A Tese problematiza o aspecto estético, ético e pedagógico do Ilê axé Oya Gbembale em Goiânia. Propõe-se compreender o Terreiro de Candomblé como espaço de aprendizagem, onde o trágico ganha um contorno pela sua plasticidade, movimento e complexidade que povoa o Cotidiano e a vida do Povo do Santo. Assim, a Educação no Axé ganha uma dimensão política e epistemológica na medida em que as vozes do Terreiro se revelam formando uma ética e uma estética do estar – junto, edificando uma Pedagogia que se constrói na experiência vivida e partilhada com a tribo do Candomblé. Intensifica-se assim, os laços existentes entre os vários aspectos da iniciação pedagógica e do mimetismo, dando um contorno a essa tragédia que faz do Candomblé um espaço vital, alegre e festivo, instaurando aí uma viscosidade nas relações humanas fruto das relações pedagógicas, ontológicas e existenciais entre os Pais e Filhos de Santo. No entanto, a Tese versa-se em torno de um relato que testemunha a gestão de uma vida e das relações dionisíacas que estabeleci com o Povo do Santo, a partir das jornadas que percorri desde o meu processo- de- iniciaçãopedag ógica, entregando-me a essa sensibilidade diante dos signos do Candomblé. Assim, tento decifrar o espaço sagrado e mitológico dos Orixás. Proponho, em outras palavras, mostrar a voz do Terreiro, dentro de uma magia fruto da conjunção humana que é tecida no interior do Terreiro e que faz dessa religião uma verdadeira obra de arte. Estabeleço um entrelaçamento entre a Antropologia Filosófica e a Educação, penetrando nas encruzilhadas teóricas de Michel Maffesoli, Martin Heidegger, Edgar Morin, Georges Balandier, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Gilbert Durand e René Girard. / The Thesis discusses about the esthetical, ethical and pedagogical aspect of Ilê axé Oyá Gbembale in Goiânia. It purposes to comprehend the "Yard of Ritual" of Candomblé as a space for learning, where the tragic gets an outline by its plasticity, movement and complexity which fills up the Holy People everyday and life. Thus, education according to Axé gets a political and epistemological dimension while the voices of the "Yard of ritual" reveal themselves forming ethics and esthetics of being - together, building the pedagogy that is constituted through the living and sharing experience with the tribe of Candomblé. It intensifies like this, the links among the several aspects of the pedagogical initiation, of mimetiza, giving appearance to this tragedy that turns Candomblé a vital space, happy and festive, establishing then a viscosity in the human relationship as a product of the pedagogical, ontological and existential relationship between "Parents and Children from Saints". However, the Thesis studies about a description which testifies a gestion of a life and of the dionysical relationship that I established with the Holy People, it starts from the journey that I went through since my pedagogical-process-of-initiation, handing me over this sensibility before the signs of Candomblé. Thus, I try to decipher the mythological and sacred space of the Orixás. I purpose, in other words, to show the voice of the "Yard of ritual", into a magic as a result of the human conjunction that is formed inside the "Yard of ritual" and that turns this religion a true art work. I establish a mixing up among the Philosophical Anthropology and the Education, going into the theorical cross-roads of Michel Maffesoli, Martin Heidegger, Edgar Morin, Georges Balandier, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Gilbert Durand e René Girard.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:06:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Daniel Rodrigues.pdf: 929080 bytes, checksum: da4db89bfdec7ec99ff5836ad5b5327e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-07-02 / The together-belongingness (Zusammengehörigkeit) of Be-ing and man is discussed in this dissertation in the style of a Phenomenological reflection the together-belongingness (Zusammengehörigkeit) of Be-ing and man. It treats of a concept which appears explicitily in the phenomenological thought of Martin Heidegger, especially, beginning in the 30s, when he questioned the meaning of Truth according to the history of Be-ing, that is, as enowning (Ereignis). The reflection, however, begins with the presupposition together-belongingness is a notion present in the thought of Heidegger from the outset of the fundamental-ontological development of the question of Be-ing, represented principally by the primary work of 1927, Sein und Zeit. For this reason, the reflection begins discussing the unity of the thought itinerary of Heidegger, showing that the reversal of the thinking (Kehre) of the 30s is responsible for the transformation which establishes the same question of Be-ing in a more originating extent than that of Sein und Zeit. Admitting from the beginning that together-belongingness translates the mutual reference between Be-ing and man, coming from the primordial unity, in dependence upon which both bring about historically their essence, and not a secondary and posterior relation between two self-subsisting poles, the discussion proceeds determining the structures of human existence, by which together-belongingness is considered in the different levels of elaboration of the question of Be-ing. Consequently, the central thrust of the dissertation is summarized in limiting the spatial-temporal ambience of the common