In an ever-changing world an armed force needs to adapt and learn from its mistakes. To do this it needs to have a working lessons-learned process and the Swedish army is in the developing phase of such a process. But how does it hold up against previous lessons-learned processes and what can be learned from these? The essay investigates the Swedish lessons-learned process used during its ISAF contingents between 2009-2013 and compare it to the process the Swedish army is developing today with the help of Dysons model for lessons-learned processes. The essay finds that, while some improvements have been achieved, there are certain factors that still needs to improve. Most importantly the understanding of what a lesson learned is and how to use it needs to be improved. This will help the organization in the other areas, such as knowledge management, dissemination, and transformation. Another area in need of development is the knowledge management IT-system. The study finds that further studies needs to be done in knowledge transformation within the organization. Further studies also need to be done regarding how the organization handles the lessons learned process in the units.

Under perioden 2011-2013 opererade det svenska helikopterförbandet Swedish Air Element Helikopter 10B på Camp Marmal i Afghanistan i syfte att utgöra sjuktransportresurs för Regional Command North inom ramen för ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). Förbandet bidrog till sjuktransportförmåga med helikopter i norra Afghanistan tillsammans med amerikanska, tyska och norska helikopterförband. De taktiska kraven på förbandet innebar att kunna hålla en hög beredskap med hög tillgänglighet i en konfliktfylld miljö i syfte att rädda liv. Den här studien syftar till att undersöka förbandets logistik och hur den påverkade förbandets operationer och verksamhet men även att undersöka i vilken utsträckning Moshe Kress teoribildning kan förklara logistiken i det valda fallet. Undersökningen visar på ett minimalistiskt logistiksystem som också bidrog positivt till förbandets operationer och verksamhet. Vidare var förbandet i hög grad beroende av extern försörjning där baseringen spelade en avgörande roll. Insatsen föregicks av en omfattande planering för att säkerställa tillgänglighet, både i insatsområdet och på hemmaförband. Undersökningen visar på att de största framgångsfaktorerna för logistiksystemet var framsynthet, tillgänglighet, överlevnadsförmåga och enkelhet.

This study aims to highlight the consequences on outposts in Afghanistan in the context of COIN and ISAF during 2003-2012. Previous research in this area is more oriented towards the perspective of COIN at the strategic and operational level and not at the tactical and local level. For example, previous research has written about how important military presence and adaptation are, but not what consequences the company that is deployed to an area and conducts the COIN operation receives. The study was designed with Kilcullen’s theory about COIN and his 28 articles as a basis, and the study was conducted with in-depth interviews as the main empirical material, with officers who served in the Swedish Armed Forces, and the British Army during 2005-2012 in Afghanistan. The study finds that one consequence at one of the outposts was from the terrain, which was that the local infrastructure couldn’t support heavy military vehicles that came to the outpost, which resulted in the roads and irrigation ditches being destroyed by the vehicles' weight. The study also found interesting patterns amongst the informants that had the same consequences, which was that the roads leading towards the outposts were often very few, which led to a predictability for the enemy to use against the units stationed at the outpost. Another interesting find in this study is that there was a difference in how open each outpost was. For example, the British Army’s outposts were more open to civilians than the Swedish outposts, although the British Army had more fighting in their area than their Swedish counterpart.

