Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu’en dépit de leurs différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des coalitions procédurales. L’analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l’agenda législatif, structuré les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité. Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les présidences d’assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l’existence d’un pouvoir de véto sur l’agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu’en Argentine. L’étude du cas argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à l’opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir. Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. A l’inverse, elle met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu’alors, entre l’Argentine et le Chili concernant le contrôle de l’agenda législatif. Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l’hypothèse générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l’hypothèse générale. Les chapitre III et IV, qui concernent respectivement l’Argentine et le Chili, décrivent le système politique de chaque pays et l’organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitre IV et VI, respectivement pour l’Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles régissant les chambres, l’évolution de l’autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l’hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche. / This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions. The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor. In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on Finance (Hacienda) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of them are more powerful than their Argentine’s counterparts. In the case of the Argentine Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition. The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked. The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country’s politics and a description of the Chambers’ organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of research.

The final thesis deals with the Leniency programme, as one of the most important instrument of the Office for the Protection of Competition and the European Commission for detecting of cartel agreements. The aim of the thesis is to analyze regulation of the Leniency programme in the Czech Republic, from the practical point of view find out how participants of cartel agreements use the programme and whether it is effective from the view of the Office for the Protection of Competition. The thesis should also involve formation and development of the programme and how it is influenced by European law. The thesis is divided into 4 parts. The first part deals with cartel agreements. The second part focuses on cartel law enforcement which is divided in term of law regulation into public and private enforcement. The third part is the core of the theoretical part of the thesis, it presents in detail the regulation of the Leniency programme within the European Union and in the Czech Republic, there are problems of the program and their possible solutions outlined as well. The fourth part concerns the practical point of view of the Leniency programme, its harmonization among the member states of the European Union and its application in the Czech Republic in decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition.

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu’en dépit de leurs différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des coalitions procédurales. L’analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l’agenda législatif, structuré les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité. Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les présidences d’assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l’existence d’un pouvoir de véto sur l’agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu’en Argentine. L’étude du cas argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à l’opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir. Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. A l’inverse, elle met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu’alors, entre l’Argentine et le Chili concernant le contrôle de l’agenda législatif. Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l’hypothèse générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l’hypothèse générale. Les chapitre III et IV, qui concernent respectivement l’Argentine et le Chili, décrivent le système politique de chaque pays et l’organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitre IV et VI, respectivement pour l’Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles régissant les chambres, l’évolution de l’autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l’hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche. / This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions. The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor. In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on Finance (Hacienda) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of them are more powerful than their Argentine’s counterparts. In the case of the Argentine Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition. The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked. The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country’s politics and a description of the Chambers’ organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of research.

