No / Bakhtin's dialogism is widely used to understand the mutual constitution of self and other in action. In this article, however, I argue that there is a second hinge to Bakhtin's work that is currently underemphasized in the literature. This is his emphasis on the sense of action that accompanies dialogue. Bakhtin refers to action as sensed as 'spirit'. In contrast, he refers to action relating to the other as 'soul'. In this article, I outline these distinctions in Bakhtin's thought before arguing that there is sometimes an intriguing and imaginative struggle between spirit and soul in dialogue. In this struggle, the distinctions between fantasy and reality can become blurred as the self risks potentially life-changing encounters with genuine others. The implications that this has for research practice in socio-cultural psychology are drawn out. In particular, I argue that the 'spirit-soul' distinction introduces a humanistic and optimistic view of the self-other relationship into cultural psychology.

Theories of reflexivity have primarily been concerned with the way agents monitor their own actions using knowledge (Giddens) or deliberate on the social context to make choices through the internal conversation (Archer), yet none have placed emotion at the centre of reflexivity. While emotion is considered in theories of reflexivity it is generally held at bay, being seen as a possible barrier to clear reflexive thought. Here, I challenge this position and, drawing on the work of C.H. Cooley, argue that feeling and emotion are central to reflexive processes, colouring the perception of self, others and social world, thus influencing our responses in social interaction as well as the way we reflexively monitor action and deliberate on the choices we face. Emotional reflexivity is therefore not simply about the way emotions are reflexively monitored or ordered, but about how emotion informs reflexivity itself.

This thesis is out from the relationship between imagination and memory. Imagination is always from memory. After expressing my imagination through pencil, things that are invinted are actually familier to the past. Based on what I have done about my thesis, the invention of using mirror image as a dimension system come up. / Master of Architecture

The practice of architecture exists because man has sought shelter from the forces of the world he finds himself. It is wonder of this same world that has caused him to shape his rooms from age to age. In every instance, he recreates the world within the world with the materials of that world. It is the marks, the cuts, the juxtaposition, and the joining of these materials in which ornament dwells. It is present wherever man has shaped material for construction. It is a whisper when homogenized, and it is a trumpet blast when varied. This thesis will delve into the making of ornament, and my love for it. My first cognizant encounter with architecture, was my fascination with the sculpted stones of the gothic cathedrals. It was the ornament that caused me to be fascinated and to remember. So for this thesis, I sought to imagine walls worth remembering. I wanted to touch every material with my mind's eye so that it might be a gift for others. I wanted to ornate. It seemed best for the design to be sacred and to be in an urban setting. I also thought that the presence of time and aging might help the thesis. I came to choose the program of a catholic cemetery in Philadelphia. I hoped to explore what meaningful marks and arrangements of materials I could impart to this ephemeral world. / Master of Architecture

