Bien que le thème de la pulsion de mort soit souvent perçu à travers un processus biologique de destruction ou de régression à un état de nirvana comme l’affirme Freud, il est cependant utilisé ici sous une perspective spéculative pour penser son statut en s’inscrivant dans les réflexions qui prendraient part à une confrontation, et dans le même temps, une articulation entre Jacques Lacan et Hegel. De sorte que la mort, à travers la détermination ontologique permet d’ouvrir la voie pour étudier la psychanalyse à la frontière de l’être et du penser, non seulement dans sa dialectique avec le sujet et le signifiant, mais également dans son appartenance, par le sujet et sa pensée à son rapport ineffaçable avec l’impensé, ce qui conduit à la constitution de la dépossession, la perte et la destitution de l’identification du Moi spéculaire.Dans cette perspective, le concept de dialectique constitue le point de départ méthodologique pour réfléchir sur le thème de la mort à partir de son statut logique/ontologique et de son déroulement signifiant soutenu par un “examen” sceptique en tant que moment essentiel de le traitement psychanalytique, conduisant ainsi à rendre compte de la subjectivité et de sa brèche/ faille constitutionnelle comme une menace, toujours présente, de désintégration et de négativité.Quant au scepticisme, il est un autre point de départ à cette réflexion et l’origine d’un déplacement vers un regard de la psychanalyse qui va au-delà du domaine clinique. En partant de la fonction de la négation, qui semble s’inscrire comme énonciation sceptique, et à partir de questions à propos de la dissolution, la disparition ou particulièrement, l’abolition [l’aufhebung] du sujet comme lieu impossible dans sa subjectivité en manque, dont l’expression psychique est en concordance avec la déchirure interne que représente le clivage, manifestée à travers le sujet barré, ce travail considère la possibilité d’un regard ontologique de la psychanalyse. Celui-ci supposerait la mort comme ce qui instaure une expérience scripturaire de négativité et qui va jusqu’à désigner l’espace spécifique de l’activité sceptique comme examen qui dirige l’aspect tragique dans le traitement psy / The theme of the pulsion of death is, sometimes, understood in the light of a biologic principle of destruction or regression to a state of nirvana as stated by Freud, nonetheless, here it is mobilized in a speculative perspective to think its status by inscribing the reflections that would take place in a confrontation and, at the same time, articulation between Jacques Lacan and Hegel. Thus, death, under the ontological determination, allows to open the way to study psychoanalysis at the border between the being and the thinking, not only in its dialectics with the subject and the signifier but also in its belonging, by the subject and his thought, to his/her indelible relation to the unthought which involves the formation of dispossession, loss and removal of the identification of the mirrored self. From this perspective, the concept of dialectics constitutes the methodological starting point to reflect about the theme of death from their logical/ontological status and its significant development mantained by a skeptical “exam” as an essential moment in the psychoanalytic cure, involving the realisation of the subjectivity and its constitutional gap/failure as an ever-present threat of disintegration and negativity.As far as it is concerned, skepticism is another starting point of this reflection and the origin of a shift towards a view of psychoanalysis that goes beyond the clinic. As of the role of negation, which we believe it is inscribed as a skeptical utterance, as well as questions about the dissolution, disappearance or specifically abolition [l'Aufhebung] of the subject as an impossible place in his/her missing subjectivity whose psychic expression is in agreement with the internal tear that means split, manifested through the barred subject. This paper considers the possibility of an ontological view of psychoanalysis that would suppose the death as that that institutes a scripturaire experience of negativity and that even designates the specific space of the skeptical activity as an examination that directs the tragic aspect of the psychoanalytic cure.But, how does this displacement of a psychoanalytic clinic operate towards an ontology of psychoanalysis? What is at stake in the movement of the signifying chain inasmuch so a dialectical process that "remains" and that "opposes/sursumée"? To what extent does skepticism appear as a suitable tool for the "exam" and a particular interpretation not just of the unconscious but, also, of the personal history of the subject in its aspect of their subjectivity dislocated? / El tema de la pulsión de muerte siendo, a menudo, entendido a la luz de un principio biológico de destrucción o regresión a un estado de nirvana tal y como lo afirma Freud, sin embargo, aquí es movilizada en una perspectiva especulativa para pensar su estatuto inscribiéndose en las reflexiones que tomarían partida en una confrontación y, al mismo tiempo, articulación entre Jacques Lacan y Hegel. De suerte que la muerte, bajo la determinación ontológica, permite abrir la vía para estudiar el psicoanálisis en las fronteras entre el ser y el pensar, no solo en su dialéctica con el sujeto y el significante sino también en su pertenencia, por parte del sujeto y su pensamiento, a su relación imborrable con lo impensado lo que conlleva la constitución de la desposesión, la perdida y destitución de la identificación del Yo especular. Desde esta perspectiva, el concepto de dialéctica constituye el punto de inicio metodológico para reflexionar el tema de la muerte a partir de su estatuto lógico/ontológico y su desenvolvimiento significante sostenido por un “examen” escéptico en cuanto momento esencial en la cura psicoanalítica, conllevando así a dar cuenta de la subjetividad y su brecha/falla constitucional como una amenaza siempre presente de desintegración y negatividad. Por su parte, el escepticismo es otro punto de partida de esta reflexión y el origen de un desplazamiento hacia una mirada del psicoanálisis que va mas allá de lo clínico. Partiendo de la función de la negación, que a nuestro parecer se inscribe como enunciación escéptica, así como también de preguntas acerca de la disolución, la desaparición o específicamente la abolición [l’aufhebung] del sujeto como lugar imposible en su subjetividad en falta cuya expresión psíquica esta en concordancia con el desgarro interno que significa la escisión, manifestada a través del sujeto barrado, este trabajo considera la posibilidad de una mirada ontológica del psicoanálisis que supondría la muerte como aquello que instituye una experiencia scripturaire de negatividad y que hasta designa el espacio específico de la actividad escéptica como examen que dirige el aspecto trágico en la cura psicoanalítica. Pero, como se opera este desplazamiento de una clínica psicoanalítica hacia una ontología del psicoanálisis? Qué es lo que está en juego en el movimiento de la cadena significante en cuanto un proceso dialectico que « permanece » y que se « opone/sursumée » ? En qué medida el escepticismo aparece como una herramienta apropiada para el “examen” y una interpretación particular no solo del inconsciente sino, también, de la historia personal del sujeto en su aspecto de su subjetividad dislocada?Apoyándonos en algunos elementos del pensamiento Hegeliano como las determinaciones-de-reflexión, la lógica de la Esencia, la diferencia y la contradicción y, en particular, sobre los textos de Lacan relacionado con el goce, la falta y el Otro esta investigación interroga la lógica/ontológica de la muerte para postular una apertura del psicoanálisis.

La Critique de la vision phénoménologique est une tentative de critique de la phénoménologie, à travers la Théorie Critique et la philosophie d’Emmanuel Lévinas, qui caractérise la phénoménologie comme une science eidétique. Nous proposons donc une bref histoire du concept de l’eidos, qui est compris comme un archétype idéal depuis le Platonisme. On aborde l’opposition du matérialisme et de l’idéalisme ancrée dans la Théorie des formes de Platon, l’hylémorphisme d’Aristote, et la Théorie matérialiste des simulacres de Lucrèce. La question substantielle : « matérialisme et/ou idéalisme » nous conduit aux principes de l’individuation, au formalisme et aux concepts de la réification. La phénoménologie de Husserl est née dans le Kulturkampf qui se caractérise par le déferlement du positivisme dans l’idéalisme. Sous cet angle, la phénoménologie est un certain tour de force idéaliste contre le positivisme. La phénoménologie essaie d’intégrer les courants contemporains de la philosophie allemande, et c’est ici et non en biologie que se situe la lutte pour la vie, selon Husserl. Le problème de la vision phénoménologique, en regard de la « race » comportant des significations qui ne sont pas particulièrement biologiques, est un problème qui remonte à Aristote. Selon lui, l’usage de l’eidos est aussi synonyme des catégories de genre et d’espèce. L’eidos d’Husserl inclut la conception d’Aristote, et se présente comme un moyen possible de construire un concept métaphysique de la race en dehors de la biologie. L’eidos en tant que type, tel qu’il est constitué dans la Lebenswelt, se caractérise finalement par la transformation de l’Umwelt en Heimwelt, dans lequel l’individu est passivement formé par la tradition, l’habitus, par terre et sang – un monde de la moyenne, de la « normalité ». Nous essayons de montrer, dans le processus de ce bouleversement irrationnel de la philosophie en Allemagne, le cas particulier et tragique du devenir de la phénoménologie de Husserl entre les mains de Heidegger, qui suggère une auto-limitation de la phénoménologie à la recherche d’un sens qui vise à l’unité du Dasein. Notre but ici est simple et radical : de même que Marx a montré que la philosophie de Hegel n’est rien d’autre que la collection des catégories de la philosophie bourgeoise en déclin, Lévinas et l’École de Francfort ont montré que la philosophie de Heidegger n’est rien d’autre qu’une poursuite de la philosophie hégélienne, mais à un niveau plus abstrait et aussi plus global. / This work is driven by the attempt to criticise Phenomenology with the help of Levinas. Similar to the Frankfurt School, he characterises it as a “vision of essences”. These eidetical essences are, and can never be fully absolute, not only because several movements of Hegelian Dialectics are refuted in submitting knowledge either to the imago of mere immanence, or to normative structures which are postulated as invariant like in certain versions of Neoplatonism, but because they function as an apriori of an eternally unfinished and fragmented Lebenswelt. Maybe it is to harsh to compare Husserl to the neoscholastic readings of Descartes and to the formalist interpretations of Kant. Husserl is well aware of the kinaesthetic foundations of consciousness and, contrary to Heidegger, he even promotes Spinozism in a certain phase of his which excels his adolescent fervour of Berkeley. Nevertheless, Husserl incorporates a subject-based, “monadic” transcendentalism, that paradoxically leads to the dissolution of subjective identity. Traditional reasoning itself is exfoliated to perfection in Heidegger afterwards. Husserl's halfhearted formalism ignores the materialist theory of the simulacrum by Lucretius. Heideggers philosophy widens this overseen aspect in calling the Eidos an Aussehen in referring to the Presocratics, but it despises any kind of method and finally flees in to poetry, maintaining its fatalist errors which it committed right form the start: this is why it gained the name of pseudo-concreteness. Cursed through a specific anti-sociological tendency caused by an anti-empiricist vision of history, their theories virtually (not conceptually) exclude the influences of society on philosophy: they are the end result of the era of Kulturkampf, in which idealism tried to battle positivism, naturalism and historicism. Husserl even defines this philosophical battle as the very struggle of existence. The formulation of the Eidos becomes performance. Aristotle used Eidos synonymous to genus and species. Hence the amplitudes of these philosophies foster the metaphysical standpoint of race, that got out of hand in the Nazi Era and even later on. The “topic” of blood and soil appears in Husserl's definition of Heimwelt and his Eurocentrism. Phenomenology is in no case to blame for National Socialism, and that it has very little to to with its causes. My work simply tries to make the same analogy that Marx had made for Hegel. It tries to describe, how two leading philosophers of the German Bourgeoisie are reproducing the categories of their surrounding society without even really observing it.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-26T18:49:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 WAGNER_CAETANO_DISSERTACAO_08_12_2010.pdf: 247736 bytes, checksum: a77cea9fa019f598329d39fd6cfa1b6f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-02 / O presente trabalho apresenta uma abordagem teórica sobre a inserção da Filosofia na grade curricular do Ensino Fundamental. Para tanto, realizou-se um levantamento bibliográfico sobre a importância da filosofia na construção do conhecimento significativo, assim como algumas de suas peculiaridades quanto ao tema Ensino e Aprendizagem. O problema motivador é a análise de um material didático que apresenta-se como um novo paradigma, pois propõe-se a ensinar filosofia para crianças sob a justificativa de que esta será o fundamento e facilitadora de todo tipo de conhecimento a ser adquirido posteriormente. O criador deste material é o filósofo norte-americano Matthew Lipman, e seu material é intitulado Filosofia para Crianças Educação para o Pensar. A análise realizada nos primeiros livros didáticos de Lipman, direcionados às séries iniciais, tem uma pretensão: identificar se sua literatura, material didático, é dialético ou dialógico. Com a finalidade de alcançar os objetivos propostos a essa pesquisa realizamos um estudo histórico-conceitual sobre a dialética, estabelecendo sua relação direta com a questão do ensino. As inferências desta análise encontram-se nos subtítulos finais deste trabalho, onde realizamos as discussões que aproximam o material didático analisado das metodologias dialética e dialógica, optando por uma destas como sendo predominante no mesmo material. Como conclusão, este trabalho identificou que o material didático de Lipman é mais próximo da metodologia dialógica - conversação que é acompanhada por princípios da coerência lógica -, do que dialética - conversação caracterizada pela contraposição de idéias, embora em alguns momentos ambas se completam, como, por exemplo, na práxis do Programa de Lipman.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-18T17:54:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 WAGNER_CAETANO_DISSERTACAO_08_12_2010.pdf: 247736 bytes, checksum: a77cea9fa019f598329d39fd6cfa1b6f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-02 / O presente trabalho apresenta uma abordagem teórica sobre a inserção da Filosofia na grade curricular do Ensino Fundamental. Para tanto, realizou-se um levantamento bibliográfico sobre a importância da filosofia na construção do conhecimento significativo, assim como algumas de suas peculiaridades quanto ao tema Ensino e Aprendizagem. O problema motivador é a análise de um material didático que apresenta-se como um novo paradigma, pois propõe-se a ensinar filosofia para crianças sob a justificativa de que esta será o fundamento e facilitadora de todo tipo de conhecimento a ser adquirido posteriormente. O criador deste material é o filósofo norte-americano Matthew Lipman, e seu material é intitulado Filosofia para Crianças Educação para o Pensar. A análise realizada nos primeiros livros didáticos de Lipman, direcionados às séries iniciais, tem uma pretensão: identificar se sua literatura, material didático, é dialético ou dialógico. Com a finalidade de alcançar os objetivos propostos a essa pesquisa realizamos um estudo histórico-conceitual sobre a dialética, estabelecendo sua relação direta com a questão do ensino. As inferências desta análise encontram-se nos subtítulos finais deste trabalho, onde realizamos as discussões que aproximam o material didático analisado das metodologias dialética e dialógica, optando por uma destas como sendo predominante no mesmo material. Como conclusão, este trabalho identificou que o material didático de Lipman é mais próximo da metodologia dialógica - conversação que é acompanhada por princípios da coerência lógica -, do que dialética - conversação caracterizada pela contraposição de idéias, embora em alguns momentos ambas se completam, como, por exemplo, na práxis do Programa de Lipman.

