[pt] Os três ensaios que compõem esta tese, têm como objetivo analisar o funcionamento do federalismo fiscal no Brasil. O primeiro analisa as tendências de longo prazo no grau de centralização e no crescimento do governo e sua relação durante o século XX. O achado mais importante deste ensaio é que os processos de descentralização fiscal promovidos pelas Constituições de 1946 e de 1988 aceleraram o crescimento do governo. Esses processos de descentralização provocaram crises no nível federal, que levaram o governo central a aumentar sua receita tributária para compensar a perda de receitas derivada da descentralização de recursos fiscais. Do outro lado, essa descentralização provocou o crescimento da despesa dos estados e municípios, que não foi compensado pela redução da despesa do governo federal. O segundo ensaio analisa a utilização de transferências intergovernamentais como mecanismo de financiamento dos níveis inferiores de governo. Esse ensaio desenvolve um modelo analítico para explicar o efeito expansivo das transferências sobre a despesa das unidades receptoras, conhecido como flypaper effect, e as diferenças regionais na sua intensidade. Usando um modelo de parámetros variando no espaço, o estudo demonstra empíricamente a presença do flypaper effect nas finanças dos municípios brasileros e suas diferenças regionais. Finalmente, o terceiro estuda os determinantes político institucionais do comportamento fiscal dos estados durante o período 1985-1997. O ensaio mostra a existência de ciclos políticos eleitorais, a influência expansionista da fragmentação do sistema partidário sobre a postura fiscal dos estados, a disciplina fiscal imposta pela da participação política da população e o fato de que que administrações estaduais de esquerda tendem a adotar posturas fiscais mais expansionistas do que as adotadas por administrações estaduais de centro ou de direita. / [en] The three essays in this dissertation analyze fiscal federalism in Brazil. The first studies the long run trends of the fiscal centralization and the size of government and their relationship during the XX Century. The most important finding of the first essay is that the process of decentralization inspired by the 1946 and 1948 Constitutions led to an overall expansion of government activities (at the federal, state, and municipal levels). The increase in state and municipal expenditures - because of the decentralization of fiscal resources - was not matched by an equivalent reduction in federal expenditures. Because federal expenditures did not decrease accordingly, and because the decentralization of fiscal resources resulted in a loss of federal revenues, the federal government needed to increase taxes in order to narrow the deficit. The second essay analyzes the use of intergovernmental transfers to finance lower levels of government. The essay develops an analytical model to explain both the expansive effects of transfers on the expenditures of recipient governments, called the flypaper effect. as well as reasons for their regional differences. Using an space-parameter varying estimation, the study empirically demonstrates the expansive effects of intergovernmental and detects their regional differences in Brazilian local governments finances. Finally, the third essay argues that political cycles strongly influenced the fiscal behavior of Brazilian states between 1985 and 1997. The study confirms the existence of political cycles, the influence of political fragmentation, the fiscal discipline induced by the participation of the population and that left wing administrations tended to adopt more expansionary fiscal policies than center or right wing administrations.