<p>Uppsatsens huvudsyfte är att undersöka om amerikanska och brittiska stridserfarenheter av kalibern 5,56 i Afghanistan kan bidra till att utveckla den svenska Försvarsmaktens taktiska förmåga. Anledningen till varför jag valde att utgå från dessa länder är därför att de har fler öppna källor samt har mer erfarenhet än många andra. Studien genomfördes genom en kvalitativ textanalys av bland annat reglementen, rapporter och artiklar. Uppsatsen visar att Försvarsmaktens kaliber till sin automatkarbin, 5,56, var potent för stridstaktikanpassad för invasionsförsvar. Detta delvis på grund av kaliberns egna logistiska fördelar men även därför att de prioriterade vapensystemen för infanteriförbanden, lätta pansarvärnsvapnen, innebar relativt korta stridsavstånd. Studien visar därefter att idag, för amerikanska och brittiska styrkor i dagens konflikt i Afghanistan, är 5,56 otillräcklig. Stridsavstånden är generellt för långa för att kalibern skall avge sin optimala verkan i målet. Studien belyser vad dessa nationer vidtagit för åtgärder, samt vilka åtgärder som planeras eller finns som förslag för att förbättra sin stridstaktiska förmåga. Den mest optimala förbättringen anser många är att byta ut kalibern 5,56 mot en grövre mellankaliber i spannet 5,56-7,62. Förslag som förändrad skjututbildning, optikutveckling och nya vapeninköp nämns också. I diskussionen diskuteras om eller hur den svenska Försvarsmakten kan dra nytta av de andra nationernas erfarenheter. Resonemanget ger det generella slutsatsen att Försvarsmakten kan utveckla sin stridstaktiska förmåga genom att studera andra nationer. Ett snabbt konkret exempel vore att implementera skarpskyttevapnet ak4 med förstorande optiskt hjälpmedel i svenska Försvarsmaktens skytteförband.</p> / <p>The main purpose with this study is to investigate whether U.S. and British combat experience of the caliber 5.56 in Afghanistan is helping to develop the Armed Forces' tactical ability. The reason why I chose to rely on these countries is because they have more unclassified sources and has more combat experience than many others. This study was conducted through a qualitative text analysis of for example regulations, reports and articles. This essay shows that the Swedish Armed Forces standard caliber that is being used in today’s assault rifle (ak5c), were potent in battle tactics designed for the defence of Sweden. This is partly becauseof 5,56 own logistical advantages and also because light anti-tank weapons had priority over small arms weapons. This resulted in relatively short shooting distances. The study shows thereafter that the U.S. and British troops in today's conflict in Afghanistan, thinks that 5.56 is insufficient. Combat distances are generally too long for the caliber to deliver its optimum effect in the target. The study highlights what kind of actions these nations have taken, and what measures are planned to improve its combat tactical ability. The study reveals that the most optimal improvement, are to replace the 5.56 with a bigger medium sized caliber. Proposals to change the marksmanship training, optics development and to purchase new weapons are also mentioned. In the end of this essay there is a discussion on, or how the Swedish Armed Forces can implement U.S and British experiences. The reasoning in the final chapter gives the general answer that the Swedish Armed Forces indeed can develop their tactical combat skills by studying other nations. An example would be to implement the older ak4 with magnifying optics that could improve the longer range capabilities of the infantry units.</p>

Uppsatsens huvudsyfte är att undersöka om amerikanska och brittiska stridserfarenheter av kalibern 5,56 i Afghanistan kan bidra till att utveckla den svenska Försvarsmaktens taktiska förmåga. Anledningen till varför jag valde att utgå från dessa länder är därför att de har fler öppna källor samt har mer erfarenhet än många andra. Studien genomfördes genom en kvalitativ textanalys av bland annat reglementen, rapporter och artiklar. Uppsatsen visar att Försvarsmaktens kaliber till sin automatkarbin, 5,56, var potent för stridstaktikanpassad för invasionsförsvar. Detta delvis på grund av kaliberns egna logistiska fördelar men även därför att de prioriterade vapensystemen för infanteriförbanden, lätta pansarvärnsvapnen, innebar relativt korta stridsavstånd. Studien visar därefter att idag, för amerikanska och brittiska styrkor i dagens konflikt i Afghanistan, är 5,56 otillräcklig. Stridsavstånden är generellt för långa för att kalibern skall avge sin optimala verkan i målet. Studien belyser vad dessa nationer vidtagit för åtgärder, samt vilka åtgärder som planeras eller finns som förslag för att förbättra sin stridstaktiska förmåga. Den mest optimala förbättringen anser många är att byta ut kalibern 5,56 mot en grövre mellankaliber i spannet 5,56-7,62. Förslag som förändrad skjututbildning, optikutveckling och nya vapeninköp nämns också. I diskussionen diskuteras om eller hur den svenska Försvarsmakten kan dra nytta av de andra nationernas erfarenheter. Resonemanget ger det generella slutsatsen att Försvarsmakten kan utveckla sin stridstaktiska förmåga genom att studera andra nationer. Ett snabbt konkret exempel vore att implementera skarpskyttevapnet ak4 med förstorande optiskt hjälpmedel i svenska Försvarsmaktens skytteförband. / The main purpose with this study is to investigate whether U.S. and British combat experience of the caliber 5.56 in Afghanistan is helping to develop the Armed Forces' tactical ability. The reason why I chose to rely on these countries is because they have more unclassified sources and has more combat experience than many others. This study was conducted through a qualitative text analysis of for example regulations, reports and articles. This essay shows that the Swedish Armed Forces standard caliber that is being used in today’s assault rifle (ak5c), were potent in battle tactics designed for the defence of Sweden. This is partly becauseof 5,56 own logistical advantages and also because light anti-tank weapons had priority over small arms weapons. This resulted in relatively short shooting distances. The study shows thereafter that the U.S. and British troops in today's conflict in Afghanistan, thinks that 5.56 is insufficient. Combat distances are generally too long for the caliber to deliver its optimum effect in the target. The study highlights what kind of actions these nations have taken, and what measures are planned to improve its combat tactical ability. The study reveals that the most optimal improvement, are to replace the 5.56 with a bigger medium sized caliber. Proposals to change the marksmanship training, optics development and to purchase new weapons are also mentioned. In the end of this essay there is a discussion on, or how the Swedish Armed Forces can implement U.S and British experiences. The reasoning in the final chapter gives the general answer that the Swedish Armed Forces indeed can develop their tactical combat skills by studying other nations. An example would be to implement the older ak4 with magnifying optics that could improve the longer range capabilities of the infantry units.