This is a conceptual historical study on the dialectic meaning of the concept of freedom. The purpose of this study is to examine John Stuart Mill’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s usage of the concept of freedom, and to examine its dialectical meaning. This is done by examining concepts such as the nature of man, moral philosophy, political thinking and the meaning and usage of the concept of freedom itself. Using the method of conceptual history and the theoretical framework of Hegelian dialectics, I have studied Mill’sOn Liberty and Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism. In my research, I have found that the two thinkers share some similarities in what they mean by freedom, but I have also found that there are striking differences. These differences are most notable in how Mill discusses freedom primarily in political and societal terms, whereas Sartre discusses freedom as being the natural human condition and in what ways it is linked to action and morals. I also note how Mill’s thinking is centered around man as an individual, whereas Sartre’s thinking is centered around man as a subject. Finally, I discuss the importance of liberal hegemony in the expected meaning of the term freedom. / Detta är en studie av dialektiken inom frihetsbegreppet. Syftet med denna undersökning är att med begreppshistorisk ansats undersöka John Stuart Mills och Jean-Paul Sartres användande av begreppet frihet, och att undersöka hur begreppets dialektiska innebörd yttrar sig genom en komparativ de bägge tänkarna. Detta görs genom att undersöka respektive tänkares syn på människans natur såväl som deras moralfilosofi, politiska tänkande samt deras användning av frihetsbegreppet som sådant. Med en begreppshistoriskt präglad metod och ett hegelianskt dialektiskt teoretiskt ramverk har jag studerat Mills Om friheten och Sartres Existentialismen är en humanism. I min undersökning har jag funnit att de två tänkarna har vissa likheter i vad de menar med frihet, men jag har även funnit slående skillnader. Dessa skillnader framträder som tydligast i hur Mill diskuterar frihet främst i politiska och samhällsenliga termer, medan Sartre betraktar frihet som människans naturtillstånd och diskuterar frihet som kopplat till handling och moral. Jag noterar även att Mills tänkande kretsar kring människan som individ, medan Sartres tänkande kretsar kring människan som subjekt. Slutligen diskuterar jag betydelsen av liberal hegemoni i utformandet av frihetsbegreppets erfarenhetsrum.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Mobile telephones are impacting societies around the world and text messaging, short type-written messages sent via mobile phones, has also garnered international research efforts. Research demonstrates that text messages are being used primarily to commence, advance, maintain or otherwise impact interpersonal relationships. The present study probes relational benefits of text messaging within familial and fraternal contexts. Specifically, the study seeks to answer the research question: How does text messaging impact feelings of “connectedness” (IJsselsteijn, van Baren & van Lanen, 2003, p. 928) within “strong-tie” (Howard, et. al., 2006), dyadic relationships? Findings from nineteen respondent interviews show that texting becomes a channel through which dialectical tensions in relationships are played out. Respondents use texting to both assert autonomy and to maintain connectedness with relational partners. Several participants noted that financial issues were an important consideration but nevertheless subscribed to texting services. Users also perceived texting as more constant and more private than mobile voice interaction. Romantic pairs vis-à-vis non-romantic dyads perceived the benefits of text messages differently.

Although Merleau-Ponty did not write a book that would explicitly deal with the philosophy of nature, it is clear - thanks to the published transcripts of lectures at the College de France - that he considered this issue to be very important. A philosophy which in its anthropological and ontological concepts overlooks nature is not able to give, according to Merleau-Ponty, a realistic picture of human existence. If the philosophy of nature is not to be subordinated to metaphysics or exact science, it must be based on thinking about our physical, and therefore perceptual- emotional being in the world. Part of this interest in nature is also an interest in non-human animals who bodily inhabit the natural world and relate to it in their own way, although they may share significant biological and behavioral traits with us. In Merleau-Ponty's philosohy, the phenomenology of not only human corporeality and vitality meets with considerations of the being of nature, and the reflection of certain scientific conceptions meets with the clarification of the philosophical concept of nature.

