Le 17 avril 1982, le système politique canadien, qui prenait racine dans les doctrines du parlementarisme classique anglais, s’est vu bouleversé par des changements constitutionnels d’envergure. En effet, la constitutionnalisation du droit effectuée en 1982 – par l’entremise de l’enchâssement de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés – a eu pour effet d’octroyer au pouvoir judiciaire un accroissement de sa prérogative constitutionnelle de révision judiciaire des lois donnant cours, selon certains, à la judiciarisation du politique au Canada. Cette problématique a fait l’objet de nombreuses recherches menées par des juristes et des politologues, tout particulièrement. Ce faisant, ces auteurs ont élaboré des théories constitutionnelles variées qui ont toutes comme objectif singulier de rendre compte de cette judiciarisation du politique. À ce titre, les théories émanant du corpus documentaire étudié sont celles : (1) de la critique de la Charte, (2) du dialogue, (3) de l’interprétation constitutionnelle coordonnée et, enfin, (4) du comportement stratégique du pouvoir judiciaire.

Au cours de l’histoire constitutionnelle française, l’expression « pouvoir constituant » a toujours été ambivalente. Sous la plume des juristes et des théoriciens ou professée à la tribune des assemblées politiques, elle n’a cessé de désigner, indistinctement, l’organe constituant ou la fonction constituante. Si la diversité des situations offertes par le premier cas a été facilement et rapidement acceptée (exercice du pouvoir constituant par une assemblée, par une personne, par le corps électoral), le second a longtemps véhiculé une alternative passée sous silence entre la rédaction et la modification de la constitution. Malgré l’utilisation du vocable « pouvoir de révision » par Georges Burdeau en 1930 ou la distinction pérenne de Roger Bonnard entre un pouvoir constituant originaire et un pouvoir constituant dérivé, la vision unitaire de la fonction du pouvoir constituant s’est imposée jusqu’à nous. Cela étant, une autre acception de la fonction constituante, selon qu’elle instaure ou qu’elle modifie l’ordre juridique, permet une relecture de l’histoire constitutionnelle française, jamais entreprise sous cet angle. Celle où, d’une part, le « pouvoir constituant » est cantonné à, et ne désigne que, la fonction de fondation de l’ordre juridique, et où d’autre part, le « pouvoir de révision », prévu ou non par le texte constitutionnel, a pour fonction de protéger et d’améliorer la Constitution. / No abstract

Ce travail étudie, dans ses aspects juridiques, le processus des ruptures de continuité constitutionnelle et des dépassements de ces ruptures, au cours de l'histoire de l'État hellénique moderne. Processus par lequel un régime en place disparaît et un autre apparaît. Processus dans lequel la légitimation précède la légalisation. Processus qui réserve un sort varié à l'ordre constitutionnel antérieur et qui s'achève par l'élaboration d'un ordre nouveau. Ce processus s'étend sur une période que l'on pourrait qualifier d' « intermédiaire». La durée de celle-ci peut varier, et il arrive qu'elle soit d'une certaine longueur. Cela fut parfois le cas en Grèce. Mais cette période a son « droit », qui trouve une place dans le droit constitutionnel général, malgré les particularités qui le singularisent. / This work studies, in its legal aspects, the process of breaches of constitutional continuity and the way out of them, in the course of the history of the modern Greek State. Process by which a regime in power disappears and another appears. Process in which legitimation precedes legalization. Process that reserves a varied fate to the former constitutional order and ends with the establishment of a new order. This process extends over a period that could be called "intermediate". Its duration varies, and it happens to be of a certain length. This was sometimes the case in Greece. But this period has its "law" that has a place in the general Constitutional Law in spite of its peculiarities that make it particular.

Avant le rapatriement constitutionnel de 1982, existait-il une coutume constitutionnelle nécessitant l’accord unanime des provinces pour modifier la Constitution ? Après avoir analysé les éléments constitutifs permettant la reconnaissance d’une coutume en tant que source de droit au niveau international et dans les États de common law, l’auteur établit, dans une perspective historique, politique et juridique, les caractéristiques qui permettent d’utiliser cette norme juridique dans le contexte canadien. Bien que la coutume constitutionnelle n’ait pas été plaidée devant les tribunaux canadiens au moment du rapatriement, l’analyse des modifications constitutionnelles depuis la naissance de la fédération, à la lumière des éléments constitutifs de cette source de droit, permet de croire que l’accord unanime des provinces était nécessaire pour modifier la Constitution. Cette analyse s’avère encore plus crédible lorsqu’elle est confrontée à l’avis des juges majoritaires de la Cour suprême du Canada rendu à l’aube du rapatriement dans le Renvoi : Résolution pour modifier la Constitution. Quelque 30 ans plus tard, une question subsiste. Serait-il toujours possible de reconnaître cette coutume afin de préserver le caractère inclusif de la Constitution ainsi que le désir commun des provinces de contracter une union fédérale comme cela avait été établi en 1867 ? / Before the constitutional patriation in 1982, was there a constitutional custom requiring the unanimous assent of the provinces to amend the Constitution ? After analysing the constitutive elements that identify a custom as a source of law at the international level and in common law jurisdictions, the author establishes the features that allow this legal approach to be used in the Canadian context, from a historical, political and legal standpoint. Despite the fact that constitutional custom was not pleaded before the Canadian courts when the Constitution was patriated, an analysis of constitutional amendments since Confederation, in light of the constitutive elements of the legal rule, suggests that unanimous agreement from the provinces was necessary to amend the Constitution. This analysis gains even more credibility from the majority decision of the Supreme Court immediately prior to patriation in Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution. Some 30 years later, a question remains. Should it still be possible to recognize this custom to preserve the inclusive nature of the Constitution along with the shared desire of the provinces to contract a federal union, as established in 1867 ?

La crise de la chaise vide dans la Communauté Economique Européenne (CEE) a éclaté après un désaccord fondamental entre la Commission de la CEE, le gouvernement français et les gouvernements partenaires de la France sur le financement de la Politique Agricole Commune. Le président français Charles de Gaulle donnait l’ordre de boycotter le Conseil des Ministres de la CEE et ses groupes de travail. Dans sa fameuse conférence de presse du 9 septembre 1965, il aggravait la crise en demandant la révision du Traité de Rome pour supprimer le vote à la majorité au Conseil des Ministres et pour dégrader la Commission de la CEE. Les partenaires de la France, sous la direction de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne, s’opposaient à la politique française et invitaient la France pour participer à une conférence extraordinaire sur les questions politiques, qui s’est déroulée en Janvier 1966 au Luxembourg. Bien que le président de Gaulle n’ait pas pu faire prévaloir sa conception, la crise de la chaise vide a finalement abouti à un ralentissement de l’intégration politique de l’Europe occidentale. / The empty chair crisis in the European Economic Community (EEC) occurred after a serious disagreement between the EEC Commission, the French government and France’s EEC partners over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy. French president Charles de Gaulle instructed his diplomats to boycott the EEC Council of Ministers and related institutions. He escalated the crisis in autumn 1965 by demanding the revision of the EEC Treaty to obtain a veto right in the EEC Council of Ministers and to limit the EEC Commission’s political ambitions. France’s partners, under German leadership, opposed the French politics and invited the French government to a crisis conference, which was eventually held in January 1966 in Luxembourg. Although president de Gaulle was unable to implement his political conception, the crisis of the empty chair had lasting effects on the development of political integration in Western Europe.

Durante todo o período de vigência da Constituição brasileira de 1891, foram produzidos diversos trabalhos doutrinários em torno da reforma da Constituição, ora mais ligados à política constitucional do período, ora de caráter mais teórico. Com os olhos voltados a esse material, o objetivo da pesquisa foi mapear e sistematizar os trabalhos doutrinários que veicularam esses discursos da época, em suportes materiais mais duradouros (livros de Direito Constitucional gerais, livros específicos sobre o tema e artigos publicados em periódicos jurídicos), a fim de verificar quais foram seus objetos e quais os objetivos de seus autores ao se inserirem no debate sobre a reforma constitucional. Para tanto, foram utilizadas as reflexões teóricas da Escola de Cambridge para o estudo da teoria política, especialmente de Quentin Skinner e J. G. A. Pocock, como instrumentos metodológicos para a reconstrução do debate. A partir da observação dos discursos em seus respectivos contextos intelectuais, foram identificados alguns objetos de reflexão recorrentes no debate, para além das propostas de reforma da Constituição de 1891. Em primeiro lugar, identificou-se que houve reflexões ligadas à teoria da Constituição e da reforma constitucional, no que diz respeito à estabilidade ou mutabilidade do texto constitucional, além de outras mais incipientes relativas à mudança da Constituição sem alteração do seu texto. Em segundo lugar, houve discursos jurídicos voltados à intepretação do artigo 90 da Constituição, quanto ao procedimento e limites materiais para a reforma constitucional, além de outros discursos com caráter político, que questionavam a legitimidade da vedação constitucional de alteração da forma republicano-federativa e da igualdade de representação dos Estados no Senado. Por fim, houve discursos político-constitucionais que se voltaram à análise de três aspectos. Em primeiro lugar, sobre a necessidade e oportunidade de uma reforma da Constituição de 1891. Em segundo lugar, discursos que objetivaram avaliar o produto da reforma constitucional realizada no Brasil entre 1924 e 1926, bem como as condições políticas em que se deu. E, enfim, os discursos que produziram a crítica à Constituição (por sua dissociação da realidade do país ou por ser inspirada em instituições estrangeiras), a crítica à crença na sua reforma com solução para os problemas políticos, econômicos e sociais do país, e outros que dialogaram com essas críticas. Nas reflexões sobre a reforma constitucional do período, verificou-se a produção de discursos com objetos e objetivos variados, que identificaram causas distintas para os mencionados problemas e que apresentaram propostas e encaminhamentos diversos para a sua solução, que tocavam no tema da reforma constitucional. / Throughout the period of time Brazilian Constitution of 1891 was in force, numerous doctrinal works on the constitutional amendment and constitutional making were done either more related to the constitutional politics of the time, or to more theoretical features. Bearing this material in mind, the purpose of this research was to map and systematize the doctrinal work that reported the discourses of the time, which were published in more durable material supports (Constitutional Law books, specific books on the topic and articles published in legal journals), in order to check which their objects were as well as the authors goals when having contributed to the debate on constitutional amendment and constitutional making. Therefore, the Cambridges School theoretical reflections for the study of political theory, especially of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, were used as methodological tools for the reconstruction of the debate. From the observation of the speeches in their respective intellectual contexts, it was identified some recurring objects of reflection in the debate, in addition to the proposed amendments to the 1891 Constitution. Firstly, it was identified that there were reflections related to the theory of the Constitution and the constitutional amendment and constitutional making, with regard to the stability or changeability of the constitutional text, besides other incipient speeches related to the Constitution change without changing its text. Secondly, there were legal discourses focused on the interpretation of article 90 of the Constitution of 1891, concerning the procedure and materials limits for constitutional amendment, along with speeches with political feature, which questioned the legitimacy of the constitutional prohibition of amendment of the Republican-federative form and the equal representation of the States in the Senate. Lastly, there were also political and constitutional speeches that targeted the analysis of the necessity and opportunity for amendment of the Constitution of 1891, during most of its validity period; others that aimed at evaluating the product of constitutional amendment held in Brazil between 1924 and 1926, as well as the political conditions under which it was carried, and, finally, speeches that criticized the Constitution (due to its dissociation of the country reality or for being inspired by foreign institutions), or criticized the belief in its amendment as a solution for the political, economical and social problems of the country, among others which dialogued with these criticisms. With the reflections upon the constitutional amendment in the Brazilian First Republic, the production of speeches with diverse objects and objectives was identified, which recognized several causes for such problems and that proposed distinct suggestions for their solution. In conclusion, in the research, many visions of Brazilian First Republics doctrine about constitutional making and constitutional amendment were observed and presented.

Durante todo o período de vigência da Constituição brasileira de 1891, foram produzidos diversos trabalhos doutrinários em torno da reforma da Constituição, ora mais ligados à política constitucional do período, ora de caráter mais teórico. Com os olhos voltados a esse material, o objetivo da pesquisa foi mapear e sistematizar os trabalhos doutrinários que veicularam esses discursos da época, em suportes materiais mais duradouros (livros de Direito Constitucional gerais, livros específicos sobre o tema e artigos publicados em periódicos jurídicos), a fim de verificar quais foram seus objetos e quais os objetivos de seus autores ao se inserirem no debate sobre a reforma constitucional. Para tanto, foram utilizadas as reflexões teóricas da Escola de Cambridge para o estudo da teoria política, especialmente de Quentin Skinner e J. G. A. Pocock, como instrumentos metodológicos para a reconstrução do debate. A partir da observação dos discursos em seus respectivos contextos intelectuais, foram identificados alguns objetos de reflexão recorrentes no debate, para além das propostas de reforma da Constituição de 1891. Em primeiro lugar, identificou-se que houve reflexões ligadas à teoria da Constituição e da reforma constitucional, no que diz respeito à estabilidade ou mutabilidade do texto constitucional, além de outras mais incipientes relativas à mudança da Constituição sem alteração do seu texto. Em segundo lugar, houve discursos jurídicos voltados à intepretação do artigo 90 da Constituição, quanto ao procedimento e limites materiais para a reforma constitucional, além de outros discursos com caráter político, que questionavam a legitimidade da vedação constitucional de alteração da forma republicano-federativa e da igualdade de representação dos Estados no Senado. Por fim, houve discursos político-constitucionais que se voltaram à análise de três aspectos. Em primeiro lugar, sobre a necessidade e oportunidade de uma reforma da Constituição de 1891. Em segundo lugar, discursos que objetivaram avaliar o produto da reforma constitucional realizada no Brasil entre 1924 e 1926, bem como as condições políticas em que se deu. E, enfim, os discursos que produziram a crítica à Constituição (por sua dissociação da realidade do país ou por ser inspirada em instituições estrangeiras), a crítica à crença na sua reforma com solução para os problemas políticos, econômicos e sociais do país, e outros que dialogaram com essas críticas. Nas reflexões sobre a reforma constitucional do período, verificou-se a produção de discursos com objetos e objetivos variados, que identificaram causas distintas para os mencionados problemas e que apresentaram propostas e encaminhamentos diversos para a sua solução, que tocavam no tema da reforma constitucional. / Throughout the period of time Brazilian Constitution of 1891 was in force, numerous doctrinal works on the constitutional amendment and constitutional making were done either more related to the constitutional politics of the time, or to more theoretical features. Bearing this material in mind, the purpose of this research was to map and systematize the doctrinal work that reported the discourses of the time, which were published in more durable material supports (Constitutional Law books, specific books on the topic and articles published in legal journals), in order to check which their objects were as well as the authors goals when having contributed to the debate on constitutional amendment and constitutional making. Therefore, the Cambridges School theoretical reflections for the study of political theory, especially of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, were used as methodological tools for the reconstruction of the debate. From the observation of the speeches in their respective intellectual contexts, it was identified some recurring objects of reflection in the debate, in addition to the proposed amendments to the 1891 Constitution. Firstly, it was identified that there were reflections related to the theory of the Constitution and the constitutional amendment and constitutional making, with regard to the stability or changeability of the constitutional text, besides other incipient speeches related to the Constitution change without changing its text. Secondly, there were legal discourses focused on the interpretation of article 90 of the Constitution of 1891, concerning the procedure and materials limits for constitutional amendment, along with speeches with political feature, which questioned the legitimacy of the constitutional prohibition of amendment of the Republican-federative form and the equal representation of the States in the Senate. Lastly, there were also political and constitutional speeches that targeted the analysis of the necessity and opportunity for amendment of the Constitution of 1891, during most of its validity period; others that aimed at evaluating the product of constitutional amendment held in Brazil between 1924 and 1926, as well as the political conditions under which it was carried, and, finally, speeches that criticized the Constitution (due to its dissociation of the country reality or for being inspired by foreign institutions), or criticized the belief in its amendment as a solution for the political, economical and social problems of the country, among others which dialogued with these criticisms. With the reflections upon the constitutional amendment in the Brazilian First Republic, the production of speeches with diverse objects and objectives was identified, which recognized several causes for such problems and that proposed distinct suggestions for their solution. In conclusion, in the research, many visions of Brazilian First Republics doctrine about constitutional making and constitutional amendment were observed and presented.

Ce mémoire propose une analyse de la pensée constitutionnelle tardorépublicaine telle qu'elle est exprimée dans les discours, traités rhétoriques et traités philosophiques de l'orateur et homme d'État romain Marcus Tullius Cicéron, entre 67 et 43 avant Jésus-Christ. Le chapitre I adopte une structure chronologique et brosse un portrait du parcours privé et public de Cicéron, en s'attardant principalement sur les éléments de son éducation et de sa carrière politique qui ont pu influencer sa réflexion. Ces éléments sont situés dans leur contexte historique et institutionnel. Les chapitres II et III sont consacrés respectivement à la réflexion cicéronienne sur le peuple et le Sénat et adoptent une approche théorique et rhétorique du droit public romain : sont étudiées les constructions et les conceptions qui sous-tendent l'analyse constitutionnelle élaborée par Cicéron, mais aussi l'instrumentalisation de celle-ci au service d'une idéologie et d'un projet politiques. Les questions de la « souveraineté » supposée du populus romanus, de la « refondation » du droit écrit par la loi naturelle, de l'idéal cicéronien de primauté institutionelle, constitutionelle et politique du Sénat, de même que celle de la valeur juridique du sénatus-consulte sont abordées. Le chapitre IV, enfin, s'attarde à la constitution « en action » : le droit public romain y est étudié dans sa pratique et son application. L'analyse d'une sélection précise de crises politiques qui sont en fait autant d'affrontements légaux – le recours au sénatus-consulte ultime, le tribunat de Clodius et l'exil de Cicéron, les troubles qui suivent l'assassinat de César dictateur – permet ainsi de mettre la théorie cicéronienne à l'épreuve du réel. La conclusion offre un retour sur une pensée paradoxale mais cohérente, qui mit au service d'une conception radicale de la suprématie sénatoriale une savante rhétorique de la tradition et une réflexion philosophique et juridique complexe.

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2004-2005 / Ce mémoire de maîtrise explore la façon par laquelle les intellectuels et figures publiques au Québec français ont abordé l'histoire constitutionnelle canadienne entre 1980 et 1995 comme un chapitre du grand récit national des Québécois. Exploitant les outils de la postmodernité, de l'analyse des discours et de l'approche constructiviste de l'identité et de la nation, le mémoire explore les significations et la fonction narrative de Pierre Elliott Trudeau comme figure archétypale du traître à la nation québécoise à travers un vaste canon de littérature politique publiée entre 1987 et 1995. / This Master's Thesis aims to examine the way by which Franco-Québec intellectuals and public figures have approached Canadian constitutional history between 1980 and 1995 as a narrative of Québec nationhood. Using the post-modernist tool-kit of discourse analysis and the constructivist approach to identity and nationhood, the essay explores the meanings and narrative function of Pierre Elliott Trudeau as an archetypal traitor figure to the Québec nation throughout a large canon of narrative, political writings published between 1987 and 1995. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2014

Le cabinet ministériel représente depuis plus d’un siècle un élément incontournable du système politique français. Équipe formée par les collaborateurs immédiats du ministre, nommée par lui, le cabinet est situé à un carrefour complexe d’interactions qui comporte les administrations, le Parlement, les groupes d’intérêt et les médias. Délaissée par les juristes, l’étude institutionnelle du cabinet ministériel est aujourd’hui l’apanage de la sociologie et des sciences politiques. À de rares exceptions près, la doctrine constitutionnelle l’a toujours considéré comme une institution juridiquement indissociable de la personne du ministre. Malgré l’ampleur du phénomène, elle observe à son égard un silence quasi unanime qui ne laisse pas de surprendre. Cette indifférence doctrinale ne peut être véritablement expliquée qu’à l’aune de l’histoire des représentations constitutionnelles. L’apparition et le développement des cabinets ministériels procèdent en effet des mutations subies par le Conseil d’État napoléonien tout au long du XIXe siècle. Par-delà les vicissitudes de l’histoire politique, les cabinets expriment la persistance coutumière d’un principe issu du constitutionnalisme révolutionnaire, selon lequel la fonction gouvernementale doit être organiquement séparée de la fonction administrative. Confondues à l’échelon du ministre, conformément à la logique propre du régime parlementaire, ces deux fonctions vont rester dissociées à l’intérieur même des ministères, grâce aux cabinets ministériels. Les réticences traditionnelles de la doctrine publiciste à l’égard de la notion de « fonction gouvernementale » expliquent en grande partie le caractère inédit d’une telle lecture de l’histoire constitutionnelle. / Since more than a century, the ministerial cabinet is an essential organ of the French political system. This team appointed by the Minister gathers his immediate staff. It is connected to administrations, to Parliament, to lobbies, to Medias, and sometimes to citizens. There are very few legal studies on this subject, which interests especially the political sciences and the sociology. With few exceptions, constitutional doctrine has always regarded the cabinet as an institution legally inseparable from the person of the Minister. Given the magnitude of this practice, the almost unanimous silence of doctrine is rather surprising. This doctrinal indifference finds an explanation in the history of constitutional representations. The emergence and development of ministerial cabinets since the monarchy’s Restoration in 1814 are related to the alterations undergone by the Napoleonic Council of State throughout the nineteenth century. Beyond the vicissitudes of political history, they express the persisting of a customary principle stemming from French revolutionary constitutionalism, according to which the governmental function must be organically separated from the administrative function. These two functions – merged at the Minister's level in accordance with the logic of the parliamentary system – will remain separated inside the ministry, by means of cabinets. The conventional reluctance of the French constitutional doctrine with regard to the notion of "governmental function" largely explains the novelty of such a reading of constitutional history.