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Third-Party funding refers to a financing arrangement in which a non-party entityprovides financial resources to a disputing party in return for some benefits whichis usually dependent on the outcome of the dispute before the court or tribunal.These benefits could be for pecuniary profits or for the achievement of somepolicy objectives.Whilst this funding model has been commended for promoting access to justice, ithas also been criticized for the possibility of it leading to the filing ofunmeritorious claims, its inherent conflict with the common law tort of champertyand maintenance, the disclosure of privileged information and its impact on theimplied or express duty of confidentiality owed by the parties in arbitration.This research seeks to examine the effect of the disclosure of privilegedinformation by the party seeking funding to the potential funder before or duringArbitration with a view to determining whether the said disclosure constitutes awaiver of litigation privileges or can the third-party funder be deemed to share acommon interest with the funded party? This research will be viewed from thelens of the domestic law operational in England and Wales and Nigeria in acomparative analytical fashion with a view to determining what lessons could belearnt by the developing jurisdiction.This study also makes a brief review of extant legal regime on Third-Partyfunding in both jurisdictions on the adequacy of the provisions on disclosure witha view to providing some safeguards towards promoting the third-party fundingpractice, balance competing interests amongst the parties, promote investorconfidence as well as enhance the growth of foreign direct investment in spite ofthe various existing criticisms against the third-party litigation financing model.

När en investerare vill investera utomlands finns många risker som måste beräknas, analyseras och hanteras. Utöver olika ekonomiska risker finns politiska risker. En investerare kan, för att hantera dessa politiska risker, välja att investera i en stat med vilken Sverige har ett bilateralt investeringsskyddsavtal. Dessa avtal reglerar både materiellt investeringsskydd, det vill säga hur en investerare ska behandlas, och processuellt skydd, det vill säga möjligheten för en investerare att väcka talan mot staten investeraren investerar i genom ett internationellt skiljeförfarande. Sverige har idag 66 stycken bilaterala investeringsskyddsavtal i kraft, varav tolv stycken är slutna med länder inom EU. Antalet bilaterala investeringsskyddsavtal slutna mellan EU-länder, intra-EU BIT, ökade avsevärt i och med att unionen utvidgades år 2004 och 2007. Sedan dess har avtalens förenlighet med EU-rätten diskuterats i litteraturen, i skiljedomstolar och nyligen även i EU- domstolen i det så kallade Achmea-målet. I uppsatsen kartläggs och analyseras argumenten i diskussionen om relationen mellan intra-EU BIT och EU-rätten. Vidare analyseras vilken del av investeringsskyddet som intra-EU BIT-förespråkare anser vara mest betydelsefull. Från resonemanget och analysen i uppsatsen dras slutsatsen att det är ISDS-systemet, tvistelösningssystemet där en investerare kan väcka talan mot en stat, som kan anses utgöra den mest betydelsefulla delen av investeringsskyddet i intra-EU BIT:en. Därefter analyseras huruvida ett investeringsskydd innehållande ett ISDS-förfarande kan vara förenligt med principen om ömsesidigt erkännande och förtroende. I uppsatsen konstateras att ISDS-förfarandet inte kan vara förenligt denna princip och att problematiken inte kan lösas genom en juridisk debatt utan måste diskuteras på en politiskt hög nivå. / When investing abroad, an investor is faced with many risks that need to be thoroughly analysed in order to be mitigated. Risks are not only financial, but also political. An investor may, to mitigate these risks, choose to invest in states with which Sweden has a bilateral investment treaty, a so called BIT. BIT do not only regulate treatment of the investor and the investment, which is the material investment protection; but also the jurisdictional possibility of the investor to raise charges against the state of in which the investment has taken place in case of violation of investment rights, procedural investment protection. Today, Sweden has 66 BITs in force, out of which twelve are concluded with EU member states, so called intra-EU BIT. The number of intra-EU BITs grew significantly as a result of the enlargement of the union in the year of 2004 and 2007. Since then, the agreements’ compatibility with the EU legislation has been a subject of discussion within literature, investment arbitrations and recently in the European Court of Justice in the Achmea case. This thesis aims to establish and analyse the context of the discussions flourishing the relationship between the intra-EU BITs and the EU legislation. Additionally, the author intends to identify which argumentation regarding investment protection, that by intra-EU BIT praisers is considered to be the most impactful. As a result, the conclusion of the thesis is that it is the ISDS-system, the investor- state dispute settlement, in which an investor can raise charges towards a state, that is the most valuable part of the investment protection given by the intra-EU BITs. Accordingly, it is analysed weather investment protection containing an ISDS-system can be compatible with the principle of mutual trust and recognition. In the thesis it is concluded that the ISDS-system cannot be considered to be compatible with the principle and that this problem should be debated on a high political level and cannot be solved through a legal debate.

