The goal of the project is to explore the issue of information overload in grand-strategy games, specifically focusing on Paradox games,and utilizing Victoria 3 as the primary case study. The research delves into the background and theory of grand strategy games, includingthe user experience, tooltip design, tutorials, and think-aloud interviews.To accomplish this, the research methodology involves conducting preliminary interviews via the think-aloud method, as well as a surveybased study. In the survey, participants will be asked to share their understanding of tutorial information and their experience with tooltips.Data analysis will be conducted using both quantitative and qualitative methods.This study discusses information overload for players within the tutorial section and tooltips within, analyzing issues from playersperspective and discussing and highlighting these issues and the challenges of overcoming them.

This bachelor’s thesis’s purpose was to determine how the complexity of economic systems invideo games affect the gameplay of said video games, Victoria II (Paradox Interactive AB,2010) and Civilization V (Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc, 2010). This was done by askingthe research question: “How does the complexity of economic systems in grand strategygames affect gameplay?“. The method was rooted in Game Research Methods (Lankoski &Björk, 2015) guidelines and the results were interpreted using Game Mechanics: AdvancedGame Design (Adams & Dormans, 2012). A formal analysis was performed for each game.The key findings of these analyses are extensive descriptions for the functioning of eachgame’s economic system as well as recommendations regarding important aspects of thesesystems and how to design them. / Denna kandidatuppsats mål var att undersöka komplexitet av ekonomiska system inomstrategiska datorspel genom att genomföra en analys för spelen Victoria II (ParadoxInteractive AB, 2010) och Civilization V (Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc, 2010) ochjämföra respektive spel. Detta med forskningsfrågan “Hur påverkar komplexiteten inomekonomiska system gameplay?”. Metoden utfördes utifrån Game Research Methods(Lankoski & Björk, 2015) riktlinjer och tolkades med hjälp av Game Mechanics: AdvancedGame Design (Adams & Dormans, 2012). Forskningen utfördes genom formell analys. Deviktigaste fynden var omfattande nedbrytningar av de ekonomiska systemen för varje spel ochrekommendationer för hur dessa system kan designas.

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Due to the high cost of manual content creation within the game development industry, methods for procedural generation of content such as game maps and levels have emerged. However, methods for generating game maps have remained relatively unexplored in competitive multiplayer contexts. Presumably, this is due to the opposing goals of generating game maps that are both interesting and fair. This study aims to explore the possibility of satisfying both these goals simultaneously by separating the generative phase from the phase that enforces fairness. In this endeavor, simple game maps for a generic multiplayer grand strategy game are generated using noise-based methods. The task of partitioning the game map fairly between the players is then modeled as a constrained categorical multiobjective minimization problem that is subsequently solved by two genetic algorithms, the reference-point-based algorithm NSGA-III and the decomposition-based algorithm MOEA/D-IEpsilon. In a primary study, the proposed partitioning method is evaluated based on the quality of the solutions produced, its scalability, and its ability to find symmetrical partitions of symmetrical game maps. The results show that the proposed method makes significant improvement from the initial guess but fails to produce completely fair partitions in general. Explanations and possible solutions to this are presented. The timing results indicate that the proposed method is not applicable in real-time contexts. However, the proposed method might still be applicable in online contexts if smaller game maps are considered and in offline contexts if larger game maps are considered. Finally, the partitioning results show that the proposed method successfully finds fair partitions of symmetrical game maps but fails to find the obvious symmetrical partitions. In a secondary study, the two genetic algorithms are compared to determine which algorithm produces dominating solutions and which algorithm produces most diverse solution. The results indicate that, for the partitioning problems considered in this study, the reference-point-based algorithm is both dominant and produces the most diverse solutions.

