Master of Arts / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / In 1989, the United States Marine Corps published the document Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting. Its appearance signaled the official adoption of maneuver warfare as the Corps's organizational philosophy and the basis of its doctrine for preparing and conducting operations. The decade of debate and experimentation that preceded the publication of Warfighting has not received detailed examination, but merits such for the insights it can provide to understanding intellectual change and military reform. Beginning in 1979, Marine Corps officers engaged in an intraservice debate over the issue of maneuver warfare, a new concept that began to circulate among military reformers in the latter half of the 1970s. A group of Marine officers known as "maneuverists" began meeting in unofficial seminars to study, refine, and promote the idea. Maneuverists believed that maneuver warfare was a more fluid and dynamic way of fighting because it stressed flexibility, creativity, and a focus on enemy behavior. They also thought the new idea offered a more effective alternative for fighting war than contemporary practices, which they thought focused too much on rigid application of standardized procedures and methods of existing manuals. The intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps involved three main mechanisms. The first was a theoretical mechanism centered on public debate in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette to introduce and defend maneuver warfare to Marine audience. The second was a functional/practical mechanism that involved educational and training initiatives at the Amphibious Warfare School and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The third mechanism was the use of institutional authority made possible with the appointment of General Alfred M. Gray, a senior and vocal maneuver warfare champion, to the position Commandant of the Marine Corps. Using the authority of his office, Gray directed the writing of a doctrinal manual encapsulating the ideas of maneuver warfare to provide the Corps organizational focus and direction. The resulting manual FMFM 1, Warfighting, officially adopted maneuver warfare as service doctrine and organizational warfighting philosophy.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / ABSTRACT Historians of the integration of the American military and African American military participation have argued that the post-World War II period was the critical period for the integration of the U.S. Navy. This dissertation argues that World War II was “the” critical period for the integration of the Navy because, in addition to forcing the Navy to change its racial policy, the war altered the Navy’s attitudes towards its African American personnel. African Americans have a long history in the U.S. Navy. In the period between the French and Indian War and the Civil War, African Americans served in the Navy because whites would not. This is especially true of the peacetime service, where conditions, pay, and discipline dissuaded most whites from enlisting. During the Civil War, a substantial number of escaped slaves and other African Americans served. Reliance on racially integrated crews survived beyond the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, only to succumb to the principle of “separate but equal,” validated by the Supreme Court in the Plessy case (1896). As racial segregation took hold and the era of “Jim Crow” began, the Navy separated the races, a task completed by the time America entered World War I. The Navy paid the price in lost efficiency to maintain the policy. After the war, the Navy chose to accept African Americans solely for duty as messmen and stewards. Matters changed in World War II. The Navy eventually lifted its restrictions on African American enlistment and promotions, commissioned its first African American officers, and finally committed itself to a program of integration. The increased interaction between whites and African Americans had also led to white officers and policymakers re-assessing the value of African American sailors, a crucial sine qua non for the actualization of integration in the postwar years.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Apparel, Textiles, and Interior Design / Sherry Haar / Nell Donnelly created a stylish, practical, affordable pink gingham apron frock in 1916, selling out her first order of 216 dresses the first morning at $1 apiece at Peck’s Dry Goods Company in Kansas City. This study investigates the forces behind the success of her dress, and finds that during the early 20th century, woman’s role became modernized, shifting from that of producer to consumer, and that clothing—in particular, the housedress—was a visible reflection of this shift. Specific attributes contributed to the success of the apron frock in design and social perspective. First, her housedress incorporated current design elements including kimono sleeves, empire waistline, waist yoke, asymmetrical front closure, and ruffle trimmings sensibly. Socially, mass advertising and mass media articles promoted fashion consciousness in women to look as pretty as those in the ad or article. As a result, integrating trendy design elements into an affordable housedress along with the growing demand for a stylish, yet practical housedress guaranteed the success of Nelly Don’s pink gingham apron frock. As such, the availability and value of the apron frock provide a vivid illustration of woman’s shifting role: its popularity as an alternative to old-fashioned Mother Hubbard housedresses demonstrates both women’s new consumer awareness as well as their growing involvement in the public sphere.