Submitted by Stefania Grezzana Merenstein (stegrez@hotmail.com) on 2016-06-01T19:29:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Stefania Grezzana - Tese_vBiblio.pdf: 2120928 bytes, checksum: 746cbcd0ea0f6d71185c9ae0b5f8dc1c (MD5) / Rejected by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br), reason: Prezada Stefania, Favor alterar seu trabalho de acordo com as normas ABNT: 1: Contra-capa: O texto padrão de introdução deve ser em português. 2: Folha de assinatura: O texto deve, também, ser em português. 3: Agradecimentos e Acknoledgments: Favor fazer uma sessão de Agradecimentos em português e posicionar antes da folha de Acknoledgments. 4: Os títulos das sessões devem estar em caixa alta, negritado e centralizado. 5: A contagem de página deve apenas aparecer da Introdução a diante, e a mesma deve estar localizado ao lado direito da folha. Atenciosamente, Letícia Monteiro 3799-3631 on 2016-06-01T19:36:24Z (GMT) / Submitted by Stefania Grezzana Merenstein (stegrez@hotmail.com) on 2016-06-02T11:45:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Stefania Grezzana - Tese_vBiblio.pdf: 2125635 bytes, checksum: 80fe18aa661329f13965b2322ec441b2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2016-06-02T12:18:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Stefania Grezzana - Tese_vBiblio.pdf: 2125635 bytes, checksum: 80fe18aa661329f13965b2322ec441b2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T12:28:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Stefania Grezzana - Tese_vBiblio.pdf: 2125635 bytes, checksum: 80fe18aa661329f13965b2322ec441b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-13 / This dissertation is a conjunction of three essays on the Industrial Organization field, this empirical work is applied to the Brazilian retail gasoline market. The first essay investigates the existence of spillover effects from cartel activity. The second essay relates the well-known economic puzzle of asymmetric cost pass through to prices with the existence of horizontal coordination - cartels - in the relevant market. Finally, the third essay investigates the effectiveness of antitrust interventions inside the offenders and the consequences of its disclosure in related markets. / Esta tese é uma conjunção de três ensaios sobre no campo de organização industrial, o trabalho empírico é aplicado ao mercado brasileiro de revenda de combustíveis, especificamente gasolina. O primeiro ensaio investiga a existência de efeitos indiretos, repercussões para outros mercados, resultantes da atividade do cartel. O segundo ensaio relaciona o conhecido tema da literatura de repasse assimétrico de custos aos preços com a existência de coordenação horizontal - cartéis - nos mercados em questão. Finalmente, o terceiro ensaio investiga a eficácia das intervenções de defesa da concorrência dentre os infractores e as consequências da sua divulgação em mercados relacionados.

Cette thèse regroupe trois essais en théorie des enchères. Le chapitre 1 introduit de ladélégation dans le mécanisme d’enchère GSP. Dans un jeu impliquant des transferts monétaires et unepolitique de rémunération mise en place par une agence, un équilibre collusif efficace est atteint.Nousproposons une caractérisation du profil d’enchères collusif implémentable dans un jeu de positions `a troisjoueurs et deux positions. Le chapitre 2 considère des ventes séquentielles d’un objet `a deux acheteurs: l’unconnaît son évaluation privée tandis que l’autre non. Les acheteurs ont une demande multi-unitaire et lesévaluations privées entre unit´es sont parfaitement corrélées. Un équilibre asymétrique existe dans lequelle joueur non-informé adopte une stratégie agressive tandis que le joueur informé joue de manière prudente.Le comportement du joueur non-informé est justifié par l’opportunité d’acquérir de l’informationgratuitement. Cette dynamique induit une décroissance des prix entre les ventes. Le chapitre 3, introduitun jeu de décision séquentielle dans la première enchère. Un équilibre séparateur existe dans lequel lejoueur informé est agressif lorsqu’il est le premier `a jouer impliquant une stratégie de non-participationde la part de son concurrent non-informé. A l’inverse, ce dernier adopte une attitude plus prudentelorsqu’il est le premier `a joueur. Un équilibre mélangeant dans lequel le joueur informé cache son informationprivée ne peut exister que si le joueur non-informé adopte une stratégie de non-participation. / This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