Ce mémoire analyse la stratégie d’affirmation de puissance mise en oeuvre par la Chine dans le contexte post-Guerre froide, caractérisé par la seule superpuissance des États-Unis, en utilisant le cadre théorique du réalisme offensif. Challenger désigné des États-Unis, la Chine a basculé dans le 21ème siècle avec un défi important à relever. La prépondérance américaine continue d’être une donnée essentielle dans le système politique mondial. Les États-Unis produisent plus du quart du total de l’économie mondiale et comptent pour près de la moitié des dépenses militaires. La Chine, de son côté, avec ses 1.3 milliards d’habitants, une croissance économique quasiexponentielle, dotée d’un arsenal nucléaire conventionnel, est la principale puissance émergente, avec le potentiel de rivaliser avec les États-Unis dans les affaires mondiales. Mais, vu l’énorme écart qui les sépare, pour la Chine la question de l’hégémonie américaine se pose sous la forme d’une équation dont la seule variable connue est le potentiel de l’adversaire à affronter. Le principal problème auquel la Chine est confrontée est dès lors sa capacité de penser une stratégie sans toutefois courir le risque de provoquer la seule superpuissance du globe. Par conséquent, cette étude analyse les politiques et actions stratégiques développées par la Chine à la lumière des contraintes que lui impose un environnement international peu favorable. Elle s’intéresse en particulier à la manière dont Beijing a su exploiter avec maestria une des armes les plus redoutables de l’ère post-Guerre froide, sa puissance économique, afin de consolider son ascension au rang de grande puissance. Elle soutient que, tenant compte d’un retard considérable à combler, la Chine a entrepris de balancer la superpuissance américaine d’une manière pragmatique. A cet effet, elle a conçu une stratégie qui comprend deux grands piliers : sur le plan interne, des réformes économiques et militaires ; sur le plan externe, une diplomatie agressive et efficace en adéquation avec ses ambitions de puissance. Nous concluons qu’une telle stratégie vise à éviter à la Chine pour le moment tout risque de confrontation directe qui aurait pour principal effet de nuire à son ascension. Cependant, à mesure que sa puissance s’accroît, elle pourrait afficher une posture plus agressive, quitte à engager également, avec la seule superpuissance du monde, des compétitions de nature sécuritaire en Asie et au-delà de cette région. / This research analyzes the power strategy implemented by China in the post-cold war context characterized by an only superpower, the United States, by using offensive realism as a theoretical framework. Designated challenger of the United States, China tilted into the 21st century with an important challenge to confront. The American ascendancy continues to be an essential fact in the world political system. The United States produces more than one fourth of the total of the world economy and counts for nearly half of the military expenditures. China, for its part, with 1.3 billion inhabitants, a quasi-exponential economic growth, endowed with a conventional nuclear arsenal, is the main emerging power, with the potential to compete with the United States in world affairs. But, considering the enormous gap separating them, for China the question of the American hegemony arises under the shape of an equation, the only known variable of which is the potential of its adversary. The main problem China then faces is its ability to think of a strategy without however running a risk of provoking the only superpower of the globe. Consequently, this work analyzes the policies and the strategic actions developed by China in light of the constraints imposed by a less favorable international environment. Its main focus is how Beijing exploited with great panache one of the most redoubtable weapons of the post-cold war era, its economic power, to strengthen its ascent to the rank of major power. It contends that, taking into account a considerable delay to catch up, China began to balance the American superpower in a pragmatic way. To that purpose, it conceived a strategy which includes two main pillars: internally, economic and military reforms; externally, an aggressive and effective diplomacy in adequacy with its power ambitions. This analysis concludes that the aim of china’s strategy is to avoid for the moment every risk of direct confrontation which would have for main effect to damage its rise. However, as its power increases, it might tend to show a more aggressive posture, even if it means also engaging, with the only superpower of the world, in competitions of a security nature in Asia and beyond this region.