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / On March 30, 1972 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a conventional offensive, dubbed the Easter Offensive, against South Vietnam. In response to this act President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN) to resume bombing North Vietnam. For the next nine months, USAF conducted offensive operations against the whole of the DRV in an attempt to accomplish four major objectives. First, USAF units sought to interdict sufficiently the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA's) supply lines to preclude continued conventional operations in South Vietnam. Second, President Nixon had directed the Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam in order to deter further aggression against its southern neighbor. Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, USAF was to establish convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of an allied nation during a major conflict. Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in December 1972, the Air Force was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part of American nuclear deterrence policy. Historically, the United States Air Force and many civilian observers have maintained that the United States Air Force succeeded in all four tasks. However, the evidence strongly indicates that the United States Air Force not only failed to achieve all but the interdiction objective during the course of operations against North Vietnam, but that this defeat stemmed from the decision not to develop a comprehensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from 1968 through 1972. In choosing this course of action, USAF's military and civilian leaders guaranteed that American forces would be unable to bring sufficient force to bear to achieve President Nixon's goals. Furthermore, by choosing this course of action and, in addition, refocusing the Air Force on nuclear delivery rather than enhancing USAF's capability to penetrate an integrated air defense (IADS), these same leaders ignored the results of Operation Rolling Thunder. The consequence of this choice, as will be shown in the following pages, was an outcome that had serious implications for the United States' Cold War conventional and nuclear military policy.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / The primary figure in the creation and administration of alternative service for conscientious objectors (COs) during World War II was General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service. With an executive order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt placing the responsibility for alternative service on the shoulders of Hershey, any program within Civilian Public Service (the alternative service program for COs) desired by the Historic Peace Churches (Brethren, Mennonite, Society of Friends) needed Hershey’s approval before it could commence. As a product of the National Guard, Hershey possessed a strong belief in the duty of the citizen to the state in a time of national emergency. However, Hershey also had Mennonite ancestry and a strong belief in minority rights. Though not personally religious, all of his beliefs towards religion, duty, minority rights, and service contributed to a much more liberal policy for COs during World War II, compared to the insensitive treatment of them during the First World War. In short, “Protector of Conscience, Proponent of Service” argues that Lewis Hershey held the primary authority for constructing policy concerning conscientious objection during World War II, and his personal beliefs and actions in shaping alternative service during that time established precedent for the remaining years of conscription in the United States. From the initial peacetime draft in 1940 to the end of conscription in 1973, alternative service remained as the central form of a CO’s duty to the state in lieu of serving in the military. Hershey’s beliefs and actions during World War II resulted in a concept of alternative service that remained for the following years of conscription in the United States, providing an illuminating example of how the concept of the citizen soldier evolved in American military history and extended even to those who refused to serve in the military.

Ce mémoire offre un résumé de l’état de la recherche quant à la perception des Japonais et de l’ennemi japonais aux États-Unis avant et pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Il en ressort que la question plus spécifique du traitement réservé à l’ennemi japonais et à la responsabilité des actions de guerre perpétrées par celui-ci dans les journaux américains mérite d’être approfondie. L’analyse des articles publiés dans les trois mois suivant l’attaque japonaise de Pearl Harbour et précédant la fin officielle de la guerre dans trois grands périodiques américains de l’époque suggère que ceux-ci offrirent un traitement de l’ennemi japonais similaire à celui présent dans l’ensemble des autres média américains de l’époque, mais que ce traitement est généralement plus nuancé et éclaté dans les trois mois précédant la fin de la guerre. Certaines dissensions importantes peuvent y être constatée quant à la question de la responsabilité des actions de guerre japonaises entre les périodiques, ce qui suggère l’existence de points de vue, de valeurs et de perceptions différentes des Japonais aux États-Unis pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. / This master’s thesis offers a summary of the state of research on the perception of the Japanese enemy in the United States before and during World War II which reveals that the question of the American newspapers’ treatment of the Japanese enemy and of who is accountable for Japan’s actions during the war deserves more attention. An analysis of the articles published in three major American newspapers in the three months following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and preceding the official end of the war suggests that the American newspapers presented the Japanese enemy in a light similar to that of the other media. However, this treatment of the Japanese and the Japanese enemy tended to be more nuanced and varied in the three months preceding the end of the war as important dissensions appeared between the newspapers about the accountability of Japan’s war actions, which suggests the existence of different values and perceptions of the Japanese people in general within the United States.

Avec le dénouement de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le problème des réfugiés en Europe devient un enjeu international. Plusieurs millions de personnes, que l’on nomme les Displaced Persons (DP), sont sans refuge et doivent recevoir une aide immédiate pour survivre. Même si la majorité de ces gens retourneront dans leurs pays d’origine, il reste encore des centaines de milliers de réfugiés en 1948. La seule solution concrète pour régler cette problématique est l’émigration des réfugiés dans des pays prêts à les accepter. Les Américains jouent un rôle crucial en acceptant 415 000 DP entre 1948 et 1952 grâce au Displaced Persons Act de 1948 et ses amendements en 1950 et 1951. Après d’âpres discussions entre les restrictionnistes et ceux qui défendent la libéralisation des lois d’immigration, naîtra le Displaced Persons Act (DP Act) signé avec beaucoup de réticence, le 25 juin 1948, par le président Harry S. Truman. Cette loi qui prévoit la venue de 202 000 DP en deux ans, contient des mesures jugées discriminatoires à l'endroit de certaines ethnies. Afin d'améliorer le DP Act, le Congrès effectue des recherches sur la situation des réfugiés toujours dans les camps en 1949 tout en étudiant l’impact de la venue des DP aux États-Unis entre 1948 et 1950. Cette étude est soumise sous forme de rapport, le Displaced Persons and Their Resettlement in the United States, le 20 janvier 1950. Ce mémoire propose une analyse minutieuse du rapport et de son contexte politique afin de démontrer le rôle important de cette étude dans le processus décisionnel du Congrès américain visant à accueillir un plus grand nombre de DP tout en posant les bases pour une politique d’accueil en matière de refugiés. / With the ending of the Second World War, the refugee problem became an international issue. Several million people, which are called the Displaced Persons (DPs), are without shelter and should receive immediate help to survive. Although the majority of DPs will return to their home country, there are still hundreds of thousands of refugees in 1948. The only practical solution to solve this problem is the migration of refugees out of Europe. The Americans have played a crucial role by agreeing to receive 415,000 DP between 1948 and 1952 through the Displaced Persons Act (DP Act) of 1948 and its amendments in 1950 and 1951. After heated discussions between the restrictionnists and those who advocate the liberalization of immigration laws, the Displaced Persons Act was voted with great reluctance and signed, June 25, 1948, by President Harry S. Truman. This law provides for the arrival of 202,000 DPs in two years, but it contains measures deemed discriminatory to certain ethnic groups. In order to improve the DP Act, Congress conducted research on the situation of refugees still in camps in 1949 while studying the impact of the DPs arrival in the United States from 1948 to 1950. This study was submitted as a report, the Displaced Persons and Their Resettlement in the United States, January 20th, 1950. This thesis proposes a thorough analysis of this report to demonstrate how the study helped the decision-making process of the U.S. Congress that led to the acceptance of a larger number of DP’s while also laying the basis for a settlement policy with regard to refugees.

En se basant sur l’histoire des Bradfords, l’une des plus grandes familles d’imprimeurs de l’histoire américaine, ce mémoire étudie la relation entre l’imprimé, les imprimeurs, et divers discours sur la liberté au cours du « long » 18e siècle. Il retrace la transition entre une ère de la « liberté de parole, » née des débats sur la liberté de presse et d’expression de la période coloniale, et une ère de la « parole de la liberté, » née au cours de la Révolution et entretenue sous la jeune république. Cette transition fut le produit de la transformation du discours des contemporains sur la liberté, mais s’effectua également en lien avec la transformation du milieu de l’imprimerie et de la culture de l’imprimé. Selon les circonstances politiques, sociales, économiques et culturelles particulières des périodes coloniale, révolutionnaire, et républicaine, l’imprimé et les imprimeurs américains furent appelés à disséminer et à contribuer au discours sur la liberté. Ils établirent ainsi une forte association entre l’imprimé et la liberté dans la culture de l’imprimé du 18e siècle, qui était destinée à être transmise aux siècles suivants. Mots- / Based on the family history of the Bradfords, one of America’s most celebrated printing dynasties, this thesis studies the interplay between print, printers, and various discourses on freedom during of the long 18th century and through the colonial, revolutionary, and early republican periods. It traces the transition between an era of the “speech of freedom,” born out of the colonial debates on the freedom of speech and press, and an era of the “freedom of speech,” born in the course of the Revolution and upheld during the early republic. This transition resulted from the transformation of the contemporaries’ discourse on liberty, but also had to do with the transformation of the printing trade and print culture. As a result of the political, social, economic, and cultural circumstances of the colonial, revolutionary, and early republican periods, American print and printers were led to disseminate and to contribute to the discourse on liberty. They thus established a strong association between print and freedom in the 18th-century print culture, an association which was destined to be transmitted to the following centuries.

La Seconde Guerre mondiale était riche en possibilités d’avancement pour la population noire. Les leaders afro-américains, conscients du caractère favorable du contexte, mirent sur pied de nouvelles stratégies afin d’optimiser les gains afro-américains. L’économie de guerre favorisa les migrations internes vers les centres industriels du Nord et de l’Ouest. Les migrants noirs s’extirpaient donc du carcan contraignant du Sud où ils étaient régulièrement privés de leur droit de vote. Les leaders noirs brandirent alors un nouvel outil pour faire pression sur les deux principaux partis politiques fédéraux : le nouveau poids électoral afro-américain. La période fut aussi marquée par une hausse de l’activisme noir. Celui-ci se voyait légitimé par les idéaux de liberté et de démocratie prétendument défendus par les États-Unis. Finalement, le plein-emploi permit l’essor du statut économique noir et les leaders afro-américains tentèrent d’exploiter cette conjoncture particulière afin d’en faire bénéficier leur communauté à long terme. / The Second World War was a period of opportunities for African-Americans. The Black leadership, aware of the favorable context, tried to exploit it to the fullest. Internal migrations from the South to the industrial centers of the North and West were facilitated by the war economy. Participating in this exodus, Blacks extirpated themselves from the politically constrictive region that often deprived them of their voting rights. By the end of the war, African-American leaders were able to wield a new weapon to pressure political parties and the government: the electoral weight of Blacks in northern States. The war was also characterized by heightened black activism. The ideals of democracy and liberty defended by the U.S. provided a new legitimacy to African-American yearnings. Ultimately, the full-employment that resulted from the war allowed Blacks to improve their economic status while their leaders were actively working to secure these gains in the long term.

En 1903, paraît le magnum opus de William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk. Ce dernier écrit cet ouvrage en poursuivant trois objectifs. Primo, il souhaite démontrer que Booker T. Washington et ses supporters font fausse route en défendant l’idée selon laquelle les Afro-américains pourront accéder à un avenir meilleur en échangeant leurs droits politiques contre des opportunités économiques. Secundo, Du Bois cherche à faire la lumière sur les talents distinctifs et les grandes réalisations de son peuple afin de convaincre les Blancs que les Noirs ne leur sont pas biologiquement ou moralement inférieurs et, par conséquent, que l’égalité raciale doit être totale et immédiate. Tertio, il veut persuader les Américains de devenir de meilleurs citoyens, en renouant avec les idéaux de leur République et en vivant en fonction de principes moraux élevés. L’écriture de Souls marque un tournant majeur dans la vie intellectuelle de son auteur, car il renonce à cette époque au discours conciliatoire qu’il avait tenu dans sa jeunesse. Les idées qu’il défend dans son livre ont germé quelques années plus tôt, au contact de certains de ses professeurs de l’Université de Berlin, d’Alexander Crummell et surtout, en effectuant une étude de terrain sur la communauté noire de Philadelphie. Du Bois réalise alors l’ampleur des injustices dont sont victimes les Noirs et contre lesquelles la bonne volonté et le travail acharné ne peuvent rien. / William Edward Burghardt Du Bois published The Souls of Black Folk in 1903. Du Bois pursued three different goals when he wrote his masterpiece. First, he argued that Booker T. Washington’s strategy of trading political rights for economic opportunities was not the best way to improve the condition of African Americans. Second, Du Bois highlighted the accomplishments and distinctive abilities of his people in order to undermine the pretended biological and moral superiority of Whites that often justified the pushback against equal rights for all. Third, Du Bois wished to inspire Americans to become better citizens by compelling his fellow countrymen to embrace the Founding Fathers’ ideals and higher moral standards. The writing of The Souls of Black Folk marks an important shift in Du Bois’ intellectual life because he recants the accommodationist rhetoric of his youth during this period. Some of the ideas introduced in The Souls of Black Folk can be traced back to the influence of Alexander Crummell and of Du Bois’ teachers at the University of Berlin. However, it is Du Bois’s field work in the black community of Philadelphia that made him realize both the degree of the inequalities faced by African Americans and the fact that hard work and enthusiasm are not enough to overcome such significant disparities.