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À l’heure où l’on parle de « banalisation » du droit administratif, une réflexion sur ce qui fait spécificité de ce droit, son exorbitance, présente un intérêt renouvelé. Les prérogatives de puissance publique sont au cœur de cette problématique. Notre étude permet de démontrer que les prérogatives de puissance publique entrent dans la catégorie des notions fonctionnelles. Cependant, nos recherches ne nous permettent pas d’affirmer avec fermeté que les prérogatives de puissance publique sont une notion conceptuelle. Il n’y a pas de critère général des dites prérogatives, elles sont diffuses et contingentes. Elles n’ont pas un contenu abstraitement déterminé une fois pour toutes. Leur contenu vit au rythme des évolutions du droit administratif. Nous pouvons cependant, essayer de donner une définition socle, c’est-à-dire une définition qui regrouperait une grande majorité des prérogatives, sans pour autant les regrouper toutes. Les prérogatives de puissance publique seraient alors, dans leur majorité – idée de noyau dur – et non dans leur globalité, définies comme des moyens d’action ou de protection exorbitants du droit commun, résultant de la puissance publique, détenus par une personne chargée de l’action administrative, en vue de satisfaire l’intérêt général. Cette définition socle présente cependant certaines imprécisions. Il apparaît alors que les prérogatives ne sont pas dans leur globalité une notion conceptuelle. / At a time when administrative law has become « common place », it is with a renewed interest that one should to ponder about the specificity of this law, its outrageousness. The prerogatives of the public authorities are at the heart of this issue. Our study will show that the prerogatives of the public authorities are within the scope of the functional notions. However, despite our research, we cannot firmly assert that the prerogatives of the public authorities are a conceptual notion. No general criteria can define these prerogatives as they are diffused and contingent. They do not have an abstractly determined content once for all. Their content changes with the evolution of administrative law. We can, however, try to give a definition as a basis, that is to say a definition which would gather a majority of prerogatives, without including them all. The prerogatives of the public authorities would then be defined, for most of them – concept of hard core – and not in their totality, as outrageous means of action or of protection of the ordinary law, resulting from the public authorities, held by a person in charge of administrative action so as to satisfy the general interest. Yet, this definition as a basis contains some inaccuracies. That is why the prerogatives then are not a conceptual notion in their totality.

In the paper Legal Liability from the Point of View of Normativist and Democratic Law Concepts concept of liability is briefly described. Social liability and its kinds are analysed. Legal liability is distinguished like a separate kind from the social liability, featuring a unique obligatory legal definition sign. Its application is assured by the state. Kinds of legal liability analysed: positive and tortious (negative) legal liability. Basis for occurrence of legal liability are described. Dependence of the legal liability upon the legal system of a state is described in the paper. In the non-democratic states, where the laws become a tool for the rulers to give law to the masses, other kinds of social liability, e.g. moral liability, contradict with the legal liability. All kinds of the social liability, except the legal liability, feature no forced measures applicable upon the violator. It is stressed that the non-democratic legal systems fail to accept the positive legal liability. Unsuccessful efforts of the Soviet law theoreticians to introduce the concept of positive legal liability into the law science are mentioned. Tortious legal liability is a sequel and guarantee of the positive liability. Therefore it is the secondary and the positive liability is the primary (main) form of the legal liability. It becomes especially vivid in the democratic society, when its right ceases being repressive and implementation of the positive law is first of all assured by the... [to full text]

