Section 23(5) of the Constitution entrenches trade unions, employer's organisations and employers' right to engage in collective bargaining. For employees, collective bargaining is the key which opens the door to better wages, improved working conditions and an overall better standard of living to name but a few. The Labour Relations Act was promulgated to give effect to section 23 of the Constitution. However, in section 2 of the Labour Relations Act, members of the South African National Defence Force were excluded from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act (LRA). After the Constitutional Court regarded members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to be "workers", they also had the right to engage in collective bargaining. However, because of the special duty that the members of the SANDF have to fulfil namely to ensure the safety of the republic and its citizens, they are not awarded the right to strike. The question therefor is: How do the members of the SANDF compel the SANDF to bargain with them? The aim of this study is to establish if a duty to bargain was implemented by Chapter XX of the General Regulations of the South African National Defence Force and the Reserve. Firstly, the new dispensation of voluntarism under the new LRA is examined to understand how collective bargaining would work in a normal situation and not that of the members of the SANDF. Freedom of association is also discussed. The reason for this was because members of the SANDF also have to right to associate with a trade union of their choice by sections 18 and 23(2) of the Constitution. Under the new LRA, organisational rights also play a major role in the bargaining process and afford trade unions more bargaining power. The voluntarist approach followed by the new LRA effectively removed the duty to bargain from collective bargaining. As explained above, the special situation applicable to the SANDF and its members are not governed by the LRA and therefor a duty to bargain might still exist in this specific system of collective bargaining managed by the regulations. The duty to bargain is based on representativeness and good faith which are also examined in this study. To establish if a duty to bargain was created by the courts, an examination of the judgements of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court reiterated that there is no legally enforceable duty to bargain between the SANDF and the South African National Defence Union (SANDU). If Chapter XX of the regulations is scrutinised, it can however be seen that there is an initial duty on the SANDF to bargain with a registered military trade union over matter set out in regulation 36 which include most if not all matters of mutual interest. Therefor it would seem that a duty to bargain is created by Chapter XX. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The term DERI stands for Defence Evaluation and Research Institute. DERls are strategic institutes, established primarily to provide technological support to the Department of Defence. They are responsible for the cost-effective development, maintenance and application of advanced technologies and concentrate on specific application areas in the South African Defence Force, corresponding to the User Support Teams in the Armament Technology Acquisition Secretariat. The research problem is how to strategically manage such a DERI in terms of vision, mission, goals, structure of organisation, clients, alliances and resources such as funding, personnel, facilities and equipment, to optimally provide the best possible service to the main client, the DoD and in the process ensure the long term sustainability of the DERI. An interview was held with the senior executive manager of each of the five official DERls and also with two very knowledgeable persons on the subject of Defence and Evaluation Research management, with the aim of determining which attributes or factors they deem important in the strategic management of a DERI. The interviews were typed ver batim and all the attributes were included in a questionnaire. A few more attributes determined from literature and discussions with De Wet, were also added. Afterwards the abovementioned managers completed a questionnaire in which they indicated the relative importance of the various attributes. The attributes that scored the highest rating were grouped into clusters and are analysed accordingly. The clusters are as follows: • ''people" cluster since it is about the knowledge, skills and trust of people • ''value-for-money cluster since the attributes are about planning, funding and objectives • "you-have-to-earn-your-survival cluster since it is about disciplines, application of R&D and the right of existence of a DERI All three clusters are enlightened by the comments, remarks, suggestions and concerns raised during the interviews with the senior executive managers. People attributes came out as being the most critical success factor in the strategic management of a DERI. "People" can effectively be divided into two categories - the DERI's employees on the one hand and the clients' employees on the other. Everything concerning people is seen as important namely: training. remuneration, quality service (internal and external), trust, growth and development, communication, Black Economic Empowerment, stakeholder interface, etc. There is a concern about the longer-term survival of the DERls because they are currently situated in two different organisations in two different state departments with different visions, missions and goals. A clear indication of the road ahead should be given as soon as possible. A solution to the integration question would be an independent investigation by people who have no vested interests in the outcome of the decision. Whatever the final answer (one of the two current state departments or a new organisation or the slatus quo), both departments (Arts, Science and Technology and Defence) should not feel endangered and the solution should be a win-win situation for both parties. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: DERI is die verkorte vorm vir Defence Evaluation and Research Institute oftewel Evaluasie- en Navorsingsinstituut vir die Weermag. DERI's is strategiese institute wat daargestel is om tegnologiese ondersteuning aan die Departement van Verdediging te bied. DERI's is verantwoordelik vir die koste-effektiewe ontwikkeling, instandhouding en aanwending van gevorderde tegnologiee en fokus op spesifieke toepassingsareas in die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag. Die ondersteuning vind plaas in ooreenstemming met die behoeftes van gebruiker ondersteuningspanne in die Wapen Tegnologie Aanskaffingsekretariaat. Die navorsingsonderwerp is hoe om 'n DERI strategies te bestuur in terme van visie, missie, doelwitte, struktuur van organisasie, kliente en bronne soos befondsing, personeel, fasiliteite en toerusting, Ten einde die bes moontlike diens aan die hoofklient, die Departement van Verdediging, te lewer en terselfdertyd die DERI volhoubaar te maak oor die lang termyn. 'n Onderhoud is gevoer met die senior uitvoerende bestuurder van elke DERI sowel as met twee baie kundige persone op die gebied van Verdedigingsevaluasie en Navorsingsbestuur. Die doel hiervan was om te bepaal watter faktore as die belangrikste in die strategiese bestuur van 'n DERI, beskou word. Die onderhoude is woordeliks getik en al die faktore aangedui, in 'n vraelys opgeneem. 'n Verdere aantal faktore, wat uit literatuurstudies en gesprekke met De Wet verkry is. is ook ingesluit in die vraelys. Die vraelys is aan die betrokke persone gestuur met die versoek om die relatiewe belangrikheid van die faktore aan te dui. Die faktore wat die meeste gewig dra, is in groepe saamgevoeg en sodanig ontleed. Die groeperings is as volg: • "mense" groepering aangesien dit handel oor kennis, vaardighede en onderlinge vertroue tussen mense • "waarde-vir-geld" groepering aangesien dit handel oor beplanning, befondsing en strategiese doelstellings • "moet-jou-oorlewing-verdien" groepering aangesien dit handel oor dissiplines, die toepassing van navorsing en ontwikkeling en die bestaansreg van 'n DERI Die drie groepe word toegelig deur kommentaar, opmerkings en voorstelle van die bestuurders tydens die onderhoude. Die "mens"-faktor is verreweg die belangrikste sukses faktor in die strategiese bestuur van 'n DERI. "Mense" kan in twee kategoriee verdeel word - die DERI se werknemers aan die een kant en die van die klient aan die ander kant. Alle aspekte rakende mense, word beskou as belangrik naamlik: opleiding, vergoeding, kwaliteit van diens (intern sowel as ekstern), vertroue, groei en ontwikkeling, kommunikasie, Swart Ekonomiese bemagtiging, kontak met belangehouers, ensovoorts. Daar bestaan onsekerheid oor die voortbestaan van die DERl's oor die langtermyn as gevolg van die feit dat hulle tans deel is van twee organisasies binne twee verskillende staatsdepartemente. Hierdie departemente het verskillende visies, missies en doelstellings. 'n Aanduiding van die pad vorentoe moet so gou as moontlik verskaf word.

This thesis asks why Japan decided to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which, because of its technological nature, had the potential to disrupt Japan’s preferred security strategy of hedging, that is, maintaining ambiguity of commitment, vis-à-vis China and the US. The investigation was divided into three parts dealing with the following questions – Why did Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered? Why were the BMD and related decisions made? Such a structure of research was informed by “neoclassical realism,” according to which the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy, but the policy choices within these international constraints are made by political elites. A range of policymaking heuristics were used to investigate the domestic element of the approach. In addition to the conventionally specified policymaking actors such as MOD, MOFA, Prime Ministers, an original attempt was made to identify the possible influences of several elite networks. On the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, two elite networks were analysed, namely the Japan’s Congressional National Security Research Group and Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange. It was concluded that they have probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions. The conclusion of this research is that BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007 and an analysis of the views of the security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, can be contained exactly because of such a reformatting of hedging.

Combatants in war inflict untold devastation. They lay waste the environment, destroy cultural heritage, wound, maim, and kill. Most importantly, they kill. These deeds would be, in any other context, paradigmatically unjust. This thesis asks whether they can be justi-fied. There are two possible approaches: first, deny that killing in war is in fact unjust; sec-ond, argue that the injustice is overridden by weightier moral reasons. In Part I, I reject the view that principles of self-defence can render killing in war just. I argue that the most plausible theories of self-defence are hardest to apply in the cha-otic context of war, while the most practicable theories are least philosophically defensible. Moreover, none of them encompasses the inevitable noncombatant deaths that all wars bring. If killing in war is almost always unjust, perhaps we should advocate pacifism. In Part II, I propose an alternative, arguing that these injustices might be all things con-sidered justified. Combatants have morally important relationships: they have deep personal relationships with friends and family, and comrades-in-arms; if they are citizens of just communities, then that relationship is valuable too. I argue that they have associative duties to protect these relationships against the threat posed by war, and that these duties may override the injustices they must commit to avert that threat. After defending a conception of associative duties, I support this conclusion with the following argument. As well as our general duties not to harm, we have general duties to protect. Our general duties to protect sometimes override our general duties not to harm, in particular, in cases of justified humanitarian intervention. Our associative duties to protect, however, are stronger than our general duties to protect. If our associative duties to protect are stronger than our general duties to protect, and our general duties to protect can override our general duties not to harm, then our associative duties to protect should also be able to override our general duties not to harm.

As mudanças no mercado global da indústria de defesa ocorridas nos últimos trinta anos impõem desafios significativos para o desenvolvimento e sustentação da uma base industrial de defesa nacional. Países como o Brasil, que se encontram em posições intermediárias da hierarquia internacional de produção de armamentos, enfrentam ainda mais constrangimentos, dado o chamado trilema de modernização da defesa. A experiência de uma série de países intermediários vem mostrando que, apesar das dificuldades, é possível desenvolver estratégias eficientes para superar o trilema da modernização e desenvolver e sustentar a indústria de defesa nacional. O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de compreender as estratégias de desenvolvimento e sustentação da base industrial de defesa nacional, buscando identificar a relação entre três variáveis: a motivação política atribuída à indústria de defesa para a inserção estratégica internacional; os arranjos institucionais arquitetados para gerenciar e promover esta indústria específica; e a configuração do modelo de desenvolvimento e de sustentação da base industrial de defesa nacional. Com este intuito, comparamos estes conceitos em três casos de estudo: África do Sul, Austrália e Brasil Desde o princípio dos anos 2000, o Brasil vem enfatizando a importância estratégica das indústrias de defesa e tem criado políticas específicas voltadas à articulação dos elementos necessários ao fortalecimento desta variável de poder ;?internacional e de desenvolvimento tecnológico. As experiências de outros países podem auxiliar o Brasil a formular um modelo de desenvolvimento e sustentação da base industrial de defesa cada vez mais robusto, eficiente e adaptado aos desafios impostos por constrangimentos estruturais. / The changes in the global defense industry over the last thirty years poses significant challenges to the development and sustainability of a national defense industrial base. Countries such as Brazil, which are in an intermediate position on the international hierarchy of arms production, face even more constraints, given the so-called defence modernization trilemma. The experience of a number of intermediate countries has shown that, despite the difficulties, it is possible to develop efficient strategies to overcome the modernization trilemma and to develop and sustain the national defense industry. The present work aims to understand the strategies of development and sustainability of the national defense industry, identifying the relationship between three variables: the political motivation attributed to the defense industry for the international strategic insertion; the institutional arrangements designed to manage and promote this particular industry; and the configuration of the development model for the national defense industry For this purpose, we compare these concepts in three case studies: South Africa, Australia and Brazil. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Brazil has emphasized the strategic importance of the defense industries and has created specific policies aimed at articulating the elements necessary to strengthen this variable of international power and technological development. The experiences of other countries can help Brazil to formulate a model of development and sustainability of the national defense industry increasingly robust, efficient and adapted to the challenges imposed by structural constraints.

Cette étude consiste en une analyse historique et stratégique de la politique de la France à l’égard de la défense européenne dans l’après-Guerre froide, du Traité de Maastricht à la Déclaration « d’opérationnalité » de la Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense, couvrant la période la plus récente dans un bref épilogue. Reposant sur des sources primaires, incluant des archives présidentielles et des témoignages oraux, cette étude vise à contribuer à la connaissance de la politique étrangère et de défense française ainsi qu’à la genèse et à la première phase de mise en oeuvre de la défense européenne. Cette étude porte un regard nouveau sur les motivations et les stratégies adoptées par la France dans le cadre des enjeux de sécurité euro-atlantiques sur une période cruciale qui commence à faire l’objet de recherches historiques approfondies. / This study consists in a historical and strategic analysis of French policy with regard to European defence in the post-Cold War era, from the Maastricht Treaty until the 2001 Laeken Declaration of ESDP « operationality », covering the most recent period in a brief coda. Relying on first-hand sources, including presidential archives and oral history, this study aims at contributing to the knowledge of French foreign and defence policy as well as European defence’s genesis and early implementation process. This study sheds new light on France’s motives and strategies in the realm of Euro-Atlantic security in a crucial period which only begins to be the subject of deeper historical research.

The integration of defence companies in Europe and the U.S. has in the defence market’s environment for a long time received considerable interest. Companies see business opportunities and attractive technology on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Governments advocate in a public discourse that transatlantic defence industry integration is highly desirable and that it would benefit all concerned. This supportive discourse is compared to the action; the corporate integration that has occurred. The aim of the thesis is to understand and explain the level and nature of the transatlantic defence industry integration and its driving forces and inhibitors. A combination of three focal theoretical concepts has been used: integration, discourse and organizational field. The thesis shows that there is a marked discrepancy between the discourse for and the actual extent of transatlantic defence industry integration. This discrepancy and the nature of the corporate integration is analyzed and explained through the combination of discourse and integration within an organizational field. The thesis shows that defence companies’ in transatlantic acquisitions achieve very limited influence over the acquired company’s strategy and operations, and that synergies and rationalization are strongly disencouraged by governments. The processual integration within trans-national groups and in transatlantic defence materiel collaboration is highly restricted by governments. The thesis also shows that the defence innovation largely is separated between the U.S. and Europe. The defence market is an example of a political market showing a very different corporate rationality compared to ideal models of corporate rationality as the SCP paradigm. The findings suggest that defence companies’ strategy and integration appear non-rational in isolation, but become rational when understood through the lens of the defence market seen as an organizational field – a perspective that emphasizes the influence of the government field. If you want to understand, analyze or engage in transatlantic defence industry integration, you should benefit from this study. It should be of interest to researchers who study the defence industry, defence procurement, political markets, organizational fields, regulatory governance and corporate integration. It should be of interest to policymakers and others engaged in the discourse that concerns reforms of political markets in general, and of the defence market in particular. Martin Lundmark is a researcher at the Center for Marketing, Distribution and Industry Dynamics at the Stockholm School of Economics. His research focuses on the defence market, defence procurement, Europeanization and the transformation within political markets. Martin also works as defence market and defence procurement analyst and deputy research director at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2011

European security and defence policy has developed at a significant rate since the late 1990s. As a growing field of analysis, there have been few studies to date that have explored the foreign and domestic implications of the European Union's emerging security and defence policies. This thesis seeks to assess the quality and effectiveness of the present day defence policies of the European Union through an examination of its commitment to civilian and military missions abroad. In so doing, this thesis suggests that these missions stem from a misguided belief that the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law beyond its border is the most effective means by which to achieve security within Europe. This thesis concludes that the economic and political tools available to the European Union provide a better means by which to ensure security in Europe and around the world.

Bakgrund: Under senare år har skandaler inom svenska banker uppmärksammats. Det har senare visat sig att många skandaler har uppkommit till följd av brister inom den interna kontrollen. Samtidigt har antalet interna brott som begås på grund av en svag intern kontroll ökat trots att flera noterade bolag har ökat sina investeringar i den interna kontrollen. Banker har en viktig roll i samhället men den interna kontrollens betydelse för att motverka individuell yrkesbaserad ekonomisk brottslighet inom svenska storbanker är inte särskilt utredd. Syfte: Studien ämnar bidra med en förståelse för hur intern yrkesbaserad ekonomisk brottslighet motverkas med de svenska storbankernas interna kontroll med hänvisning till Internal Control – Integrated Framework och Three Lines of Defence. Vidare ämnar studien utreda om orsaker bakom individuell yrkesbaserad ekonomisk brottslighet är kända hos de svenska storbankerna samt om denna kännedom ser olika ut inom organisationerna. Slutligen syftar studien att diskutera eventuella förbättringsområden som upptäckts. Metod: Studien innefattar en kvalitativ del som består av intervjuer med personer som innehar god kännedom om intern kontroll. Även en kvantitativ del ingår i studien i form av enkäter som distribuerats till kontorschefer. Teori och empiri har kontinuerligt utvärderats och anpassats vilket innebär att ett iterativt synsätt har använts i studien. Resultat: Studien har visat att de svenska storbankerna byggt ut och kompletterat de modeller som syftet omfattar. Även indikationer på problemområden inom tillämpandet av Three Lines of Defence har uppmärksammats. Vidare har studien visat att bakomliggande orsaker till individuell yrkesbaserad ekonomisk brottslighet är mindre kända på en lägre organisatorisk nivå inom bankerna. Slutligen har ett antal förbättringsområden inom studiens ramar identifierats. De omfattar främst (1) att medarbetare i större utsträckning skall förstå syftet med den interna kontrollen och (2) att några kontrollaktiviteter har god utvecklingspotential inom bankerna. / Background: Scandals within Swedish banks have been observed during the past years. Many of these have occurred as a consequence of defaults in the internal control. Simultaneously many internal white collar crimes have been committed as a consequence of weak internal control, even though public companies have increased their investments in their internal control. Banks have an important role in society; still the importance of the internal control to counteract internal white collar crime towards Swedish banks is yet to be unraveled. Aim: The study aim to contribute to an understanding of how internal white collar crime within universal banks can be counteracted by means of the internal control, within Internal Control – Integrated Framework and Three Lines of Defence. The purpose is further to investigate if causes to internal white collar crime are well-known among the universal banks at different organizational levels. The study is also aiming to discuss potential improvements that have been identified. Implementation: Both qualitative and quantitative strategies have been used. The qualitative strategy has included interviews with persons who have intimate knowledge of internal control. The quantitative strategy has included a questionnaire that was distributed to chiefs of retail departments. The study is iterative since theory and empirics have been evaluated and adjusted on a regularly basis. Result: The universal banks have made supplements to those models that the study comprehends and there are some problem areas within the use of Three Lines of Defence. Further, the study has revealed that causes to internal white collar crime are less known at a lower organizational level. A few areas that can be improved have been identified. Those of most importance are; (1) the purpose of the internal control must be better understood of employees and (2) some control activities have development potential.Search terms: Internal control, COSO, Three Lines of Defence, the four largest Swedish banks, white collar crime.

European security and defence policy has developed at a significant rate since the late 1990s. As a growing field of analysis, there have been few studies to date that have explored the foreign and domestic implications of the European Union's emerging security and defence policies. This thesis seeks to assess the quality and effectiveness of the present day defence policies of the European Union through an examination of its commitment to civilian and military missions abroad. In so doing, this thesis suggests that these missions stem from a misguided belief that the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law beyond its border is the most effective means by which to achieve security within Europe. This thesis concludes that the economic and political tools available to the European Union provide a better means by which to ensure security in Europe and around the world.