某種資訊內涵，他的波動情形經常反應著公司治理制度是否完善或公司整體的營業績效，因此公司股價除了是投資人用來作為調整投資的重要指標之外，也是對一家公司內部經營好壞的指標，而研究最後利用逐步回歸，找到主要影響公司股價的模型，探討影響公司績效的各項原因以及每一項因素的重要程度。 本研究希望可以藉由股價較高的公司，分析出其公司內部組成、持股比例和其他內部資訊和其他公司的區別，藉以讓其他公司或新創公司作為參考指標，加強其對公司治理的要求，藉此提升公司的整體營運績效。

預算參與及績效間的關係，由於牽涉的中間變項太多，至今尚未有定論。本文以實驗 方式，操縱預算參與、預算高低、及酬勞三項變數，探討在認知失調情況下之績效及 預算估計。全文共分六章、二十五節，六遇餘言。茲將各章內容扼要說明如下： 第一章：緒論，就研究動機及目的、論文結構、研究方法、及研究限制，加以扼要說 明。 第二章：文獻探討，探討關於參與及績效之文獻、及認知失調理論，進而導出假設。 第三章：研究設計，說明實驗環境。 第四章：結果。 第五章：說明，解釋研究結果。 第六章：結論與建議。

本研究主要針對影響董監酬勞與會計(市場)績效關聯性之因素進行探討。在現代公司之經營管理架構中，係由股東在股東大會選出代表進入董事會，由董事會成員選出主要執行業務經營之人，並代理所有投資人監督及管理經營層。換言之，相對於經理人，董事會成員為股東最為直接之代理人。因此，本研究認為董事會成員為外部股東最直接之代理人，故以董監酬勞為分析對象，從公司治理之角度，以股權結構(如是屬於家族控制企業、董監持股、外部大股東持股等)及董事會特性(獨立董監席次比率、董事是否兼任經理人、董事長是否兼任總經理)等相關變數，探討其對於董監酬勞與會計、市場績效間關聯性之影響。 實證結果顯示，家族企業與公司經理人兼任董事會職位時，會提升董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性；董監持股比例愈高、外部大股東持股比例愈高、獨立董監席次比例越高及董事長兼任總經理時，會降低董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性。 / This study argues that members of corporate boards are the most direct delegate of external shareholders. Agency problem may exist between board members and external shareholders. Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange Corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market over 1996-2005, this study empirically examines the effect of ownership and board structures on the compensation of board members. This study expects that the pay-performance sensitivity of board compensation is weakened when a strong monitoring mechanism is in place. Using return on assets as the measures for performance, the primary empirical results show that family-controlled firms and firms with representation of executive directors illustrate higher pay-performance sensitivity. On the contrary, firms with higher shareholdings by board members and by outside block holders, and firms with representation of independent board members demonstrate lower pay-performance sensitivity.

公司在追求規模經濟的同時，由於其所有者的時間精力有限，就必須放釋放一定的代理權，以求得企業的規模發展。當代理權釋出後，代理關係就無可避免，利害關係衝突於是產生。代理人會傾向偷懶、保守、自利、短視，以維護自己的利益，引發了所謂的代理成本，於是便需要公司治理機制加以解決。本研究除了繼續以前的研究探討我國上市電子公司之股權結構及董監酬勞與員工分紅對公司績效的影響外，由於我國高科技業的「員工分紅配股」措施，使公司的股本增大，造成其EPS降低、股價的稀釋及選舉權受到侵蝕，因而損害原股東的權益。因此，本研究也欲探討我國上市電子公司股權結構是否會影響其董監酬勞及員工分紅政策。 本研究以1997起至2002年止台灣上市電子公司為樣本，經刪除資料不完整的公司後，共計有55家公司330個觀察值為研究樣本。本研究是以複迴歸模型來進行實證研究。實證結果顯示經理人持股比率、機構法人持股比率、董事監察人持股比率，以及員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率與公司績效呈正相關。經理人持股比率及機構投資者持股比率與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率呈正相關，至於董事持股比率、監察人持股比率及監察人佔全部董事監察人比率，則與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率無關。 / When the size of the company is growing, the owners of the company have the limit time and the energy, the company must have the agent. Once the company has the agent, the interest relationship among the owner and agent will conflict. The agents are easily lazy, conservative, selfish, and nearsighted to pursue their interest, so the agent cost happen. This study beside continue the former research about the relationship between the ownership structure and the company performance, and the relationship between the the the employee bonus and the company performance in the TSE-listed electronic company. Because the high-tech company in Taiwan practice the policy of “the employee stock distribution”, the policy will cause the expansion of the stock. The expansion of the stock lessens the EPS, dilutes the stock price and erodes the right of the election. That damage the right of the original stockholders, and therefore this study examine the relationship between the ownership structure and the employee bonus in the TSE-listed electronic company as well. This study samples are the TSE-listed electronic company from 1997 to 2002, but exclude the company with insufficient data. The rest are 55 companies, and 330 observations that are obtained. This study uses complex regression model on this empirical research. The empirical result indicates the stock ownership of the managers, the stock ownership of the institution investors, the stock ownership of the board, and the bonus rate of the employee are positively related to the company performance. The stock ownership of the manager, and the stock ownership of the institution investors are positively related to the employee bonus rate. The stock ownership of the directors, the stock ownership of the supervisors, and the supervisor rate of the board reveal no significant relationship with the bonus rate of the employee.