Denna studie ämnade undersöka relationen mellan den svenska insatsen i Afghanistan och Svensk säkerhetspolitik mellan åren 2000 och 2010. Frågorna som ställdes kretsade kring vilka konsekvenser insatsen har för svensk säkerhetspolitik, om vilken orsaksriktning relationen mellan de två fenomenen kan tänkas ha och dess inverkan på svensk nationell säkerhet. Teoretiskt utgick studien främst från professor Nils Andréns strukturmodell över säkerhetspolitikens mål och medel. Metodologiskt studerades ett antal texter. Dels mediematerial i form av tidningsartiklar som analyserades för att strukturera och kronologiskt kartlägga den svenska Afghanistaninsatsens utveckling under det gångna decenniet. Vidare analyserades innehållet i ett antal försvarspropositioner för att klarlägga utvecklingen av den svenska säkerhetspolitiken under samma tid. Innehållet i dessa sorterades genom att tillämpa Andréns modell. Slutligen studerades de två fenomenen för att söka finna på vilket sätt de interagerade. Slutsatserna av arbetet pekar på att den svenska politiken förändrats i riktning mot att i större utsträckning söka försvara Sverige utanför Sverige. Samt att insatsen i Afghanistan började som en solidaritetshandling men gradvis motiverades med mer säkerhetspolitiska argument. Vidare pekade studien på att förändringen i svensk säkerhetspolitik snarare påverkat utvecklingen i Afghanistan än det omvända.

This paper deals with the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan after the NATO-invasion at the end of 2001 and its success. To ensure the stability of the country, the NATO-led coalition had not only to overthrow the Taliban regime, but also to create basic government structures and help them perform. Reconstruction is of course very common and necessary after conflict, it is however usually operated by strictly civilian measures, e. g. government institutions and humanitarian organisations. In this case, however, such approach was not possible due to volatile security situation, which in some areas grew to such intensity, it essentially became a war-conflict again. This paper focuses on the Herat province and NATO units, especially under ISAF command. It seeks to define the process of post-conflict reconstruction and using the process-tracing method, it then ascertains the extent to which ISAF units dedicated themselves to post-conflict reconstruction and made a positive progress in this area. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

The diploma thesis deals with deployment of German army within ISAF strategy in Afghanistan. The deployment of military forces is one of the most discussed queries in German politics and among German public. The thesis analyses the development in Afghanistan from 2001 to September 2013. The thesis is divided into three parts. Firstly, I define the theory of role and the concept of civil power, which is one of approaches for analysis of foreign policy. I define some criteria and according to them I examine, if Germany behaves in Afghanistan as civil power, for which is it considered. In the following part I deal with the development in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. I analyse the beginning of OEF and ISAF operations, mandate's extensions, the reasons for deployment in Afghanistan and the development of the security situation in country. The main part of this thesis is the deployment of German army within new ISAF strategy in Afghanistan, which was declared by American president Barack Obama in 2009. The thesis focuses on the attitude of Germany to the most important events in this period, for example to the declaration of new ISAF strategy, to international conference on Afghanistan in London, to transition to afghan lead, to the leaving of the international troops and to support after the year...

Bolstering local perceptions of legitimacy in armed intervention has emerged as an important feature of increasingly complex international peace and statebuilding efforts. Yet, previous research has only begun to explore what local legitimacy entails to those involved in, and affected by, armed intervention. This dissertation advances an understanding of local legitimacy as a perception-based, relational phenomenon. Through this lens, it examines armed intervention in Afghanistan (2001-2014). In particular, this dissertation studies how the relationship between Afghan citizens and intervening armed forces interacts with, and shapes, perspectives on local legitimacy held by the main 'interveners' and those 'intervened upon'. This dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four essays. Beginning with the organizational perspectives of the main intervening actors in Afghanistan, Essay I finds that the UN and NATO initially conceptualized problems of local legitimacy as principally the consequence of a fragile Afghan state, and not as failings of the intervention. When negative dimensions of intervention became increasingly recognized, principal responsibility for the legitimacy process shifted away from intervening authorities and onto the Afghan state. Similarly, Essay II shows how key U.S. military doctrine, over time, reconceptualized the formal duty of intervening forces in the local legitimacy process, ultimately considering it contingent on, and subordinate to, the will and capabilities of host-state authorities and the local population. Turning thereafter to firsthand accounts from the field, Essay III and Essay IV together contrast personal perspectives on the intervention held by U.S. Army Officers and Afghan citizens. Essay III finds that personal experiences of noncombat contact with Afghans reinforced the Officers' sense of duty toward the local population. Conversely, Essay IV suggests that the local legitimacy of intervening forces became increasingly contested among Afghans, due largely to the perceived intensification of foreign intrusion on 'everyday' life. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation lay the foundation for the development of a new concept, the host-citizen contract. In so doing, it provides a social contract framework to better understand the complex dynamics of local legitimacy in Afghanistan, and beyond.

Participation in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is one of the most common military duties assigned to present-day Western soldiers. Previous research concerned with the psychological effects of these missions on the individual soldier has focused on issues of mental health and how to ensure military effectiveness. This study takes a different perspective, and examines how PSOs affect the political psychology of the peace soldier, asking: how and to what extent do the sociopolitical psychological orientations of the individual soldier change as a consequence of peace support operations? The study combines theory from clinical, social, and personality psychology to construct a framework for understanding how and why the values and the attitudes toward violence of the soldier may be affected by PSO deployments. It is argued that although combat exposure may cause changes in attitudes and values, these variables will overall remain stable across the deployment. Stability is predicted to be the norm due to the importance of certain attitudes and values to the soldierly identity, and owing to the good person-environment fit that the deployment provides for the soldiers. It is also argued that the individual’s personality traits will predict levels of change and stability. Empirically, two Swedish contingents deployed to northern Afghanistan under the auspices of NATO’s ISAF mission are analyzed. Change and stability are examined by combining statistical analyses of surveys with in-depth interviews carried out at both the pre- and post-deployment stages. As hypothesized, the study finds that both values and attitudes exhibit high levels of stability across the mission. Contrary to expectations the soldiers’ experiences of combat exposure had little to no effect on attitudes and values. Combat exposure was, however, limited during the deployments studied. Finally, the individual’s personality traits are identified as being relatively potent factors for inducing change and stability. By demonstrating that low-exposure PSOs have only minor effects on the sociopolitical psychological orientations of soldiers, the study advances knowledge of the political psychology of the peace soldier and provides additional contributions to the fields of value and personality psychology. Among other things, the study demonstrates the stability of values in a very challenging environment, and how personality traits affect change and stability in values.