The so called "Denial of Benefits" clause (DOB) gives the respondent state an opportunity to exclude third parties to the investment protection treaties from enjoying the benefits of the treaty without assuming reciprocal obligations. No less than seventy-three investor-state disputes have been brought to arbitration under the ECT since its entry into force back in 1998. The DOB clause in ECT, Art. 17 has never been successfully invoked. States have tried to exercise their right in at least ten cases without success. This paper poses two research questions. First, what are the distinguishing features of Art. 17 of the ECT that make it function differently from other DOB clauses? Second, given the arbitral decisions, can the Art. 17 of the ECT be effectively invoked by respondent states? The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of DOB clauses and the purpose of this paper. The second chapter is theoretical and addresses the topic of DOB clauses in general and further outlines their past, present and future. The third chapter focuses specifically on the Art. 17 of the ECT it examines the ECT arbitral awards and decisions that touched upon the clause. Chapter four aims to show the procedural issues of DOB clauses from the perspective of respondent states, it...

International investment agreements largely cover today’s transnational investments. These agreements confer certain substantive rights to foreign investors while simultaneously obliging host-states to act in a given manner so as to not interfere with the investments. Most international investment agreements further contain an arbitration clause which provides the investor with the means to enforce the substantive rights of the agreement by directly bringing a claim against the host-state before an arbitral tribunal. Consequently, privately contracted arbitrators have the authority to scrutinize and overrule essentially any sovereign act of the host-state that may affect the investment – judicial and legislative acts included. This practice affects not only the parties of the dispute; when the arbitral award claims superiority to the state’s electoral choices, it further constrains the exercise of sovereignty by the population of the host-state. As a result, the arbitrators who manage the disputes and the investors who initiate them have become central power-holders in the context of both international and domestic law. Meanwhile, the arbitrators and investors alike seem to be unaccountable to the states and individuals who are adversely affected by their power assertions. A commonly accepted feature of democracy is that those who govern and wield power should be accountable to those who are governed and subjected to this power. This thesis relates this notion to a Foucauldian understanding of power, domination and resistance. The primary aim of the thesis is to examine the interplay between the prominent subjects involved in investor-state arbitration and to what degree these subjects hold power in the form of transformative capacity. After this investigation into the relations of power, the thesis scrutinizes the subjugated subjects’ ability to exercise effective resistance through institutionalized accountability mechanisms. The thesis detects an accountability deficit in the regime and concludes that foreign investors and arbitrators hold a dominant position within the context of investor-state arbitration, while states and individuals find themselves in a state of domination. The international investment regime, as it currently stands, is thus found to suffer from a democracy deficit, while it concurrently seems to undermine domestic democratic institutions.

The work deals with the topic of electronic communication with the tax authorities. The theoretical part starts with the research of related work and then the development of e-Government to nowadays form is presented. The legislation regarding electronic communication with tax authorities with possible changes towards future follows. The theoretical part of the work is finished with statistics regarding electronic communication with the tax authorities and with comparison of the situation in the Czech Republic with the situation in other European Union countries. In the practical part of the work, a set of best practices which should be obeyed by tax advisors is presented as a main output of the work. Practical part also contains a survey and statistical analysis of data arising from it. The survey is unique because of the fact that all respondents are tax advisors. In the last part, based on the survey, the benefits and shortcomings of the electronic communications with the tax authorities as well as possible steps to streamline are presented.