One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II (WWII) phenomenon and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as mainly a post-Cold War product. No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of European defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the ‘anomalous,’ ‘elusive’ CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations. But the CSDP is hardly an oddity or aberration, and it is certainly not as mysterious as some might suggest. Drawing extensively from primary sources and predicated on an overarching evolutionist approach, this thesis shows that the present CSDP is an ephemeral security and defence concept, only the latest of its kind and full of potential. Drawing its deepest ideational roots from the (pre-)Enlightenment era, the CSDP leads to a pan-European defence almost irreversibly. A common defence for Europe is quite possible and, due to the growing impact of the exogenous (multipolar) momentum, can be realized sooner rather than later even without a full-fledged European federation. / May 2016

COMMON ENDS OR COMMON MEANS? The Cold War is over and Sweden and Finland are starting to deal with the new security enviroment that has emerged. Grand Strategy in both countries is changing to meet the new Europe and surroundings. Both Sweden and Finland consider the risk of a direct attack in the near future to be highly unlikely and this has effects on the respective countries grand strategy. A broadened approach to security is applied and the military instrument is no longer the primary concern in the strategy. Both Sweden and Finland become members of the European Union in 1995 but neither is a member of NATO, the countries both consider themselves as military non-aligned, the only two countries with a coastline to the Baltic Sea with that stance. This makes for a logic choice to cooperate for the common security and a cooperation is formed to cover security policies to be relevant in peace, crisis and war. Even though the countries are existing in and interpret the new security enviroment in similar ways they approach the challanges in differing ways. This creates the differences that we identify and describe in this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to identify and describe the differences between Sweden's and Finland's grand strategy, how this difference has changed from 1996 to 2018 and if these differences can have consequences for the cooperation between the two countries, mainly military and at the highest strategic level. The thesis is focused on the elements of the grand strategy that involves the armed forces of the respective countries. This comparative text analysis compares political policy documents within the grand strategy field from both Sweden and Finland. We will compare the period from 1996-2018. The comparison will be made by examining three occasions in the period, year 1996, Year 2004 and year 2018. The documents used have relevance against these years and are analyzed by applying Jacob Westberg's model; ends, means, ways and environment. The differences and the consequences that are the conclusions of this thesis are that cooperation are not always formed because it is the best possible option but sometimest the only possible options. Sweden and Finland's history differ in some parts and this has affected the respective country's security strategies. Finland has a history of coping for itself and has thus a national focus with focus on a stable national defense while Sweden has a history without war in modern times and a constant glance at military international engagement and the political benefits that can be achieved on the international scene.

Space technologies and the tools of space warfare are proliferating across Earth. The use of spacepower in conflict necessitates strategic thinking. Strategic theory can guide and improve strategic thought about outer space. Drawing on strategic theory, this thesis develops a spacepower theory in the next step of a collective theory-making effort about warfare in the Space Age. This spacepower theory is based on seven distinct, complementary, and interacting propositions that aim to shift the debate of spacepower away from space weaponisation and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and towards a more holistic view of the vast possibilities granted by spacepower. This spacepower theory proposes that space warfare only has meaning in so far it works towards the command of space; that the command of space is about manipulating celestial lines of communication; that spacepower in Earth orbit is a place to conduct strategic manoeuvres to influence the wider war and grand strategic goals; and that the command of space can have direct meaning for battlefield success through its dispersing effects. The theory is based on three major strategic analogies from terrestrial strategic theory and experience. First, space warfare is a continuation of terrestrial politics. Second, space is like the sea in its most basic concepts. Third, Earth orbit is like a coastal region. The contributions of this work are a theory that assists the individual’s education on warfare in the Space Age that takes emphasis away from space-based weaponry and the RMA, and a treatise that demonstrates and encourages a pedagogical method of analysis in strategic studies. This has tentative implications for wider discussions of astropolitics in International Relations (IR) as well. IR will continue in its usefulness in the cosmos, while Terran IR today must account for the realities of the Space Age.

This paper seeks to determine under what conditions a U.S. president can implement a grand strategy given the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints. It will examine three comparative case studies: Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, with the goal of determining what conditions are necessary at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of analysis for grand strategy implementation. At the individual level, it will apply operational code analysis, as well as an examination of personal characteristics for each case study. At the domestic level, it will apply a five-prong test for examining factors that are key to grand strategy implementation: (1) unity of foreign policy team; (2) strength of presidency; (3) party alignment between Congress and the president; (4) public opinion; and (5) strength of domestic economy. At the systemic level, it will examine significant events faced by each president that tested whether his grand strategy could respond effectively to international imperatives. Ultimately, it will assess the success of each president's attempt at grand strategy implementation based on: (1) how closely U.S. policies aligned with his grand strategy; and (2) whether policies put in place that aligned with his grand strategy improved the global standing of the U.S. Through this analysis, it will assess the larger implications of having a grand strategy on U.S. foreign policy.