In 2001 the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) was created by some of the world’s leading natural gas producing and exporting countries in order to promote their mutual interests through cooperation, in particular with regard to extracting the maximum value from their natural gas exports. My core research question is: Does cooperation among GECF member countries explain those exporters’ market power in highly import-dependent natural gas consuming countries? To determine the influence of the GECF’s cooperative actions and policies, I study the GECF’s cooperative behaviour and measure the role of (collusive) producer conduct in terms of its contribution to achieving the main GECF objective: attaining gas prices that are measurably above the cost of production and hence help producers earn significant economic rents. I employ a variety of methods from the international relations literature on cooperation and cartelisation, collective action theory and an economic measurement model in three case studies. I find that cooperation among GECF members partly explains their market power in a number of import-dependent gas markets. This is so despite the GECF’s weak degree of institutionalisation. The reasons for the GECF’s influence on effective cooperative results are: first, conducive structural conditions in many gas importing markets favouring cartelisation; second, GECF members use methods such as artificial market entry barriers (e.g. long-term term contracts negotiated in a non-transparent way) to secure their market power and third, the GECF faces less severe internal procedural challenges that plague other cartels such as collective action problems, especially cheating. Cooperation among GECF exporters hence contributes to high(er) prices of natural gas. This causes economic inefficiencies and a transfer of wealth—and political power—from gas consumers to producers. It also hinders climate change mitigation as cleanerburning gas remains too expensive to replace ‘dirty’ coal in power generation.

After the financial crisis, several comparison websites have emerged for private lenders to enable comparison on mortgage terms. The idea behind the comparison pages is that they should be used by the private borrower. On June 1, 2015, a new directive emerged from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority to the credit institutes that instead of the list interest, the average interest rate that the lenders offer their customers should be the one published, in order to further increase the transparency of the price. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether competition in the mortgage market has improved after the introduction of the comparison websites and the effects of the increased price transparency. In order to investigate the competition on the mortgage market, the theory of market forms and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has been applied. The result of the study shows that the concentration of competition has increased over time. This study also shows that the comparison pages have contributed to increased price transparency that has contributed to consumers information about the market. This study is limited to the Swedish mortgage market. / Efter finanskrisen har flertalet jämförelsesidor uppkommit för att möjliggöra jämförelser av räntor och villkor på bolån. Jämförelsesidor ska förenkla processen att jämföra de olika långivarna. Den 1 juni 2015 kom ett nytt direktiv från finansinspektionen till långivarna att istället för listräntan ska den genomsnittliga räntan som långivarna ger sina kunder vara den som publiceras, för att öka pristransparensen ytterligare. Denna studies syfte är att undersöka hur konkurrensen på bolånemarknaden har förändrats efter jämförelsesidornas tillkomst med HHI-index och konkurrensteori. Teori om marknadsformer och Herfindahl-Hirschman Index att tillämpas för att undersöka konkurrensen. Resultatet av studien visar att koncentrationen av konkurrensen har ökat över tid. Denna studie visar även att jämförelsesidorna har bidragit med ökad pristransparens som har bidragit till konsumenternas information om marknaden. Studien är avgränsad till den svenska bolånemarknaden.

En 1971, le Parti socialiste est refondé. L'objectif est alors de conquérir le pouvoir. En 2007, le PS perd des élections présidentielles devenues son objectif « naturel » : il est aujourd'hui un parti de gouvernement et dispose d'une implantation électorale sans précédent. Cette réussite électorale n'a pas été sans générer de profondes mutations du parti. Celui-ci a été structuré sur le modèle du parti de masse et ses membres le pensent intrinsèquement comme un parti de militants. Mais, tiraillés entre ce qu'est effectivement le PS et ce qu'il devrait être, ses dirigeants ont dû adapter l'organisation socialiste à son statut. Cette adaptation est étroitement liée aux rapports qu'entretiennent désormais les socialistes à l'Etat : il a fallu intégrer les contraintes du pouvoir et surtout ajuster le parti à la professionnalisation croissante de ses élites. Or, si la croissance du financement public dans son budget, la recomposition de son organisation centrale, ou bien encore le poids des élus sur le parti semblent corroborer cette idée, l'imbrication croissante du PS dans l'Etat, sa cartellisation donc, ne saurait s'effectuer mécaniquement. L'organisation du PS est avant tout l'objectivation de la configuration partisane socialiste, c'est-àdire le produit des interdépendances qui lient l'ensemble des membres du parti entre eux. L'accession au pouvoir et la réussite électorale ont profondément bouleversé cette configuration, heurtant ainsi directement la forme et les représentations de l'organisation socialiste. La cartellisation de l'organisation constitue donc la traduction contrariée et toujours inachevée dans sa forme des transformations qui affectent la configuration partisane socialiste. Autrement dit, s'il est dorénavant « normal » que le Parti socialiste prétende au pouvoir, cette évidence n'a été rendue possible qu'au prix de la cartellisation de son organisation, condition nécessaire au bon fonctionnement d'une configuration partisane lentement – et parfois douloureusement – adaptée aux exigences que le statut du parti requiert. Aussi, au terme de cette évolution, même si les représentations du PS comme « parti de militants » perdurent encore, celui-ci est désormais bel et bien, et avant tout, une véritable entreprise partisane.

Submitted by Frederico Martins (frederico.martins2015@gvmail.br) on 2017-05-15T16:49:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TC - Frederico Martins - Versão Final modificacoes banca.pdf: 929784 bytes, checksum: 2f70d0f6aa35f7010577b505e0ae26d3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2017-05-15T17:26:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TC - Frederico Martins - Versão Final modificacoes banca.pdf: 929784 bytes, checksum: 2f70d0f6aa35f7010577b505e0ae26d3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-15T18:58:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TC - Frederico Martins - Versão Final modificacoes banca.pdf: 929784 bytes, checksum: 2f70d0f6aa35f7010577b505e0ae26d3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-17 / O presente estudo aborda com detalhes obstáculos ao ajuizamento de ações privadas de reparação de danos de cartéis no Brasil, notadamente mediante análise dos institutos de direito envolvidos, comparação do tratamento dado a eles em outras jurisdições, análise da interpretação que as cortes brasileiras têm dado a eles nas poucas ações privadas de ressarcimento contra cartéis ajuizadas até o momento, bem como entrevistas de autoridade do CADE para trazer à pesquisa o ponto de vista da autoridade concorrencial, sobretudo no que diz respeito ao compartilhamento de documentos do processo administrativo. Ao final da abordagem de cada tema, buscou-se oferecer soluções propositivas para a superação dos referidos obstáculos e, com isso, fornecer substratos para desenvolvimento das ações privadas de ressarcimento de danos decorrentes de cartéis. / The present study addresses in detail the obstacles to private enforcement of cartels in Brazil, through the analysis of the applicable legal principles, comparing the treatment given to them in other jurisdictions, and analyzing the interpretation that Brazilian courts have given to them in the few private lawsuits for compensations of cartel damages filed in Brazil so far. Interviews with the Brazilian antitrust authority were also conducted in order to bring its point of view to the research, especially regarding the sharing of documents of the administrative proceeding. Concluding each topic of the study, we tried to offer propositive solutions to overcome these obstacles and, with this, to provide tools for the development of private enforcement of cartels in Brazil.

