American policy towards European integration process has always seemed equivocal: on one hand it actively supported and encouraged the process, but on the other hand it tried to contain some specific European ambitions and steer the process in a desirable direction. The objective of the thesis is to offer a possible explanation of the long-term US policy towards the European integration and European region in general. The dissertation presents a hypothesis that the American policy towards Europe since the Second World War until current times can be explained within the theorethical concept of "regional hegemony strategy". The concept builds on neorealist and neoliberal interpretations of hegemony, which are applied to the process of formulation of American grand strategy. It identifies a set of independent variables effecting the resulting strategy and operationalizes the expected strategy into particular goals. The empirical part of the dissertation then tests the established hyphothesis in two ways. In the first part it analyzes the identified independent variables and tests the causality betwen their historical evolution and evolution of the American grand strategy, especially in relation to the European region. In the consequent parts, it focuses on the American policy towards the European integration...

The aim of this research is to analyse the development of an EU grand strategy, using the two dominant EU powers Germany and France and their respective approach to an EU grand strategy. The importance of the EU grand strategy cannot be underestimated as it concerns the national security of all citizens in the EU. Research in this area which contributes with more findings addressing new information must be seen as urgent and relevant. While other studies have researched the development of the EU grand strategy, the recent international structural events in the form of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War have not yet been studied. The concepts that will be used are strategic culture and strategic autonomy, with the purpose to provide insights on Germany’s and France’s approach to an EU grand strategy. Strategic culture and strategic autonomy will use theoretical assumptions based on constructivism and structural realism respectively. The findings are that Germany is still a major proponent of a transatlantic EU grand strategy, while France remains supportive of a Europeanist EU grand strategy. Recent events with the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War have led to that Germany have decided to abandon its energy dependency towards Russia and significantly increase its military spend to the by NATO stipulated two percent of GDP. These events will affect the development of the EU grand strategy, but the current signs are that Germany and France will not change their approach on the EU grand strategy because of this.

This study uses defensive realism, offensive realism and power transition theory (PTT) in order to examine the great powers’ grand strategies in the Arctic region, aiming to recontextualise the security theatre in the Arctic as a reflection of the return of great power politics and the end of Arctic exceptionalism, and to examine the explanatory power of the different strands of realism on the great power behaviour identified in their Arctic strategies. The study is conducted using qualitative content analysis and utilises Jacob Westberg’s theorisation of grand strategies through the categories of context, ends, means and ways as analytical framework, to which the theoretical framework is applied. The result shows that realism is a suitable theory for predicting great power behaviour in the Arctic, where PTT provides the strongest explanatory power; that the dichotomy between hard and soft security is eroding; and that the strategies were highly context-dependent, thus rendering generalisable results difficult to discern.

This dissertation offers a framework for understanding the strategies of states engaged in competition for regional hegemony. Although international relations literature refers extensively to such competition and obliquely to states' strategies, to date little has been done to show how states' strategies in such competition may be analyzed. Drawing on a variety of strategic literature, this dissertation synthesizes a theoretical approach to analyzing the strategies of states engaged in regional security competition. Employing insights drawn from business strategy, this dissertation argues for an essentially asymmetric understanding of fundamental policy goals for states engaged in competition for regional hegemony, with one state attempting to maintain a dominant position and another attempting, by focusing limited resources, to supplant it. The competition is understood metaphorically (based on an anecdote from the end of the Cold War) as a “race with no finish line,” with the reigning hegemon attempting to extend the race and the challenger attempting to create a finish line and cross it. With homage to realism, liberalism, and constructivism, possible state goals are categorized as belonging to three realms: security, welfare, and intangible goals. These are used as metrics for a state's success or failure in any given competitive scenario, as well as the resources at its disposal. Drawing on military strategic literature, this thesis then applies decision-cycle analysis to state competitive behavior. The conclusions from this analysis are then synthesized into a framework for analysis of similar regional competitive scenarios, the first such framework yet devised for such purposes. A case study: the “Dreadnought Race” between Britain and Germany prior to World War One, is then examined, in which states' performance is analyzed in the competitive scenario in light of the above strategic precepts.