reference. In the first place, attention is given to the analyses of the comprehension-interpretation project of human existence and language, according to Sein und Zeit. Then, according to Beiträge zur Philosophie, the same ambience is limited taking into consideration the grounding of Da-sein as the intermediary dimension between man and Be-ing, it being the instance of supportability of happening of Truth. Finally, the projection of human existence is revealed as the leap of Be-ing, in such a manner that movement of realization of the essence of Be-ing is shown as being the same as the consummation of the historical existence of men. Thus, the coming about of the Truth, by which Be-ing is experienced as abysmal grounding, is coordinated with the historical coming about of human existence, granting it, in virtue of the depth of its grounding, a unitary movement of revealing and of hiding the mystery of Be-ing. Being that this coordination is the manifestation of the originating space and time, human existence appears as the establishment of the space-time dimension of the abyss of Being, always in agreement with an historical possibility. In this way, the together-belongingness appears as an historical sending-forth, in the form of a questioning which Be-ing directs to man, but which is consumed in the measure which man responds, or as it may be, assumes the responsibility for the destiny of his existence according to the appeals of Be-ing. Thus, thought, understood as a human faculty during all of the history of metaphysics, is reduced to its essence: that by which man corresponds to the historical appeals of Be-ing. To think consumes the intimate reference of man to Be-ing and, therefore, is the privileged manner of placing in operation human existence in union with Be-ing. By means of thought, therefore, man has understood himself separated from and in front of Be-ing. For that reason, the reflection of this dissertation is a path in search of the forgotten unity between man and Be-ing. / Discute-se nessa dissertação, ao modo de uma reflexão fenomenológica, a co-pertinência (Zusammengehörigkeit) entre Ser e homem. Trata-se de um conceito que aparece explicitamente no pensamento fenomenológico de Martin Heidegger, sobretudo a partir dos anos 30, quando o pensamento heideggeriano interroga o sentido da Verdade segundo a história do Ser, isto é, como Ereignis. A reflexão, entretanto, parte do pressuposto de que a co-pertinência é uma noção presente no pensamento de Heidegger desde o desenvolvimento fundamental-ontológico da questão do Ser, representado principalmente pela obra capital de 1927, Sein und Zeit. Por essa razão, a reflexão principia discutindo a unidade do itinerário de pensamento de Heidegger, mostrando que a viragem (Kehre) dos anos 30 é responsável por uma transformação que instaura a mesma questão do Ser em um âmbito mais originário que aquele de Sein und Zeit. Admitindo desde o início que a co-pertinência traduz a mútua referência entre Ser e o homem, advinda da unidade primordial, em dependência da qual ambos realizam historicamente sua essência, e não uma relação secundária e posterior entre dois pólos subsistentes em si, a discussão prossegue explicitando as estruturas da existência humana, pelas quais a co-pertinência é abordada nos diferentes níveis de elaboração da questão do Ser. Nesse sentido, o esforço central da dissertação se resume em circunscrever a ambiência espaço-temporal da mútua referência. Primeiramente, privilegiam-se as análises do projeto compreensivo-interpretativo da existência humana e da linguagem, conforme Sein und Zeit. Depois, conforme os Beiträge zur Philosophie, a mesma ambiência é circunscrita tendo em vista a fundação do Da-sein como a dimensão intermediária entre homem e Ser, por ser a instância de suportabilidade do acontecimento da Verdade. Ao final, o projetar-se da existência humana se desvela como um lance do Ser, de tal maneira que o movimento de realização da Essência do Ser se mostra como sendo o mesmo da consumação da existência histórica dos homens. Assim, o acontecer da Verdade, pelo qual o Ser se dá como fundamento abissal, conjuga-se com o acontecer histórico da existência humana, conferindo a ela, em virtude da abissalidade de seu fundamento, um movimento unitário de abrir e de velar o mistério do Ser. Sendo essa conjunção a manifestação do espaço e tempo originários, o existir humano aparece como a instauração do espaço-temporal do abismo do Ser, sempre em consonância com uma possibilidade histórica. Desse modo, a co-pertinência aparece como um envio histórico, na forma de uma interpelação que o Ser dirige ao homem, mas que se consuma à medida que o homem responde, ou seja, responsabiliza-se pela destinação de sua existência segundo os apelos do Ser. Assim, o pensamento, compreendido como uma faculdade humana durante toda a história da metafísica, é reconduzido a sua essência: aquilo pelo qual o homem corresponde aos apelos históricos do Ser. Pensar consuma a íntima referência do homem ao Ser e, portanto, é o modo privilegiado de pôr em obra a existência humana em unidade com o Ser. Pelo pensamento, porém, o homem tem se compreendido separado e diante do Ser. Por isso, a reflexão dessa dissertação é um caminho em busca da unidade esquecida entre homem e Ser.