My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate that common interpretations of Kant’s theory of respect do not account for the motivation a subject feels to follow the moral law. A large number of interpreters focus on Kant’s early ethical works—such as the Grounding and the Critique of Practical Reason—to justify how the moral law alone motivates a subject to act rightly. However, by the time he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant had discovered the problem of radical evil—the fact that people tend to feel more motivated by the inclinations than by the moral law. Kant’s solution to this challenge comes in the form of moral education: the contingent practices of historical institutions (factors that are extraneous to the moral law) are required to learn respect for the law. By the end of the Religion, it will be asked whether duty for duty’s sake is ever achieved.

Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.

[pt] Esta dissertação discute, a partir de uma leitura dos trabalhos de Adam Smith em história intelectual e ética, a visão deste filósofo escocês do século XVIII sobre a natureza da atividade humana. Sugere-se que esta filosofia seja profundamente marcada por uma consciência aguda da imperfeição e finitude humanas. Intenta-se, porém, mostrar que o pensamento de Smith é também um esforço de reconciliação com esta imperfeição essencial. Toda a reflexão smithiana está voltada para a tarefa de demonstrar de que maneira é possível ao homem, a despeito de suas limitações, manter uma existência regular e harmoniosa e avançar do ponto de vista cognitivo, moral e material. De acordo com a visão de Smith, o espírito humano é mobilizado por um impulso espontâneo e desinteressado para a realização de ordem, harmonia e beleza nas diferentes esferas de sua atividade. No entanto, embora o espírito tenda naturalmente à regularidade, uma situação absolutamente simétrica nunca se realiza, em função da própria imperfeição do Homem. E é certo que assim seja, pois uma tal situação não seria nem mesmo suportável por criaturas humanas. O primeiro capítulo tem seu foco analítico em um texto de juventude de Smith, The History of Astronomy, pondo-o em diálogo com o pensamento de David Hume. Discute-se de que maneira Smith, assumindo a teoria da imaginação de Hume, se insere também no projeto humeano de uma ciência da natureza humana. O segundo capítulo envolve uma discussão da obra de Smith em ética, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, e de seu conceito central, a simpatia. / [en] This dissertation deals with Adam Smith`s view on the nature of human activity, proposing an interpretation of this eighteenth century Scottish philosopher`s works on intellectual history and ethics. It is suggested that his philosophy is marked by a keen awareness of human imperfection and finitude. It demonstrates that Adam Smith`s thought is also, however, an effort of reconciliation with this essential imperfection. Smith`s reflection is directed to the task of showing how it would be possible for mankind, notwithstanding its limitations, to maintain a regular and harmonious existence and to advance from a cognitive, moral and material point of view. According to Adam Smith`s view, the human spirit is moved by a spontaneous and disinterested impulse to the realization of order, harmony and beauty in the different spheres of its activity. Nonetheless, although the spirit is naturally order- seeking, an absolutely symmetrical situation is never actualized because of the very imperfection of mankind. Such a situation wouldn`t even be bearable to human creatures. The first chapter has its analytical focus on an early text from Adam Smith`s called The History of Astronomy, and puts it into dialogue with the thought of David Hume. The subject here is how Smith, adopting Hume`s theory of imagination, partakes in the Humean project of a science of human nature. The second chapter discusses Adam Smith`s work on ethics, The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, and its central concept, sympathy.

This thesis deals with David Hume's conception of resemblance, chiefly in the context of his theory of association of ideas. There, resemblance has a great theoretical significance for explanation of, besides other things, general ideas (or concepts). With connection to them the principal problem dealt with in this thesis shows itself best: If we interpret resemblance as sharing of properties, then by using it in explanation of concepts (that means properties as well) we are begging the question. One of the claims of this thesis is that Hume understands resemblance neither solely, nor primarily as sharing of properties but he regards it as a primitive relation, whose place is mainly in the imagination. It is therefore "perceived" resemblance. Hume's theory of association consequently presupposes "form" of the given, one aspect of which is resemblance (or similarity) in the abstract which is a "condition of possibility" of perceived resemblances. Particular resemblances fill this form with various content, which means that resemblance is in this sense relative (different individuals can perceive the resemblance between the same things differently). It appears that Hume's conception of resemblance is, according to this interpretation, basically in agreement with Nelson Goodman's conception of similarity, in...

[pt] A crise ecológica que enfrentamos hoje nos alerta sobre o perigo que corremos se continuarmos a abusar da natureza explorando-a como fonte inesgotável de matérias primas para os inventos do homem. Como se não bastasse a degradação de boa parte de seus ecossistemas, o uso pelas indústrias farmacêuticas e alimentícias representa uma das principais fontes de exploração desenfreada daqueles que são classificados como carentes de razão, afeto ou vontade. Neste sentido, a busca por uma ética mais ecocêntrica se faz necessária. Para pensar uma ética que abarcasse a relação dos homens com os animais é que recorremos aqui ao conceito de simpatia, elaborado pelo filósofo empirista britânico David Hume. Este conceito é elaborado como um princípio de distinção moral entre os homens, mas está presente também nas operações mentais dos animais entre si. Queremos defender que o conceito de simpatia, como um mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos entre os humanos e entre os animais, pode ser estendido para a relação entre homens e animais, e assim contribuir para o desenvolvimento da conduta humana em relação ao bem-estar destes seres, principalmente nas produções de escala industrial. Para isso, tomaremos como exemplo a perspectiva daqueles que criam e trabalham com os animais, servindonos da análise de Vinciane Despret e Jocelyne Porcher no livro Être Bête. Aspiramos, ainda, apresentar uma crítica à zootecnia como ciência que mecanizou os animais e os isolou dos homens, transformando-os em produtos e distorcendo o conceito de bem-estar, o qual buscaremos averiguar. / [en] The ecological crisis we face today warns us against the danger involving the continuous and abusive exploitation of nature as an inexhaustible source of raw materials at the service of mankind s inventions. Besides the degradation of a significant part of its ecosystems, the use by the drug and food companies alone, accounts for a great deal of a rampant exploitation of those classified as being deprived of reason, affection or will. In this sense, the pursuit for a more ecocentric ethics is mandatory. To think of an ethics that embodies the relationship between men and animals, we resort to the concept of sympathy, created by the Scottish empirical philosopher David Hume. The concept, elaborated as a principle of moral distinction among men, is also present in the mental operations of animals as they interact among themselves. We advocate that the concept of sympathy, as a means of communication of feelings among humans and among animals, can also be extended to the relationship between the men and animals, thus contributing to the evolution of human conduct towards the welfare of these creatures, especially when it comes to large scale production. In order to do so, we will make use of the perspective of those who raise and work with animals, using the analysis of Vinciane Despret e Jocelyne Porcher to support this thesis, found in their book Être Bête. Also, we aim to express our criticism to animal husbandry as a science which helped reinforce the mechanization of animals, thus isolating them from men, making them into products and twisting the concept of well being itself, which we will try to ascertain.

This dissertation investigates the personal identity problem on David Hume’s writings on Treatise of Human Nature. For this aim, I present the Humean conception of self concerning the operations of the understanding and of the passions or emotions, as well as two interpretative controversies arising from it. Once Hume considers the notion of substance unintelligible, and denies that there is an impression that is one and the same throughout one’s life, he considers imperfect, in section Of personal identity, the attribution of identity and simplicity to the self. All we have access about the mind are the sucessive experiences or perceptions, related through associative qualities which leads us to tend to believe in the unity of the self. If there is something beyond the sucessive perceptions which unites them, it cannot be discovered through experience. The first interpretative controversy in question concerns if, from one side, much of what Hume proposes in Book I is reaffirmed by him in the Appendix, from the other side, he claims there is one aspect that his theory was not successful in explaining. However, when he sets the problem, for which he admits he does not find a viable solution, the principles that he claims he cannot either reconcile or reject are not incompatibles with each other and also they are relevant to other issues addressed in the Treatise, not restricting their impact to the problem of personal identity. What, then, is the problem that Hume identifies in his theory of personal identity in Book I? Hume reintroduces the notion of self throughout Book II, this time as an object of pride, stating at times that we not only have an idea of self, but also an impression. The second controversy, therefore, concerns whether there are different notions of self in the Treatise, one presupposed by pride and another produced by it, or if Hume develops different aspects of the same conception of self, so that the self as a bundle of perceptions is the same implied by sympathy and produced, as an object, by pride. This dissertation unrolls and argues these problems, seeking to present how Hume's writings in books I and II on the notion of self complement each other and to what extent the human natural propensity to attribute simplicity and identity to the self is due not only to the similarity, causality and memory, as defended in Book I, but also due to the passions. / Esta dissertação investiga o problema da identidade pessoal nos escritos de David Hume no Tratado da natureza humana. Para isso, apresento a concepção humeana de eu no âmbito das operações do entendimento e das paixões ou emoções, bem como duas controvérsias interpretativas suscitadas a partir dela. Uma vez que Hume considera ininteligível a noção de substância, e que nega que exista uma impressão que seja uma e a mesma ao longo de toda a vida de alguém, ele considera, na seção Da identidade pessoal, imperfeita a atribuição de identidade e simplicidade ao eu. Tudo o que temos acesso acerca da mente são as sucessivas experiências ou percepções, relacionadas por meio de qualidades associativas, o que faz com que tendamos a acreditar na unidade do eu. Se há algo além das percepções sucessivas que as une, não é possível descobrir através da experiência. A primeira controvérsia interpretativa considerada diz respeito a se, por um lado, boa parte disso que propõe no Livro 1 é reafirmado por Hume no Apêndice, por outro, ele afirma haver um aspecto que sua teoria não foi bemsucedida em explicar. Entretanto, ao colocar o problema, para o qual admite não encontrar solução viável, os princípios que relata não conseguir compatibilizar ou rejeitar não só não são incompatíveis um quanto ao outro, como também são relevantes para outros temas abordados no Tratado, não restringindo seu impacto ao problema da identidade pessoal. Qual, então, o problema identificado por Hume quanto à teoria da identidade pessoal no Livro 1? Hume reintroduz a noção de eu ao longo de todo o Livro 2, desta vez como objeto do orgulho, afirmando, por vezes, que não só temos uma ideia de eu, como também uma impressão. A segunda controvérsia, portanto, diz respeito a se há, no Tratado, diferentes noções de eu, uma pressuposta pelo orgulho e outra por este produzida, ou se Hume desenvolve diferentes aspectos de uma mesma concepção de eu, de maneira que o eu como feixe de percepções é o mesmo implicado pela simpatia e produzido, enquanto objeto, pelo orgulho. Esta dissertação expõe e discute esses problemas, buscando apresentar como os escritos de Hume nos livros 1 e 2 acerca da noção de eu se complementam e em que medida a propensão natural humana a atribuir simplicidade e identidade ao eu se deve não apenas à semelhança, à causalidade e à memória, como defendido no Livro 1, mas também às paixões.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-12-14T12:10:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 William Galle Dietrich_.pdf: 1504567 bytes, checksum: 2093d2c1d67ede79c81a88b145c0644c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-12-14T12:10:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 William Galle Dietrich_.pdf: 1504567 bytes, checksum: 2093d2c1d67ede79c81a88b145c0644c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-10-02 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O trabalho aborda o problema da neutralidade/externalidade do método descritivo das teorias juspositivistas analíticas. O primeiro capítulo faz um recorte no empirismo filosófico, buscando as origens e fundamentos filosóficos, que amparam a estrutura básica do juspositivismo analítico, no filósofo escocês David Hume. Procura-se, portanto, estabelecer as premissas básicas de tal corrente filosófica e as respectivas incorporações dentro das teorias jurídicas que são positivistas. O segundo capítulo procura focar na questão do método descritivo. Com uma abordagem explanatória, procura detalhar como o método descritivo foi incorporado ao Direito por Jeremy Bentham, passando por John Austin e Herbert L. A. Hart, até chegar, nesta década, em Scott J. Shapiro. Trata-se, portanto, de uma reconstrução histórica do método descritivo dentro da teoria do Direito. O terceiro capítulo, por sua vez, apresenta as principais críticas ao método descritivo, sobretudo as críticas direcionadas contra a neutralidade do método, e a consequente separação rígida entre fato e valor. O trabalho tem como finalidade básica, portanto, uma exposição geral da origem do método descritivo; da sua manutenção e evolução na teoria do Direito; e das principais críticas sofridas. Trabalhou-se com o “método” hermenêutico, fio condutor da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito e com revisão bibliográfica. Como resultados parciais, pode-se dizer, a partir do referencial filosófico adotado pelas teorias juspositivistas analíticas, ainda que inconscientemente, que as características de neutralidade valorativa e externalidade do cientista não conseguem ser mais do que meros constructos artificiais, na medida em que a rígida separação entre fato e valor já foi superada no âmbito teórico e prático da filosofia e do Direito. A introdução do método experimental de raciocínio na teoria do Direito, portanto, não consegue atingir a propugnada neutralidade/externalidade. / This work deals with the neutrality/externality problem of the descriptive method of analytical legal positivist theories. The first chapter investigates the roots of philosophical empiricism in the Scottish philosopher David Hume, seeking its philosophical origins and foundations, which support the basic structure of analytical legal positivism. It seeks, therefore, to establish the basic premises of such philosophical current and the respective incorporations within the positivistic legal theories. The second chapter seeks to focus more specifically on the central question regarding the descriptive method. With an explanatory approach, it seeks to detail how the descriptive method was incorporated into jurisprudence by Jeremy Bentham — which was maintained by John Austin, Herbert L. Hart, and, in this decade, by Scott J. Shapiro. It is, therefore, a historical reconstruction of the descriptive method within jurisprudence and legal theory. The third chapter, in its turn, presents the main criticisms of the descriptive method, especially the criticisms directed against the (supposed) neutrality of it, and the consequent rigid distinction between fact and value. The main purpose of the work is, therefore, a general exposition of the origins of the descriptive method; its maintenance and evolution in jurisprudence; and the main criticisms. The work’s approach is the hermeneutical "method", the basis of the Hermeneutical Critique of Law, and also a bibliographical revision. As partial results, it can be said, from the philosophical referential adopted by analytical legal positivist theories, albeit unconsciously, that the characteristics of the scientist's neutrality and externality cannot be more than mere artificial constructs, insofar as the rigid distinction between fact and value has already been overcome in both theoretical and practical scopes of philosophy and law. The introduction of the experimental method of reasoning in legal theory, therefore, fails to achieve the advocated neutrality/externality.