Den säkerhetspolitiska situationen i Norden var under kalla kriget låst i kampen mellan öst och väst. Detta innebar att respektive lands möjligheter att fritt välja säkerhetsstrategi var begränsad. Först efter slutet på kalla kriget öppnade sig denna möjlighet och länderna kunde även se sig om efter nya samarbeten och partners. Nya säkerhetsstrategier utarbetas i Sverige och Norge där det internationella åtagandet stärks och nya samarbeten utvecklas med bland annat det nordiska försvarssamarbetet. När Ryssland i och med sitt agerande i Georgien och Ukraina återigen börjar utgöra ett potentiellt hot börjar det territoriella försvaret hamna i fokus igen. Den nya säkerhetspolitiska situationen leder till ett militärt samarbete mellan Sverige och Finland som bland annat involverar försvarsplanering för skyddandet av det andra landets territorium. Men ett sådant samarbete uppstår inte mellan Sverige och Norge. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka och beskriva likheter och skillnader i svensk- och norsk säkerhetsstrategi sedan förändringen i omvärldsläget 2008 och vidare beskriva eventuella möjligheter för utvidgade försvars- och militära samarbeten mellan Sverige och Norge, liknande det som finns mellan Sverige och Finland. Studien använder sig av kvalitativ textanalys applicerat på norska och svenska försvarsbeslut, propositioner eller underlag inför dessa. För att kunna svara på studiens syfte och frågeställningar används två olika teorier, en per frågeställning, som appliceras på textanalysens resultat. Studiens viktigaste resultat består i att de slående likheterna mellan svensk och norsk säkerhetsstrategi beror på den gemensamma strategiska miljö som länderna befinner sig i samt att hoten i den förändrade omvärlden tolkas likvärdigt. De största likheterna mellan de två ländernas utformade säkerhetsstrategier finns i de säkerhetspolitiska målen samt de tillgången till nationella medel och resurser. Den största skillnaden mellan länderna rör vald metod att genomföra sin strategi på, där Norge för en tydlig allianspolitik och bygger sitt nationella försvar kring Nato medan Sverige väljer att stå militärt alliansfritt och samarbeta genom bilaterala avtal. Denna skillnad är också den faktor som starkast negativt påverkar förutsättningarna för ett mer utvecklat militärt samarbete länderna emellan. Utöver frågan kring Nato finns det goda möjligheter för vidare militära samarbeten främst genom gemensamma förband för internationella operationer. / During the Cold War, the security situation in the Nordic countries was fixed in the battle between the East and the West. This meant that each country's ability to freely choose a security strategy was limited. Only after the end of the Cold War did this opportunity emerge and the countries could look for new partnerships. New security strategies were developed in Sweden and Norway, where the international commitment was strengthened and new collaborations were being developed, for example the Nordic defence cooperation. When Russia begun to pose a potential threat with its actions in Georgia and Ukraine, territorial defence rose in priority. The new security situation leads to enhanced military cooperation between Sweden and Finland, which involves, among other things, military planning for the protection of the other country's territory. But no such cooperation develops between Sweden and Norway. The purpose of this study is to investigate and define similarities and differences in the Swedish and Norwegian security strategies since the change in the external situation in 2008 and further describe possible opportunities for enhanced defence and military cooperations between Sweden and Norway, similar to the ones existing between Sweden and Finland. The study uses a qualitative text analysis applied to Norwegian and Swedish defence decisions, acts or reports. To be able to answer the study's purpose and questions, two different theories are being used, one per each question, which is applied to the results of the text analysis. The most significant result of this study is that the most prominent similarities in Swedish and Norwegian security strategies are results of a shared view of the strategic environment and new threats from changes in the external situation is interpreted likewise in both nations. The most notable similarities are found in the stated strategic ends for each country’s security strategy and the national means in assets and capabilities they both possess. The biggest difference between the two are in which ways they operate in the strategic environment, where Norway has chosen NATO as the foundation of their national defence and Sweden stands as non-allied military state depending on bilateral agreements for cooperation. This difference is also the most vital factor negatively effecting the possibilities for enhanced military cooperation between the two countries. Apart from the issue surrounding NATO there are relatively good possibilities for further military cooperation, primarily thru joint military units for international operations.

On 1 February 1793, the National Convention of Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands, expanding the list of France's enemies in the War of the First Coalition. Although British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had predicted fifteen years of peace one year earlier, the French declaration of war initiated nearly a quarter century of war between Britain and France with only a brief respite during the Peace of Amiens. Britain entered the war amid both a nadir in British diplomacy and internal political divisions over the direction of British foreign policy. After becoming prime minister in 1783 in the aftermath of the War of American Independence, Pitt pursued financial and naval reform to recover British strength and cautious interventionism to end Britain's diplomatic isolation in Europe. He hoped to create a collective security system based on the principles of the territorial status quo, trade agreements, neutral rights, and resolution of diplomatic disputes through mediation - armed mediation if necessary. While his domestic measures largely met with success, Pitt's foreign policy suffered from a paucity of like-minded allies, contradictions between traditional hostility to France and emergent opposition to Russian expansion, Britain's limited ability to project power on the continent, and the even more limited will of Parliament to support such interventionism. Nevertheless, Pitt's collective security goal continued to shape British strategy in the War of the First Coalition, and the same challenges continued to plague the British war effort. This led to failure in the war and left the British fighting on alone after the Treaty of Campo Formio secured peace between France and its last continental foe, Austria, on 18 October 1797.

To predict and prevent future armed conflicts like Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, there is more value in knowing how these wars occurred rather than why they occurred. The Russian Playbook is built from three distinct “plays” employed by Moscow and organised in the theoretical framework of Historical Institutionalism through Path Dependence modelling. This research focuses on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as cases for comparison by building on the Soviet legacy in each state which forms the antecedent historical conditions of the Playbook’s Path Dependence. Where Play 1 focuses on offensive and defensive influence seeking as a form of structural persistence, Play 2’s shaping and weaponisation acts to counter reactive sequences. Both Plays function within path dependency’s punctuated equilibrium and appear consistently throughout Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Play 1 and Play 2 are overpowered by reactive sequences that cannot be countered, Moscow deems the disequilibrium as irremediable and the path towards conflict begins. Play 3 refers to the start of lock-in effects towards conflict, beginning with “pre-crisis” conditions. Play 3’s Lock-in Effectsserve as the period in which a predictable conflict outcome is likely to occur, though lock-in refers to the path adherence in preparation for future conflict. This Play occurs in both Georgia and Ukraine at the time of this research, though its future employment within Moldova should not be excluded. These actions, in the form of the Russian Playbook and its Plays act as a guide for operationalising and implementing Russia’s grand strategy. This research goes beyond individual figureheads of Russia or specific institutions and instead focuses on patterns that exist throughout historical cases. These patterns show there is nothing particularly “new” in how Russia operates despite the vast number of newly coined phrases including “hybrid” leading people to believe otherwise. As such, Putin did not create the Russian Playbook, he inherited it. / <p>Master's of Political Science with a Specialisation in International and European Relations.</p>

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many authors, critics, and policy makers question the presence of a unified grand strategy with which the United States has striven toward in recent years. This is a topic worthy of pursuit since such a strategy is responsible for identifying how this nation intends to accomplish its goals. This thesis defines what, if any, grand strategy the United States is currently pursuing. It observes several prominent theories of grand strategy, from both the realist and liberal perspectives. This analysis is set in context of historical grand strategy decisions since World War II and uses the framework of Taiwan as the case study. The thesis then compares the three theories, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, and the Liberal Milieu and their recommendations to real-world activities of the United States with a focus primarily on military deployments and national objectives. The study reveals that of the three in question, the Liberal Milieu grand strategy is the only one that is supported by ongoing deployments in the East Asia region as well as by the national rhetoric which define our policy objectives.