La présente étude entend circonscrire le rôle qu’occupe la critique du modèle constitutif de la connaissance au sein de l’œuvre de Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969). La tentation est grande, lorsque vient le temps de définir la pensée d’Adorno, de la présenter comme la synthèse d’une suite d’influences historiques diverses dont un portrait juste suffirait à résumer la teneur. Le parcours intellectuel d’Adorno s’oppose, pourtant, à ce genre de raccourcis. Nous montrerons, à travers l’étude de trois figures historiques de la philosophie critiquées par Adorno, comment la pensée dialectique et matérialiste de ce dernier s’éprouve au contact de modèles théoriques qui expriment un certain stade de l’expérience historique de passivité subjective. De la fondation kantienne jusqu’à la dissolution positiviste, Adorno prend le parti du petit, c’est-à-dire de la médiation, contre des postures théoriques dominantes dont il éclaire tant l’origine sociale que le rôle idéologique. L’expérience répétée de la contradiction, loin de réduire l’effort de la pensée à néant, plonge la philosophie au cœur de considérations sociales concrètes et nous invite à envisager à nouveaux frais la visée pratique de l’activité théorique. / The present study intends to circumscribe the role of the critique of the constitutive model of knowledge in the work of Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969). The temptation is great, when defining Adorno's thought, to present it as the synthesis of a series of historical influences, the portrait of which summarizes the whole of Adorno’s theoretical contribution. His intellectual journey, however, is opposed to this kind of shortcut. We will show, through the study of three historical figures of philosophy criticized by Adorno, how the dialectical and materialist thought of the latter is shaped in contact with theoretical models that express a certain stage of the historical experience of subjective passivity. From the Kantian foundation to the positivist dissolution, Adorno takes the side of the minute, that is to say of the mediation, against dominant theoretical stances whose social origin as well as ideological role he illuminates. The repeated experience of contradiction, far from reducing the effort of thinking to nothing, opens philosophy to the consideration of concrete social problems and invites us to consider anew the practical aim of theoretical activity.

Nach Helmut Lachenmanns viel beachteter Unterscheidung von fünf Klangtypen stellt sich das Verhältnis von Klang und Struktur im Sinne eines dialektischen Prozesses dar. Als ein die Hörenden aktivierendes Phänomen repräsentiert der Strukturklang den am meisten vergeistigten Typus. Die auf das eigentlich Klangliche beschränkten Farb-, Fluktuations- und Texturklänge sieht Lachenmann hingegen als primitivere Formen an, die passive und saturierte Rezeptionshaltungen unterstützen würden. Eine Darstellung dieser Theorie des musikalischen Klangs und ihrer Verwurzelung in spezifisch deutschen musikästhetischen Traditionen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts bildet im vorliegenden Text den Ausgangspunkt einer Beschäftigung mit den Fragen, ob Aktivität und Passivität sinnvolle Kategorien der Klangwahrnehmung darstellen und inwieweit nicht auch Fluktuationsklänge engagierte und detailbezogene analytische Hörweisen anzuregen vermögen. Als Beispiele dieses Klangtyps dienen langsame Doppeltremoli und -triller, die Akkorde in triolischem Rhythmus innerlich bewegt und durch die Verschleierung metrischer Schwerpunkte gleichsam schwebend darstellen. Das von Franz Liszt vom Klavier aufdas Orchester übertragene Modell spielt besonders im Streichersatz von um 1900 entstandenen Orchesterwerken eine bedeutende Rolle. In kurzen vergleichenden Analysen zur Behandlung dieser Technik bei Dvořák, Debussy, Balakirew, Skrjabin, Strawinsky, Bartók und Ligeti wird versucht, Kriterien für die Komplexität solcher Klänge und für das Gelingen ihrer strukturellen oder dramaturgischen Einbindung in syntaktische Kontexte zu erarbeiten. / According to Helmut Lachenmann’s much noted distinction of five sound types, the relationship between sound and structure represents a dialectic process. The most spiritual type is the so called »structure sound« because it activates the listeners in a particular way. Lachenmann regards the color, fluctuation and texture sounds, which remain limited to the sound aspect itself, as rather primitive forms, reflecting passive and saturated reception attitudes. In the present article, a presentation of this musical sound’s theory and its roots in the nineteenth and twentieth-century traditions of German music aesthetics leads to a discussion on whether »activity« and »passivity« are reasonable categories of sound perception and to what extent fluctuation sounds can stimulate engaged and detailed analytic modes of listening. Examples for this sound type are slow double tremolos and double trills, representing harmonies quasi pending and inwardly moved, due to triplets and disguises of metric emphases. Franz Liszt transferred the model from the piano to the orchestra, and it plays a prominent role especially in string parts of orchestral pieces composed around the year 1900. In small studies on the treatment of this technique by Dvořák, Debussy, Balakirew, Skrjabin, Strawinsky, Bartók and Ligeti, we attempt to develop criteria for the successful integration of such sound types in structural and dramaturgical contexts of compositions.

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