Il contributo si propone – attraverso anche l'individuazione di punti di forza e di debolezza, di opportunità e di sfide (c.d. “SWOT Analysis”) – l'esame di una delle principali Agenzie pubbliche (esecutive) italiane, l' “Agenzia delle Entrate”: l'analisi dell'internazionale processo di c.d. “Agencification”, unitamente alla più sensibile dottrina versata nell'argomento, ne costituisce il presupposto teorico e comparato. La considerazione dell'adattamento al contesto italiano della modellistica internazionale (sub specie esecutiva: “structural disaggregation”; “reregulation”; “performance contracting”) e l'esame degli antecedenti storico-istituzionali e giuridici (interni) si palesano importanti linee di ricerca percorse. Lo specifico approfondimento dei profili storici, funzionali, strutturali e comparati – utilizzando lo strumentario euristico della contemporanea Scienza dell'Amministrazione – della recente esperienza istituzionale “Agenzia delle Entrate” mostra una sensibile, ma ancora parziale (specie sotto il profilo della c.d. “reregulation”), attuazione della ricordata modellistica agenziale esecutiva, ed al contempo evidenzia interessanti ipotesi di sviluppo istituzionale, già avvenute od in corso di manifestazione, per un passaggio – nella gestione del fenomeno tributario italiano – da un sistema a “Government” (ovvero verticistico e centralistico-ministeriale) ad un modello a “Governance” (cioè partecipato e qualificato dal principio di “sussidiarietà” istituzionale, verticale ed orizzontale), prima monolivello e stellare (la situazione attuale) e, quindi, multilivello e plurinodale (con l'avvento del c.d. “federalismo fiscale”). / The paper proposes - through the identification of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats (so-called “SWOT Analysis”) – the examination of one of the major public (executive) Italian Agencies, the “Agenzia delle Entrate”: the analysis of international process so-called “Agencification”, together with the more sensitive doctrine well-versed in the argument, constitutes the theoretical and compared assumption. The adaptation to the Italian context of international modelling (sub executive specie: “structural disaggregation”, “reregulation” and “performance contracting”) and the exam of the historical-institutional and legal antecedents reveal important covered lines of search. The specific deepening of historical, functional, structural and comparative profiles - using the heuristic tools of contemporary “Science of Administration” – of the recent institutional experience “Agenzia delle Entrate” shows a sensitive, but still partial (especially in terms of s.c. “reregulation”), implementation of the mentioned agencial-executive modeling, and, at the same time, highlights interesting hypothesis of institutional development, already happened or in course of show, toward a transition – managing Italian fiscal phenomenon - from a “Government” system (top - down and centralist - ministerial) to a “Governance” model (participated and qualified by institutional, vertical and horizontal “subsidiarity”), first monolevel and stellar (current situation), therefore, multilevel and networked (with the advent of s.c. “fiscal federalism”).

The purported costs of provincial autonomy in Canadian securities regulation have been well documented. Proposals for centralizing the securities regulatory regime, whether under a national regulator or through restricting the scope of provincial divergence from national standards, have consistently cited the costliness of the current regime. However, policymakers' cognitive biases lead them from time to time to overemphasize the need for decisive and swift action, which in turn causes them to abandon sound decision-making processes. Provincial autonomy ensures that policymaking with national reach is process-oriented and is more likely to be guided by facts and rational projections. Supporters of centralization discount or ignore these features of decentralization and are too sanguine about the ability of centralized regulators to adhere to process. Any further proposals for reform should properly account for these effects.

The purported costs of provincial autonomy in Canadian securities regulation have been well documented. Proposals for centralizing the securities regulatory regime, whether under a national regulator or through restricting the scope of provincial divergence from national standards, have consistently cited the costliness of the current regime. However, policymakers' cognitive biases lead them from time to time to overemphasize the need for decisive and swift action, which in turn causes them to abandon sound decision-making processes. Provincial autonomy ensures that policymaking with national reach is process-oriented and is more likely to be guided by facts and rational projections. Supporters of centralization discount or ignore these features of decentralization and are too sanguine about the ability of centralized regulators to adhere to process. Any further proposals for reform should properly account for these effects.

Josep Puig Pujades (1883-1949) fou el principal renovador del republicanisme empordanès que entroncà la vella tradició federal amb el catalanisme progressista del primer terç del segle XX. La seva àmplia producció periodística i literària permeten constatar l’important paper ideològic que va desenvolupar com a intel•lectual en l’objectiu de crear un projecte cívicocultural com a eina transformadora de la societat a través del foment de l’educació i la cultura. Els càrrecs de govern que assumí durant la Segona República i les responsabilitats en l’òrgan directori d’Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya contribuïren a forjar-lo com una de les figures més rellevants del catalanisme republicà anterior a la guerra civil. / Josep Puig Pujades (1883-1949) was key to the revival of Republicanism. This movement was a direct inheritor of the long federalist tradition in Empordà combined with Progressive Catalanism seen in the first part of the twentieth century. His extensive journalistic and literary writings show the important ideological role he played as an intellectual in the creation of a civic-cultural project as a means of transforming society through the promotion of education and culture. The government positions he held during the Second Republic and responsibilities on the board of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya helped to consolidate him as one of the leading figures of Catalanist Republicanism before the Spanish Civil War.