This thesis work is to do with the Information system of data boxes (ISDS) which is introduced from legislation's and user's point of view. Because the introduction of this system has influenced hundreds of thousands of subjects the main target of this thesis is to find out about the impact of the ISDS on users with the help of the analysis method. In this work firstly the data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs are examined and interpreted, secondly the results of the poll conducted by the author and then a cost-benefit analysis of the system from the users' point of view is carried out. The results of the work show that the ISDS was at the end of the examined period (2009 -- 2013) beneficial for its users and the total economic benefit for the respective period is 3.6 billion Czech crowns. This means that every crown spent on the operation of the system by the Ministry of Internal Affairs represents savings of 2 Czech crowns. The author of this work has come to the conclusion that the system is from a legislative, technological and economic point of view very well created. The author recommends to the system administrator its further development and also recommends to use its potential among thousands of OSVČ (the self-employed).

We begin with a short analysis of the history of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). We then discuss the merits and demerits of the regime, such as the arguments between finality, speediness, and correctness. Following from this, historical reforms are discussed, and whether those issues have gotten worse or better since these discussions. The modern problems are discussed, leading to the explanation of the “legitimacy crisis”. As Appellate Mechanisms (AM) and Investment Court Systems (ICS) both propose multi layered systems, we argue whether ISDS must be a “one bite at the apple” system. We expand on the issues of regulatory chill, before showing the contradictions in the granting of awards. From this, a discussion is raised on the advantages of a tenured system of adjudicators, particularly in reference to their apparent bias. We delve deeper into the direct consequences of the perceived issues of ISDS, in the context of human rights, the environment, and other issues of sovereignty.As more reforms are suggested, the question of “what makes arbitration, arbitration?” is raised. From here, we may begin to suggest reforms based on which key factors are to be preserved. Firstly, we discuss current reform options, such as the Mauritius Convention. We take inspiration from existing AM, and prior discussions on the implementation of such a system across the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) frameworks. We analyse whether these discussions have led to change by comparing trends in drafting.Thereon, we offer suggestions of reform. ICS and how this would be implemented, what it would look like structurally, and its positive and negative effects. Using the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and other contemporary ICS reform suggestions, we gain some knowledge of what an ICS regime could and should look like, the implementation of AM previously discussed in this regime, and other. Finally, we offer a different solution to the problems, yet less pragmatic, the termination of arbitration.

1 The Influence of EU Common Investment Policy on the System of International Investment Law Abstract Extending exclusive European Union (EU) competence to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Lisbon Treaty has had profound implications. The EU began to develop its own investment policy, including negotiating either international investment agreements or comprehensive trade and investment agreements with third parties. Taking into account the magnitude of the EU economy and the fact that EU Member States have concluded almost 1 400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) out of roughly 3 300 in force worldwide, the potential of European influence over the system of international investment, based principally on BITs, is enormous. The aim of this dissertation is to assess how and in which way the new EU competence changes the system. The EU investment policy has developed a specific approach towards investment protection and investment dispute mechanism which does not envision content declared at its beginning. According to initial documents such as the European Commission's Communication Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, the Union should have followed the available best practices of the Member States. Nevertheless, during the first bilateral negotiations with Canada and...

Performance requirements act as policy instruments for achieving broadly-defined economic and developmental objectives of States, especially industrial and technological development objectives. Many States consider that performance requirements distort trade and investment flows, negatively impact global and national welfare and disrupt investment decisions compared to business-as-usual scenarios. As a result, a number of States have committed to prohibiting performance requirements in international investment agreements (“IIAs.”). Performance requirement prohibitions (“PRPs”) are meant to eliminate trade-distorting performance requirements and performance requirements which replace investor decision-making by State decision-making. This thesis focuses on providing answers to two research questions: first, how do States prohibit performance requirements in IIAs? And second, how should PRPs in IIAs be interpreted and applied? For the first time, this thesis: proposes a comprehensive understanding of PRPs in IIAs by drawing notably on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Uruguay Round of negotiations and on the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) Programme; develops a detailed typology and analysis of PRPs in IIAs through the identification of systematically reproduced drafting patterns; conducts the first critical and in-depth analysis of all arbitral awards which have decided claims based on PRPs in IIAs; analyses interpretation and application issues related to provisions that exempt government procurement from PRPs and to reservations that shield sensitive non-conforming measures or strategically important sectors from PRPs; and anticipates the application of most-favoured nation (“MFN”) treatment clauses to PRPs in the future. Finally, this thesis formulates proposals that can help interpret and apply existing PRPs and draft future PRPs in a more deliberate and informed way.