Dans la plupart des disciplines juridiques, le motif légitime se présente comme un standard de justification des actes. Il fait obstacle à l’application de la norme, en fondant un droit ou en exonérant d’un devoir. Le droit pénal se montre réticent à l’endroit de cette notion floue qui connaît pourtant un essor sans précédent. Afin de justifier la marge d’appréciation laissée au juge, le motif légitime est généralement conçu comme un mobile, ce qui accentue la confusion entre les causes objectives et subjectives d’irresponsabilité. L’insuffisance de l’approche formelle du mécanisme justificatif explique sa subjectivation progressive. L’analyse du motif légitime suppose de revisiter la théorie de la justification à travers une conception substantielle de l’illicéité, apte à unifier son régime. L’étude de la finalité justificative du motif légitime permet de mieux comprendre la souplesse de ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Le motif légitime renverse la présomption d’illicéité fondant la responsabilité. Le jugement de valeur porté sur l’infraction est la raison d’être du reproche social. Elle se distingue de son attribution à l’auteur qui relève d’un jugement de réalité sur sa volonté. Le motif légitime procède des circonstances extérieures à l’infraction autorisant la vérification concrète de son illicéité. La nature objective du motif légitime est conforme à son effet exonératoire de responsabilité opérant in rem et non in personam. Ses conditions d’application semblent, en revanche, doublement dérogatoires au droit commun de la justification, tant à l’égard de ses critères larges que de son domaine étroit. Il est cantonné à des infractions de risque abstrait pour des valeurs secondaires dont la présomption d’illicéité est artificielle. Le prévenu doit rapporter la preuve de la légitimité concrète de son acte, alors que la légitimité abstraite de la répression est sujette à caution. L’expansion de ce domaine dérogatoire de la répression révèle l’insuffisant contrôle de sa nécessité abstraite. En tout état de cause, la mention spéciale du motif légitime est inutile car toute infraction en fait implicitement réserve, en sorte qu’il se conçoit comme un standard général de justification. Il confère au juge la libre appréciation de la nécessité concrète de la répression, au regard du contexte de chaque espèce qui échappe par nature à la loi ne pouvant régler a priori tous les conflits de valeurs. La justification a postériori des infractions socialement nécessaires ou insignifiantes renforce l’autorité de la loi en garantissant une application conforme à sa finalité de protection des valeurs. / In many legal disciplines, the legitimate reason is a model of justification of acts. The legitimate reason prevents the enforcement of the law, either by creating a right or by exempting someone from a duty. Despite an unprecedented boom, criminal law is hesitant about this vague notion. In order to justify judges' assessment margin, the legitimate reason is commonly considered as a motive. This accentuates the confusion between objective and subjective causes of irresponsibility. The formal approach of the justificatory process is inadequate, making the process increasingly biased. The analysis of the legitimate reason requires a re-examination of the justification theory using a solid understanding of unlawfulness which can help standardize its implementation. The study of the legitimate reason’s justificatory function allows a better understanding of the flexibility of its implementation requirements. The legitimate reason reverses the presumption of unlawfulness on which liability is based. The cause of liability is conditioned by the value judgment made about the offence, whereas the judgment of the reality of the offender’s intention is the condition of his imputation. The legitimate reason stems from circumstances that are external to the offence, and which enable the review of its lawfulness. The objective nature of the legitimate reason is aligned with the fact that it exempts from liability in rem and not in personam. However, the requirements for its application seem exceptional to the common law of justification in two regards: its broad criteria and its narrow field. It is limited to offences of abstract risk that protect secondary values for which the presumption of unlawfulness is artificial. The defendant must prove the legitimacy of his act whereas the abstract legitimacy of the suppression is unconfirmed. The expansion of this dispensatory field of suppression reveals an inadequate control of its abstract necessity. In any case, bringing up legitimate reason is useless as it is implicit to any offence and is considered as a general model of justification. It leaves the judge free to assess the necessity of the penalty on a case by case basis, as the law, by nature, cannot resolve all value conflicts. The post facto justification of socially necessary offences or even trivial offences reinforces the authority of the law by ensuring an enforcement that is aligned with the law's aim of protecting values.

1 Abstract - Administrative penalties and protection measures Description of all administrative penalties and protection measures is the primary goal of this thesis. Due to wide extent of chosen subject, this work aims to individual categories of administrative penalties and protection measures, examines every single condition for its imposition a notices possible contradiction within legislation. The thesis does not include the criteria for imposing penalties, noticed set from section 37 till section 44 Contraventions Act which serve as instruments for determination and length of penalties. Concurrence of contraventions is also not included. In the opening chapter the definition and description of an administrative liability is described as well as basic issues of administrative penalization, considered to be a part of administrative authority's activity. The resemblance of principles of criminal and contravention law is described, that leads to using the same principles either in criminal and contravention law. There's explored what basic sources of administrative penalization are. Each of following chapters describes one of the penalties set in section 35 Contravention Act. Every chapter begins with general description of the penalty and then depicts its main purpose for which it is imposed. Then...