Il lavoro indaga lo sviluppo del principio di autonomia nella teoria e nelle prassi del regionalismo italiano, con lo scopo di dimostrare come oggi risulta piuttosto difficile individuare un modello preciso per l’Italia. Il regionalismo, infatti, è sempre stato considerato come fattore strumentale a perseguire obiettivi estranei all’autonomia, senza però trovare un adeguato riscontro nel concreto assetto dei rapporti tra centro e periferia. Come lo studio ha cercato di dimostrare, le motivazioni di tale difficoltà, di natura storica e, soprattutto, politica, si possono rintracciare ripercorrendo le tappe del movimento regionalista: dal periodo risorgimentale di formazione dello Stato italiano alla Costituente; dalla lunga fase di inattuazione delle Regioni alle riforme costituzionali del 1999 e del 2001. Dal quadro attuale emerge un diritto regionale “confuso”, immagine sbiadita (e stravolta) del disegno realizzato a grandi linee – e frettolosamente – con la modifica del Titolo V della Costituzione. La realtà dimostra che, per valorizzare il principio di autonomia regionale, occorrerebbe un cambiamento culturale nella classe dirigente italiana. Se ciò non dovesse accadere, il regionalismo (o, come confusamente viene oggi chiamato, il federalismo) rimarrebbe ancora a lungo privo di un modello. / The study investigates the development of the autonomy principle in the theory and praxis of the Italian regionalism. It aims at demonstrating the difficulty in finding an adequate model to Italy nowadays. In fact, regionalism has always been considered as an instrument to reach goals that are extrinsic to autonomy. Nevertheless, it is not to be found in the concrete structure of the relationship between State and regions. As the study intend to focus on, the historical and mainly political reasons can be found by following the different steps of the regionalist movement: from the Risorgimento, when the Italian state was born, to the Costituente; from the long period of failure in the realization of the regions to the constitutional reforms in 1999 and 2001. The current situation shows a “confused” regional law, a faded and upset image of the project hastily outlined by modifying the Titolo V of the Constitution. It is a matter of fact that a cultural change in the Italian ruling-class should be necessary in order to evaluate the principle of regional autonomy. Otherwise, regionalism (or federalism, as it is confusedly called today) would remain without a model for a long time.

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Globalization has significantly increased the number of stakeholders in transnational issues in recent decades. The typical list of the new players in global affairs often includes non-state actors like non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and international organizations. Sub-national governments, however, have been given relatively little attention even though they, too, have a significant interest and ability to shape the increasing flow of capital, goods, services, people, and ideas that has so profoundly influenced the global political economy in recent decades. California, arguably the most significant among sub-national governments – its economy would be seventh or eighth in the world at $2.2 trillion annually, it engages in over $570 billion in merchandise trade, and has a population of nearly 40 million, out of which over 10 million are immigrants – is also one of the most active in transnational issues. The state government has opened and closed dozens trade offices abroad since the 1960s. It set up a multi-billion dollar carbon cap-and-trade system jointly with the Canadian provinces of Québec and Ontario under Assembly Bill 32, one of the most significant pieces of climate change legislation to date. California’s educational, technological, and media hubs – its public and private universities, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood – draw some of the best and brightest from around the world. California also has a long history of involvement in transnational issues. State efforts to undermine growing Chinese then Japanese “menace” immigrant populations from the mid-19th through the mid-20th centuries influenced United States foreign policy. This thesis first takes a look at the federalism and international relations issues faced by California as it plays a greater role in transnational issues. Then, it examines the main actors and institutions, and the issues at play. The states have some leeway under the Constitution and contemporary political order to use their domestic powers to influence global issues, whether through climate legislation, public pension divestment, or non-binding “Memoranda of Understanding” with foreign governments. Such behavior, while less significant than national policy, can fill gaps in national policy, promote policy change, and deepen global ties, promoting a more complex interdependence among nations. California can also exert a moral, soft power influence in leading by example. The structures promoting California’s growing role in transnational issues are poorly organized. If the Golden State is to better leverage its political, economic, and moral authority internationally, it would do well to more explicitly develop a unified vision for its role in the world.