In this paper I present, and offer a solution to, a heretofore unacknowledged textual puzzle that arises from Margaret Cavendish's use of inconceivability to make claims about what is metaphysically impossible. On the one hand, Cavendish asserts that objects or events she cannot conceive of are impossible in nature (i.e., inconceivability entails impossibility in nature). On the other hand, she writes that there are some things that exist or occur in nature that are inconceivable to humans (i.e., inconceivability does not entail impossibility in nature). Put simply, Cavendish seemingly contradicts herself. This textual puzzle not only threatens to undermine Cavendish's philosophical method; it also calls her opposition to human exceptionalism into question. By asserting that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, Cavendish implies by contraposition that she can conceive of everything that is metaphysically possible. In so doing, she seems to make an exception at least for herself: though she believes that other parts of nature cannot conceive of everything in nature, she implies that she can. Ultimately, I argue that Cavendish thinks we can sometimes tell why something is inconceivable. In some cases, something is inconceivable because it lies beyond the limits of humans' mental capacities. In other cases, something is inconceivable because it is contradictory. This interpretation solves the textual puzzle, as it is consistent for Cavendish to maintain that some objects and events in nature are beyond our mental limits and that we can derive the impossibility of some object or event in nature from its contradictoriness. My interpretation preserves Cavendish's opposition to human exceptionalism, moreover, as no part of nature can conceive of contradictions. That is, Cavendish's claim is not merely that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, but rather that what is inconceivable to her and to every other part of nature is impossible in nature. / Master of Arts / Margaret Cavendish, a seventeenth century philosopher, makes two seemingly contradictory claims throughout her philosophical works. On the one hand, she implies that if something is inconceivable to her — that is, if she cannot form a mental picture of it — that thing is impossible in nature. On the other hand, she writes that there are plenty of things that exist or occur in nature which are inconceivable to humans. A textual puzzle therefore arises: Cavendish seems to simultaneously maintain (1) that something is impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it, and (2) that something is not necessarily impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it. In this paper, I propose that Cavendish believes humans can at least sometimes determine why something is inconceivable. That is, we can at least sometimes diagnose our inability to form a mental picture of something. In some cases, Cavendish thinks, we cannot form a mental picture of something because of our limited, human mental capacities. (We might think, for example, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of all the colors butterflies see.) In other cases, we cannot form a mental picture of something because that thing is contradictory. (We might think, for instance, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of an apple that is both red all over and not red all over.) I further argue that Cavendish only asserts that something is impossible in nature if it is inconceivable because it is contradictory. On my account, the textual puzzle I presented above is in fact not so puzzling. Cavendish thinks that if something is inconceivable because it is contradictory, then it is impossible in nature. She also thinks that there are plenty of things in nature that we cannot conceive of because of our limited human mental capacities. Thankfully, these two claims are not in tension.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2009-2010 / Dans ce mémoire, nous tentons de découvrir la place fondamentale de l'imagination dans la vie de tout humain. À cette fin, il nous apparaît nécessaire en premier d'identifier les effets de cette faculté: 1. son rôle dans le processus de la connaissance, 2. de quelle façon elle aide l'humain à vivre mieux. Ensuite de cerner sa nature. Nous verrons que l'imagination, bien que souvent accusée d'être ± trompeuse ¿, s'avère d'une puissance infinie. La substance propre de l'imagination ne saurait être connue sans une analyse serrée : d'abord, de ce qui la distingue de la mémoire et de l'intelligence ; puis du lien qu'elle entretient avec la sensation - de laquelle elle semble dépendre - ; enfin de la nature de l'image, elle-même. Voir ce qui appartient de droit à chacune des parties de cette articulation, nous permettra de nous rendre compte de l'importance primordiale de cette faculté à tort mal connue. La quête de sens de toute vie humaine en dépend. Nous sommes, aujourd'hui, plus que jamais à la merci de ceux qui envahissent nos vies par des images médiatiques ; et de la technique qui les produit. Or les enjeux humains de la vie et de la mort ne sont pas des images. L'omniprésence des images virtuelles sur les nombreux écrans qui nous entourent nous assure-t-elle une vie meilleure ou ne faut-il pas plutôt nous en méfier ? Peut-on, actuellement, mesurer les conséquences d'une méconnaissance de l'importance de l'imagination ? Peut-on se payer le luxe d'une telle ignorance alors que les jeunes d'aujourd'hui meurent à cause d'un sens qu'ils ne savent imaginer ? Telles sont, parmi d'autres, les questions qui animent notre recherche.

This architectural thesis reimagines the design of prisons, proposing a new typology that helps with a more beneficial transition for prisoners back into society. By drawing insights from documentaries, movies, interviews, and existing prison models, the thesis envisions a utopian prison environment centered on rehabilitation and social reintegration. This approach challenges the conventional punitive model and aims to address the pressing issues of high recidivism rates and the marginalization of ex-offenders. The proposed prison design integrates structured psychological treatments, meaningful social interactions, and opportunities for skill development and personal growth. These elements create a dual reality for prisoners, juxtaposing the harsh physical conditions of confinement with a supportive psychological environment that encourages inner resilience and hope. This thesis explores the architectural symbolism embedded in both dystopian and utopian prison designs, reflecting societal values of control, oppression, freedom, and rehabilitation. By emphasizing the power of hope and imagination, this thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between physical confinement, mental resilience, and societal ideologies. It aims to shed light on the human capacity to maintain agency, identity, and purpose even in oppressive environments, contributing to broader discussions on justice, rehabilitation, and societal change. / Master of Architecture / This architectural thesis challenges traditional perceptions of prisons by proposing a new typology focused on facilitating prisoners' successful reintegration into society. Inspired by diverse sources, including documentaries, films, and interviews. This thesis envisions a utopian prison model that prioritizes rehabilitation over punishment. This innovative design aims to reduce recidivism and address systemic issues within the current penal system. The proposed approach combines structured psychological treatments, meaningful social interactions, and skill development opportunities to create an environment where inmates can thrive both mentally and physically. By analyzing architectural elements and their symbolic significance, this thesis highlights the contrast between conventional punitive prison designs and a new rehabilitative model. Through this reimagined prison design, this thesis explores the themes of mental resilience, hope and imagination, and architectural symbolism. It underscores the potential for prisoners to maintain a sense of identity and purpose despite physical confinement, offering a transformative vision for the future of incarceration and societal reintegration

