La liberté de circulation et la liberté d’établissement sont reconnues comme fondamentales et intrinsèquement liées au principe de dignité humaine. Pourtant, au nom de la souveraineté nationale, les États imposent des limites à la mobilité humaine. La mobilité de la main-d’œuvre est nécessaire au fonctionnement de l’économie et peut répondre en partie aux enjeux de pénurie de travailleurs. Notre thèse propose une recherche en droit positif visant à circonscrire la portée du droit à la mobilité en droit canadien. De fait, l’article 6 (2) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés reconnaît aux citoyens et résidents permanents au Canada la liberté de circulation et le droit de gagner leur vie. Toutefois, l’alinéa 6 (3) a) de la Charte contient une restriction à ces droits. Les provinces demeurent autorisées à légiférer pour limiter la mobilité, tant qu’elles n’imposent pas de discrimination basée sur la province de résidence. Nous soutenons que dans l’état actuel de la jurisprudence canadienne, le droit à la mobilité n’est pas considéré comme une liberté fondamentale. Pour leur part, les accords de commerce entre les membres de la confédération, sur le plan national, et les accords bilatéraux, régionaux et multilatéraux entre le Canada et ses partenaires contiennent des dispositions encadrant la mobilité de la main-d’œuvre. Lors des négociations constitutionnelles qui ont précédé et suivi le rapatriement de la constitution canadienne en 1982, le développement de l’union économique au pays et l’inclusion du droit à la mobilité ont été au cœur des débats. Or l’analyse des décisions de la Cour suprême du Canada portant sur l’article 6 (2) démontre pourtant que c’est uniquement la non-discrimination sur la base de la province de résidence qui est garantie par la Charte. Les instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de la personne établissent le droit à la mobilité comme un droit fondamental, mais la recension des différents accords de libre-échange permet de conclure que la mobilité de la main-d’œuvre est favorisée essentiellement pour répondre aux besoins économiques. Le droit à la mobilité ne devrait pas uniquement répondre aux besoins des aléas économiques. Dans cette perspective, la reconnaissance des compétences et des qualifications s’avère impérative pour que le droit à la mobilité soit réellement effectif. / The rights to move, the right to take up residence, and the right to gain a livelihood are recognized as fundamental and are intrinsically linked to the principle of human dignity. Yet, in the name of national sovereignty, states impose limits on human mobility. Labor mobility is a pillar of world economy and can address many aspects of workforce shortages. Our research examines current constraints to, and the scope of, the right to mobility under Canadian law. Indeed, section 6 (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes the right to move and the right to gain a livelihood for citizens and permanent residents of Canada. However, section 6 (3) a) of the Charter contains a limitation on these rights. Provinces remain authorized to limit mobility, as long as they do not discriminate on the basis of province of residence. We argue that, as Canadian jurisprudence currently stands, mobility rights are not considered a fundamental freedom. On the other hand, trade agreements between members of confederation, at the national level, and bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements between Canada and its international partners, contain provisions regulating labor mobility. During the constitutional negotiations that preceded and followed the repatriation of the Constitution Act, 1982, the development of the economic union in Canada and the inclusion of mobility rights were at the heart of the debate. However, an analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions on section 6(2) shows that the Canadian Charter guarantees non-discrimination on the basis of province of residence. International human rights instruments establish the mobility rights as a fundamental right, but a review of various free trade agreements suggests that labor mobility is promoted primarily to meet economic needs. Mobility rights should not uniquely answer economic requirements. Against this background, the recognition of skills and qualifications is imperative to ensure that mobility rights are effective.

Malgré l’amélioration du régime des droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI) en Chine après l’accession de celle-ci à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) en 2001, la question relative aux DPI demeure l’un des « sujets de vive préoccupation » dans le commerce sino-européen. Selon la stratégie européenne visant à assurer le respect des DPI dans les pays tiers, adoptée en 2005 et renouvelée en 2014, la Chine est ciblée par la Commission européenne comme le premier pays tiers dans lequel les autorités locales ne prennent pas de mesure efficace pour s’attaquer aux problèmes de violations des DPI. En raison des enjeux politiques et économiques importants pour l’UE, son intervention est nécessaire pour améliorer le régime des DPI et l’environnement de l’investissement en Chine. L’analyse de l’action extérieure de l’UE s’appuie sur l’étude des instruments auxquels elle recourt en vue de renforcer la protection et le respect des DPI en Chine. L’objet de notre recherche est d’examiner la manière dont l’Union choisit d’exploiter les instruments à géométrie variable au sein des enceintes multilatérale et bilatérale. Deux axes distincts mais complémentaires orientent la mise en œuvre de l’action extérieure de l’UE vis-à-vis de la Chine : l’approche coopérative, d’une part, et de l’approche conventionnelle, d’autre part. L’approche coopérative vise d’abord à rapprocher le régime juridique chinois des standards les plus élevés du droit de l’UE. En dépit d’un certain nombre de difficultés limitant l’efficacité de l’action extérieure de l’UE, la coopération bilatérale avec la Chine permet de contribuer à l’amélioration du régime juridique chinois. La convergence normative devrait ensuite faciliter l’apparition d’une approche commune entre l’UE et la Chine sur le plan conventionnel. Il importe à cet égard de souligner la position divergente de la Chine face à la promotion de l’UE, par la voie conventionnelle, d’un renforcement de la protection et du respect des DPI. Malgré la convergence accrue des positions européenne et chinoise favorables à la protection « ADPIC-plus » des DPI, la Chine se montre réticente voire hostile envers les initiatives conventionnelles de l’UE tendant à renforcer les mesures relatives au respect des DPI. / Despite the improvement of China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) regime after this country’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001, the IPR remains one of “major concerns” in Sino-European trade relation. According to European strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries, adopted in 2005 and renewed in 2014, China is identified by the European Commission as first priority country, in which the local authority does not take effective measures to tackle the problems caused by IPR violations. Taking into account the EU’s important political and economic concerns, his action is necessary in order to improve the IPR regime and the investment environment in China. The analysis of EU’s external action is based on the instruments used to strengthen IPR’s protection and enforcement in China. The purpose of our research is to examine the EU’s method to use the different instruments within the multilateral and bilateral fora. Two distinct but complementary axes orientate the undertaking of EU’s external action vis-à-vis China: cooperative approach, on the one hand, and the conventional approach, on the other hand. Firstly, the cooperative approach aims to bring Chinese legal system closer to higher standards in EU law. In spite of certain difficulties limiting the efficacy of EU external action, the bilateral cooperation with China can contribute to a better legal system in China. Then, the normative convergence should be able to facilitate the emergence of a common approach between the EU and China in the conventional framework. In this respect, it is important to emphasis Chinese divergent position with regard to EU’s conventional approach aiming to strengthen IPR protection and enforcement. Despite the increasing convergence of European and Chinese positions favorable toward “TRIPs-plus” protection, China seems reluctant even hostile to EU’s conventional initiatives intending to strengthen IPR enforcement measures.

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.

不論是反全球化或是支持全球化，我們都無法否認，全球化已經是一個現在進行式。另外一個與全球化一樣逐步成長的乃是市場經濟體制，市場經濟體制植基於開放競爭有助於資源合理分配的觀念，而全球化則擴大了資源分配的範圍。然而，全球化和市場經濟體制的發達，貿易壁壘的消除，也帶動跨國界限制競爭活動的發展，反托拉斯不再是單純的國內問題，而是國際問題。 國際反托拉斯所帶來的問題大致可分為下述兩種，一是阻礙國際貿易的發展，二是因為各國不同的反托拉斯標準造成國際緊張以及企業成本。第一類問題可以細分為下述幾種情況：1. 國際卡特爾破壞市場競爭機制以及消費者福祉； 2. 跨國公司在全球濫用獨占力，影響國際競爭秩序和消費者福祉；3. 競爭法的缺乏以及競爭法的不力執行構成市場進入障礙。第二類問題亦可以細分為下屬幾種情況：1. 國際合併的多國標準造成企業的額外成本，不利國際合併之進行，並造成國際緊張；2. 國與國間產業政策以及競爭政策的衝突。 面對上述這些跨國性的反托拉斯問題，各界紛紛提出競爭法調和的呼籲，此議題近來在各國際組織也漸獲重視。事實上為了處理國外限制競爭行為對國內所產生的影響，以保護本國利益，國內法方面已有所謂的「域外適用（extraterritorial application）」對策產生。但是競爭法的域外適用並無法全然解決現時國際限制競爭行為所帶來的問題，反而還帶來了新的問題，並造成國際緊張。為了在國際案件有效執行反托拉斯法，不論是在卡特爾案件或是獨占力濫用案件，各國競爭法主管機關互相合作與協調都是不可或缺的。至於將競爭法提升至國際法層次，避免國家以非關稅措施破壞自由貿易制度，似乎也有需要。 本文目的在於藉著對競爭法調和現況的瞭解和其成就之分析來尋求目前全球化時代，貿易自由化時代下跨國限制競爭問題的解決之道。 全文一共分為六章，第一章為緒論，為本論文做出開端，闡明全球化時代國際競爭秩序的問題，並提出研究範圍與目的。 第二章研究關於國際競爭秩序的雙邊條約，著眼於美國和歐盟，澳洲和紐西蘭，以及我國和世界各國所訂立的條約。討論範圍為該些雙邊關係所建立之合作內容，其具體成效，成功失敗之因素，以及可供世界各國借鏡之處。台灣部分則著眼於我國目前現狀之檢討，和未來走向之研究。 第三章為從事競爭法調和的區域性國際組織，研究範圍包括歐盟、APEC以及NAFTA。其中APEC所從事的活動較近於政策性的調和，屬於競爭政策的宣導；NAFTA則進一步具有競爭法的實體規範；歐盟不但具有實體規範，並具有一套全球獨步的競爭法執行架構。 第四章為國際組織，將討論UN, WTO和OECD在國際競爭法的發展。UN基本上雖為政治組織，但是對於競爭議題也相當重視；WTO部分則將討論目前競爭議題在WTO體系的進展，並進一步討論WTO進行國際競爭法調和工作的可行性和不可行性；OECD對於競爭議題也一直相當重視，本文將探討OECD在競爭議題方面的研究成果。 第五章為全球性的競爭法規範，討論的範圍有UNCTAD所提出的「管制限制性商業行為的一套多邊協議的公平原則和規則（Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices）」以及DIAC。這兩套全球性的競爭法不但都具有實體規範也都提出一套制度性規範，雖然兩者都未能成為具有拘束力的國際競爭法，但是其所提出的實體規範內容和架構設計仍值得我們做進一步的研究。「管制限制性商業行為的一套多邊協議的公平原則和規則」本身是以聯大決議的形式呈現，因此在某一角度而言，「管制限制性商業行為的一套多邊協議的公平原則和規則」並未失敗，然而DIAC原本乃是預定成為WTO的附件之一，唯最後這樣的理想並未實現，因此我們有必要去問，DIAC的失敗因素為何？是基於其實體內容的設計問題，或是制度面的設計問題？或者是因為其他的外在因素？ 最後，在第六章的結論，本文將試圖分析各種競爭法調和方式的利弊得失，並且提出建議。 / Some people oppose globalization, while others support globalization. However, it is undeniable that globalization is an on-going trend. Another on-going trend is market-oriented economy structure. The structure of market-oriented economy bases on the theory that competition contributes to reasonable allocation of resource. On the other hand, globalization expands the scope of the allocation of resources. However, the proliferation of globalization and the structure of market-oriented economy and the elimination of trade barriers also promote the development of transnational anticompetitive activities. Antitrust is no more a pure domestic issue, it is also an international issue nowadays. International antitrust problems could be divided into two parts. First, the international antitrust activities hinder the development of international trade. Second, different antitrust standards of each country cause international tense situation and increase enterprises’ cost. First situation contains following aspects: 1. International cartels ruin market competition system and welfare of consumers. 2. Transnational companies abuse their dominant power all globally and affect international competition order and consumers’ welfare. 3. Absence of competition law and unenforcement of it constitute market entrance obstacles. Second situation also contains following aspects: 1.Different standards of international mergers bring many results, such as increasing enterprises’ extra cost, hindering the proceedings of international mergers, and causing international tensions. 2. The conflict between industry policy and competition policy of countries. Facing those transnational antitrust problems, the issue of the harmonization of competition law has been raised. This issue is drawing more and more attention in several international organizations day by day. In fact, to deal with the domestic effect of abroad anticompetitive activities to protect national interest, the theory “extraterritorial application” of domestic law has been raised. However, the extraterritorial application of domestic law is unable to solve all the problems that the international anticompetitive activities have brought. Furthermore, it has also made new problems and caused international tensions. To enforce antitrust law effectively in international cases, cooperation and coordination between national competition agencies are unavoidable. In addition, bringing antitrust law up to international law level and avoiding nations ruin free trade system by non-tariff strategy seem also be needed. The main purpose of this essay is to understand and analysis the current situation of the harmonization of competition law and to find out the solution of transnational competition problems in the era of globalization and the era of free-trade. This essay has been divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which illustrates the international competition problems in the era of globalization and brings out the studying scope and purpose of this essay. The second chapter talks about international competition bilateral treaties between U.S. and E.U., Australia and New Zealand, Taiwan and other countries. The discussing scope contains the cooperation content which was set up by the bilateral treaty, its concrete result, and the reasons of its failure or success. As for Taiwan, this essay focuses on the review of its current situation and where its future is. The third chapter talks about regional international organizations which involve in the harmonization of competition law, such as E.U., APEC and NAFTA. APEC’s activities are more closer to the harmonization of policies, which promote competition activities. NAFTA has substantial competition regulations. E.U. not only has substantial regulations but also has the first set of enforcement system of international competition law in the world. The forth chapter is international organization, which talks about the development of international competition law in U.N., WTO and OECD. Although basically U.N. is a political organization, it also highly emphasizes competition issues. In addition, this chapter talks about the development of competition issues in the WTO system and the possibilities of promoting the harmonization of international competition law in WTO. Additionally, OECD also emphasizes competition issues very much. This chapter also talks about the study result of OECD in the competition issues. The fifth chapter is the global competition regulations, which contains “Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices” of UNCTAD and “ Draft International Antitrust Code”. Both of the global competition laws contain substantial regulations and the design of enforcement systems. Although both of them ended up in unrestrictive regulations, they also deserve further research. “Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices” was brought out with the form of UN General Assembly Resolution, but it is successful in some aspect. DIAC was meant to be an Annex of WTO originally. However this idea was not realized at the end. Why DIAC failed? Was it because of the design of its substantial content or the design of the enforcement structure or other outside factors? At last, this essay will analysis the shortages and advantages of all kinds of the harmonization of competition law and bring out recommendations in the conclusion of chapter 6.