Cette thèse porte sur la relation entre histoire et analyse dans les considérations de Hume et de Smith sur le progrès. Son objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à montrer que ces deux auteurs écossais articulent une approche historique, dite conjecturale, avec une autre approche historique qui relève de leur analyse de l’émergence de la société civile. Tandis que Hume rassemble ces deux approches historiques distinctes dans sa philosophie politique, Smith fait émerger son analyse économique de sa philosophie politique, qui est une histoire conjecturale de la société civile. Selon les deux auteurs, le gouvernement naît d’une inégalité de richesse au sein de la société et son but principal est de sécuriser la propriété privée. L’analyse économique de la Richesse des Nations dérive de cette théorie du gouvernement et de la justice. En second lieu, ce travail a pour but de souligner que Smith donne un moindre rôle à l’histoire dans sa théorie économique que Hume. Les attitudes divergentes de Hume et Smith vis-à-vis du problème de la dette publique britannique en témoigne. Tandis que Hume met en avant le danger provenant de la politique belliqueuse de la Grande Bretagne en traçant un parallèle avec l’Empire romain, Smith privilégie les effets économiques de la dette, qui, malgré leur nocivité, sont compensés par l’épargne privée. Une telle comparaison explique l’émergence ultérieure de l’école classique qui privilégie une analyse économique purement théorique, dépourvue de contexte historique. / This dissertation examines the relationship between history and analysis in Hume’s and Smith's considerations on progress. Its objective is twofold. First, it aims to show that these two Scottish thinkers bring together an historical approach, i.e. conjectural history, with another historical approach stemming from their analysis of the rise of civil society. Hume conflates these two distinct historical approaches in his political philosophy, whereas Smith separates gradually his economic analysis of from his political philosophy ― which is a conjectural history of civil society. According to both of them, the government originates from the inequality of wealth within society and its main purpose is to secure private property. The economic analysis of the Wealth of Nations derives from this theory of government and justice. Secondly, this study aims to emphasize that Smith’s economic theory is less historical than Hume. This is illustrated by the difference between Hume’s and Smith’s stance on the problem of the British public debt. While Hume points out the danger proceeding from Great Britain's aggressive international politics ― by drawing a parallel with the Roman Empire ―, Smith brings to the fore the economic effects of public debt, which, despite their harmfulness, are offset by private savings. Such a comparison explains the subsequent emergence of the classical school which deploys a purely theoretical economic analysis that lacks historical context.

David Hume argues that reflections upon public utility explain the psychological foundations of justice and the moral feelings attendant on it. Adam Smith objects that Hume’s theory of justice is psychologically implausible. A just punishment attracts the approval of every citizen on Hume’s alleged view. Not every citizen can consider the abstract public interest every time, Smith observes, so Hume can’t have explained all of justice. I argue, in response, that Smith’s objection has not accounted for all of the causal processes that Hume draws upon in support of reflections upon public utility. Conventions establish the very possibility of public interest, and socializing processes lend the public interest its moral salience. Human nature includes a species-general passion for acquiring property for the sake of family. The motivational centrality and universal scope of this passion, coupled with the dramatic psychological power of sympathy, generates the first moral feelings. Social conditioning develops those feelings into attitudes about reward and punishment. Hume’s theory of justice, with his conjectures about sociocultural processes, is both psychologically plausible and more complex than commentators tend to appreciate.

Generally acclaimed as the greatest philosopher of the Enlightenment, David Hume has been, nevertheless, a problem for Enlightenment historians. In terms of the Enlightenment's own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the age, yet it is almost diametrically opposed to the traditional historical characterization of the Enlightenment. Consequently, historians must re-assess the empirical character of the Enlightenment, acknowledging it as yet another Age of Faith rather than science (as Becker contends), or acknowledge Hume's as the most valid Enlightenment philosophy. Such a re-assessment and study of Hume's conclusions would dramatically alter Enlightenment histories and provide meaningful insights into the actual Enlightenment legacy regarding modern man and his society.