Alors que la reconstruction matérielle du pays s’achevait au milieu des années Vingt, il en allait de même pour le champ politique français. A partir de 1924, le retour à une nette bipolarisation entre gauche et droite eut un effet structurant sur le champ politique français, qui n’avait plus connu une telle configuration depuis le début du XXe siècle. Les élections de 1924, marquées par la victoire du Cartel des gauches face au Bloc national, apparaissent comme une césure politique, largement négligée par l’historiographie de l’entre-deux-guerres depuis les travaux de Jean-Noël Jeanneney sur le Cartel des gauches dans les années 1970. De leur passage dans l’opposition en 1924-1926, les droites françaises tirèrent un certain nombre de leçons. La principale était que le verdict des urnes pouvait être renversé en cours de législature : en juillet 1926, la majorité cartelliste, affaiblie par les contradictions entre socialistes et radicaux face à une crise financière et monétaire qui s’aggravait, laissa définitivement place à une majorité d’union nationale, réunie sous l’autorité du principal adversaire des gauches lors de la campagne de 1924, Raymond Poincaré. Pour les droites de nouveau vaincues en 1932 et en 1936, c’était un précédent à retenir. Autre leçon, les mobilisations anticartellistes, dans leur diversité, au sein du champ politique ou du champ social, avaient contribué à affaiblir la majorité radicale et socialiste : l’action militante, politique et sociale, avait une capacité d’influence non négligeable au sein du régime parlementaire de la Troisième République. De 1924 à 1926, les organisations anticartellistes politiques ou associatives, à l’instar de celles entendant représenter les intérêts des catholiques ou des commerçants et artisans, développèrent une culture et des pratiques politiques d’opposition, qu’elles firent rejouer tout au long de l’entre-deux-guerres. Cette expérience démontra également la persistance, dans l’opposition, des divisions structurelles du champ politique des droites, en raison du maintien de clivages tant doctrinaux (sur la laïcité, la politique étrangère ou le parlementarisme), que stratégiques (attitude d’intransigeance ou de conciliation vis-à-vis des radicaux). Dans leur ensemble, ces divisions, mais aussi les débats et les pratiques politiques qui s’épanouirent pendant ces deux années, perdurèrent jusqu’au milieu des années Trente. / In the mid-twenties, France was achieving its reconstruction, both economical and political. In 1924, and for the first time since the beginning of the century, the general election took place in a context of a clear bipolarization between left and right, which had a structuring effect on French political field. The victory of the Cartel des gauches at this election appears as a political break-point, that the historiography about political life during interwar years has rather neglected since Jean-Noël Jeanneney’s studies upon Cartel des gauches in the seventies. The organizations of the right-wing learnt a few important lessons from this period when they were in the parliamentary opposition. The most important one was that the political majority coming out democratic election could be changed in the middle of the parliamentary legislature. Indeed, in July 1926, weakened by the growing divisions between radicals and socialists incapable of giving an answer to the increasing financial and monetary crisis, the cartellist majority fell definitely. Raymond Poincaré, the main opponent of the left in 1924, came back to the Council presidency, leading a new parliamentary majority of national union. When the right had been defeated again in 1932 and 1936, it remembered this precedent. Another lesson was that the various social and political mobilizations against the Cartel des gauches had played a significant role to weaken the socialist and radical majority. The community movements, such as catholic or professional ones, and the political organizations mobilized in this period, built a culture and abilities of being in political opposition, that they have reactivated later during the interwar years. This episode proved also the persistence, in political opposition, of structural divisions of the political field of the French right-wing, due to the permanence of doctrinal and strategic splits (the first ones about questions of secularism, foreign policy or parliamentary nature of institutions; the second ones about the political attitude toward the radicals, between uncompromising attitude and conciliation). These divisions, but also the nature of the political debates and the political practices which were developed during these two years, had lasted until the mid-thirties.

[pt] Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar os laços observados no coletivo, a partir das coordenadas sugeridas por Freud na análise dos fenômenos da massa. Freud aponta a premissa do líder como fundamento de qualquer agrupamento, elo primordial nas relações entre os membros da massa. O seu caráter, ao mesmo tempo, maleável e homogêneo se definiria a partir do sugestionamento feito pelo líder. A identificação é o conceito norteador neste processo, desde sua apreensão primitiva e coletiva - através do Pai da horda, até o seu desdobramento no complexo de Édipo. Essa dissertação pretende inquirir a função do cartel enquanto ferramenta para o tratamento dos efeitos de massa; e analisar o papel do mais-um como agente provocador da incompletude no grupo. Pra tanto, observaremos um estudo dos grupos clínicos da Associação Digaí-Maré que, inspirados no cartel, buscam a inclusão da singularidade no grupo, normalmente afeito ao universal. O trabalho do clínico nos grupos do Digaí-Maré aposta nas diretrizes do mais-um, tentando descompletar a pretensa união do grupo. Os casos analisados discutem a possibilidade de sustentação do laço pela diferença. A inserção do estranho no conjunto se apresentaria como alternativa para a conservação das singularidades, assegurando o espaço para o sintoma de cada um. / [en] This study aims to investigate the ties notated in collective, started with the co-ordenates introduced by Freud in his analysis about the mass. The major premise of a pressing leader happened in any grouping. The leader induce the mass that introduce itself malleable by him. The identification is the essential concept since its origin apprehension with the horde s father till its development in the Oedipus. The cartel is an important instrument to treat the mass effects; and the plus-one is responsible to deflate the group. The groups of Digaí-Maré Association intent to include the singularity in the united that generally tends to universal. The psychoanalyst that works on Digaí-Maré Association supposes to be the plus-one that defly the mass effects. The pretend tie on group is with the insupportable difference that can interlace each member. The only possibility to conserve the uniqueness is to include the strange peculiarity that owns us.