Il s'agit dans cette thèse d'explorer la question du dualisme substantiel et sa relation avec l'union chez Descartes en choisissant comme angle d'attaque le rapport entre imagination et idée. Si, comme l'ont soutenu de nombreux commentateurs, l'imagination a été écartée par Descartes dès 1630 et surtout à partir de 1637 parce qu'il lui importait de démontrer la distinction réelle de l'âme et du corps et de fonder cette démonstration sur l'existence de Dieu, alors la théorie des idées qu'il développe dans ce contexte, devrait être déterminée indépendamment de la notion d'imagination. Nous montrons que les notions d'imagination et d'image servent à constituer sa théorie des idées, ce qui indique que cette faculté occupe toujours pour lui une place importante dans sa théorie de la connaissance et qu'elle n'est en aucun cas exclue de sa métaphysique. Comment concilier cette position épistémologique avec la thèse de la distinction réelle? Nous avons reconsidéré le statut ontologique de l'imagination, conçue comme un mode de la substance pensante mais exclue de l'essence de celle-ci. Cette distinction modale est cruciale pour ne pas interpréter la distinction réelle esprit/corps comme un dualisme dur. Car si une propriété est un mode, elle ne peut être exclue de l'essence de la substance dont elle est le mode. Nous concluons que l'imagination est en réalité exclue de l'essence de l'âme purement intellectuelle mais non de l'essence de l'âme humaine et qu'il n'y a de distinction réelle qu'entre l'âme pure et le corps. / This doctoral dissertation concerns the substantial Cartesian dualism and its relation with union in the light of the link between imagination and ideas. If imagination was removed since 1630 and 1637, as a lot of commentators argued, because Descartes wanted to demonstrate the real distinction between body and soul, and found his demonstration on the existence of God, then his theory of ideas should be constituted independently of the notion of imagination. We argue that the notions of imagination and image help to establish this theory: this shows that imagination is still important in Descartes' theory of knowledge and that it is not excluded from his Metaphysics. How to conciliate this epistemological position with real distinction thesis? We reconsidered the ontological status of imagination as a mode of a thinking substance but excluded from the essence of this substance. This modal distinction is crucial in order not to misinterpret the real distinction between soul and body, seen not only as a hard dualism. Yet, if a property is a mode, it cannot be excluded from the essence of the substance of which it is the mode. We conclude that imagination is removed from the essence of a purely intellectual soul but not from human soul and that there is only a real distinction between pure soul and body. Imagination reinforces the intelligibility of dualism since it serves to understand why the real distinction between soul and body is compatible with their substantial union.