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Felipe Netto Lauer.pdf: 575327 bytes, checksum: 6022e98d212cd348ccaf658ccf21811a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-03 / Fundação Araucária / The conductive thread of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger s phenomenological investigations is the concept of intentionality; his analysis has for purpose to solve the fundamental methodological problem concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience (Erlebnis). So that it becomes clear, it is necessary to consider him formally. In Husserl, the sphere of lived experience is the one of the pure ego or pure consciousness, and the intentionality is understood as intentionality of consciousness; in Heidegger, it is treated of what denominated factical life or existence of Dasein, in that the intentionality designates the type of comportment that the human existence maintains in relation to itself and to the world. This work seeks a critical confrontation among the two positions, pointing out the heideggerian concern with the inadequacies of the theoretical attitude and her form of conceiving the field of the formal, towards an investigation concerning the nature and the formation of the concepts and philosophical statements as formal indications. / O fio condutor das investigações fenomenológicas de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger é o conceito de intencionalidade; sua análise tem por finalidade resolver o problema metodológico fundamental acerca do modo de abrir cientificamente a esfera dos vividos (Erlebnis). Para que se torne claro, é necessário considerá-lo formalmente. Em Husserl, a esfera dos vividos é a do ego puro ou consciência pura, e a intencionalidade é compreendida como intencionalidade da consciência; em Heidegger, trata-se do que denominou vida ou existência fáctica do Dasein, em que a intencionalidade designa o tipo de comportamento que a existência humana mantém em relação a si e para com o mundo. Este trabalho visa um confronto crítico entre as duas posições, salientando a preocupação heideggeriana com as insuficiências da atitude teorética e sua forma de conceber o campo do formal, em direção a uma investigação acerca da natureza e da formação dos conceitos e enunciados filosóficos como indicações formais.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariza A S Vial Ferronatto.pdf: 566092 bytes, checksum: d06d4345d1c983654cc6cf54aba15af9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-19 / The proposal of this work has as conducting wire the inquiry of the following question: how it is possible that the notion of difference, present on the Heraclitu's fragments, can, at the same time, underlie an ontic sense of world, like the conceived by Nietzsche, and the ontologic sense of world, conceived by Heidegger? The reading of the selected bibliography indicates the possibility of exploration of the hypothesis that, as readers of Heraclitus, Nietzsche and Heidegger agree when identifying the difference as relation; however, they diverge when it refers to the dimension in wich this relation effectively happen. With the objective to underlie the hypothesis proposed, the work was divided in three distinct stages, but related. The first chapter dedicates to analyze the heideggerian reading of the fragments 16, 123, and 51 (DK) of Heraclitus. Taking as starting point these three fragments, it intendes to clarify the direction of the reading and the Heidegger's intention when approaching them. The second chapter intends to point the heraclitian theories present in the nietzschian thought and to elucidate this relation through an interpretative analysis of the Nietzsche's texts where this relation makes itself present. The third chapter aims to demonstrate that Heidegger and Nietzsche find in Heraclitus a central fundamental concept: the question of the difference seen as relation, that is used by both as essential nexus for explicitation of his theories. To conclude, it makes a reevaluation of the dimension where the use of the notion of difference as relation effectively happen. / A proposta deste trabalho tem como fio condutor a investigação da seguinte questão: como é possível que a noção de diferença, presente nos fragmentos de Heráclito, possa, ao mesmo tempo, fundamentar um sentido ôntico de mundo, como o concebido por Nietzsche, e o sentido ontológico de mundo, concebido por Heidegger? A leitura da bibliografia selecionada indica a possibilidade de exploração da hipótese de que, como leitores de Heráclito, Nietzsche e Heidegger concordam ao identificar a diferença como relação; porém, divergem quanto à dimensão em que essa relação se efetiva. Com o objetivo de fundamentar a hipótese proposta, o trabalho se divide em três etapas distintas, mas relacionadas. O primeiro capítulo dedica-se a analisar a leitura heideggeriana dos fragmentos 16, 123, e 51 (DK) de Heráclito. Tomando como ponto de partida estes três fragmentos, pretende-se esclarecer o sentido da leitura e o propósito de Heidegger ao abordá-los. O segundo capítulo pretende apontar as teorias heraclitianas presentes no pensamento nietzschiano e elucidar essa relação através de uma análise interpretativa dos textos de Nietzsche onde esta se faz presente. O terceiro capítulo procura demonstrar que Heidegger e Nietzsche encontram em Heráclito um conceito fundamental central: a questão da diferença vista como relação, que é utilizada por ambos como nexo essencial para explicitação de suas teorias. À guisa de conclusão, reavalia-se a dimensão em que se efetiva o emprego da noção de diferença como relação.