本篇論文主要係就我國競爭法規範為本，以國際合作之角度，從競爭法之制度規範及實務執行層面，探討寬恕政策應如何運用於各國執行競爭法規範，以有效偵測，進而防杜國際惡性卡特爾。論文架構可分為五個章節，茲分述如次： 第一章緒論在闡述本文研究的背景說明，確認打擊國際惡性卡特爾為國際競爭法合作最佳探討議題，進而提出本文之問題核心及研究動機、目的，並說明研究範圍及以比較法學及分析法學為本論文研究方法，藉以建立本文的架構與目標。 第二章為闡述國際惡性卡特爾之類型及特徵，並以比較各國立法例之方式，對應各主要國家競爭法所規範聯合行為之類型、豁免（例外許可或除外規定）及制裁方式，以瞭解惡性卡特爾於各國競爭法規範上定位；內容包括歸納及整理各國聯合行類型及制裁方式之立法例，藉以建立惡性卡特爾在國際競爭法規範上的實質內涵、規範特徵，作為本文論述的基礎架構；另深入探討國際惡性卡特爾如何開始、如何執行及運作暨何以規避法律，據以確認寬恕政策作為打擊國際惡性卡特爾之工具價值，以進一步探討於國際合作其間運用之可能性。 第三章係針對於競爭法規範制度內已採行寬恕政策有成效之法域：美國及歐盟為探討分析之對象。不僅就該等法域寬恕政策之內涵，加以詳盡說明，歸納其間之差異，並觀察該等施行實務執行經驗，以瞭解實務執行所面臨之障礙及其執行應用於打擊惡性卡特爾是否確具成效。 第四章從前開執行層面之觀察，探討其應用於國際惡性卡特爾之可行性；並以前開已採行及準備引進寬恕政策之我國為假想對象，進一步深入研析該等國家共同合作打擊國際惡性卡特爾之可行性。並針對縱向運用及橫向聯繫之不同合作模式，以進一步評估運用寬恕政策打擊國際惡性卡特爾之可行性，並一一檢測可能國際合作之途徑，以尋求可能之最佳合作管道及層次。 第五章為結論，主要歸結本文的研究成果，除就該等可行性之評估，歸納出最具高度可能性之最佳合作途徑，提供各國競爭法執法機關執法合作之建議，並對於正擬修法引進寬恕政策之我國競爭法主管機關言，予以取法外國立法例之修法建議，使國內修法趨勢得以兼顧競爭法國際合作觀點，不僅得以藉此有效防杜惡性卡特爾，更能有效拓展國際競爭法合作之空間及提昇國際競爭法合作之執行層次。 / The main idea of this thesis is to explain and study how the leniency policy is applied to fight hard-core cartel in one country and among nations. And the structure of the thesis includes five chapters. The thesis is based on the Fair Trade Law of R.O.C , comparing and analyzing the different regulations of hard-core cartel in the United States and the EU, to identify the characteristics of hard-core cartel and further explore the related issues of enforcement if leniency policy is applied to fight hard -core cartel. The thesis also explains the ways of international cooperation how leniency policy is applied to fight hard-core cartel in vertical application and horizontal connection. Finally the thesis submits that the best way of international cooperation in applying the leniency policy to hard-core cartel. In addition, the thesis also submits the suggestion for R.O.C. which plans to introduce the leniency policy in the Fair Trade Law of R.O.C to fight hard-core cartels.

