Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening. Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks. This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.

This thesis focuses on the link between financial system and sovereign debt crises through sovereign support to banks on one hand and banks' exposures to weak sovereigns on the other. After illustrating the main relationships on the recent financial crisis, we construct an agent-based network model of an artificial financial system allowing us to analyse the effects of state support on systemic stability and the feedback loops of risk transfer back into the financial system. First, the model is tested with various parameter settings in Monte Carlo simulations and second, it is calibrated to the real world data using a unique dataset put together from various sources. Our analyses yield the following key results: Firstly, in the short term, all the support measures improve the systemic stability. Secondly, in the longer run, the effects of state support depend on several parameters but still there are settings in which it significantly mitigates the systemic crisis. Finally, there are differences among the effects of the different types of support measures.

Die Regierungen in der Europäischen Union retten Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten durch staatliche Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen. Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln, die solche Beihilfen analysieren. Im ersten Kapitel nutze ich Daten von 86 Fällen aus den Jahren 1995-2003 um zu prüfen, wie wirksam die Beihilfen bei der Konkursprävention sind. Es gibt drei Ergebnisse. Erstens steigt die geschätzte diskrete hazard rate in den ersten vier Jahren nach der Subvention und sinkt danach, was nahelegt, dass einige Sanierungen den Konkurs eher verzögern als verhindern. Zweitens, Regierungen favorisieren staatliche Unternehmen bei Beihilfeentscheidungen, obwohl diese keine besseren Überlebenschancen haben. Drittens, die Wahl, ob Rettungs- oder Umstrukturierungsbeihilfe gewärt wird, ist eine endogene Variable in der Analyse. Wenn man sie als exogen betrachtet, unterschätzt man die Auswirkungen auf die Konkurswahrscheinlichkeit. Das zweite Kapitel ist eine Studie über die Auswirkungen von Bailouts auf Marktstruktur und Wohlfahrt in einem internationalen, asymmetrischen Cournot -- Duopol. Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Beihilfe positiv ist, auch wenn der Marktaustritt einer Firma nicht verhindert werden kann. Der Grund hierfür ist ein strategischer Effekt, der die effizientere Firma zu einer zusätzlichen kostenreduzierenden Maßnahme veranlasst. Wird der Marktaustritt verhindert, ist Effizienz geringer. Das dritte Kapitel enthält empirische Belege der politischen, institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Determinanten der Sanierungsubventionspolitik. Ich nutze einen neuen Datensatz über Entscheidungen über Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen während der Jahre 1995-2003 zusammen mit Informationen über Wahlergebnisse in den Europäischen Ländern. Das wichtigste Ergebnis ist, dass die Beihilfen in Ländern mit Mehrheitswahlsystem wahrscheinlicher sind, insbesondere während der Jahre vor Wahlen. / Governments in the European Union bail out firms in distress by granting Rescue and Restructuring Subsidies. This thesis consists of three chapters analyzing European bailouts. In the first chapter, I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy. The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. Second, governments'' bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable and treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Policy implications are discussed in the chapter. The second chapter is a study of the effects of bailouts on market structure and welfare in an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly. I show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower than in case of exit. The third chapter provides evidence of political, institutional and economic determinants of bailout policies. I use a new data set based on rescue and restructuring aid decisions during the years 1995-2003 merged with information about electoral outcomes in European countries. The main finding is that in countries with majoritarian democratic institutions bailouts are more likely, in particular during years preceding elections. Since bailouts are a targeted fiscal policy, the evidence supports the theory of Persson and Tabellini (2000) predicting that electoral systems shape incentives for fiscal policy choices.

With the internationalization of financial markets, short-term capital flows to emerging market economies have become an important phenomenon in the world. The papers in this dissertation are concerned with investigating the effects of such flows in the receiving countries. The analysis is cast in a dynamic general equilibrium framework for small open economies. Two of the papers are quantitative investigations of the forces at work in small and relatively poor economies that liberalize trade and capital flows. The common approach of these papers is that of a computational experiment: calibrated simulations constitute a test of whether the models can explain certain dynamics which we observe in the data. The first paper investigates whether a calibrated two-sector neoclassical growth model can explain the magnitudes and the timing of capital flows in the Baltic countries after the fall of the Soviet Union. The results indicate that it can, and that the large and persistent trade deficits which we observe in the data need not be a reason to worry. However, the model also tells us that a reversal of capital flows and large sectoral adjustments lie ahead of the Baltic countries. In the second paper, the focus is on modelling the observed co-movement between consumption and the real exchange rate in Spain, which experienced large capital inflows following the entry into the European Community in 1986. In accordance with episodes of trade liberalization elsewhere, consumption in Spain boomed and the real exchange rate appreciated for several years after 1986. Standard two-sector models with traded and non-traded goods have problems accounting for these facts. The paper explores some mechanisms that can improve the standard modelling framework, and evaluates their quantitative importance in calibrated simulations for Spain. The third paper studies the government’s optimal bailout policy in an environment where sudden stops of capital flows cause financial crises in a small open economy. Real world events, such as the financial crises in the South East Asian countries in 1997, motivate the analysis. Compared to the previous essays, the paper is different in its nature in that it develops a highly stylized environment to analytically study the government’s optimal bailout policy. The paper shows that the government should optimally commit to a policy that only partially protects private debtors against inefficient liquidation. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2004

The thesis focuses on banking regulation and on the nexus between financial sovereign crises. After illustrating the main mechanisms on the recent financial crisis, we construct several multi-agent network models of a financial system for testing its stability under different parameters. In the first part, we focus on the rationale for banking regulation and we describe its development including the recently introduced Basel III measures. The main conclusion of this part is that regulation is to a large extent influenced by the banks and it does not always secure financial system stability. In the second part, we build an agent-based model which enables us to simulate the impacts of various types of negative shocks given various settings of the banking system and the regulatory environment, including the capital and liquidity measures. Our simulations show firstly that sufficient capital buffers are crucial for systemic stability, secondly that the discretionary measures have little effect once a crisis breaks out and thirdly that liquidity measures are a relevant regulatory tool. In the third part, the model is extended so that it allows for testing effects of state support on systemic stability is tested with various parameter settings in Monte Carlo simulations and for testing of feedback loops in which...

La gestion du risque est un sujet primordial au niveau d’une entreprise et au niveau de l’Etat. Cette thèse investigue ce thème au travers de trois essais empiriques. Le premier essai s’intéresse à la gestion du risque de change par les entreprises. Les résultats montrent que les Fusions & Acquisitions transfrontalières offrent une couverture opérationnelle contre le risque de change. De plus, cette technique de couverture crée de la valeur pour les actionnaires. La baisse de l’exposition au risque de change (en valeur absolue) est positivement associée avec les rentabilités anormales cumulées (CAR) pour les acquéreurs. Le deuxième et le troisième essai se concentrent sur la gestion du risque au niveau de l’État - le plan de sauvetage (dit « plan Paulson ») pendant la crise financière récente aux États-Unis. Le deuxième essai confirme dans un premier temps l’effet positif du plan sur les CAR et la réduction des probabilités de défaut pour les banques participantes autour de son annonce initiale. Pourtant, l’effet du plan n’est pas neutre au sein des banques : les grands joueurs ont été les gagnants. Le dernier essai analyse les effets de bord du plan Paulson sur les pratiques d’octroi de prêts. Nos résultats révèlent qu’il y a un effet de bord positif et significatif de l’intervention gouvernementale sur la maturité des prêts syndiqués pendant la période postérieure à la crise, de 2010 à 2012. Néanmoins, cet impact positif n’apparaît pas pour la taille des prêts syndiqués. En somme, cette thèse empirique met en lumière d’une part les moyens efficaces d’une gestion du risque de change pour les entreprises, comme par exemple la couverture opérationnelle, et ses implications positives pour les actionnaires des acquéreurs, et d’autre part les résultats attendus d’une intervention de l’Etat, comme celle du plan Paulson, les effets de bord et les effets hétérogènes entre les établissements financiers. / The risk management is a crucially important topic at firm and country level. This thesis investigates this subject across three empirical essays. The first essay is interested in firm’s currency risk management. The results show that the cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions offer an operational hedging to the currency risk. Moreover, this hedging creates value for acquirers’ shareholders. The decrease in currency risk exposure (in absolute value) is positively associated with acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The second and the third essay concentrate on the risk management at country level - the bailout plan (the Paulson plan) during the recent financial crisis in United States. The second essay in a first step confirms the positive effect of the plan on bank participants’ CAR and on the decrease of default probability around the plan’s initial announcement. Nevertheless, the effect of the plan is not neutral among banks and big players were the winners. The last essay analyzes the Paulson plan’s spillover effect on the loan supply. Our results reveal that there is a positive and significant spillover effect of the government intervention on syndicated loans’ maturities during the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2012. However, this positive impact is not found for the size of syndicated loans. In sum, this empirical thesis from one side sheds light on the efficient ways of firm’s currency risk management, such as the operational hedging, and its positive effect for acquirers’ shareholders; from another side for the country-level government intervention, it highlights the Paulson plan’s spillover effect on syndicated loans and the heterogeneous impact among financial institutions.

