A governança corporativa visa aumentar a probabilidade dos fornecedores de recursos garantirem para si o retorno sobre seu investimento, por meio de um conjunto de mecanismos no qual se inclui o Conselho de Administração. O tema possui importância crescente, por ser bem difundida a hipótese de que a estrutura de governança afeta o valor da empresa. A questão é descobrir se existe uma estrutura de governança corporativa "melhor" ou "ideal". Vários códigos de governança foram elaborados com este intuito. No Brasil, destacam-se os códigos do Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa (IBGC) e da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). Esta dissertação investiga se a estrutura de governança corporativa foi relevante para as companhias abertas brasileiras de 1998 a 2000 e se as companhias adequadas às recomendações do IBGC e da CVM alcançaram maior valor de mercado ou melhor desempenho. Três variáveis de governança foram consideradas: separação dos cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho (DE), tamanho do conselho (TOT) e independência do conselho (INDEP). Utilizou-se uma regressão múltipla do tipo seção transversal entre as variáveis dependentes de valor e desempenho e as variáveis independentes de governança corporativa. A variável diretor executivo como presidente do conselho (DE) apresentou os resultados mais importantes, com forte evidência de que, em média, as empresas que têm pessoas distintas ocupando os cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho são mais valorizadas pelo mercado. A variável tamanho do conselho (TOT) apresentou uma relação certamente não linear, sugerindo que as empresas com um número intermediário de conselheiros alcançam melhor desempenho. A variável independência do conselho (INDEP) não apresentou relação significativa contra as variáveis de valor e desempenho. / Corporate governance seeks to increase the probability that suppliers of financial resources will assure themselves the return on their investment through a set of mechanisms including the Board of Directors. The subject has growing importance, because it is well spread the hypothesis that corporate governance affects firm value. The question is to find out if there is a "better" or "ideal" corporate governance structure for the firm. Several corporate governance codes were prepared with this purpose. In Brazil, we highlight the IBGC (Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance) and the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) codes. This dissertation investigates if the corporate governance structure was important to Brazilian listed companies from 1998 to 2000 and if the companies more adjusted to the IBGC and CVM recommendations achieved higher market value or superior performance. Three governance variables were considered: the separation of chief executive officer and chairman positions (DE), board size (TOT), and board independence (INDEP). The multiple regression method with cross sectional data was applied between firm value and performance dependent variables and corporate governance independent variables. The variable chief executive officer as chairman (DE) has showed the most important results, with strong evidence that, on average, firms with different people in charge of the chief executive officer and chairman positions have higher market value than the others. The variable board size (TOT) has showed a clear non linear relation, suggesting that firms with an intermediate number of directors achieve superior performance. The variable independence of the board (INDEP) has not showed a significant relation against the variables of value and performance.

The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect. / Business Administration

本研究之目的可分為二，第一個是希望探討具有不同特性之仲介員，在交易過程中是否有某些特性對於議價能力有顯著影響。第二個目的，希望探討在不同房屋類型之交易案件中，是否由更為適任之仲介員經手交易，能獲得更好的成果。透過模型設計，將特徵價格模型配合本研究目的加以修改，以實證迴歸分析那些仲介員特性更能夠在交易過程中，展現議價能力使買家提高願付價格（willingness to pay），讓委託人取得更好之賣價，同時也為公司創造更高價值。 根據實證結果顯示，仲介員性別、年齡對於議價達成率所產生的影響並不顯著，教育水準、年資與血型才是影響議價達成率的關鍵。仲介員教育程度越高議價能力越強，也越能達成委託人所委託之目標。同時本研究也發現年資高之仲介員容易產生代理人問題（agency problem），年資高之仲介員傾向於利用訊息優勢，左右買賣雙方之交易決策，使交易價格降低，不但背離委託人初衷，亦對公司造成負面影響。另一方面，血型為AB型之仲介員在議價能力上的表現最佳，該類仲介員普遍具有好的協商能力、邏輯分析能力，其次是順從、負責的A型仲介員，表現最差的反而是一般認為積極熱情的B型與O型。 / There are two purposes of this article. The first one is to identify the correlation between characteristics of a real estate agent and power of negotiation/bargain. The second one is to find if there are some characteristics of a real estate agent that are more suitable for dealing certain type of housing, including apartment, mansion and high-rise. Using the method of hedonic house pricing as a basic model, the article takes a bargain rate as dependent variable instead of housing prices, while characteristics of real estate agents are included in independent variables. It should be noted that higher bargain rate means greater power of negotiation. The results of this article are (a) education, blood type are positively significant, (b) seniority is negatively significant, (c) gender, age, astrology are not. It is also found that there are agency problems in housing markets since agents with more seniority are more likely to have poor power of negotiation, which is opposite of our expectations. The study findings may serve as a guide for further research on management and leadership of real estate industries.