La politique et le droit de la concurrence ont pour objet de contrôler le comportement des opérateurs dans le marché. Du fait des effets pervers des ententes illégales à l’économie et à la société, la majorité des autorités de la concurrence autour du monde surveillent sérieusement ce genre de comportement. Néanmoins la Thaïlande est à la traîne. Cette recherche cherche la réponse à la question « pourquoi la politique et le droit de la concurrence ne sont pas efficaces en particulier dans les économies en transition ? ». La politique et le droit de la concurrence aux niveaux local (Thaïlande), régional (ASEAN) et international (OMC, OCDE, CNUCED et RIC) ont été traités, car ils reflètent les finalités du gouvernement à l’égard du marché économique. A fortiori, la démocratie , la corruption, la culture des affaires, l’influence abusive de l’administration des entreprises et des hommes politiques, le système judiciaire et législatif, la capacité des autorités concernées, le soutien financier, l’engagement du gouvernement, la responsabilité civique, l’arrangement institutionnel, le respect du droit de la concurrence des entreprises, la coopération des autorités aux niveaux local, régional et international sont autant de facteurs majeurs influençant le régime de la concurrence. En conclusion, il faut d’abord avoir la politique de la concurrence et ensuite le droit de la concurrence, la compétence d’autorité de la concurrence, l’efficacité d’implémentation des lois et les mécanismes exécutoires et non exécutoires / The competition policy and law are introduced to control the companies’ behaviors that restraint competition. The majority of the authorities from all around the world monitor this kind of behavior very closely and carefully because of the perverse effects of illegal agreements (Cartel) that hinder the economy and society. Given that Thailand is lagging behind. This research seeks for the answer to the question "why competition policy and law are not effective particularly in transition economy?". The competition policy and law at the local level (Thailand), regional level (ASEAN) and international level (WTO, OECD, UNCTAD and ICN) were analysed to reflect the aims of the government in the economic market. A fortiori, the political system (Democracy), the business culture and the bribery, the compliance of competition law by enterprises, the misuse of power by administrative agency and politicians, the judicial and legislative system, the capacity of the authorities, the financial support, the commitment of the government, civil responsibility, the institutional arrangement, the cooperation of the authorities at the local, regional and international level are all the major factors influencing the effective competition regime. In conclusion, first of all, the competition policy and law were required before the competition authority is established, followed by the effectiveness of implementation of laws and the binding and non-binding mechanisms

The focal point of the dissertation is the term of cartel, which could be described as agreements distorting competition concluded by competitors on the horizontal level of the market, and, above all, legal instruments which are used in the process of detecting and punishing cartels. In particular, the dissertation thesis deals with three of possible instruments used in the enforcement process of cartels, i.e. with dawn rides (unannounced on-the-spot inspections/investigations carried out in business and non-business premises), sanctions and sanction policies and with the leniency programs. These instruments are generally thought to be the most important and most effective tools in the enforcement process of cartels and necessary precondition of efficiency of competition law itself. In accordance with the topic, the dissertation thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is concerned with theoretical and normative definitions of agreements distorting competition and cartels. The main purpose of this part is to provide basic characteristics of these terms and to describe them in a way which will create a basement for explanation of the three legal instruments, which form the focal point of the thesis. Second, fundamental part of the dissertation, deals with commentary to selected legal instruments, mentions already above. In particular it consists of three chapters, each one dealing with one of the instruments in question. In the final part of the dissertation are introduced conclusions and evaluations of the three legal instruments and also some proposals pro futuro.

This research aims to contribute to the knowledge gap about opposition and support parties’ competitive behaviour in minority situations where no party have a majority in the parliament. Two Swedish parties - the Centre Party and the Left Party - will be examined to answer the two overarching research questions. Namely, 1) how does the competitive behaviour of parties vary in relation to a party’s role as a support party or opposition party? And 2) does the result support the cartel party thesis or the model of classic opposition? The competitive behaviour was measured in regards to counter proposals, standpoints and reservations on the governmental propositions. This was done through a quantitative content analysis of committee reports during four terms of office. The results indicate that both parties were more competitive during their time in opposition compared to in support status. This supports the model of classic opposition and rejects the cartel party thesis.