The main objective of my thesis is to analyze and compare reactions of Iceland and Ireland to financial and economic crisis as well as the aftermath of the crisis and the process of recovery as direct consequence of these reactions. Both states had financial sector couple of times bigger than their GDP before the crisis and after the fall of Lehman Brothers they ran into some serious difficulties. However, states chose very different approaches to deal with a situation. Ireland decided to bailout its banks despite the huge increase in public debt and cost of taxpayers' money. Iceland allowed its banks to default and backed only domestic deposits. In my thesis I also analyze the fact that Ireland is a member of euro area and therefore does not possess independent monetary policy and Iceland has independent floating currency and implications that these facts had during and after the crisis on development of countries. In the last chapter I am analyzing possibilities of future development of economies and potential risks and challenges that lie ahead of them.

除了日本以外的亞洲四小龍國家，歷經了第二次世界大戰以來的高度經濟成長，這樣的經濟成就，被喻為「東亞經濟奇蹟」。觀察這些東亞國家的經濟發展軌跡，大致上可以得到一個共通的現象，即國家在經濟發展方面所扮演的重要角色，和作為後發工業化國家為了追趕上已工業化國家所採取的「發展型國家模式」。這套模式在東亞不同經濟體的運作上，展現出不同的細微樣貌，但真正對此經濟發展模式提出挑戰的，則是一九九七年東亞金融危機的爆發。 金融危機的爆發，標誌著冷戰以來的國際政治經濟環境已經起了很大的變化，這套發展模式的持續性、頑強性與適用性在全球化的時代也因此受到關注。在亞洲四小龍中，韓國一度受到金融危機的創傷頗深，然而韓國卻又在金融危機發生後的十年過後，重新成為世界經濟發展舞台上一個表現亮眼的角色，這其中的轉折令人相當的好奇也引發筆者的研究興趣。 本文的研究目的，在試圖釐清曾經受金融危機重創的韓國，於此一事件發生前後的國內政治經濟結構和環境的變化，以求探究「發展型國家模式」在後金融危機、受到國際貨幣基金援助，和接受全球化的韓國，所發生的轉變與變遷的方向，並藉此尋求韓國在後金融危機經濟重新復甦的解釋，和全球化、「發展型國家模式」，以及國家角色，彼此之間理論調和的可能性。 <a href=http://www.gospelaudio.com/ >free music download sites</a> <a href=http://www.musicfrost.com/ >musica mp3</a> / The Asian Tigers, followed by flying geese model of Japan, enjoyed high economic growth since the World War II. These East Asian countries, commonly shared an economic development , which was “developmental state”, further labeled and highlighted the role of state in the economic development stage for the late comers in the process of industrialization. Not until the outbreak of 1997 financial crisis in the East Asia, did this model face challenge and arouse severe academical discussion. The outbreak of 1997 East Asia financial crisis marked the huge change in the world political and economical environment, hence the robust effect of the developmental state model has also been questioned. The purpose of this paper aims doing the case study of South Korea, explaining the factors how and why South Korea can return to its high economic development even faced such impact as financial crisis. How much did the developmental state model contribute in this period? Or how much did this model evolve in the globalization era, especially when South Korea received the bailout of IMF? The author also tries to study the possibility for the reconciliation of different point such as: globalization, developmental state model, role of state in the economic development, and etc. <a href=http://www.gospelaudio.com/ >free music download sites</a> <a href=http://www.musicfrost.com/ >musica mp3</a>

Diese Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen auf die Realwirtschaft in drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Kapitel 1 klassifiziert die geografische Diversifikation einer Großzahl von Banken, anhand deren international syndizierten Kreditportfolios. Ergebnisse zeigen ein höheres Kreditangebot durch diversifizierte Banken während Bankenkrisen die sich in Kreditnehmerländern ereignen. Dieses relativ stabilere Kreditangebot führt zu höherem Investitions- und Beschäftigungswachstum von Unternehmen. Eine weiterführende Unterteilung von Banken anhand derer Nationalität zeigt eine Rangfolge auf: diversifizierte inländische Banken erweisen sich als die stabilste und ausländische Banken mit geringer Diversifikation als die instabilste Finanzierungsquelle. In Kapitel 2 analysiere ich die Rolle der industriellen Spezialisierung von Banken in der Transmission von Finanzierungsshocks. Anhand der Ergebnisse schützen Banken Unternehmen die Teil ihrer spezialisierten Industrien sind vor der Bankenkrise und reduzieren ihre Kreditvergabe hingegen am stärksten an Industrien, in welchen sie weniger spezialisiert sind. Darüber hinaus finde ich Evidenz für Übertragungseffekte durch reduzierte Kreditvergabe auch in Nicht-Krisenländern. Dieser Übertragungseffekt ist jedoch gedämpft für Unternehmen aus spezialisierten Industrien. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Effekte von Bankenrettungen in Europa auf die globalen Kreditströme. Gerettete Banken weisen einen höheren Anstieg des Anteils an inländischen Unternehmen in der Kreditvergabe auf als nicht-gerettete Banken. Das negative Kreditangebot für ausländische Unternehmen führt zu einer Verringerung des Absatz- und Beschäftigungswachstums. Im inländischen Markt hingegen führt die Bankenrettung zu einer Verzerrung der Kreditallokation, hin zu größeren und weniger innovativen Unternehmen. Darüber hinaus dokumentiere ich eine stärkere politische Einflussnahme, da Kontrollrechte im Zuge der Bankenrettung an die Regierung übertragen werden. / This thesis investigates the effect of banking crises on real economic outcomes in three independent chapters. In chapter one, I classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversification of their international syndicated loan portfolio. Results show that diversified banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. The positive loan supply effects lead to higher investment and employment growth for firms. Further distinguishing banks by nationality reveals a pecking order: diversified domestic banks are the most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are the most fickle. In chapter two, I show that banks' industry specialization determines how banks transmit funding shocks during banking crises to borrowers and how they spill over to non-crisis countries. Results show that banks insulate their main industries from the banking crisis while they reduce lending most to their non-main industries. Moreover, I provide evidence on spillover effects, as banks hit by a banking crisis in one borrower country reduce lending to firms in non-crisis countries. However, this contagion effect is significantly weaker for firms in banks' main industries. In chapter three, I examine the effect of government support for European banks, such as recapitalizations on financial integration and firm outcomes. Results show that bailout banks increase their home bias in lending by a quarter more than non-bailout banks. In turn, the negative loan supply effect on discriminated foreign firms translates into lower sales and employment growth. In the home market, government support distorts credit allocation by shifting lending to larger, safer and less innovative firms. Moreover, I document that politicians gain influence over banks by transferring control rights to the government as part of the support scheme.