Dozens of major cities around the world have launched large-scale waterfront redevelopment projects over the past fifty years. Absent from this list of noteworthy achievements, however, is Toronto, a case of grand ambitions gone horribly awry. Despite three extensive revitalization plans in the second half of the 20th century, Toronto’s central waterfront, an area roughly double the city’s central business district, has remained mired in political gridlock for decades. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain why this came to pass. Informed by extensive archival and interview research, as well as geospatial data analyzed using Geographic Information Systems software, the thesis demonstrates that above and beyond political challenges typical of any major urban redevelopment project, in Toronto, issues of land ownership — specifically, public land ownership — were pivotal in defining the scope and pace of waterfront planning and implementation. Few, if any, waterfront redevelopment projects around the world have been attempted amidst the same degree of public land ownership and jurisdictional fragmentation as that which plagued implementation efforts in Toronto. From 1961-1998, no less than 81% of all land in the central waterfront was owned by one public body or another, dispersed across a patchwork of public agencies, corporations, and special purpose authorities nestled within multiple levels of government. Such fragmentation, specifically across public bodies, added a layer of complexity to the existing intergovernmental dynamic that effectively crippled implementation efforts. It created a “joint-decision trap” impervious to conventional resolution via bargaining, problem solving, or unilateral action. This tangled political history poses a considerable challenge to conventional liberal, structuralist, and regime-based theories of urban politics derived from US experiences. It also highlights the limits of conventional implementation theory in the study of urban development, and calls into question longstanding interpretations of federal-provincial-municipal relations and multilevel governance in Canada.

Dozens of major cities around the world have launched large-scale waterfront redevelopment projects over the past fifty years. Absent from this list of noteworthy achievements, however, is Toronto, a case of grand ambitions gone horribly awry. Despite three extensive revitalization plans in the second half of the 20th century, Toronto’s central waterfront, an area roughly double the city’s central business district, has remained mired in political gridlock for decades. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain why this came to pass. Informed by extensive archival and interview research, as well as geospatial data analyzed using Geographic Information Systems software, the thesis demonstrates that above and beyond political challenges typical of any major urban redevelopment project, in Toronto, issues of land ownership — specifically, public land ownership — were pivotal in defining the scope and pace of waterfront planning and implementation. Few, if any, waterfront redevelopment projects around the world have been attempted amidst the same degree of public land ownership and jurisdictional fragmentation as that which plagued implementation efforts in Toronto. From 1961-1998, no less than 81% of all land in the central waterfront was owned by one public body or another, dispersed across a patchwork of public agencies, corporations, and special purpose authorities nestled within multiple levels of government. Such fragmentation, specifically across public bodies, added a layer of complexity to the existing intergovernmental dynamic that effectively crippled implementation efforts. It created a “joint-decision trap” impervious to conventional resolution via bargaining, problem solving, or unilateral action. This tangled political history poses a considerable challenge to conventional liberal, structuralist, and regime-based theories of urban politics derived from US experiences. It also highlights the limits of conventional implementation theory in the study of urban development, and calls into question longstanding interpretations of federal-provincial-municipal relations and multilevel governance in Canada.