The prevailing historical narrative of the collapse of Louis XIV's naval power has emphasised the importance of political decision-making, either in the strategic shifts between the guerre d'escadre and the guerre de course, or in the decision to reduce the naval budget in the midst of war in 1694 and 1707. As France faced massive financial overextension and an increasing need to fight for territorial survival in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), it was inevitable that Louis XIV's government would fund its armies in preference to its naval capabilities. However, a shift in priorities at Versailles does not provide a full explanation for the navy's decline. Recent works emphasise the effectiveness of the state's revenue-raising capabilities and the importance of the fiscal intermediaries who financed royal expenditure. Yet, these connections between French naval power and Louis XIV's fiscal capabilities remain only partially explored and this thesis presents a fresh examination of the navy's financing arrangements. It is argued that the difficulties that Louis XIV faced in maintaining the fleet were rooted in a unique set of issues embedded in the navy's financing mechanism and the way it was managed. The problem was four-fold: the naval ministry consistently overspent its allocated funds; the navy's budget was increasingly underfunded as a result of the finance ministry's mismanagement and also of wider fiscal instability; the naval treasury was not fit-for-purpose since the navy's fiscal intermediaries, the trésoriers généraux de la Marine, lacked the capacity to sustain costly levels of borrowing; and the crown failed to meet the organisational challenges of war by not controlling spending and the activities of the trésoriers. These structural issues surfaced internally early in the war and would be progressively and disastrously exposed by the loss of liquidity and the mounting debts that affected France in the 1700s.

Winston S. Churchill was a war leader during two world wars, and yet there are few substantive studies of his younger years when he was a practising soldier. This thesis aims to study the early intellectual development of Churchill in those areas which have direct impact on the art of war. The chapters are arranged narratively (Chapters 2-3) and thematically (Chapters 4-8). The introduction covers the scope and methodology of the work. Chapters 2-3 give an account of Churchill's early years, and trace the development of several prominent features of his character that helped form and inform the presuppositions of his later military intellectual development. Chapter 4 addresses Churchill's interactions with late Victorian cavalry doctrine and debate. Chapters 5-7 each address themes of an expanding scope of influence and conceptualization: first, the tactics of war; second, the policy and strategy of war; and finally, Churchill's conceptions of war. The conclusion summarizes the hallmarks and syntheses of Churchill's early military intellectual development, and identifies judgments which can be drawn about his perspicacity as soldier and commander.

Modern studies of Classical Greek battle devote little attention to the role and importance of the general in achieving battlefield success. As a result of this the general is reduced to a simple leader of men whose only influential decision was where and when to fight, and whose major role was to provide inspiration by fighting in the front ranks. A modern conception of Hellenic fair play in warfare has further limited the importance of the general to Greek armies: apparently advanced manoeuvring and tactics were deliberately rejected in favour of a simple and direct test of strength and morale. I do not believe this to be the case, and in this study I demonstrate the importance of the general to Greek armies by offering a new analysis of his role in hoplite battle.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-08T14:13:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 4324351 bytes, checksum: 7219a78db0ae759ba7ca1a390f5c1005 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-08T14:13:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 4324351 bytes, checksum: 7219a78db0ae759ba7ca1a390f5c1005 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / During the first phase comprising the period of Dutch Brazil (1630-1636), which corresponds, according to Evaldo Cabral de Mello (2007), the phase of conquest and consolidation of military campaigns promoted by the West India Company (West-Indische Compagnie - WIC) in actual northeastern Brazil, the Captaincy of Paraiba was one of the first four captaincies to be conquered, the next to last to surrender. This occurred after three conflicts, of which the Portuguese and Spanish were victorious in two. The purpose of this study is to analyze how they developed the three Dutch invasions in Paraíba, made in December 1631, and in February and December 1634; its impact to the colony, its connection with the conflicts in the neighboring captaincy of Itamaracá, Rio Grande and Pernambuco, and the difficulties that the Dutch had to win the Paraíba captaincy, because our conclusions reveal that the warlike enterprise undertaken by WIC to conquero Paraíba; It consisted of one of the many challenges we faced in those early years. This study was guided on the analysis of four primary sources, written by characters who attended the event in question: the relation written by Fr. Paulo do Rosário, OSB (1632); the travel journal written by Ambrósio Richshoffer (1677), german soldier, who served in the army of WIC; daily memories of Duarte de Albuquerque Coelho (1654), governor of Pernambuco, and the historical annals of Joannes de Laet (1644), a director of WIC in Amsterdam, which was not a direct witness. Such sources express the views of the Portuguese side and the Dutch side in order to build an account of such conflicts by comparing the narratives of both sides of the battlefield. To address these sources, it was decided by a discourse analysis methodology and literary analysis in order to understand the textual and discursive variations of each of the authors, showing how their values interfered in their opinions and judgments about such battles. In the analysis of conflicts, these were based on the approach of the "new military history" field of study emerged in the wake of the "new history", which seeks to rethink the study of military and war forces, not limited to the traditional war history, based in the battles and political and economic factors, but trying to understand the war in their social precepts, cultural, religious and others. / Durante a primeira fase que compreende o período do Brasil holandês (1630-1636), a qual corresponde, de acordo com Evaldo Cabral de Mello (2007), à fase de conquista e consolidação das campanhas militares promovidas pela Companhia das Índias Ocidentais (West-Indische Compagnie – WIC) no atual nordeste brasileiro, a Capitania da Paraíba foi das quatro capitanias iniciais a serem conquistadas, a penúltima a se render. Isso ocorreu após três conflitos, dos quais os portugueses e espanhóis saíram vitoriosos em dois. A proposta deste estudo foi analisar como se desenvolveram as três expedições holandesas na Capitania da Paraíba, ocorridas em dezembro de 1631, e em fevereiro e dezembro de 1634; sua repercussão para a colônia, sua ligação com os conflitos ocorridos nas capitanias vizinhas de Itamaracá, Rio Grande e Pernambuco, e as dificuldades que os holandeses tiveram para conquistar a capitania paraibana, pois nossas conclusões revelam que a empresa bélica empreendida pela WIC para conquistar a Paraíba, consistiu em um dos vários desafios que a Companhia enfrentou nestes primeiros anos. Este estudo foi pautado sobre a análise de quatro fontes primárias, escritas por personagens que participaram do evento em questão: a relação escrita por frei Paulo do Rosário, OSB (1632); o diário de viagem escrito pelo soldado alemão Ambrósio Richshoffer (1677), o qual serviu no exército da WIC; as memórias diárias do governador de Pernambuco Duarte de Albuquerque Coelho (1654), e os anais históricos de Joannes de Laet (1644), um dos diretores da WIC, em Amsterdã, o qual não foi testemunha direta. Tais fontes expressam os pontos de vista do lado português e do lado holandês, de forma a se construir um relato sobre tais conflitos comparando as narrativas dos dois lados do campo de batalha. Para a abordagem destas fontes, optou-se por uma metodologia de análise de discurso e análise literária, a fim de compreender as variações textuais e discursivas de cada um dos autores, evidenciando como seus valores interferiram em suas opiniões e juízos acerca de tais batalhas. No caso da análise dos conflitos, estes foram pautados na abordagem da “nova história militar”, campo de estudo surgido na esteira da “nova história”, o qual procura repensar o estudo das forças armadas e da guerra, não se limitando à história tradicional da guerra, pautada nas batalhas e em fatores políticos e econômicos, mas procurando compreender a guerra nos seus preceitos sociais, culturais, religiosos entre outros.

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Par une approche qui s’efforce de relier la question de la culture de la guerre à la prise de conscience des dimensions sociales, économiques, politiques du fait guerrier, cette étude met en lumière la construction de la figure du lansquenet au prisme des pratiques de ces mercenaires germaniques et des représentations des contemporains français. Pour cerner cette figure dominante de la Renaissance, il s’agit de circonscrire les stratégies mises en œuvre par les lansquenets, c’est-à-dire l’arsenal de symboles, de discours et de comportements auquel les membres de ce groupe se réfèrent, et de les confronter aux discours des militaires et des civils français afin d’appréhender la perception qu’ils ont d’eux et les comportements qu’ils développent à leur égard. La dialectique entre les pratiques des lansquenets et les représentations françaises de ceux-ci illustrent les transformations profondes de la monarchie française à l’aube de l’Époque moderne et dévoile l’appréhension d’une société face à l’altérité. / Through an approach that seeks to link the question of the culture of war to the awareness of the social, economic and political dimensions of war, this study highlights the construction of the figure of the landsknecht through the prism of the practices of these German mercenaries and the representations of French contemporaries. To identify this dominant figure of the Renaissance, it is a question of circumscribing the strategies implemented by the lansquenets, i.e. the arsenal of symbols, speeches and behaviours to which the members of this group refer, and to confront them with the discourses of the French military and civilians in order to apprehend the perception they have of the landsknechte and the behaviours they develop towards them. The dialectic between the practices of the Lansquenets and the French representations of them illustrate the profound transformations of the French monarchy at the dawn of the Modern Era and reveals a society's apprehension of alterity.

This dissertation examines U.S. food diplomacy in occupied Germany. It argues that the origins of food aid as an anti-communist strategy are located in postwar Germany. Believing a punitive occupation was the best insurance against future conflict, Allied leadership agreed to enforce a lower standard of living on Germany and did not allow relief agencies to administer aid to German civilians. Facing a growing crisis in the U.S. Zone, President Truman authorized food imports and permitted voluntary agencies to operate in 1946. This decision changed the tenor of the occupation and provided the foundation to an improved U.S.-German relationship. It also underscored the value of American food power in the emerging contest with the Soviet Union. Food served as a source of soft power. It bridged cultures and fostered new relationships while reinforcing notions of American exceptionalism. Officials recognized that humanitarian aid complemented foreign policy objectives. American economic security was reflected in their abundance of food, and the dispersal of this food to war-torn Europe, especially a former enemy, made a strong statement about the future. As relations with the Soviet Union soured, policymakers increasingly relied on American food power to encourage German embrace of western values. Occupation officials portrayed food relief as an expression of democratic ideals, emphasizing the universality of Freedom from Want and focusing on well-nourished German children as the hope for future peace. American food fostered the spread of liberal democracy but its dispersal also contained communism. This work bridges diplomatic history and food studies to investigate the consequences and significance of the transnational food exchange. Food aid had layered political, cultural, and emotional implications. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation examines the role of compassion in diplomacy and the symbolism inherent in food to demonstrate the lasting political currency of humanitarian aid. Paying close attention to the food relationships that emerge between Germans and Americans allows one to better gauge the value of U.S. food aid as a propaganda tool. Food embodies American power; it offers a medium for understanding the experience and internalization of the occupation by Americans and Germans alike. Food aid began as emergency relief in 1946, reflecting the transition from a punitive to rehabilitative occupation policy. Recognizing Germany’s need for stability and self-sufficiency Military Government officials then urged economic recovery. Food aid was an important piece for German economic recovery, with supporters emphasizing Germany’s potential contribution toward European recovery. The positive press generated by the Marshall Plan and Allied airlift of Berlin contributed to the growing significance of propaganda in the emerging Cold War. Food relief was both good policy and good public relations, providing a narrative that cast the United States as a benevolent power in a rapidly changing world. Food aid to Germany underscored America’s humanitarian obligations, conscripted emotion into the Cold War, and swayed public opinion on the home front and with the former enemy. / History

Military historians have been debating the U.S. Army's World War II replacement system for decades, but no one has completed a detailed study of the War Department's policies and practice. Authors have focused primarily on how combat units overcame the system's limitations, but they have not conducted an in-depth examination of its creation, structure, and function. Nor did they question why infantry divisions had to devise their own replacement policies in the first place. The extant literature is too celebratory of the army and utilizes ultimate victory as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness. Such a myopic view has prevented these earlier studies from evaluating how the replacement system affected the overall course of the European war. This dissertation breaks new ground by presenting a comprehensive overview of the replacement system--from the War Department down to the squad, and from the last days of World War I through the post-World War II years. It will elucidate a process of failed administration and implementation at the highest levels of the War Department and army, but it will also relate a "grassroots" story of success at the divisional level and below. The War Department's managerial approach to the utilization of military manpower was both inefficient and wasteful. The army largely overlooked the impact of individuality, morale, psyche, experience, and training on a soldier's performance. Its insistence on rushing men to the line once combat operations began meant that it often neglected to train, orient, and equip replacements in a manner conducive to their favorable and effective integration into combat units. The GIs at the front, both veterans and replacements alike, suffered for this oversight. / History

Edward Mallory "Ned" Almond belonged to the generation of US Army officers who came of age during World War I and went on to hold important command positions in World War II and the Korean War. His contemporaries included some of America's greatest captains such as Omar N. Bradley. While Almond is no longer a household name, he played a key role in Army history. Almond was ambitious and gave his all to everything he did. He was a careful student of his profession, a successful commander at battalion and corps level, a dedicated staff officer, something of a scholar, a paternalistic commander turned vehement racist, and a right-wing zealot. He earned his greatest accolades commanding the American troops who landed at Inchon, South Korea, on September 15, 1950, an amphibious flanking movement that temporarily transformed the nature of the Korean War. A soldier of such accomplishments and contradictions has gone too long without a scholarly biography; this dissertation will fill that void. This biography of Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond makes a significant and original contribution to the existing historiography by examining his life in the context of the times in which he served. Almond earned tremendous respect throughout his career for his work as a commander and military administrator from his superiors, including Gen. George C. Marshall and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, but his current reputation as the US Army's most virulent racist overshadows all of these accomplishments. Almond's attitude was not unique; racism pervaded both the Army and the United States of his day. His views reflected the dominant view of the rural white South where he grew up, and did not differ much from those of his more famous peers. Almond, however, would never accept the changes his contemporaries and the Army eventually acknowledged. Almond's reactionary posture stands in sharp contrast to the rest of his career, in which he distinguished himself as an innovator open to new ideas. This dissertation will attempt to reconcile that other Almond and show that there was more to him than his bigoted command policies. Almond's career paralleled these developments in American society and changes in the US Army. His highly professional attitude yet stubborn resistance to social change typified the senior military leadership of the era. When those racial attitudes began to change, Almond represented an increasingly outdated ideology that held black men were innately incapable of becoming good soldiers. At the end of a long life and successful career, Almond was better known for his repugnant racial attitudes than for his genuine successes. First, Almond performed better as the commander of the 92nd Division than is commonly reported, despite that unit's significant difficulties in combat. This dissertation will also explore how his experiences with the 92nd Division, and the Army's later desegregation decisions, embittered him toward black soldiers. Second, both success and failure marked his command of X Corps in Korea, and his personal relationships with other officers obscured some of his accomplishments. Third, while serving as commandant of the US Army War College, Almond would tap his rich store of military experience to push the Army toward a greater commitment to joint operations. / History

The entrance of the German Invasion of Poland and depiction thereof into modern historiographical conversations offers historians superior articulation of the creation of historical memory, mythos, and identity ‒ especially in wider terms of European Imperialism. By utilizing the current trends in gendering of empire, the use of auto-biography and life writing to understand felt realities and obfuscated truths, and the attempts by empire to queer and utilize labeled deviations to control and gain power over their colonized subjects, one is presented a better understanding of how the German Invasion of Poland fits into the story of empire and indigeneity. That story continues past the Third Reich however, as German propaganda in its various forms was accepted as truth after the Second World War, providing justification for and rationalizing post war political power structures of Western nations. As the threat of a cold war with the USSR loomed, many in the American military felt it necessary to accept and support German myths about their military prowess (and non-culpability for the Holocaust) and the inferiority of Slavic military forces. By analyzing not the myths themselves, but how they were created and propagated, historians can add to this historical conversation a case study of just how two seemingly opposed power structures can mobilize similar myths as justification for their own desires and decisions, and in doing so, mythologize the identity and memory of the earnest beginning of the Holocaust.