傳統代理理論主張，企業可利用績效酬勞激勵員工努力工作，提昇組織績效；而競賽理論則強調，利用同儕競賽，並擴大勝負間的酬勞差距，以達企業利潤極大化目標。績效酬勞與競賽誘因對員工投入的努力皆具正面激勵效果，然而，在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因隨著員工工作所需的合作程度不同，對組織績效的影響卻有所差異。 本文首先依據代理理論與競賽理論模型，將績效酬勞與競賽誘因同時納入酬勞誘因制度中，以利分析在不同工作特性的情況下，酬勞誘因對於營業單位經營績效之影響。在績效酬勞對經營績效之影響上，理論分析結果發現：不論對員工工作彼此獨立或對工作需合作的營業單位而言，績效酬勞的增加，都可提高經營績效；當隨機干擾因素增加，因員工獲得酬勞的不確定性增加，進而削弱員工努力的意願，降低營業單位之經營績效。在競賽誘因對組織績效的影響方面，靜態分析結果指出：在不同工作特性的情況下，競賽誘因會出現不同的效果。當員工工作彼此獨立時，擴大競賽後贏家與輸家間的酬勞差距，有利於組織績效之提高。相對的，在員工工作彼此合作的情況下，酬勞差距擴大後，一方面使員工最適個人努力提高，有益於組織經營績效；另一方面卻削弱員工彼此合作的意願，降低協助同儕的努力，兩種效果抵銷之後，使得酬勞誘因對組織經營績效之提昇受到限制。 本文以一家大型連鎖汽車公司為個案公司，研究期間為2001年至2004年，包括86個營業所及90家汽車修護廠的營業績效資料及中低階層員工之酬勞資料，以實地實證研究法進行實證研究。研究結果發現，當員工工作彼此獨立時，營業單位之個人績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好；當員工工作彼此需要合作時，營業單位之團體績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好。在競賽誘因方面，當員工工作彼此獨立時，不論是職務間或職務內的酬勞差距的擴大，皆對營業單位之經營績效具有正面提昇效果；相較於工作彼此獨立，當員工工作彼此需要合作時，職務間或職務內酬勞差距的擴大對營業單位績效提昇幅度顯著較小。由此可知，企業在進行酬勞誘因設計時，應同步考量工作特性與酬勞誘因機制間的配適性，俾利於組織績效的提昇。 / Agency theory suggests that organizations can motivate employees to exert their efforts by providing individual-based compensation. Tournament theory argues that, by encouraging competition among employees and increasing the compensation gaps between winners and losers, firms can direct employees’ actions in alignment with the firm’s interests. Both compensation schemes can induce employees’ efforts and increase corporate performance. However, the positive effects on corporate performance vary in the need of cooperation among employees, ranging from independent to interdependent tasks. This paper uses a theoretical and empirical analysis of performance-based and tournament-based incentives to examine the impacts of compensation incentives on branch performance. For the impacts of performance-based incentives on branch performance, the performance will increase in the individual performance-based incentives. When employees work independently, the greater the compensation gaps lead to more efforts and higher performance. When employees work interdependently, two contradictory effects of greater the compensation gaps make the performance change unclear. On the one hand, greater compensation gaps will increase employees’ efforts for being winner in the tournament. On the other hand, greater compensation gaps will induce employees not to help their competitors and hurt the performance, although help efforts can contribute firms profits. Using four years of data from a large car company with 86 car dealer branches and 90 car repair service branches, we find that for the independent tasks, the branch performance increase as individual performance-based compensation increases or revenue variance decreases. For the tasks needed cooperation among employees, the branch performance is increasing in group-based compensation or decreasing in revenue variance. Besides, we find that the larger the compensation gaps between inter- or intra-jobs, the branch performance for the independent tasks are better. The impacts of the compensation gaps on the interdependent tasks are smaller than on the independent tasks. Therefore, incentive policy rewards the best performances with the complementary fit between tasks design and compensation schemes

企業須揭露的資訊，並不以財務資訊，甚至營運資訊為已足。美國標準普爾公司所做的公司透明度與揭露調查，不僅包括財務資訊，也注重非財務資訊。這些非財務資訊包括所有權之結構及與投資者之關係，以及董事會結構與運作過程二類資訊。OECD建議，企業至少應揭露七項資訊中，有一項為「董事會成員及主要經營階層，及其報酬」，可見「董監經理人相關資訊」的重要性，不亞於財務資訊與營運資訊。但我國企業所揭露的非財務資訊，常有不足，且國際評等機構對我國企業資訊揭露的評價亦不高。 本研究認為，若能掌握影響企業董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度之因素，將有助於我國企業透明度之提升。在我國公司法制的設計下，企業資訊之揭露係由董事會負責，然董事會是否重視資訊揭露，可能與其成員之身份特性有關。因此，本研究欲檢視董事成員身份特性因素是否是影響董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度的重要因素。 本研究為我國首次關注企業非財務、營運資訊之揭露，所關心的資訊包括董監經理人之背景能力與薪資酬勞二類資訊。資訊揭露程度之衡量，係將樣本公司年報、財務報告中相關揭露內容，與本研究自行設計的揭露索引表之揭露項目逐一比對，並考慮資訊揭露詳細程度之差異，進行項目評分，再加總得出一揭露總分之方式。提出探討的董事身份特性變數包括家族董監事、法人機構董監事、法人股東是否同時選任為董事與監察人、獨立董監事，以及董事長是否兼任總經理等五項。 研究樣本為民國90年度已在台灣證交所上市之公司，排除金融保險業、官方色彩濃厚公司、判斷資料不全公司後，共計樣本數426家。實證結果顯示非關係法人董監事席次比例、獨立董監事席次比例與資訊揭露程度呈正向顯著關係，表示二者之監督，有助於提升企業資訊揭露程度。法人股東同時選任為董事與監察人時，資訊揭露程度較低，可見此情形有削弱企業監管機制，有礙資訊揭露的傾向。但家族董監事席次比例、董事長是否兼任總經理二變數，則與資訊揭露程度間未發現顯著關係。 / The information that enterprises should disclose is not limited to financial and operating information. The “Company Transparency and Disclosure Survey” by Standard & Poor’s not only includes financial information, but also focuses on nonfinancial information, including ownership structure and investor relations, and board structure and process. OECD suggests enterprises at least disclose seven kinds of material information, and one of them is “ members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration.” Thus it could reveal that “the information related to board and executives” is no less important than financial and operating information. But in our country enterprises disclosure level in nonfinancial information is not enough. Besides, national evaluation institutions set a low value on information disclosure level of our country’s enterprises. This study presumes that if we can control the influential factor of the disclosure level about information related to board and executives, it will help to enhance enterprises’ transparency in our country. In our country’s Company Law system, board is responsible for the information disclosure of enterprises. We surmise whether board emphasizes on information disclosure has relationship with characteristics of directors’ identities. So the study wants to examine if the characteristics of directors’ identities are the important factors influencing the disclosure level of the information about board and executives. This is the very first study in our country to focus the information disclosure on nonfinancial and nonoperating information, that related to background and remuneration of board and executives. The way to measure the disclosure level is that the study designs a disclosure checklist to examine if these disclosure items appear on sample enterprises’ information disclosure of annual report and financial report, and also scrutinize to what extent the disclosure detail of information reaches. Finally the study gives each item a point, and sums up a total grade. The study has five directors’ identities characteristics variables, including family directors, institutional directors, whether institutional shareholder serves as director and supervisor simultaneously, independent directors, and whether the board chairman serves as the CEO simultaneously. The study samples are companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2001, but exclude banking and insurance industry, and government-involved companies or companies with insufficient judging information are excluded. The rest amount to 426 samples. The empirical result indicates that the proportion of nonrelated institutional directors and independent directors on board are positively related to the extent of information disclosure. If a company has an institutional shareholder serves as director and supervisor simultaneously, it has lower extent of information disclosure. The proportion of family directors on the board and whether the board chairman serves as the CEO simultaneously reveal no significant relationship with the extent of information disclosure.

自去年金融海嘯爆發，許多公司雖然經營績效不佳，其管理階層卻坐領高薪，經過媒體的大幅報導，使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓與黃金降落傘之現象。針對上述不合理的現象，投資大眾期能藉由公司所揭露的訊息，瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬之間是否具有合理的關係，並進行必要之監督。此外，股東行動主義逐漸抬頭，投資大眾可利用企業所揭露之資訊判斷公司大小情事，其中包括是否存在著公司經營不善，董監事卻溢領高薪的情況。另一方面，坐領高薪之管理階層為避免引起眾怒，可能會減少資訊之數量及降低資訊之品質，以減低其領取不合理之酬勞而引發社會譁然之機率。因此，本研究之目的在於探討公司董監酬勞與資訊揭露透明度之關聯性，並藉由實證資料驗證我國企業是否存在著此種規避資訊揭露之現象。 本研究實證結果顯示，董監事為了確保其本身之利益，而維持高額之董監酬勞時，可能增加董監事與管理階層合謀之機會，而共同隱藏不利之訊息，降低其資訊揭露透明度。此外，董監酬勞占公司淨利之比例增加時，董監事個人利益與公司營運成敗的關係愈密切，而影響董監事之獨立性。換言之，董監酬勞占淨利比較高之公司較會隱藏對其不利之訊息，使得該公司資訊揭露透明度降低。再者，公司董監酬勞異常高於同業平均值時，會促使董監事隱藏與董監酬勞相關之資訊，減少其資訊揭露之數量與品質，而降低其資訊揭露透明度。 / Since the global financial tsunami broke out in 2008, many corporations have performed poorly, but their top management still receives high compensations. Through the reports in news media, people become more concerned with the unreasonable phenomenon of corporate “Fat Cat” and “Golden Parachute”. Investors are paying more attention to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between corporate performance and directors’ compensations and to perform necessary monitoring. On the other hand, directors who receive high salaries may reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between directors’ compensations and corporate information transparency. The empirical results show that for the directors and supervisors to maintain their high compensation, they may collude with the management in hiding negative information and reducing corporate information transparency. In addition, when directors’ compensations were abnormally higher than the industry average, they had a tendency to hide the compensation information or reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed. Consequently, these corporations had lower information transparency.

企業重整乃是在企業經營循環中, 不論是自發或是被迫都必然要經歷的過程. 這個過程可以幫助公司成長成巨型的國際企業, 協助公司增加或轉換不同的商品或服務, 或是從危機中存活下來. 在今日的企管領域中, 有許多的工具可以協助企業能得到較好的重整結果. 當企業重整是因為財務危機而啟動時, 如何與債權人重新架構債務結構成為最重要且急需處理的事務. 在此之後, 一個依績效設計的獎勵制度會決定這個遭遇麻煩的公司, 會如何以及何時爬出財務困難的泥淖. 在本研究中會用一個臺灣上市公司宏達科技股份有限公司(股票代碼:3004), 來闡述重新架構債務結構, 和依績效設計的獎勵制度對公司重整的影響. / Corporate restructuring is a process that every enterprise will have to voluntarily or involuntarily go through in its life cycle in order to grow to a bigger company, to increase or change to different products or services, or to survive from a crisis. In today’s business world, there are many tools that can help the company to get a better result out of the restructuring process. When the corporate restructuring is initiated due to a financial distress, how to restructure the debt with creditors is the first and most important issue to be resolved. After that, a pay-for-performance system will decide the scale and the speed that a company can get out of the troubles. A Taiwan company, National Aerospace Fasteners Corporation (NAFCO) is used to better understand the impact of debt handling and pay-for-performance system.