在經營權與所有權分離的企業經營環境中，權益基礎薪酬扮演著連結股東與經理人利益之重要角色。本研究旨在探討經理人權益基礎薪酬與企業策略聯盟行為間之關聯性，並進一步檢視權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成、策略聯盟數目、類別及跨產業聯盟與否之影響。本研究以2003年至2013年美國上市櫃公司為樣本，研究結果顯示經理人權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成有正向影響。給予經理人較高比重權益基礎薪酬之企業，不僅形成策略聯盟之機率較高，且形成策略聯盟之次數亦較多。再者，給予經理人權益基礎薪酬較高比重之企業，其形成研發聯盟之可能性較高，且更傾向於形成同產業間策略聯盟。

本研究主要在探究專利權對於高階經理人薪酬制度之影響，並提出以下之假說：(1)專利權與高階經理人之現金薪酬有正向關係；(2)專利權與高階經理人之年度股票薪酬有正向關係；(3)專利權與高階經理人之年度總薪酬有正向關係；(4)專利權與高階經理人之股票薪酬所佔總薪酬比例有正向關係。 本文以美國製造業的高階經理人薪酬為樣本，經實證結果發現，專利權申請數、股東權益報酬率及股票報酬率對於高階經理人，無論是在現金薪酬或股票薪酬制度下，皆有顯著正向影響，此正說明在製造業的公司中，專利權對高階經理人薪酬是很重要的非財務性指標。並且，專利權亦與股票薪酬所佔總薪酬之比有顯著正向相關，也顯示有專利權的公司在對經理人的薪酬上較為偏好使用股票薪酬。 / The research is to explore the association between patent count and top management remuneration system. I hypothesize that : (1) CEO cash compensation is positively associated with patent count; (2) patent count and CEO annual stocks compensation have a positive relationship; (3) patent count is positively associated with CEO total annual pay; (4) The proportion of stock compensation in CEO pay is positively associated with patent count. Using a sample of manufacturing firms I document that patent count is positively associated with CEO compensation, consistent with my hypotheses. I also find strong evidence that patent count impacts the proportion of stock compensation in CEO pay. Overall, these findings suggest that patent count is an important non-financial indicator in CEO compensation.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-02-18T14:53:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Coser_.pdf: 1143518 bytes, checksum: 1ab49a0e3a1cd5b419cae7912e0ad87c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-18T14:53:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Coser_.pdf: 1143518 bytes, checksum: 1ab49a0e3a1cd5b419cae7912e0ad87c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-17 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / A problemática resultante da separação entre propriedade e controle do capital é direcionada, nesta pesquisa, para o nível operacional e considera o fundamento assimetria da informação. Este estudo analisou como a Governança de Tecnologia da Informação (GTI) pode contribuir para reduzir problemas de agência. A relação de agência foi delimitada entre diretores (principal) e gerentes (agente) das áreas Administrativa e Comercial. Trata-se de uma pesquisa descritiva, com abordagem qualitativa, desenvolvida por meio de um estudo de caso único em uma indústria sediada no estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Os principais resultados indicam que os problemas de agência não se limitam a informações e ações ocultas no ambiente pesquisado, mas, também, se devem a fragilidades nos recursos e fluxos de informações que suportam os processos de delegação e monitoramento de atividades entre diretores e gerentes. As principais contribuições da GTI para reduzir o problema de agência associam-se, prioritariamente, ao alinhamento entre a TI e os objetivos do negócio, nos processos de planejamento, construção, entrega e monitoramento de serviços de TI. Estas visando a padronizar processos de negócio e a reduzir a dependência humana nas etapas dos mesmos. / The resulting separation issues of ownership and control of capital is directed in this research to the operational level and considers the foundation asymmetry of information. This study examined how the Information Technology (IT) Governance can help reduce agency problems. The agency relationship was established between directors (principal) and managers (agent) of the Administrative and Commercial areas. It is a descriptive research with a qualitative approach, developed through a unique case study in an industry based in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The main results indicate that agency problems are not limited to information and hidden actions the researched environment, but also are due to weaknesses in resources and information flows supporting the delegation process and monitoring activities among directors and managers. The main contributions of the IT governance to reduce the agency problem are associated primarily to the alignment between IT and business objectives in the planning, construction, delivery and monitoring of IT services. It seeks to standardize business processes and reduce human dependence on the steps of the same.

The paper explores the driving forces behind corporate cash holdings by analyzing past literature and extending this research to the behavior of firms after the 2008 recession. I look at the cash to assets and net debt to assets ratios from October 1980 to October 2011 to obtain an understanding of the past and current state of cash holdings. A comprehensive literature review is done on agency costs and transactional motives to give the reader an overview of the costs and benefits of holding cash. This provides the foundation for the precautionary motives for companies today to keep cash as a risk management tool.

自1970年代第一部個人電腦(PC, Personal Computer)的出現，以開放的架構開啟了一連串資訊革命，改變了人們學習與工作的方式。隨後在1980年代起，整體PC產業上中下游的產業鏈也為台灣帶來了經濟上高速的成長。 這樣的高速成長在2000年後逐漸有了微妙的變化，以台灣與中國大陸為主的硬體代工供應鏈，為硬體的低價提供了穩固的後勤保障，PC硬體的品牌形象隨著PC的應用轉以網際網路內容與雲端應用而逐漸式微。在2000年中期，隨著網際網路產業的興盛更進一步加速行動化應用技術的成熟。如此的變化讓許多網際網路應用的服務提供者得以挑戰傳統PC軟體與硬體的龍頭如微軟、英特爾、惠普、戴爾與IBM的領導地位。 過去近三十年間，以PC產業為主的電子資訊產業佔據了所謂高科技與創新的舞台之際，在近年來也不斷試圖以各式創新，如硬體本身的多樣化、時尚化，與多角化措施，如轉投資雲端服務、行動裝置或多品牌策略等，試圖在新的競賽中搶佔新的席位。但在無法脫離原本業所帶來的利益與包袱之下，常有運用原有人力、資金、管理團隊與思維來啟動新事業的情形，造成轉型的困境。 筆者有幸服務於曾參與PC產業榮景的領導廠商之一，也同樣見證其與近十年主要的多角化歷程，希望藉由本研究將其多角化的動機、作法與未能成功的原因以個案方式呈現，輔以相關學理與從業經驗分析，期能為類似業者在進行多角化措施提供貼近實務的參考範例。 本研究的問題有三點:為身處高門檻高獲利的寡占廠商的分析其(1)多角化動機(2)多角化作法與(3)可能失敗的原因 透過收集整理公開資料與曾參與多角化產品行銷的人員訪談，本研究得到以 下結論(1) 企業多角化策略制定應考慮管理團隊專長 (2) 多角化產品開發應以獨立組織或合資方式進行 (3) 公司多角化策略應注意代理人問題 (4) 公司多角化策略應參考其本業的競爭優勢建立條件。 / The PC has changed the way we work and learn dramatically since it was introduced in 1970. Meantime, the information technologies have been through a continuous revolution base on the open hardware and software architecture of PC as well. Taiwan also benefits from the booming PC industry, as a key partner of PC supply chain, and has created a huge economic growth since 1980s. The landscape of PC industry has shifted gradually in early 2000s resulted from particular changes. The PC supply chain from Taiwan provides cost-effective hardware to make low-cost notebook happened and in addition to that, the internet and cloud application are altering the focus on brand image of PC hardware vendors to internet-based services providers, plus the booming internet industry has facilitated the readiness of mobile application from mid-2000s. All those changes allow the internet-based services providers to challenge the leadership of the giants from PC industry, such as Microsoft, Intel, HP, Dell and IBM. For last three decades, PC industry played the crucial role of high-tech innovation and it never stop to keep the leading positon via innovation to various and trendy ID design, diversification with cloud services, mobile devices as well as multi-brand strategies in recent years. However it is not easy to start up a new business with the benefit and limitation from original business thus the enterprise transformation would fail most likely. It’s been a pleasure for me to work for couple leading companies in PC era and witnessed part of the effort to diversification in “A company”. I expect to bring similar vendors a practical case study on the motivation, strategies and potential causes of failure of its diversification with recommendations generated from diversification theory and personal experience in field. There are three goals to this study: to analyze and find the (1) motivation of diversification (2) diversification strategy and (3) potential causes of failure, for a high profit company with high-entry barrier in oligopoly market. This study has reached the conclusions via collected and analyzed the public data and interviewed with key persons involved in diversification process of “A company”: (1) Diversification Strategy shall be incorporated with the expertise of leadership team (2) Production diversification shall be managed by an independent organization or a joint venture. (3) Diversification Strategy shall be observant to agency problem (4) Diversification Strategy shall be referred to and leveraged the elements of competition advantages in original business.

Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 / Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.

This thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, I show that information about dividends implied in derivative markets predicts future dividend growth and thereby improves the forecasts of short-run returns on the aggregate market. In the second essay, we analyze the impact of options trading on the price distribution of the underlying asset. Specifically, we show that S&P 500 futures finish in the proximity of the closest strike price on days when options on S&P 500 futures expire. We document that this effect is mainly driven by the rebalancing of delta hedges of the market maker. In the third essay, we develop a theory of price support in security markets that arises from conflict of interests, and we test our hypothesis in the context of the Spanish mutual fund industry. In particular, we analyze how bank-affiliated mutual funds trade in the stock of the parent bank and show that, consistently with the price support hypothesis, affiliated mutual funds tend to increase their holdings of the parent bank’s stock following a large drop in its price. / Esta tesis consta de tres capítulos. En el primer capítulo, muestro que la información sobre dividendos implícita en los mercados de derivados predice el crecimiento futuro de los dividendos, mejorando así las predicciones de los rendimientos a corto plazo en el mercado agregado. En el segundo capítulo, analizamos el impacto de la compraventa de opciones en la distribución del precio del activo subyacente. En concreto, mostramos que los futuros del S&P 500 terminan en el entorno del precio de ejercicio más próximo en los días en que las opciones sobre los futuros del S&P 500 expiran. Documentamos que este efecto está principalmente motivado por el reajuste de la cobertura delta de los intermediarios. En el tercer capítulo, desarrollamos una teoría de sostenimiento de precios en los mercados de valores motivado por un conflicto de intereses y testamos nuestra hipótesis en el contexto de la industria española de fondos de inversión. En concreto, analizamos cómo los fondos de inversión afiliados a un banco operan las acciones del banco matriz y mostramos que, consecuentemente con la hipótesis del sostenimiento de precios, los fondos de inversión filiales tienden a incrementar sus posiciones en las acciones del banco matriz después de una caída importante de su cotización.