« Je ne mets rien au-dessus de la musique », écrit Giono. Pourtant, l’écrivain n’est guère musicien et refuse l’apprentissage du solfège, même si sa sensibilité musicale deviendra au fil du temps passion éclairée. La présence de la musique dans l’œuvre suit logiquement un parcours parallèle à celui qu’elle occupe dans la vie de Giono. Au-delà de sa simple présence thématique, aisément repérable dès les premiers écrits, outre les fonctions argumentatives, narratives et poétiques qu’elle offre aussi à l’écrivain, la musique s’impose progressivement comme une source d’inspiration et même un modèle esthétique pour l’homme de lettres. De manière inattendue, c’est lorsque la thématique musicale tend à disparaître que le roman devient ou tente de devenir véritablement musical chez Giono. La musique offre de plus l’occasion de s’interroger sur des tensions essentielles de l’œuvre, entre aspiration pour un certain naturel et nécessité de la culture, entre goûts musicaux très personnels et découverte de la musique via des mentors littéraires, entre modernité romanesque et prédilection pour des modèles souvent anciens, entre quête de structures musicales définies et transposition subjective de celles-ci. Giono aura proposé une réponse singulière à la question de l’impossible traduction du langage musical en mots qui taraude nombre d’écrivains. Paradoxalement, le rapport libre de Giono à la musique a une incidence sensible sur son écriture et, partant, intéresse de plein droit les études musico-littéraires et l’histoire de la littérature du xxe siècle et de ses mutations. / « For me nothing is more important than music », Giono wrote. However, the writer was no musician and refused to learn music theory, even though his musical sensitivity became an enlightened passion as time went by. The presence of music in his work logically follows a parallel path to that of music in Giono’s life. Beyond its mere presence as a theme, easily perceptible in his early writings, and apart from its argumentative, narrative and poetic roles that are presented to the writer, music progressively becomes essential as a source of inspiration and even a model of aesthetics for the writer. Against all odds, when the theme of music tends to disappear, the novel becomes or seeks to become truly musical in Giono’s work. Besides, music is an opportunity to ponder over the paramount tensions in his work : between an aspiration to nature and the necessity of culture, between very personal musical tastes and the discovery of music through literary mentors, between fictional modernity and a predilection for past models, between a quest for defined musical structures and their biased transposition. Giono offered a singular answer to the question of the impossible translation of the language of music in words, and this question has tormented countless writers. Paradoxically, Giono’s independence from music had a conspicuous effect on his style and is therefore relevant to music and literary studies as well as the history of 20th century literature and its transformations.

La présente étude aborde une œuvre de Théophile Gautier, Arria Marcella, au regard de la thématique de l’imagination créatrice. L’analyse se concentre sur la nouvelle elle-même, mais prend largement en compte aussi l’ensemble des œuvres narratives, et au-delà, du polygraphe – critique d’art, critique dramatique, récit de voyages et dans une moindre mesure poésie. Ce travail s’organise en trois temps : la première partie expose les différentes composantes de la nouvelle, montre la manière dont Gautier organise sa narration à partir d’un matériel intertextuel, et d’un objet transitionnel qui lui permet de mettre en scène l’aventure rétrospective d’un jeune homme du xixe siècle dans l’antiquité, à la rencontre de son idéal féminin. Arria Marcella est d’abord le récit d’un parcours, diurne, puis nocturne ; réel, puis mental. La seconde partie traite de l’imagination créatrice, donc de l’image et de sa restitution fécondante par l’écriture, à travers le travail descriptif d’un regard qui prend position. Il ne s’agit pas de restituer, mais d’enchanter le réel en le passant au révélateur du fantastique, de la survivance et de la figurabilité. La troisième partie analyse Arria Marcella à travers le prisme de lectures complémentaires qui entendent montrer la richesse de l’œuvre, laquelle occupe une position stratégique permettant d’éclairer la production de Gautier dans son ensemble. L’approche procède en trois temps : esthétique ; philosophique, par le biais d’un examen approfondi de la composante platonicienne et néoplatonicienne, fondamentale bien que filtrée, dans Arria Marcella et plus largement dans les œuvres narratives de l’auteur; générique enfin, puisqu’il s’agit de montrer comment la nouvelle pompéienne atteint au Gesamtkunswerk en mêlant les genres créatifs. / The subject of this PhD is a short story by Théophile Gautier, entitled Arria Marcella, as seen through the theme of creative imagination. Although the present dissertation focuses on this particular short story, it also takes into consideration the author’s entire works – fiction, art criticism, travel literature and to a lesser degree, poetry. The 3-part study begins by describing the different sections of the short story, and the way Gautier organized his narration. The story is based on different literary sources and a transitional object (a museum artefact) through which he staged the adventures of a nineteenth-century young man encountering his female ideal in ancient times. Arria Marcella is the story of a walk at daytime then nighttime, in reality and in the character’s mind. The second part deals with creative imagination: image and the way it is transformed and enriched in literature through descriptive work as seen through the writer’s eye. Rather than remaining faithful to reality, it is a matter of enchanting reality through the fantastic genre, survival and figurability. The third part is devoted to an analysis of Arria Marcella through further readings so as to highlight its complexity. Thus, this work, which holds a strategic position among Gautier’s works, can help explain his writings. The viewpoint is threefold: aesthetic, philosophical, through a close examination of the Platonism and Neoplatonism features – essential though filtered, and finally generic since it shows how the Pompeian short story reaches Gesamtkunswerk by combining different creative genres.