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Situerad Moral : Är det tanken som räknas? / Situated Morals : Is it the thought that counts?Molander, Fanny January 2020 (has links)
Hur tillskriver vi moraliskt ansvar, och varför? Inom filosofin debatteras häftigt huruvida vi har fri vilja eller ej, och således ifrågasätts om vi kan tillskrivas moraliskt ansvar över huvud taget. Ett av argumenten som sägs hota den fria viljan är den omfattande situationistiska litteraturen, som verkar visa på att människors beteende påverkas mer av situationella faktorer än av personlighetsdrag. EH (Explanation Hypothesis) är en psykologisk hypotes som, förutom att redogöra för vardagliga moraliska bedömningar, kan reda ut filosofiska frågor såsom varför våra intuitioner kring moraliskt ansvar ter sig inkonsekventa. Denna studie testade EH experimentellt med en enkätstudie som dessutom undersökte folks intuitioner i moraliskt signifikanta situationer med kopplingar till den situationistiska litteraturen. Resultaten stärkte EH i enlighet med tidigare resultat, samt visade på att folks moraliska bedömningar inte påverkades av vetskapen om starka psykosociala fenomen som kan ha haft inverkan på agenternas beteenden. Implikationerna för den filosofiska debatten kring fri vilja och moraliskt ansvar, liksom begreppet determinism, diskuteras och förslag på fortsatt forskning läggs fram. / How do we attribute moral responsibility, and why? The notion of free will is heavily debated within philosophy, thus questioning whether we can truly be morally responsible for our actions. One of the arguments said to threaten the notion of free will is the vast collection of situationist literature that seem to show that human behavior is often more influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits. The Explanation Hypothesis (EH) is a psychological hypothesis that make general claims about everyday moral judgements, as well as accounting for philosophical issues such as the inconsistency of folk-intuitions on these issues. This study used surveys to test EH experimentally, also investigating folk-intuitions on moral responsibility in scenarios related to the situationist literature. The results support the hypothesis according to an earlier, similar study, as well as showing that the participants moral judgements were not influenced by being made aware of strong, psychosocial phenomena that seem to have had an impact on agents behaviors. The implications for the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility as well as the notion of determinism is discussed and further research is proposed.
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Margaret Cavendish and Scientific Discourse in Seventeenth-Century EnglandBolander, Alisa Curtis 06 May 2004 (has links)
Although the natural philosophy of Margaret Cavendish is eclectic and uncustomary, it offers an important critique of contemporary scientific methods, especially mechanism and experimentalism. As presented in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and Blazing World, Cavendish's natural philosophy incorporates rationalistic and subjective elements, urging contemporary natural philosophers to recognize that pure objectivity is unattainable through any method of inquiry and that reason is essential in making sense and use of scientific observation. In addition to its scientific implications, Cavendish's three-tiered model of matter presents interesting sociopolitical associations. Through her own use of metaphor and her theoretical fusion of matter and motion, Cavendish confronts the masculinist metaphors and implications of mechanism. Through the dramatization of her model of matter in the narrative Blazing World, Cavendish exposes the theoretical failings of contemporary methods and legitimizes her alternative to pure experimentalism. By envisioning a new planet to place the utopia of Blazing World, Cavendish actively uses the rational functions of the mind, showing that reason and rational matter are above all else in natural philosophy. Although Cavendish's scientific theory in some ways promotes the participation of women in natural philosophy, it becomes complicated as she simultaneously reinforces her social biases and urges a traditional class system with a monarchical government. Cavendish actively separates the gender constraints in philosophical inquiry from the social limitations placed on the lower classes to promote herself and other aristocratic women in the pursuit of natural philosophy, urging that the rational realm, where all sexes are equal, should govern scientific investigation.
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La responsabilité criminelle a-t-elle un avenir? : enquête sur les fondements philosophiques, juridiques et psychologiques de l’imputabilité pénale à l’ère des neurosciencesGilbert Tremblay, Ugo 04 1900 (has links)
La présente thèse a une vocation à la fois descriptive et prospective. Descriptive, d’une part, en ce qu’elle entend mettre au jour les fondements juridiques actuels de la responsabilité criminelle tout en déterminant l’étendue des rapports qu’ils entretiennent avec la notion philosophique de libre arbitre. Prospective, d’autre part, en ce qu’elle entend évaluer les chances de survie de ces fondements à la lumière de la nouvelle vision de l’homme qui se dégage des avancées récentes en neurosciences. Nous aurons pour ce faire à soupeser la vraisemblance de deux grandes prophéties concernant l’avenir de la responsabilité criminelle : l’une, que nous qualifierons de « scientiste », prétend que le concept juridique actuel de responsabilité criminelle est voué à tomber en désuétude en raison de son incompatibilité avec notre connaissance du cerveau. L’autre, que nous qualifierons de « légitimiste », prétend que c’est plutôt en modifiant les intuitions populaires en matière de responsabilité que les neurosciences bouleverseront l’édifice pénal. Dans les deux cas, nous découvrirons qu’une erreur de diagnostic quant au fonctionnement juridique et psychologique des jugements de responsabilité conduit à une erreur de pronostic. / This doctoral dissertation is both descriptive and prospective. Descriptive, on the one hand, by seeking to identify the current legal foundations of criminal responsibility and by trying to determinate the extent of their relationship with the philosophical notion of free will. Prospective, on the other hand, by seeking to evaluate the chances of survival of these foundations in the light of the new vision of man that emanates from advances in neuroscience. To this end, two great prophecies concerning the future of criminal responsibility will have to be weighed: one, which we will call ‘‘scientist’’, claims that the current legal concept of criminal responsibility is incompatible with what neuroscience teaches us and is, therefore, destined to fall into disuse. The other, which we will call ‘‘legitimist’’, claims that it is rather by altering the popular intuitions about responsibility that neuroscience will threat the penal edifice. In both cases, we will discover that a misdiagnosis concerning the legal and psychological functioning of the judgments of responsibility leads to an error of prognosis.
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Leben als Experiment / Selbstsorge und Lebenskunst bei Nietzsche, Wittgenstein und SontagJaspers, Kristina Lianne 21 January 2025 (has links)
Leben als Experiment. Selbstsorge und Lebenskunst bei Nietzsche, Wittgenstein und Sontag. Für Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein und Susan Sontag sind Leben und Werk nicht voneinander zu trennen. Sie beschäftigen sich intensiv mit Fragen der Selbstformung und der Suche nach einem gelungenen Leben – teilweise im direkten Bezug aufeinander. So sieht Wittgenstein in Nietzsche ein Vorbild in Fragen der Stilistik und Introspektion; Sontag möchte Wittgenstein in der Konsequenz seiner Lebensentscheidungen folgen und Nietzsche in seinem Selbstbewusstsein sowie in seiner Selbstkritik. Die Lektüre geistesverwandter Den-ker:innen dient allen dreien als Anregung und Bestärkung auf ihrem eigenen Lebensweg. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht drei Experimentierfelder, auf denen Nietzsche, Wittgenstein und Sontag sich in ihrer Selbstsorge und Lebenskunst erprobt haben: Ortswechsel dienen der Veränderung des äußeren Umfelds, der Suche nach neuen Anregungen oder dem Rückzug in eine ihnen gemäße Umgebung. Die Beschäftigung mit Gesundheit und Krankheit betrifft ihre psychische wie physische Verfasstheit und schließt zugleich mentale Übungen ein, die der Modifikation ihrer Haltungen und Wertmaßstäbe dienen. In der künstlerischen Praxis suchen sie neue Erfahrungen, ein anderes Selbsterleben sowie Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten jen-seits der Sprache. Welche Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede lassen sich in den Strategien der drei Denker:innen nachweisen? Und wie können ihre Ansätze zu Selbstsorge und Lebenskunst für heute frucht-bar gemacht werden? Die Untersuchung zieht hierfür aktuelle Studien aus der Psychologie und anderen Disziplinen heran und eröffnet damit weitere Forschungsfelder zu Fragen der Selbstkonstitution und Lebenskunst. Zahlreiche Dokumente aus dem Nachlass sowie Lesespu-ren aus der Bibliothek von Susan Sontag werden erstmals zitiert und zugänglich gemacht. / Life as an Experiment. Self-Care and the Art of Living in Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Sontag. From the perspectives of Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Susan Sontag, life and work cannot be separated. Each of them dealt intensively with questions of self-formation and the search for a successful life—sometimes in direct reference to one another. Thus, Wittgenstein saw Nietzsche as a role model in questions of stylistics and introspection; Sontag aspired to follow Wittgenstein in the consistency of his life decisions and Nietzsche in his self-awareness and self-criticism. Reading thinkers with similar views served all three authors as a stimulus and encouragement on their own paths in life. This study examines three fields of experimentation through which Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Sontag tested themselves in their self-care and art of living. Changes of place served to alter the external environment, to provide new stimulation, or as a retreat into an environment that suited them. A preoccupation with health and illness affected their psychological as well as physical constitutions and, at the same time, included mental exercises that served to modi-fy their attitudes and value standards. And finally, in their respective artistic practices, they sought new experiences, a deeper level of self-experience, and possibilities of expression be-yond language. What similarities and differences can be found in the strategies of these three thinkers? And how are their approaches to self-care and the art of living applicable today? This work draws on current studies from psychology and other disciplines and opens up further fields of re-search on questions of self-constitution and the art of living. Numerous documents from Su-san Sontag’s estate and reading traces from her library are cited and made accessible for the first time.
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