In this dissertation, I argue that Yves Bonnefoy, a major 20th-century French poet and a heir to French poetic modernity, pursued the dialogue between poetry and painting that has been central to French poetry, and in doing so praised some specific artists in the 20th century in a coherent manner, outlining what I call a counter-history of 20th century art. This counter-history, I argue, reveals his fundamental opposition to modern art. What emerges from the study of his prose writings on 20th-century art is the fact that Bonnefoy continued modernity yet critiqued it. In doing so he was influenced philosophically by Heidegger and poetically by Baudelaire, and also marked by his break with Surrealism and Breton. This leads me to conclude that Bonnefoy was a sort of "antimodern"; and that he laid out the foundations of an "antimodern" vision of 20th-century art. My research reveals a coherent family of artists emerging from Bonnefoy's writings, who saw themselves as part of this alternative art history.

This dissertation addresses a challenge facing Michel Foucault’s conception of systemic power, a challenge I call ‘the problem of organization.’ Foucault argues that power is exercised through systems (‘dispositifs’) that are made up of various elements, such as institutions, procedures, techniques, and discourses, that co-operate in the execution of strategies of mastery and control. However, this view gives rise to a question: What accounts for the organization in purpose and function exhibited by systems of power, such as the criminal justice system or the public health apparatus, if the strategies they put into operation are not consciously arranged or centrally coordinated by any specific person or group? I argue that Foucault answers this challenge by conceiving such systems as technological, drawing on accounts of technology found in the work of Georges Canguilhem, Martin Heidegger, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Foucault holds that this organization emerges not in accordance with a conscious plan, as in a conspiracy, nor through an evolutionary process, as in an organism, but instead, like in a technology, through the decentralized coordination made possible by the production and circulation of knowledge.

No description available.

Avec la phénoménologie, naît une nouvelle idée de la raison qui, au-delà de l’alternative du rationalisme et de l’irrationalisme et contre sa réduction kantienne à une faculté, est redéfinie à l’aune de l’expérience qu’elle permet de décrire. Mais la difficulté survient lorsqu’il s’agit d’atteindre la raison de l’expérience sensible elle-même, en son irréductibilité à toute exigence rationnelle - en son caractère particulier, complexe, lacunaire ou indéterminé. Dès lors, à quelles conditions peut-on penser une logique du sensible, sans aussitôt trahir le sensible ou perdre la raison ? Le projet husserlien d’une « logique-du-monde » exige en sa compréhension comme en son renouvellement, une réévaluation des concepts de « raison » et de « sensibilité ». Notre travail consiste donc en l’étude problématique et critique de ces concepts, depuis deux moments de leur déploiement :leur inauguration husserlienne et leur radicalisation lévinassienne. Le choix de ces deux oeuvres a pour intérêt historique de mesurer l’ampleur de l’élargissement phénoménologique de la raison – d’une conception« intellectualiste » de la sensibilité chez Husserl à sa profondeur lévinassienne ; et pour intérêt problématique de mener le problème à son terme et dans ses dernières contrées, là où le sensible n’apparaît plus comme pétri de sens mais dans son irrationalité même, là où la sensibilité n’est plus la saisie perceptive d’une identité mais l’expérience affective radicale d’une exposition à l’altérité. C’est donc en sa fondamentale équivocité que la sensibilité doit se faire le lieu d’une épreuve renouvelée de la raison, le principe critique de la rationalité mobilisée par sa description. / A new idea of reason was born with phenomenology. Beyond the opposition between rationalism andirrationalism, and against its Kantian reduction to a faculty, reason is redefined in the light of the experiencethat it enables to describe. But the difficulty arises when we attempt to reach the rationality of the sensibleexperience itself, in its own irreducibility to the demands of reason - in its irreducible peculiarity, complexity,lack and indetermination. Under which conditions can we think a logic of the sensible without betrayingsensibility or compromising reason? Husserl’s project of a “logic-of-the-world” requires, in its understandingas in its renewal, a reevaluation of the concepts of “reason” and “sensibility”. This dissertation consists in acritical study of these concepts, from these two main moments of their unfolding: their Husserlian inaugurationand their Levinassian radicalization. From a historical point of view, this choice enables us to assess thisphenomenological extension of reason - from an intellectual conception of sensibility in Husserl, to itsLevinassian depth. From a problematical point of view, this choice enables us to lead the problem to its finalterms, where the sensible is not made of meaning anymore, but appears in its very irrationality - whensensibility is not the perceptive grasp of an identity, but an affective exposure to otherness. Thought in itsfundamental equivocity, sensibility must be the place of a renewed challenge of reason, the critical principle ofthe rationality used by its description.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Vaccinations are an important step in preventing childhood illnesses and disease outbreaks in the community. Complete immunizations before school assure eligibility for enrollment and protect children against severe illness. The fact that foreign-born children of Latino immigrants face health disparities in receiving vaccinations is well documented. However, there is little information in the literature about the actual experience of immigrants facing the complexities of the health system, and through their eyes, which factors ultimately affect vaccination rates of immigrant Latino children. The purpose of this study is to give voice to Latino immigrant families who have recently immigrated to the United States, in terms of the issues they encountered when engaging the health care system for vaccinations.

La thèse interroge le sens et la portée de l’historicité de l’existence à partir de l’œuvre de Dilthey et de sa lecture par Heidegger :qu’est-ce qu’être historique et quelles sont les conséquences d’une telle historicité pour la pensée philosophique ?L’approche diltheyenne d’une telle question repose sur une « psychologie concrète » qui en tentant de saisir la vie dans sa Faktizität s’engage sur la voie d’une anthropologie historique. L’interrogation psychologique et historique de Dilthey est radicalisée par Heidegger, qui reprend la question de l’historicité à partir de son enracinement dans l’« être » de l’existence, c’est-à-dire également à l’horizon d’une pensée renouvelée de la temporalité. Cette dernière conduit au seuil d’une conception de l’« événementialité » de la vie qui, tout en rompant avec Dilthey, permet de réviser les grands thèmes de ce dernier. Le travail de recherche se penche notamment sur le passage d’une herméneutique philosophique à une philosophie herméneutique intégrant l’historicité de l’existence jusque dans la dimension première du sens. Est également examiné le réinvestissement, par cette herméneutique repensée à l’aune d’un concept radicalisé d’historicité, de certains thèmes et concepts de l’herméneutique diltheyenne. La question de savoir comment la philosophie doit assumer sa propre historicité peut dès lors être reprise. Tandis que Dilthey répond à la mise en cause de la possibilité de la métaphysique par l’histoire à travers l’élaboration d’une doctrine de la vision du monde, Heidegger procède à une radicalisation transcendantale du concept d’histoire – cette dernière étant toutefois appelée à être renversée au bénéfice de l’événement.<p><p>The Dissertation investigates the historicity of existence, its meaning and impact, from Wilhelm Dilthey’s Works and Heidegger’s reading of it: What does being historical mean, and what are the consequences of this historicity on philosophical thought? Dilthey’s approach to this problem is based on a “concrete psychology” which, by developing the implications of the facticity of life, leads to an historical anthropology. Heidegger radicalizes this psychological and historical Diltheyan questioning by reconsidering the problem of historicity from the point of view of the “being” of existence, which also involves a renewed conception of temporality. The latter leads to the threshold of a conception of life as “eventiality” which means both a break with Dilthey and the possibility of taking over an improved version of Dilthey’s major issues. The research examines in particular the transition from a philosophical hermeneutics to a hermeneutic philosophy based on the acknowledgment of the radical historicity of life. Heidegger’s appropriation of Diltheyan themes and concepts in the context of this transition is analyzed in a detailed manner. Finally, the question is raised how philosophy has to deal with its historicity. Dilthey’s response to the historical undermining of the very possibility of metaphysics consists in the development of a doctrine of worldviews. Heidegger carries out a transcendental radicalization of the concept of history – the latter however being soon anew reversed for the benefit of the “event”.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished