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La evolución del Homo economicus: problemas del marco de decisión racional en Economía / La evolución del Homo economicus: problemas del marco de decisión racional en EconomíaMaletta, Héctor 10 April 2018 (has links)
Since its beginnings, and more clearly since the mid 1800, Economics has been resting on the assumption that economic agents make rational decisions, maximizing their utility or well-being according to their own preferences and interests. The economic order resulting from that plurality of rational decisions is regarded as an efficient and Pareto-optimum one. Several authors have questioned the validity of those assumptions, and this has entailed a gradual transformation of the assumptions. This paper discusses the problems faced by the idea of a fully rational Homo economicus, the adjustments and defensive measures adopted by various tendencies within Economics to overcome those problems and counter various related theoretical and methodological criticisms. The paper also discusses more recent conceptions of economic reality that are at variance with the traditional view, especially those linked to behavioural, institutional and evolutionary Economics. / Desde sus inicios, y más claramente desde mediados del siglo XIX, la Economía se ha basado en el supuesto de que los agentes económicos toman decisiones racionales, maximizando su utilidad o bienestar de acuerdo a sus propias preferencias e intereses. El orden económico resultante de esa pluralidad de decisiones es considerado óptimo o eficiente. Diversos autores han cuestionado la validez de estos supuestos y ello ha motivado una gradual transformación de esos mismos supuestos. En este artículo se examinan los problemas que enfrenta la noción de un Homo economicus completamente racional, las correcciones y medidas defensivas adoptadas por distintas tendencias dentro del análisis económico a fin de resolver esos problemas y contrarrestar críticas teóricas y metodológicas, y el desarrollo reciente de algunas concepciones de la realidad económica que se apartan de aquella concepción tradicional, en especial las vinculadas a la economía conductual, a la economía institucional y a la economía evolucionaria.
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The theory of self-interest in modern economic discourse: a critical study in the light of African Humanism and process philosophical AnthropologyMurove, Munyaradzi Felix 09 1900 (has links)
Modern economic theory of self-interest alleges that in their economic relations people
always behave in a way that maximises their utility. The idea whether human beings were
solely self-interested has a long history as it can be seen from the writings of Greek
philosophers and the Church fathers. Among Greek philosophers there were those who argued that human beings were naturally self-interested (Aristotle) and those who maintained that human beings were communal by nature (Plato, Stoics and the Pythagoreans). The later position was adopted by the Church fathers as they condemned
self-interest as the sin of avarice and greed.
The justification of self-interest in human and political activities was part and parcel of
the economic and political early modernists, as it can be seen in the works of Mandeville,
Hobbes, Hume and Adam Smith. In the writings of these thinkers, the flourishing of wealth depended on individual freedom to pursue their self-interests. In this regard, selfinterest
became the sole source of motivation in the behaviour of homo economicus. A persistent motif in late modern economic discourse on self-interest is based on the idea that people think and act on the basis of that which is to their self-interest. It is mainly for this reason that late modern economic thinkers maintain that society would prosper when people are left alone to pursue their self-interests. Late modern economic theory of utility maximisation alleges that individuals act only after calculating costs and benefits.
The argument of this thesis, based on the commonalities between African humanism and
process philosophical anthropology, is that self-interest is antithetical to communal life as
advocated in the ethic of Ubuntu. One who acts solely on the basis of maximising his or
her utility would inevitably deprive others of a humane existence. A holistic metaphysical
outlook based on the relatedness and interrelatedness of everything that exists as we find it in African humanism and process philosophical anthropology implies that the
individual exists in internal relations with everything else. We should go beyond selfinterest
by giving primacy to a holistic ethic. / Systematic Theology & Theological Ethics / D. Div. (Theological Ethics)
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The theory of self-interest in modern economic discourse: a critical study in the light of African Humanism and process philosophical AnthropologyMurove, Munyaradzi Felix 09 1900 (has links)
Modern economic theory of self-interest alleges that in their economic relations people
always behave in a way that maximises their utility. The idea whether human beings were
solely self-interested has a long history as it can be seen from the writings of Greek
philosophers and the Church fathers. Among Greek philosophers there were those who argued that human beings were naturally self-interested (Aristotle) and those who maintained that human beings were communal by nature (Plato, Stoics and the Pythagoreans). The later position was adopted by the Church fathers as they condemned
self-interest as the sin of avarice and greed.
The justification of self-interest in human and political activities was part and parcel of
the economic and political early modernists, as it can be seen in the works of Mandeville,
Hobbes, Hume and Adam Smith. In the writings of these thinkers, the flourishing of wealth depended on individual freedom to pursue their self-interests. In this regard, selfinterest
became the sole source of motivation in the behaviour of homo economicus. A persistent motif in late modern economic discourse on self-interest is based on the idea that people think and act on the basis of that which is to their self-interest. It is mainly for this reason that late modern economic thinkers maintain that society would prosper when people are left alone to pursue their self-interests. Late modern economic theory of utility maximisation alleges that individuals act only after calculating costs and benefits.
The argument of this thesis, based on the commonalities between African humanism and
process philosophical anthropology, is that self-interest is antithetical to communal life as
advocated in the ethic of Ubuntu. One who acts solely on the basis of maximising his or
her utility would inevitably deprive others of a humane existence. A holistic metaphysical
outlook based on the relatedness and interrelatedness of everything that exists as we find it in African humanism and process philosophical anthropology implies that the
individual exists in internal relations with everything else. We should go beyond selfinterest
by giving primacy to a holistic ethic. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Div. (Theological Ethics)
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The Social Construction of Economic Man: The Genesis, Spread, Impact and Institutionalisation of Economic IdeasMackinnon, Lauchlan A. K. Unknown Date (has links)
The present thesis is concerned with the genesis, diffusion, impact and institutionalisation of economic ideas. Despite Keynes's oft-cited comments to the effect that 'the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood'(Keynes 1936: 383), and the highly visible impact of economic ideas (for example Keynesian economics, Monetarism, or economic ideas regarding deregulation and antitrust issues) on the economic system, economists have done little to systematically explore the spread and impact of economic ideas. In fact, with only a few notable exceptions, the majority of scholarly work concerning the spread and impact of economic ideas has been developed outside of the economics literature, for example in the political institutionalist literature in the social sciences. The present thesis addresses the current lack of attention to the spread and impact of economic ideas by economists by drawing on the political institutionalist, sociological, and psychology of creativity literatures to develop a framework in which the genesis, spread, impact and institutionalisation of economic ideas may be understood. To articulate the dissemination and impact of economic ideas within economics, I consider as a case study the evolution of economists' conception of the economic agent - "homo oeconomicus." I argue that the intellectual milieu or paradigm of economics is 'socially constructed' in a specific sense, namely: (i) economic ideas are created or modified by particular individuals; (ii) economic ideas are disseminated (iii) certain economic ideas are accepted by economists and (iv) economic ideas become institutionalised into the paradigm or milieu of economics. Economic ideas are, of course, disseminated not only within economics to fellow economists, but are also disseminated externally to economic policy makers and business leaders who can - and often do - take economic ideas into account when formulating policy and building economic institutions. Important economic institutions are thereby socially constructed, in the general sense proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1966). But how exactly do economic ideas enter into this process of social construction of economic institutions? Drawing from and building on structure/agency theory (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 1977; Bhaskar 1979/1998, 1989; Bourdieu 1990; Lawson 1997, 2003) in the wider social sciences, I provide a framework for understanding how economic ideas enter into the process of social construction of economic institutions. Finally, I take up a methodological question: if economic ideas are disseminated, and if economic ideas have a real and constitutive impact on the economic system being modelled, does 'economic science' then accurately and objectively model an independently existing economic reality, unchanged by economic theory, or does economic theory have an interdependent and 'reflexive' relationship with economic reality, as economic reality co-exists with, is shaped by, and also shapes economic theory? I argue the latter, and consider the implications for evaluating in what sense economic science is, in fact, a science in the classical sense. The thesis makes original contributions to understanding the genesis of economic ideas in the psychological creative work processes of economists; understanding the ontological location of economic ideas in the economic system; articulating the social construction of economic ideas; and highlighting the importance of the spread of economic ideas to economic practice and economic methodology.
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