Ce mémoire analyse la stratégie d’affirmation de puissance mise en oeuvre par la Chine dans le contexte post-Guerre froide, caractérisé par la seule superpuissance des États-Unis, en utilisant le cadre théorique du réalisme offensif. Challenger désigné des États-Unis, la Chine a basculé dans le 21ème siècle avec un défi important à relever. La prépondérance américaine continue d’être une donnée essentielle dans le système politique mondial. Les États-Unis produisent plus du quart du total de l’économie mondiale et comptent pour près de la moitié des dépenses militaires. La Chine, de son côté, avec ses 1.3 milliards d’habitants, une croissance économique quasiexponentielle, dotée d’un arsenal nucléaire conventionnel, est la principale puissance émergente, avec le potentiel de rivaliser avec les États-Unis dans les affaires mondiales. Mais, vu l’énorme écart qui les sépare, pour la Chine la question de l’hégémonie américaine se pose sous la forme d’une équation dont la seule variable connue est le potentiel de l’adversaire à affronter. Le principal problème auquel la Chine est confrontée est dès lors sa capacité de penser une stratégie sans toutefois courir le risque de provoquer la seule superpuissance du globe. Par conséquent, cette étude analyse les politiques et actions stratégiques développées par la Chine à la lumière des contraintes que lui impose un environnement international peu favorable. Elle s’intéresse en particulier à la manière dont Beijing a su exploiter avec maestria une des armes les plus redoutables de l’ère post-Guerre froide, sa puissance économique, afin de consolider son ascension au rang de grande puissance. Elle soutient que, tenant compte d’un retard considérable à combler, la Chine a entrepris de balancer la superpuissance américaine d’une manière pragmatique. A cet effet, elle a conçu une stratégie qui comprend deux grands piliers : sur le plan interne, des réformes économiques et militaires ; sur le plan externe, une diplomatie agressive et efficace en adéquation avec ses ambitions de puissance. Nous concluons qu’une telle stratégie vise à éviter à la Chine pour le moment tout risque de confrontation directe qui aurait pour principal effet de nuire à son ascension. Cependant, à mesure que sa puissance s’accroît, elle pourrait afficher une posture plus agressive, quitte à engager également, avec la seule superpuissance du monde, des compétitions de nature sécuritaire en Asie et au-delà de cette région. / This research analyzes the power strategy implemented by China in the post-cold war context characterized by an only superpower, the United States, by using offensive realism as a theoretical framework. Designated challenger of the United States, China tilted into the 21st century with an important challenge to confront. The American ascendancy continues to be an essential fact in the world political system. The United States produces more than one fourth of the total of the world economy and counts for nearly half of the military expenditures. China, for its part, with 1.3 billion inhabitants, a quasi-exponential economic growth, endowed with a conventional nuclear arsenal, is the main emerging power, with the potential to compete with the United States in world affairs. But, considering the enormous gap separating them, for China the question of the American hegemony arises under the shape of an equation, the only known variable of which is the potential of its adversary. The main problem China then faces is its ability to think of a strategy without however running a risk of provoking the only superpower of the globe. Consequently, this work analyzes the policies and the strategic actions developed by China in light of the constraints imposed by a less favorable international environment. Its main focus is how Beijing exploited with great panache one of the most redoubtable weapons of the post-cold war era, its economic power, to strengthen its ascent to the rank of major power. It contends that, taking into account a considerable delay to catch up, China began to balance the American superpower in a pragmatic way. To that purpose, it conceived a strategy which includes two main pillars: internally, economic and military reforms; externally, an aggressive and effective diplomacy in adequacy with its power ambitions. This analysis concludes that the aim of china’s strategy is to avoid for the moment every risk of direct confrontation which would have for main effect to damage its rise. However, as its power increases, it might tend to show a more aggressive posture, even if it means also engaging, with the only superpower of the world, in competitions of a security nature in Asia and beyond this region.