This thesis deals with the competition law of the European Union, namely with the private consequences of cartel agreements (as defined in Article 101, paragraph 1, TFEU) and with their enforcement. It understands its subject widely and therefore it is not concerned only with private consequences and their enforcement but it also analyses the nature of prohibition and voidness of such agreements on the basis of a causal relationship between these legal concepts and respective consequences. Furthermore, it describes the private enforcement of EU competition law (which is legal instrument to enforce claims that emerge from private law consequences) not only from the perspective of its topic but also in terms of its relationship to the public enforcement. It also deals with the interaction between these enforcement systems. Chapter 2 of the thesis provides a basic introduction to the topic of cartel agreements governed by the EU law. It describes prohibition of these agreements under Article 101 paragraph 1 TFEU and deals with their voidness under paragraph 2 ibid. It concentrates on the later because of the considerable uncertainties about its nature in terms of interpretation of its legislation, absoluteness and possibility to severe void provisions from the rest. Chapter 3 covers the consequences of...

This report outlines the conceptual, procedural and formal descriptions of the artistic development I have acquired over the course of the past three years. The current violent events caused by the War on Drugs in México –my home country- led me to this research. Beginning with the idea of erasure as language, I concentrated on the use of processes that are reductive in nature to create the bodies of work mentioned in this report. Thousands of people die in drug-related violence every year in México; by using metaphors and visual metonymies to tie together process and subject matter I explore the idea of perception, memory and transformation. I believe my work is derived from a need to find meaning in these brutal events that repositions the corpse in our field of vision, reminding us that our physical existence is finite. / text

The present interview seeks to give some points of view about the reform of Competency regulation. In that line, the interviewee give us his general opinion about the reform, the main contribution to the matter and those aspects that were missed, focusing his opinion on anti-competitive practice and negative regulation of anticompetitive practices. / La presente entrevista busca dar algunos puntos de vista respecto a la reforma a la Ley de Competencia. En esa línea, el entrevistado nos da su opinión general sobre la reforma, los aportes que brinda y aquellos aspectos que considera faltaron regularse, centrando su opinión en aquellos temas de combate de prácticas anticompetitivas y control de regulaciones anticompetitivas.

Submitted by Seiji Fetter (seijifetter@gmail.com) on 2012-03-25T15:05:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 seijikf dissertacao final.pdf: 455320 bytes, checksum: 36d1a9b7fd17769fb9a735a6e3ef4c8c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-03-26T12:40:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 seijikf dissertacao final.pdf: 455320 bytes, checksum: 36d1a9b7fd17769fb9a735a6e3ef4c8c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-03-26T12:55:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 seijikf dissertacao final.pdf: 455320 bytes, checksum: 36d1a9b7fd17769fb9a735a6e3ef4c8c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-05 / Modelos teóricos de colusão tácita podem fornecer predições sobre preços ou outras variáveis estratégicas que permitam a detecção de conduta anticompetitiva. Esses marcadores de colusão geram hipóteses testáveis sobre o comportamento cíclico dos preços, sua dispersão entre concorrentes e sua variabilidade temporal. Utilizando dados municipais mensais para preços e custos da gasolina, regressões de painel dinâmico em forma reduzida são realizadas para averiguar a aderência empírica desses marcadores. Os efeitos são identificados comparando com 10 municípios que tiveram cartéis operando no varejo de combustíveis. Os resultados corroboraram as predições de preços anticíclicos e redução da dispersão dos preços, ainda que com ressalvas. Porém, não se encontrou evidências de aumento de volatilidade nos preços induzidos por choques adversos de demanda, que pretende capturar uma maior frequência de guerras de preços. A redução da volatilidade dos preços é parcialmente confirmada. / Theoretic models of tacit collusion may offer predictions over prices or other strategic variables that allow for the detection of anticompetitive conduct. These collusion markers generate testable implications on the cyclical movement of prices, its dispersion and its time series variability. Using municipal monthly data of gasoline prices and costs, reduced-form dynamic panel regressions are employed to assess the empirical adherence of these markers. The effects are identified through comparison against 10 municipalities, which exhibited episodes of cartelization. The results point to some evidence of countercyclical pricing and price dispersion reduction. However, no evidence if found for price wars, measured through increased price volatility due to adverse demand shocks. The prediction of price volatility reduction is partially sustained.