In presenting their correspondence, I highlight the means in which Hobbes is able to divorce nature and politics in his philosophy. This is done by bringing to light Hobbes’s agreement with Descartes’s deceiving God argument. First, I demonstrate Hobbes’s hidden agreement with it by analyzing his objection to Descartes’s first Meditation. Second, I show that Hobbes and Descartes both retreat into consciousness in order to deal with the possibility of deception on the behalf of God. Third, I trace Hobbes’s rational justification for entertaining that very possibility. Fourth, I bring forward Hobbes’s certain principle, that God is incomprehensible. Fifth, I demonstrate Hobbes’s rationalization for rendering nature incomprehensible in turn. From this key insight, the differences between the two philosophers stand out more. Whereas Descartes rids himself of the possibility of a deceiving God, Hobbes does not. Sixth, I show that Descartes needs to rid himself of that possibility in order to have a basis for science, Hobbes’s science is such that he does not need to rid himself of that possibility. My investigation ends by considering both Hobbes’s and Descartes’s stance on nature, in relation to politics. I find that Hobbes’s principle is much more practical that Descartes’s principle. Hobbes’s principle is shown to be much more instructive and sustainable for human life. In conclusion, this analysis of the origins, principles, and orientation of the two philosopher’s thought brings forward the overarching question, whether the recovery of value and meaning is to be brought about in nature, or in civilization.

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La clásica argumentación hobbesiana a favor de la necesidad de establecer un Estado soberano, dotado de plenas atribuciones para disponer de la suerte, los recursos e incluso la vida de sus ciudadanos, caracterizados como súbditos, tiene, aunque resulte paradójico, un núcleo originariamente liberal. En efecto, el punto de partida del razonamiento filosófico-político hobbesiano es la libertad de los individuos, concebidos capaces de decidir en términos propios, al margen de cualquier predeterminación exterior del sentido de su querer y su acción. Este punto de partida, sin embargo, termina completamente ensombrecido por la ulterior legitimación de la autoridad socialmente irrestricta de la instancia soberana de gobierno bajo el ordenamiento dado en el Estado civil.

Thomas Hobbes est sans doute mieux connu comme philosophe politique que comme homme de science et ses longues querelles avec John Wallis en mathématiques et Robert Boyle en physique n’ont guère encouragé les historiens des sciences à prêter attention à son œuvre scientifique. Pourtant, Hobbes conçut la philosophie comme une science et se considérait comme le fondateur non seulement d’une science nouvelle : la philosophie civile, mais aussi de la science de l’optique - récemment renouvelée à la faveur de la découverte du télescope - et même des mathématiques. Mais à quoi Hobbes pense-t-il quand il parle de science ? Aux mathématiques qu’il admire tant ? A la philosophie naturelle de Galilée ? Ou à la médecine de Harvey ? En quel sens la philosophie civile est-elle une science et quel est le statut des mathématiques ? Telles sont les questions que nous abordons à partir d’une analyse du De Corpore et des dix premiers chapitres du De Homine traduits du latin. L’interprétation proposée ici consiste à réaffirmer l’unité du système des Éléments de la philosophie et à souligner la dimension matérialiste et réaliste de la science hobbesienne. Bien que Noel Malcolm ait définitivement établi que Hobbes n’est pas l’auteur du Short Tract on first principles, nous montrons que le tournant scientifique de Hobbes est profondément marqué par son intérêt pour l’optique qu’il renouvela sur la base d’une ontologie matérialiste et des principes du mécanisme hérités de Galilée. / Thomas Hobbes is perhaps best known as a political philosopher than as a scientist and his too long quarrels with John Wallis in mathematics and Robert Boyle in physics did little to encourage historians of science to pay attention to his scientific work. Yet Hobbes conceived of philosophy as a science and considered himself the founder not only of a new science: civil philosophy, but also the science of optics - recently renewed thanks to the discovery of the telescope - even mathematics. But what Hobbes has in mind when he talks about science? Mathematics he so admires? Galileo’s natural philosophy? Or Harvey’s medicine? In what sense civil philosophy is a science and what is the status of mathematics? These are the issues we discuss from an analysis of De Corpore and the first ten chapters of De Homine translated from Latin. The interpretation proposed here is to underline the unity of the system of the Elements of philosophy and emphasize the materialistic and realistic nature of Hobbesian science. Although Noel Malcolm has definitively established that Hobbes is not the author of Short Tract on First Principles, we show that Hobbes’s shift to science was deeply marked by his interest in the science of optics he renewed on the basis of a materialist ontology and principles inherited from Galilee mechanism.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Martins Bueno.pdf: 642296 bytes, checksum: f5683cd88801763d6a1fe266d2de9a1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-21 / We intend with this work to offer an analysis and an interpretation of the origin of the concept of freedom in Thomas Hobbes's thought, at the beginning of science in the 17th century. The text gives a scenery of the history of science, distinguishing the Aristotelian physics main ideas that will be the objective of the new science, going by the medieval age up to the Scientific Revolution. In this aspect, we will analyze exclusively in the physics field and, more precisely, in the movement as understood in Galileu Galilei's thought and Descartes that Hobbes will take as paradigm for his philosophy. Our work will start with the appropriation of the tradition of the modern science, more specifically the reflections on the movement that resulted in the inertia principle and we will identify the main ideas in the English philosopher's political theory, mainly the ones which refer to the conception of freedom, as being shaped in the ideals of that new way of facing knowledge. For that reason we begin with the reading of the author's commentators to verify, in a first moment, if Hobbes was influenced or not by the new discoveries of the science of that period and with this premise we try to understand how the problem of freedom was treated in the theoretical English politician's works. With the new science as paradigm, we will show how the concept of freedom is in syntony with the conception of movement of that period, as freedom, for Hobbes, means the absence of opposition, identifying in this way, the genesis of this concept as a result of the reflections that happened in the movement in the 17th century. Distinguishing the concept of freedom and understanding it as a complex theme, we intend to understand as the author will deal with men's life in society, with all limitations imposed by a State that necessarily needs to have its unlimited power to guarantee peace and safety and even so assure the individual freedoms. With this view in mind we try to understand that, for Hobbes, State is a human creation, that is, artificial and necessarily needs to have its power so that society is organized and the freedom guaranteed. Then, the monarchic and unlimited power proposed by Thomas Hobbes should be understood as a result of a general will, that is, it is not treated here the individuals' will, but that the political representatives acted to accomplish the will of the individuals, in other words, State should be understood as the individuals' creation for their representation. Therefore, the political theory proposed by the thinker should be understood not only in an absolutist manner, but as a true theory of supreme power / Pretende-se, com o presente trabalho, oferecer uma análise e uma interpretação da origem do conceito de liberdade no pensamento de Thomas Hobbes, à luz da ciência nascente do século XVII. O texto se inicia dando um panorama da história da ciência, destacando os principais pontos da física aristotélica, que será o grande alvo da nova ciência, passando pelos medievais até culminar com a Revolução Científica. Neste aspecto, realizar-se-á um recorte exclusivamente no campo da física e, mais precisamente ainda, na conceituação de movimento no pensamento de Galileu Galilei e Descartes que Hobbes tomará como paradigma para sua filosofia. Da apropriação da tradição da ciência moderna, mais objetivamente das reflexões sobre o movimento que resultou no princípio de inércia, serão identificados os principais pontos na teoria política do filósofo inglês, principalmente no que se refere à concepção de liberdade, como sendo moldada nos ideais daquela nova maneira de encarar o conhecimento. Para tanto, a partir da leitura de comentadores do autor, verificar-se-á, num primeiro momento, se Hobbes foi ou não influenciado pelas novas descobertas da ciência setecentista, que em tese admite-se que sim, e desta premissa compreender como foi tratado o problema da liberdade nas obras do teórico político inglês. Tendo a nova ciência como paradigma, será demonstrado como o conceito de liberdade está em sintonia com a concepção de movimento daquele período, uma vez que liberdade, para Hobbes, significa a ausência de oposição, identificando, desta forma, a gênese deste conceito como resultado das reflexões que ocorreram sobre o movimento no século XVII. Destacando o conceito de liberdade e entendendo-a como um tema complexo, objetivase compreender como o autor dará conta da vida dos homens em sociedade, com todas as limitações impostas por um Estado, que necessariamente precisa ter seus poderes ilimitados para garantir a paz e a segurança e mesmo assim assegurar as liberdades individuais. E nesta perspectiva, compreender que, para Hobbes, o Estado é fruto da criação humana, ou seja, artificial, e necessariamente precisa-se ter um poder maior para que de fato a sociedade seja organizada e a liberdade garantida. Assim, o poder monárquico e ilimitado proposto por Thomas Hobbes deve ser entendido como resultado de uma vontade geral, isto é, não se trata aqui de realizar a vontade dos indivíduos, mas que os representantes políticos agissem para realizar a vontade da unidade dos indivíduos, ou seja, o Estado deve ser compreendido como criação dos indivíduos para sua representação. Por isso, a teoria política proposta pelo pensador deve ser entendida não simplesmente como absolutista, pois trata-se de uma verdadeira teoria da soberania

O trabalho procura analisar o sentido de história no Behemoth ou Longo Parlamento de Thomas Hobbes a partir das referências aos antigos. Para isso, o pensador é colocado em seu contexto social, político e cultural. Com o objetivo de perceber as redes de leitura que atravessam a obra, são contrapostos autores modernos e antigos, assim como os discursos – humanista, religioso e político - que permeiam a obra. Como um autor político, preocupado com seu tempo, o discurso da guerra e do medo iminente da volta ao estado de natureza estão presentes em sua narrativa. Entre o contingente da história e o universal da ciência civil, o uso dos antigos deve servir à paz do Estado. / The work analyzes the meaning of history in the Behemoth or the Long Parliament by Thomas Hobbes from references to the ancients. For this, the thinker is placed in its social, political and cultural. In order to understand the reading networks that permeate the work, are contrasted ancient and modern authors, as well as the speeches - humanist, religious and political - that permeate the work. As a political writer, concerned with their time, the discourse of war and fear of imminent return to the state of nature is in his narrative. Among the contingent and the universal history of civil science, the use of the ancients serve the peace of the State.

O trabalho procura analisar o sentido de história no Behemoth ou Longo Parlamento de Thomas Hobbes a partir das referências aos antigos. Para isso, o pensador é colocado em seu contexto social, político e cultural. Com o objetivo de perceber as redes de leitura que atravessam a obra, são contrapostos autores modernos e antigos, assim como os discursos – humanista, religioso e político - que permeiam a obra. Como um autor político, preocupado com seu tempo, o discurso da guerra e do medo iminente da volta ao estado de natureza estão presentes em sua narrativa. Entre o contingente da história e o universal da ciência civil, o uso dos antigos deve servir à paz do Estado. / The work analyzes the meaning of history in the Behemoth or the Long Parliament by Thomas Hobbes from references to the ancients. For this, the thinker is placed in its social, political and cultural. In order to understand the reading networks that permeate the work, are contrasted ancient and modern authors, as well as the speeches - humanist, religious and political - that permeate the work. As a political writer, concerned with their time, the discourse of war and fear of imminent return to the state of nature is in his narrative. Among the contingent and the universal history of civil science, the use of the ancients serve the peace of the State.

O trabalho procura analisar o sentido de história no Behemoth ou Longo Parlamento de Thomas Hobbes a partir das referências aos antigos. Para isso, o pensador é colocado em seu contexto social, político e cultural. Com o objetivo de perceber as redes de leitura que atravessam a obra, são contrapostos autores modernos e antigos, assim como os discursos – humanista, religioso e político - que permeiam a obra. Como um autor político, preocupado com seu tempo, o discurso da guerra e do medo iminente da volta ao estado de natureza estão presentes em sua narrativa. Entre o contingente da história e o universal da ciência civil, o uso dos antigos deve servir à paz do Estado. / The work analyzes the meaning of history in the Behemoth or the Long Parliament by Thomas Hobbes from references to the ancients. For this, the thinker is placed in its social, political and cultural. In order to understand the reading networks that permeate the work, are contrasted ancient and modern authors, as well as the speeches - humanist, religious and political - that permeate the work. As a political writer, concerned with their time, the discourse of war and fear of imminent return to the state of nature is in his narrative. Among the contingent and the universal history of civil science, the use of the ancients serve the peace of the State.

Notion irréductible de notre univers politique, la souveraineté semble aujourd’hui dépassée, et appelée à céder sa place à d’autres modes de représentation de l’État et de la collectivité. Pourtant, les difficultés liées à son dépassement recèlent le fait que ce concept n’a rien en réalité rien d’évident :abstraite et mystérieuse, la souveraineté l’est par nécessité. Le cœur de cette abstraction, fossile théologico-politique, fonde sa légitimité. Ainsi, la souveraineté est surtout le produit d’un refoulement des sources et de la nature violente de l’autorité vers le Tiers autoritaire, notion médiane caractérisant la nécessaire conceptualisation de l’autorité légitime comme troisième terme institutionnalisé de la relation entre celui qui exerce l’autorité et celui qui la subit. <p><p>Ce Tiers, au sortir de la théologie médiévale, s’est d’abord incarné dans le concept de Corps ;le corps de l’État dérive en droite ligne du corps du Christ d’abord, de celui de l’Église ensuite, et a offert à l’autorité, alors pensée sur un registre hétéronome, divin et naturel, un écrin la liant à une légitimité et une nécessité naturelles. Le mythe du Corps, pourtant, va petit à petit devenir celui du Père au fur et à mesure de la constitution de l’État, et singulièrement de la monarchie absolue. Le Père campe alors le caractère nécessaire de l’autorité devant être exercée par le créateur sur sa chose créée, mais permet de continuer dans le même temps à faire bénéficier les structures existantes de l’empreinte théologique représentée sur terre par des mandataires héréditaire – les princes. L’institutionnalisation de l’État, et la relative stabilité qui va en découler, va toutefois fournir le cadre apte à permettre à une pensée du sujet d’émerger, faisant naître des concepts qui, tels la multitude et le peuple, posent de plus en plus directement la question de la légitimité par la prise en compte de la volonté de ceux sur lesquels elle s’exerce. C’est ainsi que naîtront les théories du pacte social, qui tentent chacune à leur manière de concevoir un moment méthodologique où l’octroi du pouvoir soit a été cédé dans le passé, soit est toujours exercé par le peuple à chaque instant. Le mythe du contrat, ainsi, est celui par lequel la légitimité de l’autorité est conciliée avec l’origine du pouvoir. Cette liaison est rendue possible par le meurtre du Père, c’est-à-dire la suppression de l’autorité naturelle et nécessaire au profit d’une autorité conventionnelle et contingente. Or, le mythe du contrat est fragile ;il nécessite, pour juguler le flux de contingence qui émerge dès lors que la question de la légitimité se pose, que la question de la nature du pouvoir soit dûment maîtrisée. Cela demande que l’autorité ne prenne pas sa source dans le repli sur le présent permanent, c’est-à-dire sur le peuple, mais sur un critère de représentativité. Cela nécessite surtout un refoulement conscient de la nature et de l’origine de l’autorité vers un sur-moi qui constituera, à l’apogée de la modernité, le cœur abstrait de la notion de souveraineté. <p><p>Or cette conception de l’autorité se fissure elle-même sous le poids d’une contingence qui, comme flux permanent, tend par nature à excéder son cadre. A terme, ainsi, l’étiolement de la souveraineté coïncide-t-il avec l’avènement du dogme des droits de l’homme, appelés sur un registre immanent à compenser la perte de sens induite par l’insuffisance de verticalité assumée par la modernité.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished