Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / A partir de los textos de Hannah Arendt, La Ilustración y la cuestión judía; La asimilación original. Un epílogo con motivo del primer centenario de la muerte de Rahel Varnhagen; Salón berlinés, y Rahel Varnhagen. Vida de una mujer judía, que fueron escritos por la filósofa alemana en la década de 1930, se puede formular la siguiente hipótesis de investigación sobre estas obras: Según Arendt, el problema de la asimilación judía puede entenderse como una confrontación entre el individuo, su comunidad de origen y la sociedad europea a la que se quiere insertar. (Arendt, 2005b) (Arendt, 2010c) (Kohn & Feldman editores, 2009) Esta oposición se relaciona con la tensión entre el individuo con su judeidad (jewishness), entendida como la condición existencial que no puede ser negada, como la dotación meramente pasiva del ser, como un dato incontrovertible, como las fibras que lo constituyen, lo que no ha sido elegido: ‘lo dado’; y su judaísmo (judaism), definido como un sistema de creencias, compuesto por religión, nación, tradición, historia, folklore y cultura como pueblo judío, que puede ser aceptado o rechazado. (Kohn & Feldman editores, 2009) (Arendt, 2005a) (Arendt, 2005b) (Arendt, 2010c) Las respuestas para las dicotomías planteadas variarán según cómo el individuo enfrente el proceso de asimilación. Surgiendo dos categorías: el paria consciente y el advenedizo o parvenu. Arendt definirá como paria consciente al individuo marginado socialmente, tanto en relación a la sociedad europea como a la comunidad judía de origen, pero que sabe cuál es su status. Es honesto y afirma su condición judía y su derecho a un sitio en la vida europea. Como contrapartida surge el concepto del advenedizo, quien se caracterizará por su intento de ascender social y económicamente en la sociedad gentil o bien quien terminará convirtiéndose al cristianismo. (Arendt, 2005b) (Arendt, 2010c) (Kohn & Feldman editores, 2009) De esta forma, siguiendo los textos indicados, en esta investigación se busca desentrañar el modo como el individuo judío se asimila a la sociedad europea, a la luz de la pertenencia al judaísmo y a la judeidad, a partir de las nociones postuladas por Arendt de advenedizo y paria consciente.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:04:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo858_1.pdf: 416013 bytes, checksum: 89a3c65884546030b3ac0712313b05d4 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Universidade Federal de Pernambuco / A pluralidade é um dos baluartes da teoria política de Hannah Arendt. Perpassa a sua obra quase inteiramente. Faz-se notar desde As origens do totalitarismo, publicada em 1951, livro que deu notoriedade internacional a autora, até A vida do espírito, de 1978, póstuma; mas, é em A condição humana, de 1958, que ganha um lugar imprescindível. Seguindo as indicações desse escrito podemos caracterizar a pluralidade como à condição da ação e do discurso. Esses dois aspectos que lhe são inerentes manifestam a singularidade humana. Isto é, somente na presença de outros com e entre os quais agimos e falamos, que nos são iguais e diferentes, é que podemos ir desvelando o Quem que cada um de nós é. Isso pode significar algumas convergências com a analítica existencial heideggeriana, apesar de não tê-la necessariamente como única fonte de inspiração e de também poder apresentar alguma divergência. O Dasein nunca se dá isoladamente, ele é sempre ser-com, é co-presença e neste mesmo sentido o mundo é sempre mundo compartilhado, viver é conviver. No pensamento de Heidegger não há lugar para se pensar em um si-mesmo isolado da presença dos outros, visto que até na decisão resoluta do Dasein de assumir o peso de sua finitude, seu modo de ser mais próprio, isso se dá simultaneamente a todos os outros modos de ser. Não há como separar o ser-para-morte do ser-no-mundo e do ser-com-os-outros. Aceitando essa interpretação podemos perceber que o Dasein mesmo em seu modo de ser mais próprio, na singularização permitida pela angústia fundamental, manifesta e não nega a pluralidade que lhe é inerente. Arendt insinua essa compreensão de Heidegger a partir dos anos cinquenta. Dessa forma, pode-se assumir como possibilidade, a partir dessa reinterpretação da analítica existencial, que a noção de mundo e de Dasein como ser-nomundo e ser-com tem um papel importante para a noção de pluralidade como a paradoxal pluralidade de seres singulares , desenvolvida em A condição humana. O presente texto versa sobre essa possível aproximação entre os autores. Procuramos resgatar o legado heideggeriano sobre uma autora e um tema que cada vez mais são estudados com recorrência na contemporaneidade. A pluralidade é uma das categorias atuais mais visitadas em diversas áreas do saber, isso por causa do seu potencial de fazer refletir sobre a igualdade e o respeito às diferenças

Submitted by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2018-06-06T18:27:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1386593 bytes, checksum: 42fd891b00baed659062e846ab202f46 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2018-06-06T18:27:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1386593 bytes, checksum: 42fd891b00baed659062e846ab202f46 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2018-06-06T18:27:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1386593 bytes, checksum: 42fd891b00baed659062e846ab202f46 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-06T18:28:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1386593 bytes, checksum: 42fd891b00baed659062e846ab202f46 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-01 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta pesquisa refere-se a uma análise acerca do modo como Hannah Arendt articula a relação verdade e política na sua teoria da ação. Esse tema, dentro dessa teoria parece apontar para um debate sobre o limite da política. A hipótese que será desenvolvida é que o lugar da verdade, no texto da autora, não incorre numa pretensão normativa, de cunho platônico, mas que há momentos em que a verdade, enquanto verdade dos fatos, ao se contrapor à mentira organizada, como ameaça de destruição sistemática da realidade, mesmo não sendo política, “atua politicamente”. A “atuação política” da verdade dos fatos se faz como resistência e não como normatizadora dos negócios humanos, ou seja, ela é ocasional, frágil e consequentemente não tem a pretensão de atuar como um absoluto. A sustentação e a demonstração da hipótese de leitura passa por três eixos: o caráter excessivo da verdade filosófica, de matriz platônica, em sua pretensão normativa; os riscos da mentira organizada em torno dos elementos totalitários como a ideologia e a propaganda; e a maneira como a relação verdade e opinião se desenvolve no contexto da obra de Arendt. As análises desses elementos abrem vias para apontar para o tipo de verdade que, em política, interessa à Hannah Arendt, isto é, a verdade dos fatos. A indicação de um tipo de “atuação política” que esse tipo de verdade tem é devedora da revalorização ontológica da aparência que permite uma relação horizontal entre verdade de fato e opinião, bem como do seu tensionamento com a mentira. Assim, as verdades de fato, ao tensionarem com a mentira organizada, em virtude de seus riscos, “atuam politicamente” e resistem à máxima totalitária do “tudo é possível”. / The research refers to an analysis about how Hannah Arendt articulates the relationship truth and politics in her theory of action. This theme, seen within his theory of action, seems to point to a debate about the limit of politics. The hypothesis that will be developed is that the place of truth, in author's text, doesn’t have a normative pretension, of platonic character. But that there are times when truth, as factual truth, in countering with organized lie, as a threat of systematic destruction of reality, even not been politics, it "acts politically." A "political actuation" of the factual truth is done as resistance and not as an agent normative of human affairs. In that situation, it is occasional, fragile and consequently does not have the pretension to act as an absolute. The support and demonstration of hypothesis of reading, pass through three axes: the exaggerated character of the philosophical truth, of the platonic matrix, in its normative pretension; the risks of lying organized around of totalitarian elements as ideology and advertisement; and the way like the relationship truth and opinion were developed in the context of Arendt's work. The analyzes these elements open ways to point the kind of truth, in politics, it interests to Hannah Arendt. The truth that interests her is the factual truth. The indication of a kind of "political action" that this kind of truth has does reference at a reappraisal of ontology of appearance that permits a horizontal relationship between factual truth and opinion, and its tension with lie. Thus, the factual truth, by tension with organized lies, in virtue of their risks, it "acts politically" and resists to totalitarian maxim of "everything is possible." / Só foi apresentado título em português.

No description available.

In this work I examine the role of judgment in the writings of Hannah Arendt. I argue that consideration of this concept helps to shed light on her important contribution to political philosophy, and in particular on the often overlooked radical aspects of her work. Judgment lies at the heart of a cluster of characteristically ‘Arendtian’ themes: those of natality, plurality, narrative and the relation between political action, thought and disclosure, as well as her notions of political public space and its relation to past and future. I argue that in adapting Kant’s conception of judgment as presented in his Critique of Judgment, Arendt also inherits a problematic pair of ideas associated with it: ‘Taste’ and sensus communis. These concepts, I suggest, raise questions of authority, exclusion and participation that were already politically coded in Kant. Examining the part they came to play in Arendt’s thought helps us to see a significant problematic for a political thought that would aspire to be critical and radical. Specifically, it exposes two closely interlinked questions: that of the limits of the political (its character and distinctiveness) and that of the political subjects themselves (the notion of proper and improper political subjects). I conclude that an engagement with the role of reflective judgment in Arendt is an illuminating and important way to understand both the radical current in Arendt’s thought and the challenge faced by any radical political thought at the opening of the twenty-first century.

The thesis of this essay is to show that there is a complex and deep ground in Hannah Arendt ́s political thinking. A ground that, thru Immanuel Kant ́s first and third critiques, is going back to the thinking of the ancient Greek ideas of insight, nous, a concept used especially by Aristotle, but also by Parmenides. My idea is that Arendt ́s attempt to establish her political thinking in the idea of common sense, or in Latin:sensus communis, needs a deeper understanding, thou the use and interpretation of common sense as a concept today is deeply under influence of a liberal ideological preunderstanding; meaning the (moral) things everyone knows without any special efforts. In my view there is no chance that Arendt joins, or supports that kind of shallow interpretation of the idea of common sense, thou that would make her political thinking as banal as she accuses most of the modern politics to be, which of course is very contradictive. In other words must her understanding of the concept of common sense, sensus communis, be founded on a much deeper level, a level which we can find in her essays if we look real hard, and read as open as a real reading must be based on. Her language and her recurring references to time, gives us the leads to where to dig; to where, and through which thinking, we can find her deeper ground, a ground that hopefully will make all her political thinking clearer.

Cette thèse de maîtrise porte sur les pensées politiques de Jacques Rancière et d’Hannah Arendt. Elle a pour point de départ la critique formulée par Rancière à l’endroit d’Arendt. Dans un premier temps, nous allons explorer les diverses accusations formulées par Rancière à l’endroit de la penseuse et, dans un deuxième temps, il sera question de répondre à ces accusations en soulignant les importantes affinités qui existent entre leurs conceptions du conflit et de la théâtralité en politique. Nous constaterons en outre que le projet arendtien visant à réhabiliter la dignité de la politique ne se nourrit pas principalement de ses lectures d’Aristote, contrairement à ce que suggère Rancière, mais bien de ses lectures de Machiavel. C’est précisément à partir du machiavélisme que nous allons proposer un rapprochement entre Arendt et Rancière et ainsi, aller au-delà de leur mésentente.

This dissertation examines the potential dependence of praxis upon poiesis. The relation between praxis and poiesis, or action and work, is complicated by the conflicting qualities and principles of each. This tension, however, illuminates the human being as free and worldly. It is therefore concluded that praxis and poiesis form an interdependent tension that is potentially mediated by the faculty of judging and care for the world. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the framework and significant elements of Arendt's overall project. It begins with an elucidation of the philosophical bias against politics that Arendt critiques. The rest of the chapter explores the unique characteristics and principles that Arendt attributes to each respective activity of the vita activa. This chapter enables the reader to grasp the significance of the differences that Arendt accentuates between activities, as well as the specific characteristics and principles of action and work. Chapter 2 introduces the potential dependence of action upon the capabilities of the work activity. It centres on the relationship between action, the condition of plurality, the public space of appearance, and the durable, fabricated world. The durable world provides both a shared context and shared concern for potential action and the realisation of plurality. But this is problematic considering the extent to which the durable world arises through fabrication. This suggests that action is subordinate to the faculty of work. The problematic implications of such a relationship are further analysed, with a focus on the principles that inform homo faber's view of the world in general, and the relation between this sensibility and public spaces of appearance in particular. The contradictory principles of work and action, and yet the significance of work in building a durable world, will come to light. Chapter 3 explores further the extent of the relationship between action and world. The aim is to provide an exegesis of Arendt's notion of amor mundi, or love for the world, coupled 132 with her emphasis on the frailty of action. Amor mundi illuminates actors' concern with the world as a space for appearance and as a durable world. However, the extent to which political actors may effectively care for the world is brought into question. The faculties of promisemaking, forgiveness, and remembrance are examined as 'solutions' to the frailty of action. But remembrance once again suggests a dependence of action on work. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the relationship between praxis and poiesis in light of the role of remembrance and the tension between freedom and permanence. Chapter 4 builds on the claim that praxis and poiesis must be rethought in terms of an interdependence that reflects the nature of human being as free and worldly. It is argued that it is specifically in the faculty of judgment that this interdependence is mediated. The role of the disinterested spectator is therefore introduced and its relevance in both praxis and poiesis investigated. This faculty emphasises the importance of spectators who judge all appearances on the basis of beauty and meaning, and out of a concern for the world as a durable public space. The relation between judgment, action, and work also illuminates the condition of the human being as free and worldly, and the capacity to care for the world through the activities of both beginning and preserving. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Philosophy / unrestricted

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / Los problemas derivados del cambio climático han dejado varias cuestiones en evidencia, una de ellas, sino la más importante, apela a la premura que el tratamiento de la crisis plantea si queremos evitar un escenario de catástrofe. Sin embargo, la falta de compromiso de las autoridades políticas y económicas, la visión reduccionista que ha prevalecido como instancia resolutiva de los conflictos ambientales, así como la persistencia de un paradigma de desarrollo sustentado en un modelo de consumo indiscriminado, no parecen sintonizar con los requerimientos exigidos por uno de los mayores retos a los que se ha visto desafiada la humanidad. Además, teniendo en consideración la serie de transformaciones estructurales que el problema reclama, parece muy difícil depositar las esperanzas de cambio exclusivamente en el Estado, la ciencia o el mercado. Dicho aquello, se propone comprender la ciudadanía como una instancia capaz de generar el poder necesario para demandar a las organizaciones correspondientes la implementación de los cambios requeridos.

This dissertation takes as its founding premise that modern subjects interpret and experience the political as somehow alienating or other—as a form of experience that is not fundamental but is only significant as a means to some further end. It is common in late modern societies to think of the political as subservient to economic and social ends, and to make it so. In light of this, my dissertation addresses two major problems: the erosion of distinctly political experience in modernity and the attempt to show how such experience can be recovered. By erosion I mean both the deterioration of the “public space,” a political concept that comes from Hannah Arendt, and the general impoverishment of political discourse. I argue, with Arendt, that political experience is recoverable through articulating a concept of the public space in which the need of creating and maintaining it for the sake of political experience as an experience in which freedom can arise. The dissertation is therefore an interpretation and extension of Arendt’s political thought, with a major objective being to seek a path forward in combating the alienation and instrumentality that, I argue, characterizes contemporary citizens’ experience of the political.